California State Archives
State Government Oral History Program

Oral History Interview

with

ADRIANA GIANTURCO

Director,
California Department of Transportation
[Caltrans]

March 15 1976 - January 3, 1983

March 2 - May 5, 1994
Sacramento, California

George F Petershagen
Oral History Program
Center for California Studies
California State University, Sacramento
RESTRICTIONS ON THIS INTERVIEW

None

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PREFACE

On September 25, 1985, Governor George Deukmejian signed into law A B 2104 (Chapter 965 of the Statutes of 1985). This legislation established, under the administration of the California State Archives, a State Government Oral History Program "to provide through the use of oral history a continuing documentation of state policy development as reflected in California's legislative and executive history."

The following interview is one of a series of oral histories undertaken for inclusion in the state program. These interviews offer insights into the actual workings of both the legislative and executive processes and policy mechanisms. They also offer an increased understanding of the men and women who create legislation and implement state development in California state government and of how both the legislative and executive branches of government deal with issues and problems facing the state.

Interviewees are chosen primarily on the basis of their contributions to and influence on the policy process of the state of California. They include members of the legislative and executive branches of the state government as well as legislative staff, advocates, members of the media, and other people who played significant roles in specific issue areas of major and continuing importance to California.

By authorizing the California State Archives to work cooperatively with oral history units at California colleges and universities to conduct interviews, this program is structured to take advantage of the resources and expertise in oral history available through California's several institutionally based programs.
Participating as cooperating institutions in the State Government Oral History Program are

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California State University, Fullerton

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Center for California Studies
California State University, Sacramento

Oral History Program
Claremont Graduate School

Regional Oral History Office
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University of California, Berkeley

Oral History Program
University of California, Los Angeles

The establishment of the California State Archives State Government Oral History Program marks one of the most significant commitments made by any state toward the preservation and documentation of its governmental history. It supplements the often fragmentary historical written record by adding an organized primary source, enriching the historical information available on given topics and allowing for more thorough historical analysis. As such, the program, through the preservation and publication of interviews such as the one which follows, will be of lasting value to current and future generations of scholars, critics, and leaders.

John F. Burns
State Archivist

July 27, 1988

This interview is printed on acid-free paper.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTERVIEW HISTORY**

1

**BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY**

111

**SESSION 1, MARCH 2, 1994**

[Tape 1, Side A]

1

Birth—Parents' background—Grandfather's political career—High school—Selection of college

[Tape 1, Side B]

24

Choice of college—Major in history—Job search—Graduate school—Introduction to Jerry Brown—Second tour of Europe

[Tape 2, Side A]

50

Second tour of Europe—Egypt and Israel—Life on a kibbutz—Time Paris Bureau—Women in journalism

**SESSION 2, MARCH 10, 1994**

[Tape 2, Side B]

79

Common Market—European economic matters—Port of Zurich—University of California graduate school—Reporter for (San Francisco) Chinese World—Harvard Graduate School

[Tape 3, Side A]

100

Employment in Massachusetts—Action for Boston Community Development—Massachusetts Office of Planning and Management—Boston Redevelopment Authority
SESSION 3, March 16, 1994

Selection as Caltrans Director—Transition from the Division of Highways to the Department of Transportation—Assembly Bill 69—Diamond Lanes

Diamond Lanes—State Transportation Plan—Economics of road use—State Transportation Board

Calif ornia Highway Commission—Ethics concerns with highway planning—"Bankruptcy" of state highway fund—Assembly Bill 402—California Transportation Commission (CTC)

SESSION 4, March 23, 1994

Philosophy of boards and commissions—Selection of members of first CTC

CTC Selection process—Mission of CTC—Geographic bachelorhood—Carpenter hearings on highway expenditures—Near-fatal automobile accident of John Saltonstall

Accident—Town Creek Bridge—Engineering vs management decisions—Director's salary removed from budget—Celebrity vs controversy—Relationship with press
INTERVIEW HISTORY

Interviewer/Editor

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Interview Time and Place

March 2, 1994
Library of the C M Goethe House at 3730 T Street
Sacramento
Session of one and one-half hours

March 10, 1994
Library of the C M Goethe House, Sacramento
Session of one and one-half hours

March 16, 1994
Same

March 23, 1994
Same

April 13, 1994
Same

April 20, 1994
Library of C M Goethe House, Sacramento
Session of two hours

April 29, 1994
Same

May 5, 1994
Same
Editing

Mr. Petershagen checked the verbatim manuscript of the interview against the original tape recording, edited for punctuation, paragraphing, and spellings, and verified proper names. Insertions by the editor are bracketed. The interviewer also prepared the introductory materials.

Ms. Gianturco reviewed a copy of the transcript and returned the manuscript with only minor corrections. Additional editing was done by Dr. Jacqueline S. Reinier, California State University, Sacramento to remove repetitive material.

Papers

No private papers were consulted by the interviewer for this interview. Sources included various official documents and newspaper articles contained in the "Adriana Gianturco Files" maintained by Caltrans' Transportation Library in Sacramento, and contemporary issues of the San Francisco Chronicle, Sacramento Bee and Union, and Los Angeles Times.

Tapes and Interview Records

The original tape recordings of the interview are in the University Archives, The Library, California State University, Sacramento along with the records relating to the interview. Master tapes are preserved at the California State Archives.
BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

Adriana Gianturco was born in Berkeley, California on June 5, 1939. Although a Californian by birth, she completed her primary and secondary education in schools in Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. Following graduation from Washington's Western High School, Ms. Gianturco enrolled in Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. She graduated Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Smith with a degree in History in 1960.

Following graduation from Smith, Ms. Gianturco returned to the city of her birth to attend graduate school at the University of California. There she received a Master of Arts Degree in Economics. A subsequent tour of Europe and the Middle East resulted in employment with the Paris Bureau of Time magazine. Returning to Berkeley to continue her graduate studies, she worked as a reporter for Chinese World, a Chinese-American newspaper published in San Francisco.

Ms. Gianturco has also worked as a planning and economics consultant, as Director of Planning and Evaluation for the Boston anti-poverty program for the state of Massachusetts, as Director of Planning in the Office of State Planning and Management, and for the state of California as the Assistant Secretary of the Business and Transportation Agency, now the Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. appointed her to the directorship of Caltrans in March 1976. Ms. Gianturco was working toward a Ph.D. at Harvard University at the time of her appointment.

The first woman to serve in such a position in California and the entire United States, Ms. Gianturco oversaw Caltrans almost from the beginning of its formation from the Division of Highways and a handful of other state agencies. Major changes occurred in California's approach to transportation challenges and issues during her tenure. Some of these came about as a result of her own initiative or objectives of the Brown administration, while others were imposed by the California legislature or external factors.
Ms Gianturco has written a number of articles describing her unique experience as Caltrans' Director and currently is preparing a book on the subject.
Ms Gianturco, would you please describe for us the earliest years of your life—when you were born, where you were born, and circumstances of your childhood that you might recall?

I was born June 5, 1939, in Berkeley, California's Alta Bates Hospital. It so happened that I was born the day before my grandfather died in the same hospital, which has always struck me as sort of an interesting fact. I remember my mother [Valentine McGillycuddy Gianturco] frequently saying that one generation was dying at the same time as the next one was being born, and it was curious but interesting and good. My father [Elio Gianturco] at the time was completing his Ph.D. dissertation in Romance Languages. He received a Ph.D. from Columbia [University], and he was an Assistant Professor at UC [University of California].
GIANTURCO

Berkeley which is where he met my mother. The reason I'm going into these details is, of course, you asked me the question, but I think it's very important—a person's formative experiences—when you look at a later career because you bring to the job certain values and familiarities or ways of looking at the world. I think mine was quite different from any previous Caltrans [California Department of Transportation] Director. Not only the fact that I was a woman, but I think my background in terms of the kind of family I grew up in and my education was not like that of previous Caltrans Directors.

My mother was one of the first women to receive a degree in architecture from UC, Berkeley. She was in the class of 1929. There were only six women in that class. Of course, she graduated in 1929, which was the start of the Depression. At the time she graduated, there were very few jobs around for anybody, male or female, but there was also tremendous discrimination against women. It was absolutely unheard of. Julia Morgan comes to mind as a female architect, but
GIANTURCO apart from her there are very few women that practiced architecture at that time. She knew from early childhood that she wanted to be an architect, from age four or at the earliest she could remember, she always knew what she wanted to be, which was to be an architect. After she received her degree, she and the other five women in her class went on a grand tour of Europe to visit the cities that had famous or important architectural heritages, which would be, of course, the standard ones—London, Paris. They went to various cities in Italy—Florence, Rome, and so on. And they stayed altogether about a year drawing buildings and creating renderings of interesting buildings that they saw.

She then came back to the United States and met my father, who had been born in Italy and had come to the United States to get his degree in Romance Languages. He already had a law degree. I can get into this some because this family history, I think, is fairly interesting. He already had a law degree, but he did not want to practice law. He felt he was under pressure from his family.
GIANTURCO  to practice law, so he decided to leave Italy and come to the United States. This was also when [Italian Dictator Benito] Mussolini was coming into power. He [Gianturco] wanted to change fields, and I guess they told him at Columbia that they could not accept him until he had a degree from an American institution. So he first went to Rollins College in Florida and got an M.A. in American Studies and then was accepted by Columbia into their Ph.D. program and worked on his Ph.D. After having done all the course work and chosen a dissertation topic, he went to Berkeley, and that is where he met my mother.

My mother, having come back from this tour, was unable to find a job, so she just took courses part-time at UC, Berkeley. One of the courses she took was Italian because she loved Italy on her trip. That's how she met my father. They were married in Berkeley and lived there for quite a while. I guess I was born about six years after they were married.

PETERSHAGEN  Do you think that your mother's difficulty in trying to find a position was mostly because
of the Depression or mostly because she was a woman?

GIANTURCO I think both of those things. Either one of them alone was sufficient to make it impossible to find a job. The two of them together made it virtually 100 percent impossible. Although, at some point during the early years of her marriage to my father before I was born, she did find a job in an architect's office in San Francisco doing drafting, the kind of thing that you would employ a high school graduate to do. She did that for about a year. Then that firm had financial troubles as everybody was having at that time, and that job disappeared. But, as I say, I think either one of those, the time and the fact that she was a woman, were real strikes against her.

PETERSHAGEN I seem to remember that even Julia Morgan had to get her start that way as a draftsperson, rather than starting out as a full-fledged architect.

GIANTURCO Uh-huh. Well, another interesting thing I didn't talk about is my grandfather [Emmanuele Gianturco] on my father's side, which was something that repeated itself when
I went to Caltrans. My grandfather, my paternal grandfather had been leader of the Italian Parliament in Italy. I have never understood how modern European governments work with this cabinet system, with people moving in and out of Parliament accepting cabinet jobs in terms of particular areas of responsibility. He had held several cabinet positions when his party was in power. He was a member of a conservative party. One of the cabinet positions he had held was Minister of Public Works in which he was in charge of all road building, etc. in Italy. So when I came to that position it was a repeat of history. So we might say it's almost genetic.

[Laughter] Do you remember your paternal grandfather's name?

Yes. Emmanuele [Gianturco]. He's very well known in Italy. He held three cabinet positions.

[He was] Minister of Education at a time when the educational system was in chaos in Italy with student riots complaining about the methods of instruction, the admission standards to the universities and so on.
GIANTURCO was kind of like the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley, although that was certainly not the issue in those days. We're talking about the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century.

As a matter of fact, I was reading a diary written by my grandmother [Name here] describing her life with him, and talking about one situation in particular where he had visited Naples in his capacity of Minister of Education and all hell broke loose. It reminded me of various experiences I had when we were doing something that people considered extremely controversial. I would show up, and it was just beyond belief the amount of public interest in whatever this was we were doing. He went through this kind of experience time after time in that capacity, particularly as the Minister of Education.

He was also Minister of Justice at one point, and that's where he's best known. He essentially is known as the father of the modern Italian legal system. Italy had not been unified very long by the time he moved into the government, and they were still
operating under a hodgepodge of provincial laws. He pulled this together and established a legal code with a framework that's still in existence today.

The third one was the Minister of Public Works. At the time of his death he was in the Parliament as the Majority Leader. The next step, had he lived, would have been Prime Minister, but he died.

PETERSHAGEN: And when was that?
GIANTURCO: I believe it was 1912.
PETERSHAGEN: All right. You said your father came to the United States largely to avoid the Mussolini period?
GIANTURCO: Well, he had a lot of different stories for why he came. [Laughter] The reason that he gave us most often when I was growing up was that he came because his father was so well-known. He was, as I said, a very prominent figure in Italian history and was a lawyer. He had wanted his son to be a lawyer. He had felt this tremendous pressure to go to law school. My father had no natural inclination for the law. He bad-mouthed it constantly. The law to him was dusty old books and sitting in a library, boring and dull, and
estates and trusts and awful stuff that no person of intelligence and love of life and creativity would want to get bogged down in. The reason he gave for coming to the United States was that he felt that if he stayed in Italy in the memory of his father, he would have to do what his father wanted him to do, which was practice law. And the only way he felt he could come out from underneath that burden was to actually leave the country, so he came to the United States.

Now, once he got here, you said, he had to overcome this difficulty concerning his education and Americanize it, so to speak, to legitimize his degree.

Yes, yes.

But then, through all that, it wasn't difficult, though. It worked like clockwork. He was admitted to Rollins College. He stayed there for a year or so to get his masters degree and immediately went into the PhD program at Columbia in New York City in Romance Languages, which is what he was interested in. His brother [Cesare Gianturco] came at approximately the same time. The only Italian relatives I have are
the United States—very close relatives—are his brother's children. His brother [Cesare Gianturco] was sort of the same kind of a situation. I'm sure a slightly different family history or relationship to the father, but he came to the United States. He was my uncle on my father's side, one of them. He was a doctor, and he came to the United States to do an internship at the Mayo Clinic at approximately the same time that my father came to go to Rollins and then Columbia. I think this Mayo Clinic thing, again, was a way of transitioning from a European education into the American system and preparing yourself to enter a profession in the United States.

PETERSHAGEN: So you really do come from a very well educated background, your family background.

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: How about yourself? You went to public school in Berkeley?

GIANTURCO: No, because by the time I was in school my parents moved to the east coast. My father finished his dissertation in Berkeley, I believe. I'm not sure of this, but I think he finished it by the time they left.
And they went to New York where he had to defend the dissertation. I'm not exactly sure how this Ph.D. program worked there, but I'm sure there was an oral defense of the dissertation. He had to rewrite it a couple of times. I know, because of having read some diaries of this, that he was very frustrated and thought that there was nothing wrong with this thing, but they made him go back and redo parts of it. And, of course, he was probably older than most of the students because he had already gone through the whole educational system in Italy before he even started graduate school here. The net result was that he, I assume, was older than most other students and really wanted to get through this, and he had to make changes in the dissertation, as most people do.

And so they stayed in New York, I believe, about a year. This was before I was born. Then they came back to California, and I was born in Berkeley. About two years after that they moved to Washington, D.C., and I spent most of my childhood in Washington, D.C. When I started school, I went to a private school called the [Sidwell]
Friends School, which has been in the news a lot because [Daughter of President Bill Clinton] Chelsea Clinton goes there. I went there a couple of years. Then my mother, who was doing some research on the educational system in Washington, D.C., decided that there was a public school that was supposed to be the best public elementary school in Washington—better than the Sidwell Friends School. So she took me out of the Sidwell Friends, and I went to this school, which is called the John Eaton School, a public school. I went there through the sixth grade and then to a public school for junior high. At that point my father got a teaching position in Pennsylvania with Penn State University [Pennsylvania State University], and so we moved there. We were there for—I don't remember—two or three years, and then we moved back to Washington. I actually graduated from public high school in Washington.

PETERSHAGEN: OK. Now, excuse me. You mentioned your mother doing research into schools in Washington.
Just as a parent, she heard other parents talking about this great school, and so she looked into it. It seemed to be the consensus that this was an excellent school.

I'm the oldest of three children, so there was my brother coming along who also started out at the Sidwell Friends School. Then there is my sister who is five years younger than me coming along. And, of course, tuition at private schools is not something to sneeze at. So, seeing as there was this good public school, and they were going to have three children who would be either continuing in a private school at considerable financial cost or going to an equally good or better public school, there was no question. So I switched to that John Eaton School, and that's where I went through elementary school and then, later, junior and senior high school. I finished high school the first year that the schools were desegregated in Washington, D.C.

So you went to a segregated high school?

I went to an integrated high school in the first year of integration, which was a very interesting experience. I have to say.
And that was your senior year?

That was my senior year. At the time the name of this high school was Western High School. The area for it is Georgetown basically and it was all white the year before I attended it. I had gone for the first couple of years of high school to school in Pennsylvania, and when we went back to Washington, I entered Western High School for my senior year. I graduated in 1956. The Brown versus Board of Education decision had come down in 1954.

It took the school system in Washington about a year to get its act together before they actually integrated, and they started the integration in the Fall of 1955. I went to this school in the Fall of 1955, which went overnight from being 100 percent white before I was there and before desegregation to approximately fifty-fifty white and black, which is the way it was when I was there.

What was the reaction on the part of the student body?

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1 Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 349 (1955)
GIANTURCO

I wasn't able to compare it because I hadn't been there the year before so I don't have a before and after picture. But, I can tell you what the after picture was like, which is pretty interesting. Apparently—and I learned this just from talking to other people in the school—the parents of the children in this school were extremely concerned about integration, didn't want it basically, I guess. And here it was by court order that the school was being integrated. About half of the parents took their children out of school and put them in private school so that they would not have to attend an integrated school. And it was decided—well, I don't know if this was on the sly or how they did it—that they would cut out all after school activities at this school, so that there would be no social mixing of blacks and whites. So this school, contrary to every school I had gone to before that, which had things like football teams, basketball, hockey whatever you do in high school plus a French club, a stamp club, had absolutely nothing. There were no extracurricular activities by decision apparently of the PTA.
[Parent Teachers Association] in association with whomever was running this school. That was number one.

The second thing was that the two groups of students, white and black, acted as though the other was not there. In the lunch room, which was the one time of day the two groups mixed in a non-academic way, the blacks sat on one side. I don't remember anyone saying that the blacks have to sit here and whites have to sit here, but that was the way it was. They sat at certain tables. We sat at other tables. There was absolutely no mixing whatsoever.

PETERSHAGEN: So there was almost still a consensus segregation within that school.

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: Did that same phenomenon pass over into classroom seating?

GIANTURCO: I don't remember it in the classroom seating. I think in the classroom seating it was mixed. It really had to do more with ability there. The students that were interested, that wanted to talk, would sit in the front, black or white. The ones that hadn't done
their homework would sit in the back, black or white

PETERSHAGEN I see [Laughter] It is an interesting view on the integration of the school system. Now from high school you went to Smith College.

GIANTURCO Yes

PETERSHAGEN Why Smith as opposed to other ones?

GIANTURCO Well, it's interesting. Here I grew up in a family with both parents very educated, certainly more educated than the general population, my father with a Ph D, my mother with a professional degree, which she used only occasionally. Both parents were very educated, and one would have thought that they would have directed me and my brother and sister in some way academically or encouraged us to prepare for college or be interested in which college we went to. They just took it for granted that we would go on to higher education, and there was never any discussion of colleges or which colleges were better or what are you interested in studying or any of that. It was just kind of left up to us.

My senior year in high school I started getting worried about what am I going to do.
It never occurred to me that I was going to do anything other than go to college, but I can't recall a single discussion at home where either my father or mother said, "Well, why don't you think about a school that has such and such a characteristic or is in such and such a location?" There was no discussion of it, and the way I ended up going to Smith was sort of by fluke.

In those days they gave the College Board examinations only once. You took them in your senior year. It was a one-shot deal. You did well or you didn't do well, and that was it. I did very well on these College Board exams. I also had done very well in school. I was virtually a straight A student all the way through school. I also skipped a grade so I was a year younger than everybody else. So I looked good to college recruiters. The question was where was I going to apply to college. And to get some insight on this, since I wasn't getting any of it at home, I went and talked to the school guidance counselor.
This guidance counselor looking at my records and seeing that I was a year younger than everybody else because I had skipped a grade and I had virtually straight A's, said, "Well you ought to apply to good colleges." She just whipped out a list of colleges, I think I can remember them to this day. Smith was one of them. In those days there was the Ivy League, and then there was everybody else. If you were at the top, that [the Ivy League] was your choice. That was basically how the higher education system was looked at.

There were the "seven sisters" for the Ivy League women's colleges. Of course, also, in those days there were women's colleges and men's colleges, and the Ivy League was separate colleges for women and men. Some schools had two schools, one for men and one for women, operating jointly. In those days you could only have your College Board scores sent to six colleges. So I had to pick six. And basically the six were picked for me by this guidance counselor. She picked Smith, Radcliffe, Wellesley—we're talking now about the Ivy League--Bryn Mawr,
and Vassar which were the best Then she said, "But we never know, Adriana It could be you can't get into one of these places even though you have all these great grades and have done so well on these College Boards."

Although I never did find out my scores, which is an interesting thing, until I graduated from Smith, I think the way it worked was that the scores were sent to the high school you were attending Things were so rigid in those days It was completely different from the way it is now where students have rights and people are more flexible and college students go to school part-time Then it was paternalistic and very rule-ridden I think, probably, the way it worked was you took these exams, the results were sent to the school that you were attending, and then through the school they were sent to whatever colleges, the six colleges, you picked And the colleges themselves were in some kind of collusion so that if you happened to send it to a seventh one, the six would know about it or all
seven Because each one was told what other colleges got it or something like that

So we got the five out of the seven sisters which was the Ivy League And the guidance counselor said, "In case you don't get into one of those five, though, Adriana, we better have a fallback position and have you apply to one school which is second rank " And so I said, "Well, what would that be?" She said, "I suggest Duke University " So the sixth school that I applied to was Duke And this is kind of interesting the way this happened I filled out the applications to the six, including Duke And within something like a month, I'd heard back from Duke, and they had accepted me But I hadn't heard a thing from these other colleges So I thought, "Shoo, what am I going to do? If I turn them down, it may turn out I don't get accepted anywhere else, and then I'll be up the creek I'll have no place to go " So I wrote back to Duke and accepted and was all set to go there They also offered me a huge scholarship I wouldn't have had to pay anything, so I really had nothing to lose But, then the
GIANTURCO others started coming in about a month after that I was accepted everyplace and offered huge scholarships at each one of them. And, finally, it came down to a decision I went and visited Vassar which I thought was awful I couldn't stand the location and the kind of atmosphere of the place. Wellesley ditto, maybe a little bit better, but I didn't like it I don't think I even bothered to visit Bryn Mawr. It finally came down to a decision between Smith and Radcliffe, and I chose Smith over Radcliffe even though, looking back, I think I should have gone to Radcliffe. In each case they accepted like one out of 100 applicants I mean it was considered a great honor

I chose Smith over Radcliffe on the basis of the amount of the scholarship At Radcliffe the scholarship was somewhat less than at Smith. At Smith they gave me the full tuition, full room and board, and money on top of that. Whereas at Radcliffe it was full tuition, partial room and board, something like that, although I think if I
would have gone there, they would have
increased it the second year

**PETERSHAGEN**
You mentioned that in hindsight you think
maybe you should have gone to Radcliffe
instead of Smith

**GIANTURCO**
Yes, for one thing, location Smith is in
the boondocks in Massachusetts. It's in
western Massachusetts, a very isolated kind
of place. Freezing cold. This may seem like
a minor point, but it was so cold that to go
to class was torture. You had to bundle up
in about ten layers of down and everything
else that you could think of and slog through
mountains of snow. I found that extremely
unpleasant. The fact that it was not
coeducational bothered me a whole lot, even
though there were several men's colleges in
the area. But I had always been in
coeducational schools, and here, all of a
sudden, I am in an all women's college, which
seemed to me not a healthy situation for a
young person. On the academic side, I would
say that I couldn't have made a better choice
than Smith. In those days—I don't know how
it is now—but academically it was absolutely
first rate. As a matter of fact, I went to
graduate school later I went to [UC] Berkeley, and then I went to Harvard. The instruction at Smith was head and shoulders above anything that I experienced at either Berkeley or Harvard, which surprised me at the time. But there was no comparison. The expectations academically, the level of teaching, was much better there than the other schools that I had a later opportunity to compare it to.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN Now, Ms Gianturco, you mentioned strictly eastern schools in your decision as far as your college education. So the question is almost obligatory. As a native Californian, why not UC? Why not Stanford? And in conjunction with that, why history as opposed to any other field?

GIANTURCO Well, in terms of California schools, and I don't mean to insult California by saying this, but as I said before, the elite schools, the Ivy League, was east coast. Same for prep schools at the secondary level. If you're going to a private school, a boarding school, if you were going to be at
the top, the choices were pretty limited
For boys it would be Groton, Exeter, St
Paul's Academy They're all on the east
coast Ditto for the girls' schools, Miss
Porter's, Foxboro, they're all on the east
coast And the Ivy League, the top schools,
are all, or at that time, all were considered
to be on the east coast I depended on the
advice of this guidance counselor, and she
was looking at the best schools, admittedly
from probably a very elitist, provincial
standpoint But, according to the thinking
of the day, if you were going to go to the
best school, there was no question You went
to one of these Ivy League schools, all of
which were on the east coast The only
exceptions would have been possibly Stanford,
which would have been considered on the same
level as Duke, which was my fallback
position, and Mills College And I do
remember some discussion of Mills College,
but she ruled that out, and I was relying on
this guidance counselor's advice

PETERSHAGEN Did you have any sense of your California
heritage at all at this time? Did you
consider yourself a Californian?
GIANTURCO
Oh, absolutely, absolutely No question about it My mother was truly like a wild bird who has a native habitat, and her native habitat was northern California When I visited various places, obscure places, for the first time as Caltrans' Director, many of them were not strange to me at all, like Bishop How many people go to Bishop? Well, I had heard my mother talk about the eastern Sierras and what that was like over there, and Bodie and so on I many, many times had a sense of deja vu in visiting, as I say, places that most people, if they were just coming to California, would be completely strange to them Nothing was strange to me about California because my mother was so steeped in that and talked about it a lot As did my father because most of his early experiences in the United States were also California from the years that he spent at Berkeley

PETERSHAGEN
Let me try it from just one more different angle, and then we'll get off this As a senior in high school would you say your perception of yourself was more as a Californian or as a Washingtonian?
GIANTURCO

I never had a perception of myself as a Washingtonian. Washington was a very interesting place to grow up in. First of all, I had not been born there. Most people who are there have not been born there. It's a transitory place. Very few people consider themselves to be native Washingtonians. It's almost like a college town in that respect. People come in and out. They have government jobs and they leave. I assume that there are some segments of society where there is a real sense of community in Washington, but they are limited. The broad spectrum of society there is, as I say, like a college town, people coming and going. So I never had the sense of myself as a Washingtonian.

What I actually had the sense of myself as was as an Italian, which may sound bizarre, but my father was [chuckle] quite a forceful personality and continually stressed this Italian heritage, and he was a naturalized American. In so far as I thought of myself other than, you know, just like everybody else, I thought what makes me different is that I'm Italian.

PETERSHAGEN

Interesting
The first trip I made to Italy, which was when I was in college, I thought, "Boy, I'm going home I'm going to Italy." I had no sooner stepped on a train in Italy than I realized I'm an American I'm no more Italian than I'm the man in the moon. But it took going to Italy for me to get that out of my mind that what I was was an Italian.

So you went to Smith for your college education, for your baccalaureate degree, and you took a degree in history. Why history?

Yes. Well, it was also kind of by chance. I didn't know what I wanted to major in. This sounds immodest to say, but the fact was I'd gotten good grades in every subject in high school. There wasn't one thing that just drew me the way architecture had drawn my mother, for example. I mean I was good in English, and I was good in the foreign languages I took. If anything, the two fields that I thought I had the greatest aptitude for were music and mathematics. And I seriously considered majoring in one of those.

Actually, when I was in high school, I went into an advanced math program which they...
GIANTURCO had at that time where they taught us college level calculus in the junior and the senior years. So that, when I got to Smith, had I become a math major I could have moved immediately into the advanced mathematics courses which I, in fact, did do in my freshman year. I took one of the advanced math courses which was advanced calculus, the third year of calculus. Everybody else in the class was a senior, and I was a freshman.

And I was also very interested in music, but I couldn't think of anything logical thing to do with a degree in either of those subjects. I was not interested particularly in science as a field, which math would have led to. And music—I certainly didn't want to be a music teacher—which was the obvious thing that would have led to unless I were a concert pianist or something. I played the piano quite seriously, but I clearly was not at the level of [Pianist Vladimir] Horowitz or somebody like that. And if you're not at that level, there is no point in doing it in my view.

So I really I had a pretty open mind. I should say that Smith College, being a
GIANTURCO liberal arts college, was set up just for people like me. The idea was, in going to college you are going to get a broad education in the arts and sciences, and you're not supposed to specialize in college. You pick a major, but the point is that you learn how to think and you get an exposure to culture. And it's not a technical education. It's the opposite of a technical education.

I don't know if this is still true at Smith, and I know it is not true in many institutions of higher education. They had requirements that you had to take courses in a broad selection of fields. You had to fulfill a science requirement, a language requirement, a social sciences requirement. I think there were five altogether as I recall. And the idea was that your first two years you fulfilled these requirements. So everybody got a smattering of art, literature, history, science, social science, natural science, foreign language and so on.

In my sophomore year I took a course in European history to satisfy the social sciences requirement, and I was fascinated by the way this was presented and the readings.
what went along with it. To the extent that I gave it no second thought, it just seemed a natural. And so I ended up majoring in history, which was a real surprise to me at the time. When I took this course it was an eye-opener because in high school history had been so boring. I mean basically it consisted of memorizing dates, when was the Magna Carta signed and stuff like this. Talk about dry, dusty, uninteresting. Nothing could have been worse then the way they, in those days, presented history at the secondary school level.

PETERSHAGEN: So history became the study of ideas as opposed to memorization.

GIANTURCO: Exactly, exactly, exactly. And that really appealed to me. It was so broad. I mean it could encompass anything. You could pursue any interest within the framework of history.

PETERSHAGEN: You mentioned in connection with music, you said you didn't see yourself as a music teacher.

GIANTURCO: Right.

PETERSHAGEN: As you proceeded toward your degree in history, were you working toward becoming a history teacher? Was that your mentality?
GIANTURCO No I never thought of becoming a history teacher My idea was, this is going to give me a broad education, and it will be in graduate school that I'll zero in on a field, which was, as I say, the philosophy at Smith. That's how they were structured, and that was their philosophy of education. Now, in the European system—and I think it's part of the problem with the American educational system—in the European system the idea is that you get this broad education in secondary school, so that when you get to the university level you're specializing. In the United States—I mean we've had so many problems with the schools, and they're obviously probably worse today than they ever were—in secondary school, high school, you tend not to get a broad education, and if you don't get it in college, you're never going to get it, which is something I'll return to when we talk about Caltrans and people that go straight into engineering. They know nothing about anything other than engineering. I mean, I was shocked many times. Something that it would be natural to me to refer to something that would have some cultural, historical
contrast and nobody would have the vaguest idea of what I was talking about because their education consisted of going to high school where you learned to memorize the date of the Magna Carta--that's your exposure to history--and then straight into this technical training with nothing in between.

I think it's much better for people to go through the broad educational, cultural, historical, whatever, kind of education before they specialize. This is not to say that you didn't specialize to a certain extent because as a history major the requirement, once you selected your major, as I remember, was that you take something like five or six courses in that field and then you decided whether to go into the honors program or just the straight major program. I went into the honors program, which had some additional requirements, and you had to do a thesis and defend it and go through all that kind of stuff.

PETERSHAGEN

The honors program in history was perhaps closer to what one might find in a graduate school.
GIANTURCO: Yes, it was very similar to what is required to get an M.A. now.

PETERSHAGEN: OK. Then did you have some particular field of study in history that you would call a specialty?

GIANTURCO: What I was interested in was modern European history. I took courses in American history. Other than modern European history, I took a survey course in European history which started with, I guess, Greek and Roman ancient history and went through World War II. Another thing about the honors program was that this was supposed to be the cream of the cream. Most of the courses that you took were organized as seminars with a small number of students meeting once a week for two hours as opposed to a lecture with three hours of teaching assistants in a big lecture hall. Outside of courses in modern European history, the only ones I can think of that I took were a seminar in American Studies, American history, and one in medieval history. The rest I took were things like nineteenth-century Britain and I took a course on twentieth-century Germany. These were all seminars on the period of the First
World War, the signing of the Versailles Treaty. I took a course, in economic history, in modern European intellectual history, but stressing economics. But at the same time I was continuing to take courses in other fields. It wasn't all history.

PETERSHAGEN: I see. Now, I would imagine that perhaps a future researcher would look at this part of the transcript and just kind of say, "Well, of course, modern European history. It's her family history. That's what led her there." Would you care to either agree or perhaps defend against that statement?

GIANTURCO: No, absolutely. It's interesting you should bring that up. That thought has never passed my mind. It had nothing to do with my family. It just happened to be that I was interested, more interested, in that period. From the survey course that I took, which was excellent, the one that led me to the history major, what interested me was when we got into the modern period. The twentieth century interested me a lot more than, say, the fourteenth or fifteenth century. It just did. Not to mention ancient Greece or Rome. It didn't have anything to do with my family.
I just had an intellectual affinity, I guess, for that period.

PETERSHAGEN: I see. Then, from Smith did you go straight to graduate school?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: And that was at UC at Berkeley?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: And that was in economics?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: Now, why from history to economics?

GIANTURCO: Well, again it got to a question, what do you do with a history degree? Now, another thing you have to [Laughter] remember is, we're still in a situation where there is unbelievable discrimination against women. I graduated in 1960. This is before [Author/Advocate] Betty Friedan wrote *The Feminine Mystique* [New York, Norton, 1963]. There was no women's liberation movement. [Author/Advocate] Gloria Steinem, who also went to Smith, was not a known figure at that time. This is pre-all the things that have happened that people take for granted now. Equal treatment, equal pay, or whatever. None of that was the way of doing things. And I graduated Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta.
Kappa  I got a prize for my Honors dissertation as the best dissertation written by that graduating class. So I had done well academically.

PETERSHAGEN  Not just in history, but in the whole graduating class.

GIANTURCO  Yes. In all fields. So I thought, "You know, I ought to be able to get an interesting job." But I was particularly interested in those days in making documentary films. I just had in the back of my mind I would love to do that. I mean these would have been films with a historical content to them. And, as a matter of fact, later on I pursued this and went to Los Angeles. I was interested in working for this production company which is still around, [Film Producer] David L. Wolper. They've done a lot of historical films on modern subjects.

PETERSHAGEN  Correct.

GIANTURCO  I had already decided to go to graduate school, and I had made application. I had decided I wanted to go to Berkeley, and frankly, I don't remember why. It just was never any question in my mind that I was
GIANTURCO going to go to Berkeley My mother had gone there My father had been there It was just a natural And so I applied there, and I was admitted

But, in the meantime, I was thinking maybe I shouldn't be going to graduate school I had been in school for a long time, and like most people, you know, I was at this time twenty-one years old, barely twenty-one I thought, "Gee, it would be nice to see the world and have some real world experience and get away from this academia and studying for exams and writing papers" I was really sick of this stuff I thought, "Boy, doing that for another couple of years, I don't know if I can stand it So I'll look around for a job, but at the same time I'll have applied for graduate school so if I don't get a good job, I'll just go into graduate school"

I went to New York, and I went around to places looking for a job I was interested, as I say, in documentary films I obviously should have been in L A [Los Angeles], but there was this kind of activity also in New York And the publishing area--magazine
writing, book publishing, films—those were the things that I was exploring. It didn't matter where I went, though. The only question that I got asked—and this is etched in my brain and I'll remember it until my dying day—was, "How fast can you type?" It did not matter for a woman in those days what your qualifications were. You were automatically funneled into the secretarial field.

So just as your architect mother had to be a draftsman, you, the writer, weren't going to be a writer. You were going to be a secretarial or administrative type.

Yes. Well, not necessarily a writer. I wasn't going to be a management trainee. I mean, I started looking at everything. When everybody kept asking me how fast I could type at these publishing companies and film companies and so on, I started thinking I'll explore some other things. I was looking at all kinds of jobs by the end just to see what the job situation was, like working for stock brokerage firms and so on. There were a lot of companies that had management training programs in those days, and they were
strictly limited to men I would walk in some place, and they'd say, "Well, gee."
They'd look at my transcript or my resume or whatever and see this very good schooling history, and that was all you expected or anybody would have done at that age. They'd say, "Too bad. If you were a man, if you were a boy, we'd put you in our management training program, but we don't take women. So the only thing we'd have available would be a secretarial job. How fast can you type?" And this was perfectly legal. Everybody of my generation went through this. When [U.S. Supreme Court Justice] Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the Supreme Court, and her story came out, I could identify with that 100 percent. When she graduated from law school, she could not find a job with a law firm.

PETERSHAGEN: Exactly.

GIANTURCO: She got a job teaching, which was acceptable. Basically, the jobs you could get were secretarial, which is what most people went into, or nursing or teaching. That was it.

PETERSHAGEN: I just want to say here for the record that not only does the frustration show up in your
voice, but it shows up on your face and in all the body language as we're going through this. [Laughter] And I think I understand the frustration. I empathize with it, but I'm sure that I don't feel the emotion that you've been exhibiting for the last five minutes or so. [Laughter]

Well, I guess, the next question, then, is, Berkeley was so automatic, but why was the study of economics so automatic?

GIANTURCO It wasn't really automatic. I was trying to think of something that had a practical side to it because the only thing you could do with history was teaching. And I was never interested in teaching, although I have taught some courses or taught sessions of courses, and I think I'm actually pretty good at it. But it's not something that I particularly like to do. And economics, I thought that's going to be something that there'll be all kinds of jobs because you are studying the real world and money and how things work. I'll have more career opportunities open to me. That was really why I took it.
So you saw it as a way of opening some of these doors that had been otherwise shut.

Although they were still shut, this is more than thirty years ago. I never accepted that I would be put in some secretarial track. I never could have stood it mentally, psychologically. I did have clerical jobs. I mean I had summer jobs typing and so on, which were the only kinds of things available to women in those days. But it was obvious to me from a very early age that being put in that track I would be just a fish out of water. Mentally, I was not prepared for that kind of thing. So I was striking out in my own way, trying to carve out some other progression of my life, and this seemed, having talked to various people, that it would be something that would open up doors.

As I found out, to skip ahead, to have a Masters Degree in Economics and to be a woman in those days, you were no further ahead than you were if you were a high school graduate. Again, being a woman, "How fast can you type?" was still the question.
Understand, At Berkeley, as my research so far has indicated, that's where you first met [Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr] Jerry Brown?

GIANTURCO Yes

PETERSHAGEN Was that an instantaneous friendship between the two of you? Or was your experience at Berkeley that you were just two students that happened to be at the same school and later on, for whatever reasons, got to know each other better?

GIANTURCO Well, it wasn't either of those extremes. We happened to live in the same place, the International House. So I was in the first year of a masters program, and Jerry was, as I remember, a senior because he had gone to this seminary, which took him out of the normal track of education. He dropped out of the seminary and went to college. I think he may have first gone to [University of] Santa Clara. I don't remember.

Anyway, even though he was a year older than I, he was a senior. I was a graduate student. But at the International House this made no difference. Of course, at a younger age you never associate with anybody younger than you are or in a lower class than you.
by graduate school time none of this mattered. Anyway, he was about a year older than I am, but he was a senior, and I was a graduate student. I met him as I met many other people in the I House. I think we had a lot in common. We became friendly, but I became friendly with a lot of other people, too.

The first time I met him I realized this guy is brilliant. That's what first struck me about him. He's extremely intelligent, which is something I think he's gotten very little credit for. His mind is like a steel trap to use a cliche. He's very well read. And he's a very fast thinker and a logical thinker. He's read a lot, and he's very interesting to talk to. Of course, this was way before he was showing any interest in politics. But just as a person, I liked all those things about him, and we had shared a lot of common interest in terms of things we read or fields we were interested in or whatever. So we got to be friendly.

So you feel you recognized his brilliance almost at your first meeting?
Oh, yes Well, I don't even remember our first meeting The I House was a very informal atmosphere, and they encouraged people to get to know other people That was the whole point of the I House I'm sure it still is It was funded by Rockefeller [Foundation] with the idea of international good will And you would meet foreigners on a human level, and you would also meet other Americans And it was set up in such a way that you were constantly thrown together with other people at the meal times They had lots of social events organized and so on And it was in the course of that kind of thing that I met Jerry I don't remember how I met him I mean I don't remember the first time I talked to him But I do remember that I liked him, and, I assume, he liked me and we became friends

I don't want to make it sound as though there is something there that really isn't But, obviously as we go through this, one of the background questions is going to be why Jerry Brown selected you for Director of Caltrans as opposed to a whole slate of possible candidates he may have had And I just
wanted to establish this kind of a first meeting

How many people lived in the I House at that time?

GIANTURCO I'm guessing, really, but I think maybe about four hundred, something like that. It could have been eight hundred. I think it was more like four hundred though.

PETERSHAGEN So you spent two years at Berkeley?

GIANTURCO Not quite two years. I was taking courses for a year and a half. I got my masters after a year and a half. But it seems to me that I stayed there for about two months after I got the degree, and I arrived about a month early before the classes started the first semester I was there. So the whole period at that time was between a year and a half and two years that I was there initially in Berkeley before I went to Europe.

PETERSHAGEN Was that was in connection with your employment with *Time* magazine or that was before that?

GIANTURCO No, it was as a result of my trip to Europe that I ended up being employed by *Time* magazine. I had already been in Europe. This was not my first trip to Europe. In my
junior year in college I spent the year in Geneva. Smith College had a program then which was really the pioneer program common all over the U.S. [United States] now. Colleges have junior year abroad programs. But I believe that Smith was the first one to do this because when I was in it we had students from other colleges, other than Smith, that were in it. You had a choice of Geneva, Paris, Madrid, Edinburgh, and maybe one or two other places, probably some place in Germany. And I went to Geneva and spent the year there, and when we weren't having classes or had vacations, I traveled around a lot.

That was my first time in Italy, when I realized that I was not Italian and thought [Laughter] all these years, "Gee, with this name and that father, that makes you Italian, Adriana." As I say, the moment that train crossed that border from, I believe it was, Austria or Germany into Italy, and Italians got on the train in grand, large numbers, I realized that I'm no more Italian than the man in the moon.

PETERSHAGEN: That's interesting.
So I had been in Europe, and I was interested I wanted to do traveling, and I thought that this is my opportunity because as you get older and, you know, you're married, and you have children, you have responsibilities and you have a mortgage, you're not going to be doing any traveling around. It's now or never. And I'd gotten a taste of this in my junior year. And after I got that master's degree I thought, "I'm going to take this opportunity to really see the world or a part of the world." So I went again to Europe.

You said that it was as a result of that trip that you began working for *Time*?

The sequence was that I first went to parts of Europe that I hadn't seen before, namely Scandinavia and northern Germany. I decided I wanted to see the Middle East. I should say also that in those days it was just unheard of for a woman to go to the Middle East.

I guess' [Laughter]

But I wanted to see it. I mean I'd read about, you know, Egyptian civilization, and, well, it was the cradle of civilization, the
GIANTURCO

Tigris and the Euphrates [Rivers] and all these things I wanted to see this part of the world And also I wanted to see Greece which I had not seen when I was in Europe before And it so happened that my mother had a friend that was working for the Agency for International Development who was stationed in Athens So my mother said, "I'm sure if you went to Greece you could stay with Dick Mills," also a Californian, who grew up in Pacific Grove He was in Athens with his wife, and he had a little boy And they said they would love to have me come and stay, and I could see Athens and that part of the surroundings of there So I intended to do that, and I did do that After I'd gone through Scandinavia and Germany, I just went straight down to Athens

I guess I stopped and saw Sparta on the way I figured if I'm going to see Athens I've got to see Sparta, too, being a history addict, then a history major Sparta was quite a disappointment [Laughter] I also went to see Delphi, also a disappointment, but I thought I'd go see these places that had these great historical connections Then
I went to Athens I stayed there about six weeks I wanted to see both Israel, because that fascinated me, and these Arab countries And in these days, this was in 1962, Jerusalem was a divided city

Ms Gianturco, you were telling us about your European adventures, and you're now approaching the Middle East [Laughter] So if you'd pick it up from that point and tell us about your Middle Eastern experiences

OK I went to the Middle East from Greece, and in those days, as I say--it would have been the Fall of 1962--I wanted to see both Israel and the Arab countries, and there was no relationship whatsoever between those two The Arab countries did not recognize Israel They didn't use the word Israel in discussing it They called it Occupied Palestine or something like that I've forgotten But, anyway, they, as has been discussed recently in the negotiations going on, did not recognize Israel's right to exist, and this was demonstrated in various ways including its effects on tourists
If you went to Israel and then wanted to go to an Arab country you would not, could not, be admitted. And I should say here I'm not Jewish in case that was a question because this enters later on in this accounting of events here, how I managed to see both Israel and the Arab countries.

Petershagen: Let me interrupt you. Do you mean that you couldn't go directly from Israel into an Arab country or if they even found out you had been in Israel?

Giunturco: The second. Anytime you had visited Israel you could not go into an Arab country. Say you went to Israel and then you went to Paris and then you flew back into Beirut, you would not be allowed to leave the airport in Beirut because you would have this stamp in your passport showing that two years before you had been in Israel.

The only way that you could do it was a kind of a tricky thing. What you did was you went to Cyprus. I'm not the only person who did this. Most of the people who wanted to see both Israel and the Arab countries were Christian tourists on tours of Biblical
GIANTURCO spots, which cover both Israel and the Arab countries. So anybody going on a tour who was sponsored by some church group or individually interested in visiting Nazareth, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and various sites in Jordan and so on that have historical connections with the Christian religion, so if they wanted to go both places they had to do what I did.

And what you did then was go to Cyprus from wherever you were. And from Cyprus you could go to I'm trying to remember what the embarkation point was. I'm not sure if it was Haifa or Tel Aviv. In any event, wherever you came in, there was an agreement that had been reached by some kind of negotiations by I don't know what group of countries. But anyway, the Israeli authorities would not stamp your passport if you entered from Cyprus. And then, after you'd seen Israel, you could go to an Arab country adjoining Israel. The only way you could go, though, was you could go through Jerusalem which then was a divided city like Berlin. It had the Arab half of the city,
GIANTURCO which was the old city, and the Israeli half, the new city. And in between was a no man's land with barbed wire and mines and the whole kit and caboodle.

And this location where you could go through was the Mendelbaum Gate, which nobody knows about anymore, but it was like Checkpoint Charlie on the Berlin Wall. It was the same kind of thing. I mean this was the single entry point. And what you had to do was to get a letter in Israel from a Christian organization, church, or whatever.

I was brought up nominally as an Episcopalian. I felt very hypocritical about all this. But I went to an Episcopal Church in Tel Aviv. As I recall there was one. And the minister in this church signed a letter for me saying that I was on a tour of Biblical places, which in fact I was, but not from any particular interest in Christianity because I'm really pretty a-religious.

You would then go present yourself at the Mendelbaum Gate with this letter that you had gotten from some church in Israel, Christian church, saying that you were on
this tour. And they would allow you to walk from one side, the Israeli side, across this no man's land. I mean it was kind of scary. There was barbed wire, and, as I say, it was mined. It was a big deal. It took you about three minutes to walk across this no man's land. You would end up on the Arab side, which was Jordan—I can't remember the geography, if this is Jordan or Lebanon—that you entered on the other side. At any event, it was an Arab country. The border guards there would check your passport to make sure there was no stamp from Israel in there, which would jinx the whole deal, and checked to see that you had this letter saying that you were on a pilgrimage of the holy spots. And if you had those two things they would let you go through the gate, and then you were in the Arab world. If you didn't have those two things, well, I don't know. Either you were machine gunned to death, or [Laughter] they let you go back into Israel. So that's how I went on my Middle East tour. From Greece I went to Cyprus, and then I went...
GIANTURCO to what the point of entry was, Tel Aviv or Haifa

I spent about six weeks in Israel, stayed on a kibbutz for about three weeks, and just toured around and saw what there is to see there, which isn't a whole lot. It's a tiny little country. It's hard for an American to imagine this. You can go from north to south in no time. And at some points, as the Israelis are constantly saying in these negotiations—they are so worried about their security—at some points it's only like ten or twelve miles wide. Nothing I mean it's like going from downtown Sacramento to Sunrise Mall. I mean this is what we're talking about the size of this country. So I saw basically what there is to see in Israel, which was very interesting I have to say.

And then I traveled around. I saw Beirut before the civil war which was an entirely different thing, I guess, from what's there now. I mean it's been bombed practically into oblivion. But it was the way it was before, which was the center of
cosmopolitan Arab culture. People came to Beirut in those days from all over the Arab world. There were opera, ballet, symphony, lots of cultural events, a beautiful city. Later on when that civil war started I was just heartbroken to think—kind of like Sarajevo—that a city could be so destroyed with this awful stuff going on. Anyway, I stayed in Beirut for a while. I went to Damascus. I went all over. I went to Baalbek where there are some very famous ruins. The last place I went in the Middle East was Egypt. And I went and spent some time in Cairo.

Then I went down the Nile. This was kind of interesting, too. I didn't take a boat down the Nile because it was too expensive and it took a long time and it sounded as though it would be kind of boring. Plus it's boiling hot. You can take these tourist boats which take you from, I guess, Cairo or some point near Cairo down to the famous ruins. The most famous ruins at that time were at this place called Abu Simbel which, I don't know if you've heard of this
George, but this became an international issue. Abu Simbel—Simbel, S-I-M-B-E-L, in the Roman alphabet—is one of the best preserved and most historically significant of the historic sites in Egypt. And the Egyptian government at this time wanted to build a dam, the Aswan Dam, and it was going to flood Abu Simbel. And there was an international outcry about this, and what was finally done was Abu Simbel was picked up stone by stone and moved to another location so that when they built the dam it wouldn't be under a hundred feet of water.

But when I was making this trip the dam had not yet been built, and Abu Simbel was in its original location. And so my thought was to go down the Nile, visit Luxor, another place with very important ruins, and then continue on to Abu Simbel, and then come back. I wanted to see Alexandria because I had read [Author] Lawrence Durrell's *The Alexandria Quartet*, and it sounded like a very fabulous place. Great disappointment I would say.
But anyway, by this time now, when I'd got to Egypt I had been traveling around for, I guess, six or seven months. And after a certain amount of traveling you just get glassy-eyed. You get so blasé you just are no longer interested in historical sites. It's a common experience for the tourist to think, "I just can't stand to see one more ruin." I was about at that stage when I was in Egypt. And I got down to Luxor, and it was hot to beat anything. I mean like 110 degrees in the shade, and I thought, "I just can't face going any further. I don't care if Abu Simbel is the greatest historical monument in the world. If it's one of the seven wonders of the world I still don't want to continue this. I've just had it. I want to go back up to Alexandria which was on the coast and head back on to Europe."

It was my intention to end this trip in Paris which I had visited a number of times before. So I didn't go to see Abu Simbel. I went as far as Luxor, and then I went to Alexandria, which, as I said, was a terrible disappointment. That city, in the time of
Lawrence Durrell, which was probably the 1930s, maybe forties—I'm not sure exactly—was very different from what it was thirty years ago. And then I went from there to Paris. I ended up in Paris, and that's when I started working for *Time* magazine.

If we could go back a few weeks or months in your journey, you mentioned you had spent three weeks on a kibbutz while you were in Israel. Was that a planned tourist kind of a thing, or how did you arrange that?

Well, I had read about this. I had read about kibbutzim. In the sixties it was still considered a very interesting social experiment. I mean this is true communism. Now, I've done a lot of reading in nineteenth-century history, so I should know the difference between communism and socialism, and there is a difference. [German Philosopher Karl] Marx was talking about one and not the other. Since I studied history, I did a lot of reading on Marxism and the social movements connected with that. The kibbutzim system being one which was based very much on the thinking of these
nineteenth-century people, principally Marx, was something that I wanted to experience.

Well, no, it wasn't a common tourist thing. As a matter of fact, then, and I believe probably even more so now, these people are pretty serious minded, and they're not set up to handle tourists. They don't think of themselves as tourist attractions. And to be accepted to visit and live on a kibbutz was not easy at all. As I remember, at that time there was an organization, which there probably still is, in probably Tel Aviv, which was some kind of an umbrella organization representing the interests of the kibbutzim, which then and now contained a very small minority of the total population of Israel. It's like 1 percent, 5 percent. Very few people live on them. They have an inordinately large influence on the politics of the country because they represent the idealistic side of early Zionism and just like the orthodox Jews have a much greater influence than their numbers would indicate.

But in any event there was some office you could go to in Tel Aviv which had
connections with these kibbutzim, and if you were lucky they would find a spot for you to stay on one for a limited period of time. And this was not something automatic. You would be lucky if they were able to. When I went in to that office, they said, "Well, we think you might be able to stay in such and such a kibbutz because we've heard that they've taken some people recently." But there was some problem. They were unable to contact them (the kibbutz) directly, or it was only indirectly that they contacted them or something. So it was up in the air, but in the end they said, "We would advise that you just go there, just show up, and the chances are they'll take you." So, Israel being such a small country—to go from Tel Aviv to this kibbutz was probably an hour and a half bus ride—it wasn't a big deal to go there.

So I did go to this kibbutz. And they said, "Sorry. We've already got two foreigners staying here," or, "We've decided we're not taking any more foreigners." Because it's an economic hardship for them,
too. These people are earning their living by working, and they are not set up to feed an extra mouth who's not fully contributing to the life of this kibbutz. Even if they assign you a job like picking oranges or something, which is what many of the jobs are because a lot of them grow agricultural products. That's how they make their money. You probably are not as efficient an orange picker as somebody who has been doing that for years, and so you're a drain on their resources. In any event, they said, "We're sorry we can't take you." But they said, "There's another kibbutz five miles from here, and maybe you should try them." So I got back on the bus or whatever—it must have been a bus—and went to this other kibbutz. And they said, "OK." And so I ended up staying there.

I learned something interesting there which I wasn't aware of until I stayed on this kibbutz. This was an English speaking kibbutz, too. They had a group of people staying there for several months who were
PETERSHAGEN

GIANTURCO

Mormons I didn't know anything about the Mormon religion at this time, but I've learned since that they, the Mormons, consider themselves either the lost tribe of Israel or something like that. Anyway, Israel is the Holy Land, and they feel an affinity or that there is a historic relationship between them and Israel. They had on this kibbutz that I stayed on a group of about twenty or thirty Mormons that were staying there for several months. And they just put me in with the Mormons. As far as they were concerned probably I was a Mormon I mean I wasn't Jewish. So, what the heck! There are Mormons staying. We'll let you join the Mormon group. And that's how I ended up being allowed to stay.

PETERSHAGEN

Interesting. So what was your job? What was your contribution?

GIANTURCO

Picking oranges. [Laughter] Picking oranges, which I would have to say is about the most boring thing you can imagine. I mean boring to the extent it would drive you crazy. I don't know how people do it. When you think of these agricultural workers in
California, I mean this is just mind numbing even though you're outside. You're in the blazing sun, and all you're doing is picking oranges. For me, anyway, it was just sheer torture.

The schedule for life on this kibbutz was you got up very early in the morning, like four o'clock in the morning. I mean really early. You ate a light breakfast, and then you went out and picked oranges. This is before it got too hot, from say five until nine. And then you had breakfast, and you went out for about another hour or two. And then it was really too hot to work at all, so you came back and had lunch and a siesta. And then we picked oranges, as I remember, also late in the afternoon. It was all around the temperature and how hot it was. We just kept piling these trucks just like agricultural workers in California. Go out in the orange groves, pick the oranges, come back, eat, and we'd be exhausted from this.

PETERSHAGEN Were you on any sort of contract? Did you agree to stay for three weeks and work that period of time?
GIANTURCO

No, no

PETERSHAGEN

You could have left anytime you wanted to?

GIANTURCO

Yes Yes, it was very informal I'm sure if I had been with this Mormon group They had probably worked it all out months in advance, the amount of time they were staying and what they were going to do and so on But I was just kind of an add-on, which they accepted Maybe one of the Mormons hadn't shown up I don't know what the circumstances were But they had this group there, and they fit me into the group

PETERSHAGEN

That's interesting

GIANTURCO

I became interested in Mormonism, as a matter of fact, because they put me in a room They had very primitive accommodations just kind of like army barracks, and I was in a room with two or three other girls my age, about my age And they were very nice, and, so I got to be fairly friendly with them I mean not life-long friends I haven't kept up with them But, anyway, of course, they were very religious and serious about Mormonism, and they talked about it a lot So I, later on, much later, had the
opportunity to visit Salt Lake City which I thought was fascinating. And I went all around. Of course, they don't let non-Mormons in the tabernacle, but there are other things that you can visit. And I went and heard the Mormon Tabernacle Choir and went around and learned about [Mormon church founder] Joseph Smith and so on. My interest in that all stemmed from this stay with the Mormons on the kibbutz in Israel.

So you could have, at any point that you wanted to, just picked up and left the kibbutz, just said, "This is too much for me" and gone on with your tours?

Yes.

Did you ever pause to think that perhaps some of those secretarial jobs that you decided were

Looked better than orange groves? You know, that's an interesting point. I never thought of the two in combination, but they're equally mind numbing--different ways, but the same thing. No, I never thought I mean that would be really a Sophie's Choice type situation, and no disrespect intended to
that book. But really bad choices, between a rock and a hard place, if you had to choose between picking oranges and typing letters all day long.

PETERSHAGEN: Somehow I expected that was going to be your answer to that question. [Laughter] So you got to Paris, then, after all this traveling. And how many months are we talking about?

GIANTURCO: It was probably six or seven months altogether. When I got to Paris it was late Fall, and I had left Berkeley, I think, around the middle of February.

PETERSHAGEN: Then when you got to Paris you had some intention of finding work there?

GIANTURCO: I thought I'd look around and see. You see, I knew the job opportunities in the U S of A for women were pretty limited. [Laughter] I mean, that's an understatement. It had been my plan—I mean, this was all sort of a plan. I didn't have every detail worked out, but I was following a general agenda. I thought I would do this traveling around. And then another thing was that when I had spent a year in Geneva we had, in the first part of that year, spent six weeks in Paris.
polishing up our French particularly our accent I had had seven or eight years of French by that time But it's one thing to study it in school, and it's another thing to learn how to converse in an intelligible way with a Frenchman who doesn't want to be speaking to an American in the first place because they think all Americans are out of it Anyway, [Laughter] we had six weeks, spent six weeks in Paris studying conversational French, and I had wanted to spend some more time in Paris I was fascinated with Paris It's a wonderful city

So, when I planned this trip, it was with the intention of ending up in Paris and with the intention of seeing if I could get a job there So that's what I did And when I got there, which was probably late October or early November, I started just pounding the pavement Again, what I was interested in, what I kind of narrowed things down to in terms of things I could do was, one, work for some international organization using my degree in economics And two international
GIANTURCO organizations that are headquartered in Paris that presented that opportunity were UNESCO [United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization], which had headquarters or big offices there, and the other one is the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It's not just Europe, it's global. And I don't recall that I ever applied for a job at UNESCO. I did apply for a job at this OECD place and got a job. But I didn't take it because simultaneously I thought the other track I'll pursue is American publications, specifically the New York Herald Tribune which at that time had published an international edition out of Paris which they still do, the International Tribune— they hire Americans—and also the weekly magazines --Time, Newsweek--and the networks--ABC, NBC, CBS—which had offices there.

So I went around to all these places, and this is kind of interesting, how this happened. One of the first of these journalistic enterprises that I visited was Time magazine. I was very naive. I didn't
know how you were supposed to look for jobs
I didn't know about networking or any of this
stuff. I thought that you just went up to
the front desk in a place and said, "I'm
interested in a job. Do you have an
application I can fill out?" And actually,
that was pretty much the way people got jobs
in those days.

And I remember walking into the offices
of *Time* magazine. There was a receptionist
at a desk. She was an American, or if she
wasn't an American, she spoke perfect English
because this was an American publication. It
was actually the joint offices of *Time* and
*Life* at that time. I said, "I'm interested
in a job. Do you have an application?" And
she just whipped out an application--she did
have applications--and gave it to me. And I
filled it out, I guess sitting right there
probably, and left it with her and went on
with my job hunt and, as I say, was offered a
job at OECD, which was this economic
organization.

And I would have been hired as an
economist or economist trainee or something.
like that. I mean I wasn't going to be the head of any section. It was an entry level job, but it was a professional job. It was not typing. But I didn't hear about that for several weeks—the OECD thing. And I was seriously considering taking it. I mean I would have taken it. I was trying to drag this out, as a matter of fact, sort of keeping them on the line, trying to hold this job, at the same time thinking if I could get a job with one of these journalistic enterprises I would prefer that.

It seems to me this happened over the weekend. I got a call from this OECD place on, say, Friday, and they said, "We just have to know one way or the other. Are you going to take that job or not?" And I said, "I'll take it." And, no sooner had I told them this than the most bizarre thing happened. I was staying in a small hotel, really small. It was run by two old ladies who, unlike most Parisian French, were extremely friendly and nice to Americans. They were both probably in their sixties or seventies. They had never met an American before. I mean I was
GIANTURCO

the first one. It was a real test case, and they were very motherly-like with me. They took care of me. At some point in my stay there I had come down with the flu, and they were very concerned about that and brought chicken soup to my room and all this kind of thing.

In the middle of the night on this same weekend when I had told OECD that I would work for them—I guess on a Friday, say the following night—there was a knock on my door at like four o'clock in the morning. And one of these old Frenchwomen that owned this little hotel was extremely excited because the reason she was knocking on my door at, whatever, 4:00 A.M. was that there was a phone call for me. They had never gotten an international phone call, but there was a phone call for me coming from Washington, D.C. This was the biggest thing that had happened there for years.

So, the phone call was from my mother in Washington, D.C., and she said that she had gotten a phone call. The reason that it was 4:00 A.M. was that my mother got confused.
GIANTURCO about the international time change and thought she was calling me during the day when she wasn't. She was calling me in the middle of the night. She had gotten a phone call from the New York offices of *Time* magazine saying they had been desperately trying to track me down. They wanted to offer me a job and couldn't find me. What had happened was that as soon as I had submitted my application to this regional office of *Time* they decided they wanted to hire me, but either I wrote down the wrong address of this hotel or it was smudged on that part of the application or something. And they had been unable to find me. Finally they had called the New York office of *Time*, headquarters I guess at someplace on there I had listed as a relative in case something happened to you, my mother in Washington, D.C. And the New York office of *Time* called my mother to find out if she knew where I was. And so she said, "Expect a call from *Time*. They're going to call you." And that happened. On Monday they called me, and they offered me a job. And so I called OECD,
and I said, "I'm sorry I'm going to have to turn the job down." I took the *Time* job instead.

**PETERSHAGEN** And what did they call this position with *Time*?

**GIANTURCO** That's another thing which relates to the culture of the times. Had I been a man my title would have been reporter. As a woman my title was research assistant/reporter. This became a big issue with *Time* because two or three years after I stopped working for them, *Newsweek* magazine, which also had had this very discriminatory policy against women simply did not have women in full-scale writing jobs. They would have you do background research and interviews and so on and write up a preliminary report, but you weren't the one that got to put together the final thing that appeared in the magazine.

There is a complicating factor here which was in those days both *Time* and *Newsweek* practiced what's called corporate journalism, which was that nobody's name appeared on these stories. Still there was a person who was in charge of the final story. There was
no woman in charge of the final copy in either *Time* or *Newsweek* except for the people that handled fashion and I think maybe food, but I'm not sure that was a separate section. I do remember that there was a woman at *Time* who did the final copy on the stuff they did on fashion. But everything else, the final copy was put together by men. And as I say, shortly after I left *Time*, maybe within two or three years, the women at *Newsweek* brought a lawsuit against *Newsweek* over precisely this issue, discrimination. And they won. And it changed the whole picture. So if I were doing the same job for *Time* now that I was doing then, my title would have been reporter period--none of this research assistant/reporter business.

In the eyes of the corporation it looks to me, though, that even though you had a professional degree, the fact that you were a female made your position almost that of intern as opposed to professional.

Second class citizen was the idea, and that's basically what these people at *Newsweek* said. They said, "We're doing the same work. We're
doing most of the work. And what is this giving us a special title?" And the thing was that they, that both *Time* and *Newsweek*.

It wasn't only *Time* and *Newsweek*. I believe this was the case with newspapers, too. They said, "Well, the reason that we can't have you as a full-scale participating member of the editorial staff, the writing staff, is that when we have meetings, which they did to hash out these story assignments or how are we going to treat something or whatever, we use a lot of filthy language, and it's not suitable for women." They actually said that I was told that many times.

There was one woman in particular at *Time* in Paris who was fantastic. She was a wonderful writer. I mean she had a real skill. She should have been at the top of the line, editor of a major section of the magazine. She had been stuck at this reporter/assistant level for something like seven or eight years. Betty was her name.¹

¹Unable to verify
I haven't kept up with her so I don't know what the final outcome is here. But she was told this repeatedly. She got sick of it. By the time I left Time, actually, they made an exception and let Betty attend these meetings. But they had told her for years that the reason she couldn't have the title and the full responsibilities of a reporter was that in the editorial meetings they used a lot of language that was unsuitable for women, and, you know, ladies just couldn't be involved in that stuff. This was for real! Now it sounds absolutely absurd! Then it was the conventional wisdom. The law did nothing to protect you until these lawsuits that were filed which, you know, finally decided it another way and forced these organizations into the modern twentieth century.

PETERSHAGEN

I was just going to say it sounds absolutely ludicrous to me today, and I probably said the same things thirty years ago myself, [Laughter] and it made perfect sense then.

GIANTURCO

It sounds so ridiculous when I think of this being on a tape I would think of some historian looking at this thinking this woman
saying this must be some paranoid nut making this up. This couldn't be true. But it is the truth. That's the way it was.

[End Tape 2, Side A]
PETERSHAGEN Adriana, if you would, please continue with your story now of your tenure at Time Magazine in the Paris Bureau. Specifically, I think I'm really interested in hearing what you were expected to cover and what your areas of responsibility were.

GIANTURCO My area of responsibility was pretty specific in terms of how it was laid out to me initially. It broadened in the course of doing the job. But, specifically I was hired to be the assistant to the Common Market Bureau Chief. The Common Market was the predecessor organization to the European Union. And *Time* had one full-time correspondent, that was the title, correspondent, or actually correspondent/bureau chief, a single person who filled those responsibilities with regard to the Common Market stationed in Paris, and I was the one other person in the bureau. The two of us basically were supposed to keep
track of what was going on in the Common Market. So I kept up with the news basically. I think I may have mentioned in a previous tape that those were the days of—still exists, but not to the same extent—corporate journalism at Time. You found out what was going on and then wrote these dispatches, I guess you might call them, that were sent to New York, and then they wrote the stories in New York.

The main story, as a matter of fact, while I was there was the issue of England joining the Common Market because when the Common Market was first set up England was not part of it. And [French President Charles] de Gaulle, and he was very much opposed to England joining the Common Market. The reason Time had decided that they needed a second person covering the Common Market was that this was such a hot issue, and there were lots of things going on, lots of intrigues, and behind the scenes negotiations, deals being made. However, it probably was within the first six months that I was at Time that de Gaulle successfully excluded England from the Common Market. The
Common Market really had a setback as a result of that, and very little happened on any front. There was not that much news for either the Bureau Chief or me to deal with so we just kind of covered whatever happened that was in the economic area that was affecting Europe.

I did two specific things that were time consuming. I was at Time for altogether about two years, a little less than two years. They assigned me the responsibility of compiling the European section of a listing that's done annually. I believe it's still done, the "Fortune Five Hundred," which is international, not just companies in the United States, but companies world-wide. And that involved a lot of tedious research, of actually calling these corporations. I did the French section. I had to contact, I can't remember, probably hundreds of corporations and try to find out what their profits were, what their turnover was. I remember one thing that was very frustrating about it was that the method of accounting and bookkeeping used by European corporations is not the same as that of American ones. To
try to translate the type of numbers they were getting into something so you could compare apples to apples with American corporations was very difficult to do.

Do you think that's still a problem today?

Well, I don't know because I haven't been involved in that kind of thing for years. I have no idea. I can tell you that the French concept and the way they express it, or the way they did express it at that time, the volume of activity for a company was by a term called "chiffre d'affaires." It's a number that just doesn't correspond to anything. It's not profits or net profits or sales activity before operating costs are taken. It's a separate thing. As I say, I don't know if they are still doing that or not. Of course, accounting methods change in the United States all the time, too.

I took a course in accounting a few years ago having done sort of intuitive accounting for years, but never having taken an actual academic course in it. It was interesting for me to find out that this is quite a sophisticated field, and the method of keeping track of volumes of economic
activity at the firm level is not a static thing. So I don't know the answer to that question. I suspect they've probably changed that. But we maybe have changed our methods so that we are still just as far apart, but on other grounds, than we were at that time on the American and the French method anyway. I don't know about the other Europeans. As I say, my responsibility was to try to compile the information for firms that were in France.

Another problem with this "Fortune Five Hundred" is when you are dealing with international firms, you know, global operations, how do you separate out activity? Do you separate out activity in one country as opposed to world-wide operations? It was a very complicated and, I must say not very interesting activity that I spent a lot of time doing.

I should say that the reason I was involved in that is, as I say, the Common Market had slowed down so there was very little going on for my boss and me to do with regard to the Common Market. And so they gave me this "Fortune Five Hundred"
GIANTURCO assignment  Fortune Magazine is part of the family of magazines owned by Time, now Time-Warner, so there was a lot of cross-utilization of staff between Time, Life, and Fortune. If there was a shortage of manpower in one of these foreign bureaus, they would assign somebody that was working for one of the other organizations to do a job for another one.

Anyway, a second assignment that I did also for Fortune magazine was a story that they wanted to put together on internal waterways in Europe which was something that I don't think very many Americans were aware of. I remember writing a letter to [Columnist] Herb Caen after I'd done this story. I was back in San Francisco for some reason. I don't recall the circumstances of that. He had a column in which he talked about a news article which he thought was absolutely ridiculous, and he presented it as being a ridiculous article because it talked about Zurich as a port. And he said, "What do you mean Zurich? What could be less port-like than a city which is in the Alps?" And I wrote Herb Caen a letter and said, "Herb,
GIANTURCO you're sadly mistaken. In fact, it is a port, because--and I'm pretty sure this is Zurich—the Rhine River goes through I believe it's the Rhine. Anyway, there is one of the most important European waterways which at that time could take sea-going vessels, was deep enough and was channelized, and so this Swiss city, as unlikely as it may seem, is in fact a port. He put that in his column and wrote me a nice note back.

Anyway, my story, which I did in conjunction with a photographer, was to just investigate and find out what was the deal with internal waterways in Europe which were a very important means of transportation. Not only the Rhine, but various canals that joined places. I don't know compared to the United States whether water transportation, river transportation, and canals are more important there than they are here. I suspect it is probably more important in Europe because Europe is smaller. There are a lot of rivers, and there are a lot of mountains, and a river is obviously not going

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1 The River Limmat, a tributary of the Rhine, flows through Zurich.
to climb up a mountain and come down the other side. It provides a method of transporting things on the flat, so to speak, so it's economically feasible.

What this photographer and I did was travel around for a period of several months visiting various cities and important spots in the internal waterway system. He photographed the port activities, and I was researching what was going on in these different areas. That appeared as a quite a lengthy article in Fortune. It involved a lot of research. It wasn't just something covering a news conference and reporting what have you with that.

PETERSHAGEN Now, with England not being a part of the Common Market, it almost sounded in your description of that as if there was some disappointment on your part that it made your tenure at Time a little bit less exciting than it might have been. Is that a fair assessment?

GIANTURCO Oh, I think that's definitely true. Yes, I mean there was less to do. I was there. That was supposed to be my job. That was supposed to be my boss's job. Neither one of
us had that much to do. For several years, the activities of the Common Market almost came to a standstill over that exclusion of England. And later that was resuscitated, but that was after I left. Ultimately, of course, they did become a member, and they've moved on to much greater integration, economic integration, than was the case when I was covering it.

PETERSHAGEN: So some of your expectations that you may have had when you first started with *Time* really weren’t met, but otherwise, I take it, it was a fairly pleasant experience overall?

GIANTURCO: Oh, yes. Yes. I was going to say it was certainly pleasant living in Paris. I kind of take that back. I had mixed feelings about Paris. Like most Americans, you like the city, but the people aren’t so great.

[Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN: Then you came back to the United States from *Time*?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: Why?

GIANTURCO: I’m trying to remember. I guess it was a combination of circumstances. But, as I say, this job covering the Common Market wasn’t
leading to anything I considered working for *Time* in New York, which I probably could have done, but I'm not too crazy about New York I started thinking I wanted to get back to California, so I came back to California I came back, and I lived in Berkeley, I guess about a year, while I was trying to figure out what my next move was going to be I took a couple of courses at Berkeley, and I worked half-time for a newspaper, which no longer exists, that was published in [San Francisco's] Chinatown They had an English section to it and a Chinese section I and one other person put together the English part of this Chinese-American newspaper

*PETERSHAGEN* I think by most of the written accounts I've read that people tend to lump things together and say that you were editor of the English language page of this Chinese newspaper while you were at Berkeley going to graduate school

*GIANTURCO* No, this was subsequent to that

*PETERSHAGEN* Do you want to separate these periods to be clear on that?
Yes, I already had a Master's from Berkeley. I was trying to decide what was my next career move. The only full-time job I had had other than summer jobs had been in journalism. I was still interested in journalism, and this job came up. As I say, it was half-time. It ended up taking more than half-time. Officially it was half-time. As I say, I took a couple of courses at Berkeley, one in sociology. And I was talking to a lot of people and trying again to figure out what kind of career could I get into.

I sort of fell upon the field of urban and regional planning which at that time was a hot profession. The federal government had lots of money to spend on urban renewal. The HUD [Department of Housing and Urban Development] programs were going full steam ahead, and there was a great demand for city planners.

Let me interrupt you here before we get into that phase of your life. There's one or two details yet about the Chinese newspaper. Do you remember the name of it?

The Chinese World.
The Chinese World  And your position there with the English language portion of the newspaper, that was general world news, local news, or was there an emphasis?

Both, both  We covered things that were going on  I was not very politically aware in those days, but looking back and piecing it together obviously this newspaper was

This was before [U.S. President Richard] Nixon had made his trip to China  The United States recognized the Chinese mainland as being China  As far as we were concerned at that time Taiwan was China, and the people that were behind this, the financial backers of this newspaper were, I think, probably Nationalist Chinese, so it was pretty conservative  But we covered news principally having to do with Taiwan, plus events that were happening on the local scene  And there were a lot of them

Chinatown in San Francisco is a big community, and there were a lot of business openings  Of course, a major component of the economic life in Chinatown in San Francisco is restaurants  And every time a restaurant, a new one, was being opened I
would be sent to go to the opening. So I ate some fantastic Chinese food, I'll say, certainly more than the average American over the period I worked for that newspaper.

[Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN
Now, let's jump back into the urban planning part of your career. That began then in Berkeley?

GIANTURCO
Again, this is a transition. At that time the field of city planning really was attracting people from two different kinds of backgrounds. One was people with backgrounds in the social sciences, which is what I had starting out with a history major and then going into economics. That was one track. And the second track was basically people with backgrounds in civil engineering and, sort of as a sub-track there, architecture. There was a number of people with degrees in architecture that got into that field. As I say, there was a boom in that period, an explosion in the field, the number of people in it. My interest in it was, "Well, again, it's a natural extension of my kind of work, the courses I took in economics will lead directly into this." And there was virtually
GIANTURCO

no discrimination against women. It was one of the few fields around at that time where firms were so desperate to hire people that if you were a woman it made no difference. And I found this out from talking to a number of people, so I decided, "Well, I'll get a degree in city planning."

I only applied one place which was the Harvard graduate program in urban and regional planning. I applied initially for the masters program, which is a professional degree, and was admitted to it. At the last minute I began to have second thoughts about it. I thought, "Gee, I already have a masters degree. Do I want to get a second masters degree?" At the very last minute, like two weeks before the semester was starting, I sent them a letter that said I'd decided against coming. And I got a phone call back from, as I recall, the Dean of the School of Design offering me a big, huge, fat fellowship to go. I thought, "Well, it looks as though this is in the cards. I'll do it." So I did.

I stayed though when I got there I found out that this program, the masters' program,
GIANTURCO which was a three year program, in my opinion, anyway, was academically for the birds. I remember in an early session that we had the first semester, some kind of orientation meeting that was being held, one of the professors saying to the collected students, and there were like thirty-five of us in the class, "Now that you're at Harvard, take full advantage of what Harvard has to offer, and go to the library. You will see all these books by great authors, and you should read..." And I thought, "What the heck is this?" I mean this is pathetic, that at this level the students in this program would have to be told or don't have already a knowledge of literature, history, whatever, and that they are advising them to go to the library.

I was very disappointed in the quality of the courses offered in that program, too. I remember one course where we spent the majority of the semester debating what was the difference between various terms like what was the difference between a goal, an objective, and a strategy, which to me is like arguing over the number of angels on the
head of a pin I mean who cares You could obviously draw some distinctions about means and ends and intermediate means but as far as spending valuable academic time discussing this, I just couldn't believe it In terms of the people that were in the class, there were basically two tracks that people were getting into city planning from at that time One was people with backgrounds in the social sciences, which would have included me, and then the engineering track I would have to say, though, that the engineering students could have benefitted by going to the library because most of them had absolutely no knowledge whatsoever of anything other than, you know, how to use a slide rule—we weren't using computers then and making mathematical calculations about lot size or whatever was the issue—and had no knowledge or very limited knowledge of anything broader than that, which I think you really need if you're going to be involved in trying to figure out how cities should work, do work, could be made to work better

So at the end of that year I decided that this was not for me And there was an
option I decided that if I was going to stay I did not want to be in this program anymore I wanted to switch over to the Ph D program in urban and regional planning which was in another part of Harvard Harvard has reorganized that urban and regional planning program time after time They can't decide where to put it in the university structure At the time that I entered the master's program, it was in the School of Design The Ph D program was in the School of Arts and Sciences, so I switched from the School of Design to the School of Arts and Sciences and continued in the Ph D program, which was much broader Basically, you designed your own program There was no Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the Ph D level It was an interdepartmental program under the Department of Economics and my background, graduate background, was economics, so I sort of continued along those lines at the Ph D level

PETERSHAGEN And how long did you go through that Ph D program? You did not complete that, correct?
GIANTURCO

I didn't complete the dissertation. I completed the course requirements. I took the comprehensive exams. In those days—and I don't know how it is now—but the way that the program was structured was they had a sort of a minimal requirement for courses, like maybe thirty units. I had practically met that by my previous graduate work. They accepted the work at Berkeley as counting toward this, or most of it. And then it was up to you, what you wanted to do, in order to prepare for the exams. And another thing, this program at that time was so diffuse, and it was not clearly focused. As I say, they've reorganized it several times since then. You really had to figure out what this field was and how to prepare for the exams, and it was up to you how you did it. It was up to you to figure out what it was, and it was up to you to then learn what you would need to know in order to pass exams in a subject that was very fuzzy.

So I took about, I guess, the first year that I was in that Ph D program, which would have been my second year at Harvard, actually taking courses for credit as I remember, and
then a second year where I took courses
About the only thing that was firm about this
was that you took both written and oral
examinations I don't know if this is same
other places or if it's the same at Harvard
now I'm not talking about defending the
thesis I'm talking about the qualifying
exams themselves You took, as I remember,
five written exams and then, depending on how
you did on those written exams, you either
took five oral exams or, if you did well on
the written exams, they would cut down the
number of oral exams that you took And I
did well on the writtens, so I ended up
taking three I took five written and
three oral I passed with flying colors, so
to speak In order to take these exams you
had to decide what field you were going to
take them in and there was a broad array of
fields that you could choose from And the
fields that I took were urban and
architectural history, statistics, and I
believe urban and regional economics was my
third field So, for the time that I took
courses and then when I was just preparing
for the exams, I was taking courses and doing reading to cover those fields

By this time, I was probably about three years into the program. Well, actually it didn't happen like that because part way through I started to work full-time. I got a job working for a consulting firm in Cambridge, which was doing a lot of urban renewal work under contract to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. And I worked there, and I was kind of doing some reading on the side. I may have been studying statistics. That was the thing that was giving me the most trouble, although ultimately that was one of the fields I did the best in because I studied it so hard I really got to know it. [Laughter] I mean I had to study it because I just couldn't figure out what they were talking about half the time. That actually was given in the Harvard Business School.

So I started to work full-time. Even though I had taken all the course work and done most of the reading, preparing myself for the exams, I did not actually take the exams because I started working full-time and
GIANTURCO just put off the final crunch of reviewing the literature and getting myself ready for it. I worked for, I guess, two or three years before I took those exams so it was about five years into my enrollment at Harvard.

And Harvard the way it was then—I don't know how they are now—but once you are in that Ph.D. program, you're in it for life. I mean they just carry you on the rolls. There is a limit between the time when you take the exams and when you finish your dissertation, but even that is not a true limit because if you don't finish the dissertation within that time period you're still part of the program, but you have to retake the exams. So anyway, they're carrying me on the books, and I hadn't missed any time limits in about, let's say, three years. After I started working full-time I decided, "Well, I'm going to start forgetting this stuff that I had been reading up on before and the courses I had taken and so on."

So I decided to take the exams. I took a couple of months off from my job, and, almost like taking these law school cram
things, I studied for the exams and took them and passed them. And then the next stage was to write the dissertation, but I went back to work. I had a tentative dissertation topic that I'd done a lot of research on, but I hadn't gotten the topic finely honed down and approved. It wasn't really at the stage where I knew exactly what I was going to write about and exactly how I was going to formulate it. About then, which would have been probably five or six years after I started the Harvard program, I came back to California. I'd had a couple of other jobs in the interim which I'd be happy to talk about, but anyway that was at the same time that I was in Harvard program.

[End Tape 2, Side B]

[Begin Tape 3, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana, when we stopped the last tape you had pretty much, I think, completed your description of your graduate work at Harvard. In the course of describing that you mentioned that you had started working for firms in that area, specifically in Cambridge. Would you care to go into that for us, please?
GIANTURCO

Well, I had, I guess, three jobs before I came to California to start working in the transportation area. And my first job in the transportation area was not at Caltrans, as you're probably aware.

The first job that I had, and I'm talking about full-time jobs when I was still a graduate student, but I was working a regular thirty-five, forty hour week in these jobs. The first one was at this consulting firm that was doing a lot of work under contract to HUD or more specifically under contract to various cities and counties across the United States, preparing comprehensive plans which you had to do in order to be eligible to receive urban renewal funds. And I worked for them, I guess, probably about between two and three years, someplace in there. Most of the work I did there were economic studies of what was going on in these different communities and what were the potentials for increasing business or revitalizing downtowns, that kind of thing, which was a big issue in those days and still is, of course. I worked for them.
maybe two-and-a-half years, close to three years

I was then offered a job with the poverty program in Boston, which was going full swing in those days. I guess you'd call it the anti-poverty program, the Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] program that was started in the [U.S. President John F. Kennedy administration and which was getting a lot of attention nationwide. I guess this is still around, although it's certainly dwindled down to much less than it was then. It was the hey-day of the program when I worked for it. The way it was organized in cities, anyway major cities—and Boston is a major city in these terms and I guess in any terms—organizations were put together called community action agencies, which were charged with receiving and dispersing anti-poverty funds to accomplish various purposes including the Headstart Program—that was one of the programs that went through our agency—job training—the Job Corps was part of our effort, programs in community health—we ran several health clinics, lots of work in community organization. The idea was that
people were going to learn to help themselves. This isn't going to be "Lady Bountiful" coming down and handing out money. The programs will be run and staffed by the people who are going to benefit from them, although there will be also some professionals hired in connection with that.

I was in that second category of employees.

Our program was very, very active in Boston. It was organized in departments. We had a Headstart Department, a Health Department, an Employment Department, basically the major functions of the agency, and then some overhead departments. There was a Department of Administration. There was a Budget Department. And then there was the department that I headed, which was Planning and Evaluation. We worked very closely with the Budget Department, trying to figure out what the agencies should be doing, writing grant proposals, and then evaluating the activities of these various programs as they went along. And I worked there for, I guess, almost four years.

We did a lot of interesting work all across the board in this general area of
trying to help people get themselves out of poverty

PETERSHAGEN Before you go on from there can you explain a little bit more about the organization? Were you employed by the federal government?

GIANTURCO No

PETERSHAGEN Was this agency established as a government corporation?

GIANTURCO It was a non-profit corporation. There were different arrangements in different cities, but in no instance were they profit-making organizations. And, as I recall, there was some issue—I think it had been pretty well resolved by the time that I started working for the agency in Boston—as to whether these community action agencies could actually be an arm of city government, if that was an acceptable alternative. And I think that it was decided that they couldn't be.

In any event, the one that I worked for was a non-profit organization which had actually existed prior to the OEO coming into existence. It had been an organization funded by the Ford Foundation to do pretty much the same thing that it then continued to do with federal funding. We got grants from
the federal government that came directly to us. They did not go through the city or the state, which is a controversial aspect about this.

As a matter of fact, many of these programs aiding cities—we're still in the 1960s at this point—bypassed the states. One of the things, if I remember, Nixon wanted to place greater emphasis on the state rather than direct federal-city relationships which had flourished before and were getting stronger and stronger. And the feeling was that most people in the United States live in cities, and if you have direct federal-city relationships, what's the point of even having the states? There was a pulling back from that way of doing business. The name of this organization was Action for Boston Community Development [ABCD], and when I worked for it the funding was straight from the federal government to us.

Do you remember what years those were? I'm guessing it's '65, '66, '67, about that time. Something like that. It was the late sixties. It was probably those years that
you mentioned I'd have to look on my resume to check it out.

PETERSHAGEN As I understand it was while you were working on this particular economic program, the anti-poverty program as you called it, that you met John [Saltonstall], correct?

GIANTURCO You mean my husband?

PETERSHAGEN Yes

GIANTURCO Yes He was on the Boston city council. This was another controversial aspect about the poverty program which had to do with the relationship—the institutional arrangements—for these community action agencies and how closely they should be tied to city government. The way it worked out in Boston was that the organization ABCD was entirely independent as a legal entity. It was incorporated as ABCD, Inc. The board consisted of a certain number of representatives, I believe the majority I think that was a federal requirement, who were elected by the neighborhoods, poor neighborhoods, in which we had actual programs operating. And then a certain number of seats were reserved for members of the Boston city council. He was on the
Boston city council, and that was my first contact with him. He was a member of the board, and I had to make frequent presentations to that board on things we were doing.

You went then from that anti-poverty program to working for the state of Massachusetts. Is that correct?

Yes.

What were the circumstances under which you made that transfer?

Of course, there are networks in any field, and so I had met a lot of people in connection with working for this anti-poverty program. One of the organizations that I had had a quite a bit of contact with, not only in my capacity, professional capacity, at ABCD, but also because I was very heavily involved in community activities on my own as a private citizen—actually, that's a pretty important part of my background. I would say—in any event, I had come into contact with the redevelopment authority in Boston and one individual in particular who was named by Governor [Francis W.] Sargent, who was the predecessor to [Governor Michael] Mike.
Dukakis, to head a unit of state government in the Department of, I think it's called, Administration and Finance, which kind of was a mixed bag of functions. It was called the Office of State Planning and Management. When he was named by Sargent to that job, he asked me to take a job under him which was Director of the Office of State Planning, which was one of the sub-offices that he was in charge of, which is comparable in California to OPR, the Office of Planning and Research. It's the overall state planning agency.

I see, and so

This is an interesting California connection. Hale Champion, who was Director of Finance in California under, I guess, [Governor] Edmund G. Brown, Sr., was sent to Boston. I'm trying to remember what he did there, whether he was the head of the redevelopment agency or the same agency that my acquaintance, whose name is Tom O'Brien, worked for or what. In any event, he ended up at Harvard, Hale Champion did, as Vice President for Finance. My boss in state government, when he left state government, went to Harvard and
became assistant to Hale Champion. He then became at Harvard Vice President for Finance, took over Hale Champion's job. As I say, I think he recently retired.

The world always turns out to be much smaller than we think it is. [Laughter]

I've never personally met Hale Champion, but I sure used to hear a lot of stories about him and Tom, my boss, and various adventures they had together, things that happened, and so on.

I see. In your position with the state of Massachusetts you were, for administrative purposes, I would think then considered part of the governor's staff?

Yes, it was not a civil service appointment. I've forgotten how they separated it out. They don't use the term exempt, but it is essentially the same thing as exempt in California.

Similar to a CEA [Career Executive Appointment] kind of appointment?

Well, no. CEA are civil service people that have moved into a sub-category of civil service. And then there is the whole non-civil service cadre of people, and I was not
in the civil service. It had nothing to do with civil service. So it went through the governor. I don't know if my appointment was actually by governor's signature or whether it was by the signature of my immediate boss or what. In any event, I didn't have civil service protection or any of the things that go along with being a civil servant. I was a political appointee.

So you were a political appointee, but not to the point that you needed to go through a confirmation process or anything like that?

No. No. This office was very non-partisan. If anything, it in many ways resembled the Office of the Legislative Analyst in California in that we were supposed to look at things in an objective way apart from the partisan bickering that was going on in the legislature and make recommendations about what the state should be spending its money on basically. One of the functions that we did in my office, which was the Office of State Planning, was to review. At that time there was a procedure—I don't know if this still exists—called the A-95 Review. The federal government in making grants to
GIANTURCO states required that the state have a centralized point of review where it would review all grant applications to make sure that the left hand knew what the right hand was doing, that they weren't applying for funds to build a highway in some location and applying for funds say to FHWA [Federal Highway Administration] and at the same time applying for funds to HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] to build a hospital, let's say, half a mile from where this highway was or in the exact same site. That's an extreme example, but the idea was to coordinate the use of federal funds and there were lots of federal funds coming into the state at this point. We spent a lot of our time on that. Any grant for federal funds came through our office and was reviewed. Either we sent it back and said it's got to be changed or you have to make sure you coordinate with whatever the other agency was or the other program that it was in conflict with or you could do better if the two of you got together and put in a
GIANTURCO joint application for something. We were quite active in that arena.

We also did some planning functions similar to, again, things that OPR. I don't know if OPR is still doing this kind of thing. For example, one of the things that we did when I was director of this office was to come up with a state plan for improving air quality which was in response to—and I don't remember which clean air act this was or which set of amendments it was. It was the set of amendments that established air quality maintenance areas as I remember. For the first time in a very explicit way the federal government was requiring that you do a plan in an area which truly involved the integration of the activities of lots of different arms of government and the private sector. First of all, you would decide which areas had pollution problems. That's not so hard to do. That's a scientific question of measuring air quality. Then you would come up with methods of reducing those levels of pollution, which would involve clearly substantial work in the area of
transportation, but not just in the area of transportation. At that time there was a lot of emphasis on what were called "complex sources"--developments that attract automobiles but are not highways or roadways themselves. Say, sports stadia. This kind of thing. Of course, there are other activities that cause pollution that have nothing to do with transportation, they're industrial emissions. The idea was to try to bring together what was being done in the way of focusing economic development activities and highway development and large-scale developments that will attract automobile traffic, pull it all together, and come up with an integrated plan that's going to do something about pollution. And that responsibility was assigned to our office.

We spent about a year working with various state agencies coming up with a plan. It was the first time many of these agencies had worked together. I mean, they were forced to work together. And that was submitted to the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]. It led to a whole effort
in Massachusetts California, of course, at that time was the pioneer, and, I guess, still is California was way ahead of what everybody else was doing up until that point. I think as a result of that legislation the other states were forced to catch up, and, in some cases, maybe even went beyond what California was doing in terms of trying to look at the interrelationship between different things that cause a problem so that you don't in focusing on one thing have unintended side effects that may overcome the benefits that you achieved in focusing on that single area.

PETERSHAGEN Now, you were the first incumbent in a new position that required considerable liaison with several state agencies. Typically in bureaucracies this can be a real point of trouble. Did you have any problems overcoming the resistance to the kind of attitude that says, "Well, here we have this central planner that we didn't have before, and why should we have to deal with this new office?"
Yes, to a certain extent, but I can't say it was a really major problem. There is a whole other angle here, which is just the general lethargy and extreme bureaucratization of government in Massachusetts, [Laughter] which may have been a more important factor here. When I started working for state government in California, I couldn't have been more surprised at the difference in the way of doing business. My office, which was the Office of State Planning, was part of this larger cabinet level structure, the Agency for Administration and Finance. We had civil servants in that agency who had been there forty or fifty years who basically came to work and read the newspaper. I mean there was nothing for them to do. When I heard about this I just couldn't believe it, but this is true. At the time, and now we're talking about the early seventies, there was a wave of computerization going on in offices, not just government, but in general society. The payroll system in Massachusetts had been computerized. Well, they had a large staff of people, say around a hundred,
GIANTURCO whose job had been to put the payroll together essentially. What exactly that involved I don't know. But routine. It's green-eye-shade accounting, bookkeeping type work. Well, when this system was computerized, there was no need for these people at all. You could have fired every last one of them, and it would have made no difference to the operation of state government. But that did not happen because they had civil service protection, and the state government there is so political in the sense of padding the payroll with cronies. Maybe this has changed, but this is the way it was then. It was notorious for this. In that particular office which had put together the payroll the people were kept on, even though it was computerized. They were given the job of checking over the computer printouts that were generated on payroll to make sure that the computer hadn't made mistakes. [Laughter] It was this kind of thing that we were up against, that struck me more than, any resistance to agencies working
together, although that certainly existed, too.

I remember [Laughter] spending a lot of energy because one of my employees needed a bookcase. You think it would be routine to call up whatever part of state--General Services, I've forgotten what it was called in Massachusetts--and say, "We need a bookcase. There's no bookcase in this office." Well, I just could not get that bookcase, and I spent months calling, writing memos, and so on. I don't remember when I finally left whether or not we had even gotten that bookcase. The poor guy had books stacked on the floor and files all over the place. [Laughter] It was just ridiculous.

PETERSHAGEN: Now I'm starting to sense some of the facial expression and some of the body language that I saw earlier when you were talking about your frustrations with your job hunting experience and having doors closed just because you were a woman.

GIANTURCO: [Laughter] This had nothing to do with me being a woman.
PETERSHAGEN  No, I know that, but it looks to me that perhaps inbred bureaucracies are one of those "hot buttons" for you

GIANTURCO  I don't mind bureaucracy  I think bureaucracy serves a real function, and in places like France, for example, it's what kept the country going  If you have a very unstable political situation it's bureaucracy that gets the work done and provides the continuity  But when you get hide-bound bureaucracy or bureaucracy which is just kind of existing on its own per se, this is not productive  My experience in observing that kind of thing in Massachusetts' state government plus there was a lot of this—I would have to say not the same, but related—kind of problems with the poverty program, led me to be very skeptical about spending money, the expenditure of public funds  I mean there is so much waste in government I just am shocked by it, have been ever since the days of those experiences and the idea of throwing money at problems—if there is a problem just throw some more money—even if that means if you are keeping fifty people on
or a hundred to check to see whether the computer made a mistake

So with both the anti-poverty program and the Office of Planning and Management job you really had your eyes opened to governmental and bureaucratic waste

Yes, and the fact that effectiveness of programs is frequently one of the least important factors in whether that program gets funded or is continued or whatever. There are other things that play a more important role, unfortunately for the taxpayer.

Earlier you mentioned that you had some citizen involvements that occurred while you were with the poverty program and, I assume, carried over into the Massachusetts state job that you said were interesting. Would you care to comment on that?

Yes, I lived in a neighborhood in Boston which is the waterfront now touted by Boston as one of its finest achievements. I'm talking about the city saying, "Boy! We really did a good job preserving our waterfront." The redevelopment authority,
known as the BRA [Boston Redevelopment Authority] in Boston, its official plan for the waterfront was basically to tear down everything that was there and put up high-rises and parking lots.

PETERSHAGEN: That sounds familiar. [Laughter]

GIANTURCO: At the time that this plan was devised, it would have been in response to the same urban renewal binge that was going on across the country. Boston was one of the cities in the United States where people practically came to blows over urban renewal, specifically over one neighborhood that was razed—the West End—and there have been several academic studies of this. It led to a revolt against urban renewal. They tore down an entire historic neighborhood as part of renewal. Kind of the same thing happened in San Francisco with that Yerba Buena project where land was razed, and then nothing was put there to replace it for years and years and years. That is what happened in Boston with this West End. They had plans to raze various other parts of Boston and put up new
That's a hard thing I don't think we want to get into here.

In any event, in Boston, one of the areas that was slated to be torn down was this waterfront. It had been in the plans, the official plans for the city, for some years by the time that I moved into this neighborhood, and people in the neighborhood were very upset about it. There were not very many residents. This is one of the most historic areas of Boston, but it's an industrial area. What it consists of or did then was principally warehouses, a few of which had been turned into apartments, and there were people that were living in these apartments—very limited number of people. I don't think there were more than two or three hundred residents in the neighborhood. It was an official renewal area, but since it was mostly an industrial area there were not very many people there to say "We don't want our neighborhood torn down." Although the few people that lived there made a lot of noises about opposing this plan essentially
GIANTURCO to raze the neighborhood, they didn't get anywhere.

They finally filed a lawsuit against the city and got an injunction or a restraining order—well, it finally turned into an injunction—preventing the city from tearing down the buildings and proceeding with this plan. Part way through this legal battle I got involved because I moved into the neighborhood, and I was instantly interested in this problem. It's kind of ironic that I

The city had already started this tear down/rebuild process by the time the court put a stop to what was going on. I moved into one of the buildings that was put up, a high-rise, on land that should have been used in my opinion for something else. Anyway, I'm living in this high-rise, and I found out about what was going on and got very interested in it. Within a year or so I became the president of that neighborhood organization that was fighting the city over the plans for that neighborhood.

One of our principal points of contention was the city's plan to build,
Although it wasn't a freeway, it was designed virtually to be a freeway, to cut right through the neighborhood, tearing down all kinds of historic buildings, and the idea being that there was too much traffic on the expressway which already cuts through this neighborhood and that you needed a secondary facility to carry the overflow. I don't remember how many lanes it was supposed to be, at least six, as I recall—big, ugly, and, as I say, destroying hundreds of historic buildings. I don't recall, I don't remember, if these buildings were on the National Register [of Historic Places] or not, but it seems to me that we got a lot of stuff on the Register as part of our strategy of trying to stop this plan. We managed to essentially stop the plan and have the city revise what it intended to do in that neighborhood. It is now considered to be the jewel of Boston. Boston's mayor and the BRA and all point to this neighborhood as being one of their finest achievements in restoring and rehabilitating Boston and making it a great tourist attraction. As I say, the
Irony of the idea is that we had to fight tooth and nail. This took up a tremendous amount of time. I probably spent as much time on that as I did working. I mean every night I would go home, and we had organized various activities to fight this.

One track we were pursuing was the legal one. We were meeting with other groups that had interests in this neighborhood. There was a question of how to reuse the buildings, and we came up with plans to convert some of these industrial buildings to residential use. We wanted a park, and we got somebody to design a park. And this is now the waterfront park which is one of the, again, jewels of the Boston park system. It's right at the edge of the water, and there's an aquarium there. So I spent a lot of time on that.

PETERSHAGEN: You're fairly proud of that accomplishment. I can hear that in your voice and see it.

GIANTURCO: Oh, yes! It was so frustrating because we were fighting these bureaucrats that were telling us, "It can't be done. It has to be the way we say it is, and you as citizens,
GIANTURCO who are you to tell us what to do?" And my thought was, "I'm a taxpayer, and who is this bureaucrat telling me that you need a six-lane expressway going through a historic neighborhood, tearing down fifty warehouses which if they aren't on the Register, ought to be and would qualify in every way?" It's just insanity I remember discussion after discussion with the highway types They finally backed down, as a matter of fact, and now there is no question whatsoever that I mean if the same people were planning this area today never in a million years would they put a six-lane expressway through there It would have destroyed what was there It's the kind of problem we have in Sacramento where I-5 [Interstate Highway 5] was put, you know, cutting off Old Sacramento and the river from the rest of the city It's just crazy

That was one of my first--I guess from the citizen point of view it was the first--real exposure I had to the transportation planning process I had been involved in it as a bureaucrat, from the other side, in
reviewing the plans of the Department of Public Works and in my capacity as the head of the Office of State Planning. And when I was working for the poverty program we had lots of stuff connected to transportation that was going on, but from the side of the man in the street that's affected by this, I saw that whole angle as a result of my involvement in that neighborhood association.

PETERSHAGEN: So this time period overlapped your state

Did anybody suggest there was any kind of a conflict between your activity here?

GIANTURCO: There was none.

PETERSHAGEN: I'm not trying to suggest that. Did anybody point that finger at you?

GIANTURCO: No, never. Because there was absolutely no connection. I've always been very, very aware of conflict. I think too aware because I think there are some things, for example, when I was at Caltrans that I should have gotten involved in community things in Sacramento, but I felt it was not appropriate since I'm a state official. I should just keep my fingers out of anything else. The
only slight relationship there might have been was that this, well, they didn't call it an expressway, but that's what it was, this roadway, that was planned

[End Tape 3, Side A]

[Begin Tape 3, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN Now, you've just said, Adriana, that there was some more that you wanted to address on this citizen involvement, so please go ahead with that

GIANTURCO There was something that evolved out of my being involved in this neighborhood organization and becoming the president of it while we were fighting this battle with the redevelopment people. And that was that one of the things we had wanted to do, which I think I mentioned before, was to convert some of these industrial buildings into residential units. The city finally accepted that. Then the question was who's going to live in these residential units. The idea was that they would be sold essentially as—I'm not sure if they were—cooperatives or condominiums. But, in any event, they were not to be apartment houses rented out. They
were to be owned by individuals. This area of Boston was probably economically one of the most thriving and prosperous areas at the time Boston was a major seaport, which it no longer is. It still has some seaport activity, but the big activity was in the nineteenth century. These are nineteenth-century buildings, and a lot of them are small. They are ideal to convert into row houses.

The city had finally accepted a portion of our alternative plan for the use of the area that involved conversion of these buildings into housing. The question was who was going to get these row houses. The location could not have been more desirable. You're within a block of the water. Some of these buildings or these row structures actually had views of the harbor, and who was going to get them? People stood to make a lot of money if they got them. This was ripe, a situation ripe, for corruption in that somebody could get one of these structures—I think altogether we were talking about twenty or thirty of them—fix
it up, install plumbing, redo the interior, whatever, convert it, and then sell it and make a fortune on this. So part of the agreement that we reached with the redevelopment agency was that there would be a citizens' group put together that would recommend to the redevelopment agency who'd be awarded the contract to rehab and also own these buildings. I was appointed as one of the members of this committee which, as I remember, had about four or five members. It was a small committee. I'm simplifying this. It was a very complicated situation, but it boiled down to a minority of us on this committee deciding that we wanted to do this in a very organized way and that the people that we thought should get these buildings would be people who had a commitment to the neighborhood and people who were going to stay in the neighborhood who were not land speculators and hopefully people who were of moderate income who otherwise would not have a chance to buy housing of this quality because this housing is expensive. This was
GIANTURCO publicly subsidized because it was a redevelopment project.

We established a I don't remember exactly how this was done, through advertisement in the newspaper or something that the redevelopment authority did. It was made known to the public in general that these housing units or these structures were to be awarded to people for conversion into residential use. They were to apply, and it would go through a screening process, and then a certain number of people would be given these structures at a very low price. As I remember, it wasn't a dollar, but it was something close to that. It was a nominal cost that you assumed ownership. I don't recall if they were set up as condominiums or planned unit developments or something. Still, it was private ownership.

We went through a process, this minority group on the committee, of establishing criteria for judging these applications. We decided to interview everybody who had applied and to ask them a set of questions which were designed to get at their
GIANTURCO committed to the neighborhood, whether or not they'd lived in this area before, did it look as though they intended to live there in the future, what was their income level, and I don't know. It was a series of what we felt were objective questions, which I believe were, and certainly should have been, in my opinion, the criteria used to award goodies like this. And this is what it boiled down to. These were public goodies being handed out. So we went through this process. We interviewed the various applicants. We must have interviewed probably close to a hundred people. Some people were screened out immediately by the committee as a whole as not meeting some very basic criteria. I don't remember what that was, but maybe if you had declared bankruptcy within the past two years you couldn't be considered. But beyond that it was pretty much wide open.

We finally came up with a list of recommended people to get these units, and that was then submitted to the redevelopment agency. They accepted, again I don't
remember the numbers, but maybe a quarter of the people that we recommended. The other three quarters were buddies of people on the redevelopment authority, or buddies of the mayor, or buddies of somebody or other. It was just the most blatant cronyism. It had nothing to do whatsoever with any of these criteria that we had established. There were people on there who took these units, got a contractor in, did a quick fix-up job, and sold them six months later and made hundreds of thousands of dollars of profit. It was absolutely disgraceful. And I was shocked to beat the band by this. I just couldn't believe it. This was the worst I had seen in government.

So I took it upon myself to write a letter to HUD, which was the federal agency behind the renewal program. I wrote a long letter. I'm a pretty good writer, too. It was probably six or seven pages long. I wrote it to the regional office of HUD. I said I had been on this committee, and I described exactly what had happened and how we had gone through this process, and I named
GIANTURCO

names and dates and the whole thing. And I never got a response back. Nothing! Several months elapsed. The thing is at that time, also, I just didn't know how the ropes of, how government really works. It's the squeaky wheel that gets the grease. I never got a response. After something like six months I finally thought, "What is this? This is ridiculous. There hasn't been any response. These units are being sold off. These buddies, political cronies, are making windfall profits off this. It's really disgraceful. This is taxpayers' money that went into this because the redevelopment agency had acquired these properties as part of the eminent domain process. They had paid for them. It wasn't coming free."

So I called HUD, the regional office, and I got some secretary or somebody or other. The interesting thing to me was that they instantly knew what this was. I was referred to the Legal Department or the Legal Counsel for the regional office of HUD, somebody in that part of the office who told me, "Oh, yes. They had gotten this letter..."
and they were really apologetic that they hadn't got back to me. They were writing a response to it, and I would get it shortly. I never did get a response. I never got a response, and I guess it must have been about, I guess it was right around that period that I came back to California. I've since talked about that situation with a number of people including my husband who is a lawyer who said, "You should have carried that all the way." I mean, knowing what I know now and how suspect that whole thing was, I should have pursued it when I didn't get an answer out of that regional office to HUD in Washington and taken it to the President's Office, if necessary. It is disgusting when that kind of thing happens in government. Unless somebody blows the whistle it happens.

Let me get this clear. It sounded like with your very first follow-up phone call, as soon as you mentioned your name and the subject of your call, that just about everybody in that regional office was aware of you and your letter and that subject.
That's right!

So it sounds like there had been considerable discussion going on without your getting an answer.

Absolutely clearly, it was not that that letter had gotten lost. They couldn't figure out what to do with it, and they were probably in cahoots. And I say this, [Laughter] they were probably aware of this situation, and maybe even before I was trying to blow the whistle on it and didn't want to do anything about it. They thought, "Gee, if we ignore this hopefully this woman will go away, and here she's calling. Gee, what are we going to do now?" And then they were just as relieved as could be when I let it drop after that phone call and did not pursue it further, which I know now looking back I should have done.

While you were in Massachusetts during this period of your life, this is when you and John were married? Is that correct?

No, I was not married to him at that time. I was married to him right before I took the job, the first job. Now I'm trying to
remember I've been married to him for nineteen years I was married to him right before I came to Caltrans

PETERSHAGEN I see So in between the time that you were Assistant Secretary at Business and Transportation [B and T] and coming to Caltrans

GIANTURCO Yes

PETERSHAGEN Are we ready then to get you back to California?

GIANTURCO OK

PETERSHAGEN Are there other issues, that maybe we should discuss, in Massachusetts?

GIANTURCO [Laughter] I don't think so My Massachusetts experience in government both from the point of view of being a member of Well, I worked for a consulting firm there I got one view of how things work in this world, you know, from the private business side and then how it tends to work in bureaucracies and government, non-profit corporations, and then this citizen angle So by this time I'm getting kind of a broad view of what makes the world turn around when you are trying to accomplish public purposes,
and it doesn't always work the way you think it does

PETERSHAGEN

I think we've all had to learn that the hard way at some point in our lives. [Laughter] So would you care to describe to us the circumstances of your leaving Massachusetts and coming to California?

GIANTURCO

Well, after Jerry Brown was elected Governor, I had known Jerry Brown when I lived in the I House, and I had kept in contact with him sporadically over the years. When I was working for *Time* magazine, I may have mentioned this before, I think he'd got a job with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] one summer, which was, I don't know if it still is, but I believe at that time it was headquartered in Paris. Now, it seems to me, it's in Brussels.

PETERSHAGEN

Yes. It's moved to Brussels since France has dropped out for all intents and purposes.

GIANTURCO

Oh, is that what did it? [Laughter] It seems to me at that time either it was still in Paris or they had a Paris branch. So he was there one summer, and I saw him several times during that summer. And then when he
GIANTURCO went to Yale Law School was the time that I was at Harvard so I saw him a few times then I don’t know. When he came east after he was elected [California] secretary of state I saw him a couple of times. I'd made some trips to California. So we'd maintained a friendship, and when he was elected governor he asked me to come out and work in California government.

My first job was actually not at Caltrans as you know, but in the Business and Transportation Agency, which was headed by Don Burns who had been Jerry Brown's roommate, I guess, at law school or one of his roommates or, in any event, a friend of his. I came into the B and T Agency and stayed there, I guess, for about not quite a year, less than that, because Harvard entered into this again. I was running up against the deadline that they established for turning in a dissertation without having to retake these comprehensive exams. I didn't want to retake these comprehensive exams, and at that point I thought, "I want to finish this Ph D thing." So I left and came back.
east after being in the B and T Agency for, as I say, less than a year. It must have been about six or seven months. I'm not sure. I think I started in February and left in November.

It was at the time that Caltrans had produced the famous, or infamous, transportation plan that was extremely controversial. And I had a lot to do with reviewing that from the standpoint of the agency and then when we thought that it was not an acceptable plan of putting together a team to come up with a new plan. And towards the end of working on that I went back with the idea of doing this dissertation and before I'd really gotten into that.

There had been an Acting Director of Caltrans. First there was the holdover from the [Governor Ronald] Reagan administration. I'm trying to remember his name, a very nice man who stayed, I guess, through about June or July of the first year of Jerry Brown's tenure.

PETERSHAGEN: Was that [Acting Director] Sid [McCausland]?
No, no, it was the guy before Sid. What was his name? Well, you can easily find it out. "[Director] Howard Ullrich, maybe". Does that ring a bell? "Could be."

And [Deputy Director Robert] Bob Best was his Chief Deputy. I think it was Howard Ullrich. He left, and Sid McCausland was named Acting Director of Caltrans. There was a search for a permanent director, and I was named director in March which was the year following the year I'd started to work for the Brown administration. So there was a gap there of, I guess, about three or four months. When I had gone back east to try and get this dissertation underway and complete that work, then I decided, "What the heck! I'm more interested in the real world than academia, and it sounds [Laughter] far more interesting to do this Caltrans job than to work on the dissertation."

So the legend goes that you were working on your dissertation, and it was the Jerry Brown call to California that brought you back. Perhaps you went back to work on your...
dissertation, though, with some thought that you might want to be director of Caltrans already? Is that fair to say?

GIANTURCO No I mean my motive for going back was to get that dissertation done But these events It has to do with the sequence of the events, and I don't think it's very important in terms of how it affected any, whatever, my thinking at the time But my thinking at the time was that I needed to do And I was under the gun because I was running against this seven year deal with Harvard So that was my last chance to do it without having to retake the comprehensive exams So I went back because I wanted to meet that seven year deadline Then, when I was offered the Caltrans job, I had to make a choice, and I made the choice to take the Caltrans job I was not actually at the seven year point At the time I became director of Caltrans I still had, I think, maybe a year or so to run on the seven year deadline So I could have supposedly, if I had been Superwoman, been director of Caltrans and written a dissertation at the
same time But it didn't work out like that

[Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN

No, I wouldn't imagine that it would I think either one of them could be a handful If I could take you back one more step, before he was governor Jerry was secretary of state There was no conversation between the two of you about perhaps a position while he was secretary of state?

GIANTURCO

No And, as a matter of fact, I was surprised I didn't even realize he was running for governor I was all wrapped up in what I was doing I knew he was secretary of state obviously, and I had had some contact with him while he was secretary of state But I was really wrapped up in these things that I was doing in Massachusetts When he was elected governor was the first I knew he had run for governor because I had not spoken to him in quite some time since he had made the decision to run I guess when he was secretary of state he might have mentioned to me that he was thinking of that as the next step, but it was sometime prior to his decision to actually go for it
PETERSHAGEN: So while you were back working on your dissertation, that's the time period that you and John were married?

GIANTURCO: Uh-huh

PETERSHAGEN: And then you decided to come to be Director of Caltrans. Some of the written accounts that I've read of your background suggest that under ordinary circumstances perhaps the Saltonstall family might have objected to John's marriage to somebody of Italian heritage, and I think that was written somewhat tongue-in-cheek only to describe that he was somewhat on the outs in the family structure anyhow since he was a Democrat.

GIANTURCO: That's true. Well, I don't know that his family would have objected, but he was known as the Democratic Saltonstall. Leverett Saltonstall was in the U.S. Senate for years and was known as "Mr. Republican," and his family is well-known in Republican circles. But he's a fairly liberal Democrat.

PETERSHAGEN: So as a relative newlywed you get the call to come to California, and John, of course, is established in the east and is probably not
ready to pick up and move to California

There must have been considerable discussion before you made this decision.

Oh, yes. There was a lot of discussion. Days and days and days of discussion, trying to figure this out. Of course, now the idea of commuter marriage is somewhat accepted. This happens more and more. You have two-career families. What do you do? It's difficult. Then it was pretty unusual. We finally decided, "Well, this sounds like something that would be very exciting and challenging to do." And so, I decided to do it. I mean it was a joint decision. We really burned up those phone lines, and he would come out here. I guess we saw each other on the average, I'd say, once every three weeks with me either flying east for a weekend and a day, say, or his doing the same, coming to California, and talking on the phone constantly. And, of course, I had to make some trips, not a whole lot, but from time to time, I would have to go to Washington so I would swing by Boston on the way. That lasted, I guess—I'm trying to
remember—the first year or so that I was director, and then he did come to California. He was teaching at McGeorge Law School.

PETERSHAGEN: He came directly to McGeorge?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: Then, as I've read, there were about two hundred candidates screened for the directorship of Caltrans. Does that sound about right?

GIANTURCO: I don't know. Actually, I had been involved in setting up the selection committee before when I was assistant secretary in the agency, and I frankly don't recall the circumstances of deciding to have a selection committee. But, as I say, Sid McCausland had been appointed as acting director, and it was decided not by me, but by the governor or Don Burns or somebody that they wanted to go through the whole process and, you know, do a nationwide search on this thing which was one of

I don't remember if there were many departments at that point that still didn't have permanent directors. It seems to me that when Jerry Brown first became governor
GIANTURCO there were a number of hold-overs. This is not true when [Governor George] Deukmejian came. When Deukmejian came in he basically told everybody that was there, "You're out," while Jerry Brown didn't do that. There were a lot of hold-overs and then a lot of acting directors. By this time, I guess, again, I wasn't in on these high level discussions, but it was obviously decided. Looking back I assume it was decided, "We want to get our act together here and get people in a place and no more of this acting business."

One of the assignments I was given was to put together a search committee and to try to solicit applications for the director of Caltrans. I was on the committee and Carlotta Mellon, who was Jerry Brown's appointment secretary, and we got Frank Herringer who was the head of BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit (District)] at that time, seems to me maybe a fourth person who was an academic type, maybe the Institute of Transportation Studies at Berkeley or something like that. And we started soliciting applications. Interestingly
enough, we did not get a lot of people that seemed to be interested in coming to California. I was surprised. It seems to me we advertised the job. I don't recall specifically what we did because I wasn't involved in it very long. I was involved maybe for the first month, and then I went back to work on my dissertation. So I dropped out of this process. But in the short time that I was involved in that there had been very few people that had expressed an interest.

Our idea was that we would try to interest people, that the people on this committee would know people. Like Herringer, we assumed, would know people in the transportation field who would be suitable candidates, and he would call around. And that's what happened, but very few names came forward. At the time I left I don't think we had in process more than—and it's hazy in my mind—but I don't think we had more than twenty names. At that point we hadn't started any screening down process. It was a process of getting names in
So you were as much a recruiting committee as a screening committee

Yes, we were. We started off as a recruiting committee. When I was involved, it was recruiting. And then it obviously at some point turned into a screening committee. But, by that time I was off it because I was back in Boston trying to finish up my Harvard work. And I remember the final screening when I was asked if I would like to be--and I was in Boston--if I would like to be considered. I said, "Sure." The final interviews, as I remember, were conducted in the governor's office, and I'm trying to remember who was there. I do remember that [Secretary of Agriculture and Services] Rose [Elizabeth] Bird was there and Don Burns, who was the head of B and T, who I already knew because I had worked for him in the agency. I'm not sure that Jerry Brown was even present. I think he probably was. The thing that they stressed was that they wanted, which I had said initially when I had been involved in the recruitment phase, that we want somebody with a broad background. We
PETERSHAGEN

Don't want somebody who's just going to be tunnel vision, just build a highway because it's been in the works for twenty years, somebody who's going to look at how transportation impacts on all kinds of other things—the environment, the development of communities, economic development, and not going to look at it in isolation. When I was interviewed, myself, for the position that was the general thrust of the questions that were asked.

PETERSHAGEN

Did you specifically rule out engineers in making that decision?

GIANTURCO

No, absolutely not. I don't remember that that was an issue at all at the recruitment stage. I don't think we had specified anything particularly in terms of academic training. It was more in terms of people with some experience in transportation and who could relate transportation to other objectives. Whether they were engineers or not, I don't think ever was a part of it, not in my experience with it anyway. But I should say, since you bring that up, George, that as far as I know there never was prior
to my being named director of Caltrans a person who was the head of that agency who was a licensed civil engineer [Director] Jim Moe, who had been the last director under Reagan prior to Howard Ullrich, was a civil engineer, but not licensed He got his license while he was at the Department

Of course, this department was the Division of Highways and went through various permutations and so on But, in terms of people being in charge of whatever it was called, they were principally business types in political appointments I'm not talking now about the chief engineer The chief engineer was the one who was running things, and the director, whatever he was called, director of public works or whatever, tended to be political appointments--cut the ribbon and that type of thing To my knowledge there had been nobody prior to me who was a licensed civil engineer in my position There had been one person who was an engineer, but not licensed

PETERSHAGEN Understood, and thanks for clarifying the distinction between director of public works
and the state highway engineer because that is one we need to make. We might as well, since we are talking about the recruitment phase, and you mentioned Rose Bird being involved in that. Let's address the Bird/Gianturco conspiracy, then, that I don't believe that. Let me clarify that I don't believe she was in the recruitment phase at all.

PETERSHAGEN: I'm sorry. I thought you said that she was on the interview committee.

GIANTURCO: Obviously at this point I wasn't part of the process of selecting since I was a candidate. I don't know that she was even involved in the screening, but at that time she. This was right after she had been very successful in settling this longstanding problem with farm workers and the question of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board. That thing was set up, and finally there was some kind of a peace reached. She had negotiated that. That was at a high point. She was not at that point controversial in the way she later became. She was a person who had a real track record in accomplishing something,
and the fact that she was in that group doesn't mean to me or doesn't imply to me, I don't know how they had it set up, that she necessarily sat in on all interviews. But she was somebody whose judgment about things the governor trusted in the capacity of, you know, how you make things work in state government. Her job was at that time secretary of food and agriculture, I guess was the title.

PETERSHAGEN Understood

GIANTURCO None of that later controversy was present then

PETERSHAGEN Right. The thing that I wanted to address was this idea that you and Rose Bird having both resided in the I House at the same time that Jerry was there, that somehow the two of you had come to influence him.

GIANTURCO In some kind of a cabal

PETERSHAGEN That I had read in some written biographical sketch about you.

GIANTURCO There is just absolutely no truth to it. I may have influenced Jerry Brown, or he may have influenced me. And Rose Bird may have influenced him, and he may have influenced
her I didn't even know Rose Bird in the I House So there was certainly no conspiracy on our part because I didn't even know the woman [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN Thanks for making that clear At this time was B T Collins Jerry Brown's chief of staff?

GIANTURCO No He was the assistant legislative affairs person in the governor's office, and the head of legislative affairs--I've forgotten what the exact title is--was Mark Poche, who is now a judge in Santa Clara County Superior Court, I believe He was Poche's second in command

PETERSHAGEN Of course, B T was known for his sense of humor Later on, as Jerry had appointed yourself and many other women to high offices, B T Collins apparently had given you as a group the name "Jerry's Nuns " Had you ever heard that expression before?

GIANTURCO Never heard it I'm not a Catholic so it wouldn't apply to me [Laughter] But I never did hear that expression

PETERSHAGEN It was something that just leaped out at me I'm sure I'll be able to find where I read
it, but it just leaped out at me. It seemed so typical B T.

GIANTURCO

I was very friendly with B T in those days, as a matter of fact. This was before B T got famous. We hit it off right off the bat, and we spent loads of time together kind of. I don't know, socializing. I don't even know how to describe our friendship, but we had a lot in common and talked about a lot [of things].

[End Tape 3, Side B]
Adriana, when we finished the last session we had pretty much gotten to the point in your life where you had been appointed the director of Caltrans. On that last tape you had compared yourself, I think rather interestingly, to men that I would identify as the Directors of Public Works in the former organization such as [Jim] Moe, [Col Walter E] Garrison, [Earl Lee] Kelly—people that were not engineers. I can't escape the notion that that's probably a valid comparison to make as the director of the new Caltrans being much more than a highway agency but I wonder if neither were my immediate two predecessors at Caltrans itself. Sid McCausland was not an engineer nor was—and I just cannot remember this man's name, his immediate predecessor who was appointed by Reagan—Howard Ullrich. They weren't engineers, and they were heads of Caltrans. Caltrans was a new organization
formed in 1974, only two years before I became director. But in those two years there had been two directors, neither of whom was an engineer, and in all the predecessor organizations, the Department of Public Works, whatever, the directors had not been engineers either. There was no tradition whatsoever of engineers leading this organization or its predecessor organization.

What I'm trying to lead up to, I think, is my own perception that Caltrans internally still views itself as the Division of Highways.

Oh yes. No question about that. You mean even now?

Even now.

Certainly at the time I was there it did.

Yes, certainly at the time you were there. And I think that even as you had that perception of a tradition of non-engineers you were still cast in the role by a lot of Caltrans professionals as the "Director of the Division of Highways," and I say that in quotes, and therefore you were required to be an engineer.

Well, there are a lot of elements to this situation, George, and I'd have to really
think it through and do an analytical thing, which I could maybe do if I were writing a paper on this, to try to separate out what was going on

One is, we're dealing with a new organization. This was a new organization so part of my task was to form this new organization. It had been there for two years, but it had been in such a state of crisis that in terms of internal organization and setting direction and so on that opportunity had really been put on the back burner because the place was in such financial difficulty that there just wasn't enough organizational energy to think through what are we doing, how do we structure ourselves to do it, and so on. That's one thing.

Another thing is that this thing about the Division of Highways was a major problem in and of itself because there had been, as I understand it—and now I'm going back in history before I was there—when it was decided that the Division of Highways would evolve into a Department of Transportation. As I understand it, there was significant
opposition among certain of the more liberal elements in the legislature toward that happening, their thought being that the Division of Highways was so highway dominated in its thinking, in its culture, and so on that it could not possibly become a broader organization, that mass transit which was the principal thing that was going to be added on, aeronautics also, but mass transit was the major new component, that this Division of Highways couldn't do the job, that its thinking was so hide-bound and so narrowly focused on highways. So I was faced with one of my jobs, specifically to try to change the situation to make the organization evolve into something that it was predisposed according to many people not to do, i.e., not to be able to reconfigure itself, change its way of thinking, and so on.

A third element I would mention is that I think I was just a different personality type than many of the previous directors, leaving apart entirely the question of gender. I am a take-charge kind of individual, and I also am a hands-on manager. Many of the previous directors, whether you
GIANTURCO are talking Division of Highways, whatever, predecessor organizations, had essentially seen their jobs as ceremonial, oriented toward the governor’s office, the legislature perhaps, but not involved with internal management. I saw my job as taking hold of that organization and reshaping it, not having other people doing that. Although, of course, I delegated—had to. I mean you have to delegate authority. You can’t do everything yourself.

This was very foreign to the organization to have a director, engineer or non-engineer, take charge in the way that I attempted to do and I believe successfully did. The individual within the organization, the organizations prior to Caltrans and Caltrans itself when it was first established, who really ran the place was the chief engineer, not the director. I saw the chief engineer as a deputy to the director. The director was the boss, not the chief engineer. And that conflict also set up a tension between me as a non-engineer and the rest of the organization that perhaps would
GIANTURCO not have existed had there not existed this position of chief engineer

I should say also from my, I would say rather limited, but probably more knowledgeable background on this subject than the man in the street that it's my understanding that when Caltrans was established in the law, when A B 69 passed, there was an issue about whether or not there should be a chief engineer. I believe that as part of the legislative process of compromise and back and forth and so on that it was decided as a concession to the people that were opposing the formation of this organization, a transportation organization which presumably would decrease the power of the engineering establishment because it was making it into something broader than the engineering organization had been before, that as a concession to these people whether or not they were engineers within Caltrans or the so-called "highway lobby" or the legislators who were aligned with this element, that the position of chief

\footnote{A B 69, 1972 Reg Sess, Cal Stat, Ch 1253}
engineer was written into the law. However, it was not written in, as I remember now—I may have gotten this wrong and it's something that you might want to do or anybody researching this or listening to this tape would want to make sure of—but it is my recollection that what the law says is there shall be a chief engineer, but it does not say what that chief engineer is to do. That in itself was a compromise of a compromise. It said there is going to be a chief engineer, but it did not say that everybody in the organization is going to report to him or he's in charge of this, that, and the other thing. It just simply said he's going to be there.

I take it from that general kind of a statement "There shall be a State Engineer" that it probably didn't go into the details of what that meant.

Deliberately! This was not by accident. It was somewhat of a sop to the people that saw the engineering component of Caltrans being threatened by the existence of a Caltrans. It was decided that mention would be made of a position and that that position would be
written into the law, but it was also
deliberately not spelled out in the law that
this position was given certain authority
In other words, it was kind of a meaningless
gesture to say there shall be a chief
engineer. Well, maybe the chief engineer is
in charge of, you know, sweeping the floors
It didn't say

Interesting

Now, as I say, somebody doing historic
research better check this out. This is
quite a bit after the fact, and this happened
before I was even director, but as I
understand or as I understood at the time,
that was the legislative history in the
creation of the organization having to do
with the position of chief engineer.¹

Well, we can footnote the transcript to
clarify that. Just for the record you've
used the term, "take charge" half a dozen
times now in the last few minutes and
"manager" probably equally as often and
"hands on" about equally as often. How old

¹A B 69 (Section 50) refers to the State Highway
Engineer's duties going to the Director
were you when you became director of Caltrans?

GIANTURCO

Thirty-six

PETERSHAGEN

A relative kid, I think, by previous standards

GIANTURCO

By Caltrans standards, but not by overall standards. When I look at this [President William Jefferson] Clinton administration in Washington right now I can't believe the age of some of these people. I mean like Carol Browner, who is the head of the [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency] EPA, is thirty-two, something like that. I mean they are in their thirties. Somebody in their forties is considered old.

In relationship to Caltrans that was young. I would certainly grant that. But there was a specific thing about the age structure of Caltrans which happened to have been one of our concerns at the time in that we were top heavy. The organization was top heavy with older people and just looking at the cohorts and what was going to happen to them we faced—and we had a whole group of people working on this problem for a substantial period of time trying to figure
out what is the best way to cope with it—a
wave of retirements that was going to
declaw the top ranks of the organization
Because a lot of people had been hired, I
mean the main hiring period as I recall was
in probably, in the Well, it had to
be in the sixties when the Interstate Highway
Program was going full swing A huge group
came in at that time A few of them peeled
off and went into the private sector or
whatever, but a large number of them stayed
And those people had moved through the ranks
of the organization and were at the top of
the organization and at this time were in
their fifties, early sixties—approaching
retirement
So, of course, having a director of
thirty-six compared to that top management
thing which was an historical—I don't want
to call it a fluke—but it was an historical
fact because of the timing of the legislation
creating the highway program It had created
a particular age structure at Caltrans which
led to the average age of the employees being
higher, management employees in any case,
being higher than what you would have
expected I think if you had compared Caltrans to other organizations. Again, that would be an interesting thing to do if you were doing historical research on this.

The second factor along those lines was that when I came in layoffs were still going on. The layoffs were done on the basis of seniority. So the age structure was even more skewed toward older people because the younger people had been laid off. They were the ones that got the notices.

PETERSHAGEN: You took the very next question right out of my mouth. That's just fine. So I guess the point I'm trying to lead up to is with the gender issue you're certainly a pioneer woman with regard to Caltrans or highway construction in California.

GIANTURCO: Or the U.S. There wasn't anybody even in any other states or the U.S. government, the federal government.

PETERSHAGEN: You were not an engineer.

GIANTURCO: Now, that shouldn't have counted against me. I will say again. But for these various reasons added on to the other things it was a convenient thing to. It was a total red herring. Because that factually was
nothing different from what had happened before

PETERSHAGEN

Of course No argument that it's a red herring, but we have your gender, you're not an engineer, you're relatively young
If you look at the score sheet there are a tremendous number of strikes against you that add up to your being the "wrong" person for the job And I say wrong in quotes

GIANTURCO

That depends on whose defining right and wrong Wrong for the people who want to continue doing things the way they had been done twenty years before Definitely not, I mean I was trying to bring Caltrans into the future And if you were looking for somebody to take it back to the past or keep it mired in the past I was certainly the wrong person No doubt about it I'd be the first person to say that

PETERSHAGEN

Now I'm going to assume that in conjunction with your appointment to the directorship, you and Governor Brown must have discussed that aspect of it considerably

GIANTURCO

No, we did not

PETERSHAGEN

No, you did not?
GIANTURCO: No, not considerably. We had some discussion. I mean there was just no question. It was not a matter of discussion. It was taken for granted. Or the way it was presented to me is we've got this organization, Caltrans, which is pretty new in state government. It's only been there for two years under this new law, A B 69, and we want to make it into what the law says it's supposed to be which is the Department of Transportation—not just the Division of Highways. The key thing about that is not only that it has become multi-modal, but we are not going to deal with transportation as something separate and apart from everything else that goes on in society, but transportation as it relates to land use, the environment, job development, dispersal of jobs, etc., that we are going to see transportation as an integral part of the overall economic, environmental, and social picture in California. As I say, that was not an issue of discussion in the sense that there was any dissension about it. He and I were fully agreed upon that, and that is
precisely what the law itself says. I mean that's what A B 69 says.

A B 69, as I said, went into effect in 1974 as I recall. It was passed in '73, enacted in '73, and took effect in '74. It's a very progressive piece of legislation, and it says basically what I just said.

PETERSHAGEN: All right, it's progressive, and it calls for this integrated transportation approach.

GIANTURCO: Integrated between the modes.

PETERSHAGEN: Right.

GIANTURCO: And then transportation itself related to other things that it affects and that affect it.

PETERSHAGEN: Right. A lot of people might say that is very liberal legislation. Yet, earlier in contrast with that you mentioned a lot of the political liberals had opposed that approach as being unworkable.

GIANTURCO: Oh, no, no, no. No, I didn't make myself clear. They opposed the old Division of Highways being the organization that would transform itself into Caltrans. As I understand the issue, the issue was do we take the Division of Highways and make that
GIANTURCO the major component of this new organization, or do we just forget this Division of Highways—"it's hopeless"—and start a new organization completely separate from the Division of Highways and call that Caltrans? That was the issue. And some of the more liberal thinkers wanted to take that second approach. Forget this Division of Highways. It's never going to be able to do anything other than build highways. We need a separate Department of Transportation.

How they planned to integrate the highway function into this new department I don't know. What is that expression? You know, you can't make a leopard change its spots. You can change the name, but as long as you have the same people there, the same procedures, the same everything, you can call it the Division of Transportation or Department of Transportation until you're blue in the face. It's still going to be a Division of Highways with the "flying tomato" as its symbol.

Boy, did I hear a lot about that! There used to be some logo or something representing the Division of Highways, and
people would all actually become misty-eyed talking about this flying tomato and how much it meant to them. I went to a number of retirement parties for old-timers who'd been there from the heyday of the Division of Highways who had little flags or banners or things presented to them with the tomato on it. I mean that was the height of their career.

And, again, the conflict within the legislature, though, was not whether or not we should have the Department of Transportation. The question was do we make the core of that department this old Division of Highways, or do we start from scratch? Now, as it was announced that you were going to become director, from what I've been able to discern from all that is written about that, as soon as that announcement was made, Senator Collier, [State Senator Randolph] Randy Collier, immediately stood up and announced his opposition to it.

Right. He'd never met me, never heard of me, and had no reason in the world. He didn't have a clue what my thinking was because I had never exchanged two words with
I have often heard of him, along with perhaps one or two others, mentioned as the "father of the California Highway system."

Freeway system, I think more the freeway and expressway system. I think he was the author of that. I think it was, 1948 legislation that established the freeway and expressway system in statute.

At any rate, he was probably as a member of the legislative body the most powerful detractor or opponent to your nomination.

Initially, but he did not end up that way. I don't know if you want to ask me some questions, or why aren't you asking me questions? [Laughter] and I'll give you some answers. [Laughter]

Are you suggesting that he became perhaps a supporter of you? Did it make that much of a story?

I don't know if you would say he was an active supporter, but his opposition was neutralized, and I believe he finally voted.

Note: Gianturco is correct. This was a misstatement on the part of the Interviewer.
for my nomination. You would again have to check that in the historical record. What happened was that I was named director, and instantly he held a press conference or issued a press release or something or other saying I was a wild-eyed—oh, I can't remember—anti-freeway type who didn't own an automobile who I mean you would have thought I came from Mars with the description of this [Laughter]

It's something I pointed out at the time. I mean, this is just an aside here, he tried to paint me as somebody who had no understanding of nor connection with the modern culture of the United States, which involves extensive use of the automobile, obviously. It just so happens that the very first thing that I did when I turned sixteen which is the legal age for getting a driver's license in Pennsylvania where I was living at the time, the first thing that I did on my birthday was to go down and get my driver's license. I mean I'm fully familiar with the car culture. But to hear Collier describe this, initially the problem was that I had no understanding of this whatsoever or
connection with it  I walked everywhere  I walked fifty miles if I wanted to go to the beach  I mean it was really absurd

But he was up for reelection, and he was apparently facing a tough race for maybe the first time in his career or certainly in his later career  Somebody had appeared on the scene  This is hazy in my mind again  Anybody wanting to do historical research ought to pin this down  But as I remember, he was facing a serious opponent for the first time in a long time  And I was a convenient target  I wasn't even on the spot because when I was named I was on the east coast  So I wasn't around to respond  He kept this up  Then after I arrived on the scene, which was like four or five days after I was named, very shortly thereafter, these attacks continued, but it didn't last that long because what happened was that we had a really wonderful person who was working for the department—and I cannot speak too highly of the quality of many of the personnel at Caltrans  The civil service people were immensely talented and principled people  I mean I was surprised particularly
GIANTURCO contrasting it with the government in the state of Massachusetts which I think I may have talked about last time—inept, incompetent, corrupt, lazy. It's just not like that. I mean there may be those elements of people in California state government, but much less than anything I had experienced before. Caltrans had a particularly high-quality staff.

In any event, the head of the Legal Division at that time was an individual by the name of Emerson Rhyner, who had been with Caltrans for most of his career—probably thirty or forty years by that point. He was close to retirement. He retired maybe a couple of years after I became director. He had been, I guess if not a personal friend, at least very close to Randy Collier. And he had been around at the time that Randy Collier was in his heyday as "father of the freeway system" and had helped to put together the legislation and really knew how Randy Collier ticked. And this Emerson Rhyner was, as I say, a wonderful individual and extremely talented, competent, and ethical. I mean the kind of person that
GIANTURCO anybody would trust Non-partisan Just a very good person And he, after the attacks continued for a while, one day in my office said, "Adriana, you know, I think this is really pretty terrible, what's going on Why don't you see if I can do something about it?" So he talked to Collier and said, "You know you're really giving her a bum rap " Em Rhyner set up a meeting between me and Collier We met, and actually I hit it off with Collier He was kind of a charming guy and not nearly the dragon that I had thought him to be from these barrages of criticism he was leveling at me And he said, "You know, basically, Adriana, what I want from you is the assurance that you won't have"--I couldn't believe this when I heard it, but he said--"I want an assurance from you that you are not going to try to use highway funds to build BART systems in the rural areas " Well, of course, this thought had never crossed my mind I mean who would ever think of building BART in Siskiyou County, which I believe is the place he came from It wouldn't make any sense I had no trouble assuring him that nothing was further from my
mind than diverting highway funds for heavy rail systems in rural areas. That was basically his concern. And after that, I don't know whether he actually supported me, as I say, but there was no further criticism, and my confirmation slid through pretty easily.

As a matter of fact, the criticism that I got in the confirmation—this was pretty interesting—was that I was not pro-transit enough. By this time the tables had kind of turned because I had gone to such lengths to assure people that I didn't have these wild-eyed ideas of building subway systems between Grass Valley and Nevada City or whatever. They thought that all this woman is interested in is highways, and the whole point of this Department of Transportation is we're going to go beyond just highways alone. At the Rules Committee hearing as I remember, the toughest questioning and the opposition that surfaced was from [State Senator James R] Jim Mills, who was "Mr Transit" at that time, saying that he had real doubts in his mind about whether I was
sufficiently committed to transit and wasn't too highway oriented [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN Amazing' [Laughter] Absolutely amazing' As you went through the confirmation process were there any real bumps at all?

GIANTURCO No I spent a lot of time and went around and talked to everybody on the Rules Committee and all the key people and tried to have frank discussions about what did they expect and where was I coming from, and it went very smoothly as I recall There were no bumps One thing was that I was so surprised as I was sitting there in that hearing, in the Rules Committee one which is the key one, to have Mills make this kind of set speech about his concerns about my not being pro-transit enough, being too highway oriented [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN As future people hear this tape or read the transcript of it, I'm sure they're going to be somewhat surprised to hear that statement As I understand it, on or very close to the day that you took office was the opening of the first diamond lane on, I believe, the Santa Monica Freeway
GIANTURCO: Yes, but let me correct that. It was not the first diamond lane.

PETERSHAGEN: Oh, and where was the first diamond lane?

GIANTURCO: I don't know where the first one was, but there were already diamond lanes on Route 101 north of the Golden Gate Bridge, Marin 101, and there were diamond lanes on the San Bernardino Freeway as a separated facility, a busway, so those two projects I know about. There may have been some isolated cases elsewhere of short stretches of diamonds, but there were those two extensive projects already in operation. And, as to when the diamond lanes opened in relationship to my being made director, they opened the very same day I became director. I assumed office, I think I was sworn in probably at--I'm guessing now--but say 10:00 A.M., 9:00 or 10:00 A.M., something like that on March 15, and at 6:30 or 7:00 A.M., whatever the starting time for those lanes was--I've forgotten now--it was the morning rush hour, they opened.

PETERSHAGEN: So it's probably that one little bump in history that has identified you with the
diamond lanes more than anything else I would guess

Of course, I obviously had nothing to do with planning these lanes. I mean, how could I have? [Laughter] I was telling some newspaper reporter not long ago. One individual in particular, Zev Yaroslavsky, who's on the City Council in L.A. and is still there and was there at the time, was very much opposed to the diamond lanes on the Santa Monica Freeway. He insisted to this newspaper reporter that I had planned the Santa Monica Freeway diamond lanes. As I told the reporter, had I been able to plan that what I would have had to have done was to have gotten up at, say, four o'clock on the morning of March 15, figured the whole thing out—where the lane's going to be—gotten all the signs painted, painted the diamonds on the lane, gotten together with the highway patrol and worked out the procedures for giving tickets, done everything, put the ramp meters in which were in connection with the lanes, and done all this before I was sworn in—four or five hours earlier. Patently absurd. Those lanes
GIANTURCO were planned under the Reagan [gubernatorial] administration, and they were ready to go when Jerry Brown assumed office. What happened was that when Jerry Brown became Caltrans Director, they decided to do some more community work preparing the public. I'm talking about the Brown administration, pre-opening of the lanes themselves. As I say, the lanes were ready to go. All the physical work had been done—all the planning, all the traffic engineering connected with it, and so on. There had been extensive consultations with the local street people, the local police, local political structure, community organizations, and so on. But as I understand it, and I kind of observed this second hand because I was in the B and T Agency at the time, So I was pretty much aware of what was going on overall in transportation, although I was not directly involved in what was happening with the diamond lanes at all. I had nothing to do with it. It wasn't part of my responsibility.
But, what was happening during that year was that the Brown Administration was trying to do even more preparation of the community for the opening of these lanes. What happened was, the opening was planned for March 15 and had been for some number of months. The plan had been that we were going to open it March 15, 1976. I was named director, or was asked to be director and accepted, about, I guess maybe four or five days before that--not long before that. I was not in California. I was in Boston at the time. I told the governor's office that I wanted... They said, "Well, how do you want to schedule the time that you actually take the job, or when can you start?" I wanted to take a month off or something just for some relaxing time before I got into this job. They said, "That's fine." So I had intended to start some time in April. As I remember, March 15 was a Monday. The prior Friday, which was like two days after they had first told me that they wanted to name me Caltrans director, they called me back and said, "You know, Adriana, we've got this project opening up on Monday, and we're
getting some rumblings that it may not all go smoothly even though it's been in the works for years now. We'd really like to have you start on Monday so you can be around when it opens. Can you come right now?" And this meant, I mean last minute. I literally did not have time to pack a suitcase full of clothes. I took a weekend bag and flew to Sacramento so I could be here in Sacramento on Monday when the lanes opened.

But in terms of my planning them I didn't plan them. The reason that I'm so identified with them is I did deliberately identify myself with those lanes because I believed in them, not because I planned them. But I thought they were the right thing to do regardless of who planned them.

PETERSHAGEN

It would have been, it seems to me, very easy and very expeditious for you to have just said, "You're not going to hang those things on me. It's not my idea." Yet you never did that.

[End Tape 4, Side A]

[Begin Tape 4, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN

Adriana, as we were finishing the other side of the tape we were talking about the
identification of you and the diamond lanes as almost being one and the same. I had mentioned that I thought it would have been rather easy for you just to cast the blame as it were onto the Reagan administration. You chose not to do that. Would you care to explore that a little bit for us?

GIANTURCO: Well, frankly the thought never crossed my mind. I, at that time and still—maybe not to the same extent because I'm not quite as naive as I was then—but I was apolitical, non-partisan. I believed in that project. It never occurred to me. I mean, it was not a decision that I made, that I'm going to blame them or not blame them for this project. I thought this was a good project, and who planned it is totally irrelevant. And I give the Reagan administration credit for having planned that. I give the Reagan Administration credit for having established the Department of Transportation as far as that goes. A B 69 that established Caltrans was a Reagan bill. It was under Ronald Reagan that CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act] was passed and some of the landmark legislation I agree with all that.
So it was Reagan. Big deal. I know now, but as I was too busy to even think about it at the time, and as I say, it never occurred to me. Had it occurred to me, I would have dismissed the thought instantly. You weasel out of something by saying somebody else did it and I didn't have anything to do with this and blame my predecessor, which I have to say particularly shocked me, truly morally offended and shocked me, when I left Caltrans that my successors at Caltrans as directors at every possible opportunity when anything went wrong, 99 percent of which of these things had nothing whatsoever to do with me, the first thing they did was point at me and say, "Well, that's not my fault. This happened because Adriana planned it before she left." I never, ever did that with anything at Caltrans, not just the diamond lanes, but anything else. My thought was my predecessors did the best jobs they could. Who am I to second guess them?

In the case of the diamond lanes I happen to agree that was a very good idea, and it's come back. I mean it's proved
GIANTURCO itself No question about it It was done for a good reason I mean, they had to do it Not only was it good on the merits as far as I'm concerned, but they did it because they were under the gun from the EPA with the Clean Air Act had named Los Angeles, not unsurprisingly, as one of the areas with the worst air pollution in the United States, most of it due to the automobile And they had to come up with a plan for cutting smog in L A or air pollution in general The transportation portion of this plan, and I'm not sure--this happened again before my time--I'm not sure if the plan that was devised to meet the Clean Air Act, and I'm not even sure if this was the original Clean Air Act or a later set of amendments It seems to me that it was the first set of amendments to the original Clean Air Act It required cities that had terrible pollution problems to come up with these plans which may have gone beyond transportation or may have included only transportation I'm not sure of that But, in any event, the transportation element, whether or not it was the whole plan or part of a larger plan for L A , had
three major parts to it all relating to diamond lanes. That was the essence of the plan. And it was being done in order to try to cut air pollution and, at the same time, have some other good effects, namely, cut congestion by getting fewer vehicles on the road, carrying the same or greater numbers of people, saving energy again because you have less vehicle use. I mean, the objectives were laudatory. Who could argue with any of those things, and certainly I wouldn't argue with them.

Another item that was somewhat of a holdover from the Reagan administration, I think was

Let me just interrupt for one second, George. Sure.

There were sanctions attached to this, also. If a metropolitan area had a plan and didn't carry it out, the sanction was elimination of all highway funding and the imposition of an EPA plan. At that time EPA had not shown to be as wimpish as unfortunately it has proved to be since, you know, making these threats and then not doing anything about it. People
GIANTURCO thought this was a real threat. And the threat that was being bandied about was that if Los Angeles doesn't do something about this one person, one car situation which is causing this terrible pollution or which is a major element of it What EPA was talking about was banning the use of the automobile entirely in L A , not entirely seven days a week but going to some kind of a system, for example, which would say that you could only drive your car every other day of the week. The day of the week would be determined whether your license number ended in an odd number or an even number, something like that.

They were talking about truly draconian measures as an alternative to this relatively benign notion of diamond lanes. It wasn't just the Santa Monica Freeway. There were diamond lanes planned in other locations, too, which I would be happy to talk about. That was the essence of this plan and it was not nearly as bad, from the point of view of people who think it was bad, than what the alternative was at that time.
Where I was headed next was in the direction of the Division of Transportation Planning and the State Transportation Plan, which I believe was almost in its final form at the time that you took office. Correct?

Well, no. When I was in the Business and Transportation Agency before I took over Caltrans, the California Transportation Plan was in its final draft. This was something that was called for under A B 69. And, interestingly enough, I was told by various people in Caltrans when I went to Caltrans, not when I was in the agency, but when I got to Caltrans, that this development of a California Transportation Plan had been used by Caltrans staff as an excuse for the past several years not to do one thing after another because whenever a problem would arise, the answer would be, "Well, we really can't deal with that until we have the California Transportation Plan." It was as though this was this big panacea that was going to provide the answer to every question. It was going to be kind of like the Oracle of Delphi. [Laughter] You consult it, and it tells you, "Yes, well, you
GIANTURCO put diamond lanes here or you put a truck passing lane there or you spend more money on this or you don't do affirmative action if it involves. It was going to have the answer to everything.

But, getting back to the main point of your question or the main thrust of this, the California Transportation Plan which as I say was laid out in the law, was required by the same legislation that established Caltrans, and it was made a central feature of that law. It was supposed to provide the answers to where are we going, How do we get it all together? It was going to be comprehensive. It was not to be just a highway plan. It was to get this multi-modal plan in place which would relate transportation to the kinds of things I was talking about before, land use, economic development, environment, provision of special services for handicapped groups, and the elderly and so on. It was going to do all these things.

It had been assigned to the Division of Transportation Planning, as you say, within Caltrans. The preparation of this plan had been assigned to them, and, I think, they
GIANTURCO really didn't know what they were doing. There was much too much asked of that Division in preparing this plan. I mean the plan, as I say, was seen as the be all and the end all. It was going to be the Bible. It was just going to be the Revelation. It was going to do all these wonderful things and provide all these answers, and you assigned a group of people who had been essentially brought up in the highway tradition whose training was civil engineering, not planning. They may have called themselves planners, but they weren't used to thinking in these big abstract terms. And they were given this monumental task of putting this plan together.

Well, the plan was together in its final draft when I started working in the Business and Transportation Agency. And one of my first assignments—one of the first assignments I was given—was to try to rescue this plan. Before I was named director, the secretary of business and transportation had given a speech in which he blasted this plan and called it "a wind tunnel of rhetoric." That was the phrase, and it caught on. The
GIANTURCO plan basically said nothing I mean it just said, "Gee, air pollution is bad so we're going to try to do something about it." I can't remember The thing just had no substance to it It was just fluff When I read it, I thought, "Bad!" I mean, I don't know what to say I wrote a memo to the secretary about what was wrong with this plan, and I can resuscitate that from my files if some historian is looking at this at some future date I could probably find it or you could find it in the Caltrans or the B and T files Anyway I tried to figure out exactly what is wrong with this plan It boiled down to the fact it wasn't a plan I mean there was nothing there

So I was given the job when I was in the B and T Agency of, as I say, trying to come up with a new plan because the legislation required that there be a plan and that it be adopted by the, what was it called, State Transportation Board, an entity that no longer exists It was folded into the California Transportation Commission [CTC] But the law required that the Transportation Board adopt this plan by such and such a
date, and the date was fast approaching, and there was nothing that the Brown administration wanted to identify itself with to present to this board for adoption.

So, as I say, that was one of my assignments to try to get this in place, and the approach that we took was to get together a task force. I hate that term because usually it means you just have people sitting around trying to avoid a problem. But, in this case, this task force was there to solve a problem. I think we hired about twelve or thirteen people. Some of them, a few of them, taken from Caltrans, but most of them not from Caltrans, working under the direction of a guy that we hired from the outside, a consultant. Their job was to put together a new plan that made sense, and they had a very limited amount of time to do this—like six months.

And they put together what I think was one of the most revolutionary documents that anybody has produced in the transportation area since I've been involved in transportation. They presented ideas in there which people are talking about again.
now Economists have talked about for ages, but engineers have stayed clear of the notion of congestion pricing. A central feature of this document was the statement, which many economists have done research on and there is no question about it, that we do not charge motorists enough for using the roads and in particular we do not charge them enough for using the roads at times when the roads are congested. From an economist's standpoint the whole way the market works, and there's nothing unique about transportation here, is that if you have a large demand and a limited supply the price goes up. And what happens in rush hours is that you have more people trying to use the roads, that's the demand side, than the supply, which is the capacity, is capable of accommodating in any reasonable way. Now the way to solve that is to charge those people who are using the roads at the rush hours more than you charge the people who are using them the off hours. This plan went into a lot of analysis of this phenomenon.

What happens when you don't properly charge for road use is that you get the off
peak users subsidizing the peak users. It's not fair. I mean we build roads to a capacity much larger than they have to be to accommodate the person who isn't using them to go to work. Of course, this is getting less true because we just don't have enough capacity period because we haven't built enough alternate facilities such as mass transit.

And the principle is the same regardless. If we build the road to twelve lanes wide because that's what you need more or less to accommodate people traveling between seven and nine in the morning, the person who uses the road at three o'clock in the afternoon, say a mother who stays at home and picks up a kid from school, she's paying for a twelve-lane road when at that time of day when she uses it all you need is a four lane road. And yet her gasoline taxes are going into supporting this much bigger facility. So one of the things that was proposed in this plan was congestion pricing, time of day pricing. Suggestions, these were specific proposals laid out to capture the indirect costs of automobile use by having
GIANTURCO

Some kind of a smog tax that vehicles that caused a lot of pollution should have higher registration fees or in some way be made to pay for the cost they impose on society in general. It had a lot of specifics like that in it. It also got into the question of mass transit and in what situations was it appropriate and so on.

I thought it was a really fabulous document, forward thinking. It didn't deal with just cornball, cliche kind of things—you got some traffic congestion, therefore add some more lanes. I mean it went way beyond that. It tried to get at what are the problems in transportation, the root problems, and how can we solve them. It went over like a lead balloon. I mean it was extremely controversial. It was way before its time. I'm just trying to think what the outcome of that plan was. I guess what happened at the end was that the governor's office got cold feet about the whole thing because they could see that it could be a very controversial thing.

There had been some other plan that had been presented, and I'm not clear on this...
GIANTURCO don't remember Some person in some other agency in a resource field like agriculture or something, I've forgotten, had presented a plan about what to do with something in that field Maybe it was migrant housing or something Anyway, that plan had been very controversial, and it had come out shortly before this new revised California Transportation Plan was scheduled to come out The governor's office was kind of gun shy of these controversial plans Plus Jerry Brown, himself, personally is not a believer in planning as he's said many times Just the idea turns him off, the whole idea of planning So he was not anxious to be identified with this plan that was going

Oh' Another thing that hit down heavily on Another thing I should say was that the board, the State Transportation Board, which was charged with adopting this plan was very much involved in the development of this second California Transportation Plan

In the case of the first one, the one that was shot down as a "wind tunnel of rhetoric," the DOTP [Division of
Transportation Planning] at Caltrans had developed it and kind of gone through presentations from time to time to the Board to tell them what they were doing. In the second effort with this task force the Board was really built into the process. I mean they participated in workshops on particular elements of it. And there was constant back and forth between this relatively small staff of like twelve or fifteen people that worked on the plan and the members of the Board. I've forgotten the composition of that board, but say there were ten or twelve people on it, certainly not more than that. Almost all of them were Reagan appointees, and some of them were very conservative—not all, but some.

But this plan was so well thought through they had support from virtually every member of that board including the one or two Brown appointees, who tended to be environmental types, and the most conservative of the Reagan appointees, who were free-market types and didn't believe in government getting involved in anything other than national defense is what it practically
boiled down to There was virtually unanimous support behind this plan I mean it was so logical it was hard to disagree with But in any event, what happened at the end was that, despite the fact that the board was behind the plan and knew fully what was in it, had been involved in its development, at the last minute the governor's office decided to withdraw it and not present it for approval So it was never adopted The State Transportation Board was very upset about this, understandably so because they had put a lot of work into this But it just kind of went away

By this time having gone through the bad experience with the "wind tunnel of rhetoric" plan and then this very controversial plan that came out afterwards, the fact that it was written into law that a plan had to be adopted by a certain date was in fact ignored I don't believe that anybody made an issue of that Nobody in the legislature said you violated the law by not doing a plan It just withered away And so there was no plan And all that had happened
before I went to Caltrans That happened while I was in the B and T Agency So it's over twenty years ago, or a minimum of twenty years ago, that was going on. You might be interested to know that just recently I saw a draft California Transportation Plan. [Laughter]

Another one. Yes, I know. Yes, it'll never go away. They keep rising like phoenixes or phoenices, whatever the word would be. [Laughter]

The State Transportation Board, can we compare that to the California Transportation Commission? The types of people that were appointed to it were about the same? Or were they more transportation professionals?

I find that question hard to answer. I could tell you the kind of people that were on the State Transportation. I was very impressed again with the quality of people. As I say, almost all of them were Reagan appointees. There was one person, Ross Eckard, who is a Professor of Economics. One thing I should say, my background being principally economics I could relate to a lot of what these Reagan people had in mind. I
mean being economically oriented, I was thinking in terms of cost, benefit, market forces, and so on. Those are terms that I understand. And this Ross Eckard was one of the people on the board—very intelligent. He was really in favor of this congestion pricing idea, although that hasn't been his main academic interest. His work has been in the field of principally, I believe, or had been until that time, had been in the field of the economics of general aviation. His thesis being that the taxpayer subsidizes this to an outrageous extent. He's done, then, a lot of work along these lines. He was then at the Hoover Institution or whatever it's called at Stanford University.

PETERSHAGEN Institute

GIANTURCO Yes. There was a guy from Walnut Creek who was a lawyer, just kind of a non-partisan, smart, nice, thoughtful person. I can't remember his name, but again, the kind of person who would look at all angles of a situation. I should say none of these people...
were firebrands. Not a one of them was a grandstander. There was a person who was a county supervisor in San Diego— I’m talking again about Reagan appointees—who was really in favor of and identified himself with clean air. That was his gig, so to speak. I mean that was his big interest, cleaning up the air. Although he was not a liberal Democrat. He was a Republican.

Something people forget is that the environmental movement started or got its final official imprimatur under Republican administrations. It was Richard Nixon that signed NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act], and [Presidential advisor] John Ehrlichman that was pushing all these various environmental things.

I’m trying to think of the other members of this board. Oh, there was an older man who came from Sonora who was a businessman, but who was very interested. He was retired. He was very interested in the transportation of the elderly. Just a very kind, nice person, conservative Republican, but again not a fire-breathing-Pat-Buchanan-family-values type. None of these kinds of
GIANTURCO people were on there. They were intelligent, thoughtful, competent people.

When the State Transportation Board existed, simultaneously there existed the California Highway Commission and the State Aeronautics Board. And you tended to get the conservative types, the Neanderthals if you'll pardon the expression, on the Highway Commission. And you got the more thoughtful people on the State Transportation Board.
The Highway Commission was a much more high-powered, heavy duty kind of appointment with a lot more prestige attached to it than the State Transportation Board. So that's where you got the more ideological people with really fixed views about highways as the be all and the end all. They don't want to hear about anything else. Any other solution, anything else, is silly. It's ridiculous.
The attitude of most of the members of the Highway Commission was, you know, I'll revise that opinion somewhat. I was quite impressed again with a number of the Reagan members of the Highway Commission. There were some on there whose views shocked me because they seemed so retrograde and so
rigid and so out of touch with what was going on in the world today. But some of the others, again, were thoughtful people trying to do the right thing, and I wouldn't draw any great contrast between them and the people that were appointed by Jerry Brown.

PETERSHAGEN: I think the point I was trying to make in trying to make the comparison with the CTC is that these were largely... 

GIANTURCO: I was comparing the Highway Commission. Now the CTC, we're talking about a third organization now.

PETERSHAGEN: Right, that comes later. Understood. The point I was trying to make, though, is that these are largely citizen groups. Citizen appointments, and they're not really transportation professionals. They haven't really worked their way up through the ranks so to speak. They're not engineers.

GIANTURCO: Well, yes, that's true. That's true. Well, Ross Eckard, who in my view to be an academic who spent most of your career studying general aviation makes you as much a transportation person as a civil engineer who's designed bridges. You know, big deal. It's not to say bridges aren't important, but...
GIANTURCO

who's to say a bridge is more important than an airport. So, it depends on how you are going to judge these things.

There was one person on the State Transportation Board who worked for [DMJM] as I recall. I've forgotten what it stands for. It's a big consulting firm. It may not even be still around. It was big in those days. It was headquartered in Los Angeles, and it was involved in a lot of construction projects. I don't know that he was an engineer. He may or may not have been, but he was in that whole kind of mode—again, though, a thoughtful, not ideological person at all. There was nobody on either the—and this has changed and, again, not a change that I think is for the better, I think it's for the worse—there was nobody on the State Transportation Board that you could conceivably have thought of would have a conflict of interest in serving on that board and ditto for the Highway Commission in that there were no people who were involved in designing highway projects or getting construction contracts or anything like that. In years since this has been the case.
People have been appointed to the Transportation Commission, the successor agency, who in my view are inherently in a situation of conflict because it's their business to be building highways.

**PETERSHAGEN**

That's interesting, but one more step in the comparison. The State Transportation Board was a part-time appointment?

**GIANTURCO**

Yes.

**PETERSHAGEN**

They did not meet five days a week and eight hours a day?

**GIANTURCO**

No. No. They had a small staff. That was true also for the Highway Commission, part-time, and it is true also for the California Transportation Commission. The difference with the Transportation Commission is that they have a somewhat larger staff—not much larger, but larger.

This was a big bone of contention. I got into a major knock-down, drag-out battle with the Highway Commission. I don't know if you are aware of this or want to talk about it at some point in these tapes, but it was a big thing that happened in my first year in office. I won the battle, maybe lost the war. [Laughter] The State
Transportation Board had a staff of at least two professionals, maybe three, and a secretary, maybe two secretaries. The Highway Commission had a staff of one and a secretary and basically depended on the staff of Caltrans, namely the engineering staff, to provide it with information. It was closely connected. I mean it's kind of like the, you know, military-industrial complex that [U.S. President Dwight D.] Eisenhower talked about or congressional committees where they're so closely tied to the Executive Branch offices that they supervise it's hard to see where the difference is. That is kind of the relationship between the old Highway Commission and the Division of Highways. They had virtually no staff of their own, just one person, and they relied on the old Division of Highways and then its successor individuals within Caltrans to do the staff work for them.

Now, certainly a lot of what you've described with regards to the Transportation Board and the CHC [California Highway Commission] is a retrospective. Did you, as you became director or even as you were an assistant...
secretary in B and T, did you think you recognized most of those problems at that time?

GIANTURCO

What I've just been talking about? Oh yes, sure. Yes. These aren't things that have occurred to me thinking about it since then.

PETERSHAGEN

So it's fair to say that some of your administration, then, at Caltrans would have been focused on trying to fix some of these problems realizing that the director of Caltrans doesn't have a whole lot that he or she can do about that.

GIANTURCO

Anyway, I did do a whole lot about it because I engaged in a knock-down, drag-out battle with this Highway Commission and, as I say, won that battle. May have lost the war but as the result, the direct result, of actions that I took with regard to that body, they lost all power. They had been operating for years under the assumption that they had various powers assigned to them under the law, and I confronted them on that. I mean after a lot of disputes between us—and there was an opinion written by the attorney general's office that agreed with me. And that was basically the end of the Highway
Commission They hung around for a while before they were replaced with the CTC, but their power was gone I mean I basically called it, you know, the emperor has no clothes, and he had no clothes.

PETERSHAGEN Maybe we should go into that next then.

[End Tape 4, Side B]

[Begin Tape 5, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana, as we finished the last tape we were discussing as you put it, perhaps you won the battle, but lost the war with the Highway Commission Would you care to go into that for us and give us some of the details of that story?

GIANTURCO Well, I'll go into the battle part I don't know if I did lose the war, but I did win the battle [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN Well, maybe we should leave judgment on the war for later historians.

GIANTURCO Yes, right [Laughter] I can tell you about the battle, though, because I was in the thick of it. Well, first a little bit more on this Highway Commission. This was an extremely powerful body It had been for years in California's state government, and it
GIANTURCO operated basically behind the scenes. I mean nobody knew what it was doing. It was—I'm presenting it now in sort of terms of caricature, but it's not far from the truth—a deal making organization where they got together with people in the back rooms of Caltrans or restaurants or wherever the heck they were meeting and decided we're going to build a highway here or we're going to do this there, and citizen input was nothing. I mean the influence on this thing, on that body, came essentially from, and I hate to use this cliche, but it's the shortest way to describe it, "the highway lobby," namely Associated General Contractors, various land development interests, the labor organizations involving construction workers, and local Chambers of Commerce. I mean those were the people they heard from. They were wined and dined by these people. I was shocked by that. As a matter of fact, not only was the Highway Commission wined and dined by these people, but the staff that worked the Caltrans staff that worked, as staff to the Commission or that had many relations with the Commission also wined and
GIANTURCO dined with these people, which I thought was a clear conflict of interest or presented certainly the appearance of it. You just don't take freebies from people who are asking you to do something that's going to materially and economically benefit them. Whether or not there is a law that says you can do this, you don't do it. You just don't do it in my view.

So one of the first things I did when I found out as director that this kind of thing was going on, namely this wining and dining deal. I'm talking about the Highway Commission would be traveling around. It made its practice, as did the Transportation Board and the CTC, the successor organization--nothing wrong with this inherently--but they made a practice of traveling around the state. Well, actually there are some things wrong with it, but you could make an argument that they should travel around the state and have their meetings in different places so they can see conditions in different parts of the state. And they did do that. Except what they were seeing always were the same conditions.
because they were seeing the same groups of people in each one of these locations, namely these Chamber of Commerce types and highway lobbyists and land development interests in those communities who were the only people that showed up at their meetings and who also showed up at these elaborate social functions that were held in connection with the meetings, where there would be fancy meals served, free drinks, you know, the whole "kit an' caboodle "

The thing that kind of brought it to a head for me was there was an annual function that was held by, I guess sponsored by, the Chamber of Commerce--although I'm not positive of this, but I'm sure the Chamber was involved to some extent, anyway business interests in Eureka--the annual crab feed which they held for the Highway Commission and invited all these Caltrans staff. And there were unlimited quantities of crab and booze, and it was a big social event where, you know, the people who want a highway and the people who can deliver a highway are getting together. And the people who want the highway are paying for it. Now this to
GIANTURCO me is immoral, unethical. I guess what happened was that I went to the first crab feed that was held after I was there. I was invited naturally as director as were all the people, though, in the organization who could possibly deliver on this freeway they wanted up there. And, I thought, "This is just too much." I mean, as I say, I had been aware that this kind of thing was going on, but that kind of was the coup de grace as far as I was concerned for those types of functions.

I sent out a memo telling the staff that if they were to attend any function paid for by people seeking highway projects they were to pay their own way or not go. Well, this caused a big uproar. People in Eureka were furious. But then what they decided to do, as a matter of fact, with the next crab feed.

Or maybe I sent that thing out right before a crab feed was about to happen. I've forgotten I think that might have been the case, that I sent this memo out like a month before this crab feed was scheduled to take place. Although I don't know this for a fact I can imagine in my mind's eye that the people who organized that feed up in Eureka
GIANTURCO got together and thought, "Gee, what are we going to do about this? We've been doing this for thirty years. We've got it all organized, set to go, and now this crazy woman is telling those people that we are giving the crab feed for that they are going to have to pay to go to it. What are we going to do?" So what they did was say it's going to cost. It was some absurdly low price like a dollar fifty to attend the crab feed. [Laughter]

Anyway, I say all that by way of background of the way this stuff operated. It was the good ol' boy network—the engineers and the Chambers of Commerce getting together, deciding when's the highway going to be built, who's going to get the highway. It certainly didn't involve the public in any significant way or different elements of the public. It did not involve consideration of how this project is going to affect the overall development of a region of the state or is it going to be good or bad environmentally. It wasn't going to do any of those things. It was just deal making. It was sheer pork. It was pork barrel.
politics at its worst. I mean that was the essence of how these decisions were made.

Now, I do not want in saying this, though to downgrade the professionalism of the Caltrans staff. There was a whole other element. The organization was kind of schizophrenic on this point because the Caltrans staff is extremely professional. In terms of thinking through things like levels of traffic, and the technical ways of judging do you need more lanes here, or what's going to be safe, what's not going to be safe, and wanting to do the right thing, that element is there, too. But at the same time there was this kind of underbelly to the staff that was not good, not in my opinion. And I think my opinion is pretty much backed up by the law as far as that goes. In any event, that was the situation with the Highway Commission.

The Highway Commission was used to having its way. As I say, it was a heavyweight commission. The people that got on that Commission, I think I don't know this to be a fact. A researcher would have to look into it. They were probably big
campaign contributors. Those were the kind of people that got on that commission as opposed to the State Transportation Board who tended to be nice people that had helped Reagan or previous governors in one way or the other. Actually it would have been only Reagan because I believe the State Transportation Board was created by A B 69. So it wasn't in existence that long, but the Highway Commission had been around for a long time. They were the heavy hitters. They thought they were important, and they threw their weight around. If they wanted something they expected to get it.

Well, my idea was I'm the director of Caltrans, and this is a board which has certain legal functions specifically to vote on. Now I've forgotten exactly, George. I'd have to do more thinking on this, or some researcher would have to look into it. But I did do research at the time to see what really were the functions of this commission. In my view, and it was backed up by the research done by the legal staff their functions were pretty limited. They were supposed to vote on a project's going to
They were supposed to vote on the acquisition of right-of-way for particular projects. And they were to vote on—this is a powerful thing, but they took it way beyond what the power they were given allowed them to do—they were supposed to vote on the budget of Caltrans because at that time the legislature had nothing to do with Caltrans' budget whatsoever. It didn't go through the legislature.

But they had taken these functions way beyond this. They had taken it upon themselves to decide basically what the long-range highway program was as opposed to the annual budget. The budget was supposed to be things like how much—a line item budget—how much are you spending for personnel, how much are you spending for, I don't know, space, how much are you spending for computer services, that type of stuff. It was not a program budget. The law gave them no responsibility to lay out a long-term construction program to schedule highways for construction in future years, but they had taken it upon themselves to say that they were doing that. They had been doing it for
GIANTURCO quite some time and nobody had challenged them on it. I challenged them on it. I said they had no legal. They were not given the legal right to do this, that it was the job of the Executive Branch to lay out the long-range highway program, and it was their job to vote on the allocation of funds for specific projects during a given year and the annual budget for that year.

Push came to shove, and as I say, this went to. What drove it finally to this, they made the dumb mistake of asking for this attorney general's opinion on this issue of their power to determine the overall program. It was they that asked for it, and they got the opinion back that they never imagined they'd get back which said basically, "Your functions are very, very limited. They are what Adriana said they are," which is not much.

The way it came to a head, though, was that when I became director the department was bankrupt. It had been bankrupt when Jerry Brown assumed office. It was so bad there was no money in the bank to pay salaries, or that was the projection anyway.
As I remember when I started working in the B and T Agency, people from Caltrans came up to the secretary's office on several occasions where I was present to say that their projections of cash in the bank were such that two or three months down the line there would not be enough cash to meet the payroll.

So while I was still in the agency the layoff process was started within Caltrans. Altogether, I think, between two and three thousand positions were cut. A total moratorium was put on all letting of new contracts. Various cost-saving measures were taken. Basically the place was frozen, and it was like that when I became director. There were no new contracts being let. Layoffs were still going on. The various cost-saving measures were still in place, most of which were left in place. The place was dead in the water. I'm really going into a lot more than this thing, but it's necessary to talk about what happened to the Highway Commission because it became

One of the angles on this, the confrontation with the Commission, was that in those first six months that I spent at
Caltrans a lot of my time was devoted to this diamond lane brouhaha in L A , but the remainder of the time--most of the remainder of it--was devoted to trying to straighten out this financial crisis that existed in the highway program I mean I spent long hours, hour after hour after hour, weekends, evenings trying to figure out what are we going to do about this, and we finally put together When I say we I mean myself and the top management staff at Caltrans, again, whom I cannot speak too highly of, the people that were around Really, they just killed themselves on this We all worked hard These are civil servants I mean the kind of people that the public likes to put down, but professional, hardworking people interested in the public interest Anyway, we put together a program or a way of approaching the spending of highway funds that essentially stopped the hemorrhaging of funds and started building up cash and allowed us to develop a new--I'm trying to remember the first program Caltrans had no long-range program in place When I came into office there was a moratorium on
The last multi-year program of projects had been adopted by the Highway Commission probably two years before that. So there was nothing in effect. There was nothing going on. No plans for the future, layoffs. I mean a pretty bad situation.

Well, as I say, after six months we worked our way through this financial crisis for which we never got any credit. Thinking back, really, it's extraordinary. We managed to do this without any increases in gas taxes, too. We put together a new highway program, and the amount of it for the first six years I guess on the average for the six years. I think it was a six-year program. I don't remember why we did six years maybe because some work I'd done prior to that. I'd been working on city capital budgets. At that time six years was a standard period to use. You have the one year budget and then five years beyond that. Now people tend more to do five years with the first year being the annual budget. But, anyway, we did a six-year program, and, as I recall, it was about a billion dollars a
This was going from zero at the time we started working on this with the expectation of no funds. I mean just being able to maintain this cut down staff with no contracts going out at all to being able to plan for a billion dollars worth of program.

What we did was to present this to the Highway Commission. I remember when this happened. We put out this program. It was big news. The Los Angeles Times had it as a banner headline when the program was first presented to the Commission: "Brown Proposes Billion Dollar Highway Spending" or something like that. Jerry Brown already by this point plus all the publicity that had associated itself with me and the diamond lanes had been that we were totally anti-highway and here we're coming out with this big highway spending plan. People couldn't believe it! So there were a few days of euphoria among the highway types, the pro-highway building types, about "Gee! This is great. They've come out with this plan that includes all these projects that we thought were just gone forever, and here they've been resuscitated. They've laid them out. Here they have a
GIANTURCO financial plan to start paying for them, and they're ready to let contracts. This is great!" Then a phenomenon happened which is quite common in history, I think. It's only when things get good to a certain point that the revolution happens. [Laughter] That's what they say about the French Revolution. It was when conditions got a little bit better that people started realizing they could be a whole lot better.

So after these few days of euphoria the pro-highway types said, "Gee! This program is terrible. They ought to be spending two or three billion--I don't remember what the number was--but why are they only spending a billion a year?" This is after zero spending for three years. [Laughter] They started on this rampage of getting more and more projects added into this long-range program that we had developed, the six year program. They wanted this. They wanted that. They wanted every pork barrel project you've ever heard of. I mean these things that to my mind people should be embarrassed to talk about that were strictly in there to benefit some developer someplace. I mean just very
GIANTURCO

little merit If you did a cost-benefit analysis on some of these projects they wouldn't get past the first screening stage. They were adding in this stuff Every time we'd go to a Highway Commission meeting there was more garbage that would get added in.

Well, I was resisting this. I'm telescoping what happened over a period a quite extensive period. It may have gone on I can't remember how long this went on before the final confrontation happened with the Commission. It may have occurred over more than one year It may have occurred over more than one funding cycle. It could have gone into the second or the third cycle before finally the rubber hit the road.

They were adding in all this stuff, and at a certain point we had introduced It was probably the second or the third round of this, two or three years into the administration We had presented another multi-year program, and the Commission The chairman then was [William E ] Bill Leonard who is the father of I think it's [Assemblyman William R ] Bill Leonard, Jr who is in the legislature. Anyway, Bill
Leonard, Sr was Chairman of the Commission. Nice guy. I like him. And a person of principle too. And a real highway type. I mean he wants those highways. He got together with some sort of dissident Caltrans staff members, and there were plenty of them, and put together an alternate program to the program that I had presented or had been the official Caltrans program. And this one was—I'm making up the number—I don't remember exactly what it was—but it was like two or three times as much spending as we were proposing.

So we're approaching something on the order of maybe six, eight, ten billion dollars. Something like that. I mean the money wasn't there. Our program was carefully worked out. We have so much money, and here is what we recommend. At this point we are asking for them to approve this stuff, too. We're going through the motions that we want their stamp of approval on it, although it's in the back of my mind that they don't have the right to turn us down. I mean this is out of courtesy, out of historic tradition, that we're going to them for approval. But really
by this time, after we'd gone through some of these confrontations it was becoming clear to me, and also because of some of the legal research that I'm having done, that their power to force us to do things was pretty limited. They may have had a veto power to stop us from doing something, but in terms of forcing a public agency to spend money that doesn't exist, they didn't have that power. That's what it really boiled down to.

We were making these projections, and they were pretty straightforward, although there was a lot of controversy about that, too—red herring type stuff—but people said we were playing around with the numbers and changing our numbers and making the numbers come out artificially low. All this was ridiculous. Again, these were professional people in Caltrans doing this who had no interest in juggling the numbers around to try to make things look as though we had less money to spend than we really did. That just was not happening, but those kinds of charges were floating around.

Apart from that, though, the Commission was telling us—and Bill Leonard, in
GIANTURCO particular—to go with this alternate program. And this, as I remember, was the thing that caused the final confrontation. They wanted us to spend two or three times the amount of money that we projected would be coming in from the gas tax. He and the staff that were working with him had gone through some kind of analysis that said there's going to be zero inflation for the next— I don't know. They had some kind of financial analysis to back this up, but it was based on patently absurd assumptions.

As a matter of fact, most of these assumptions were 180 degrees different from what the Commission had been telling us was what we should assume about the future. In order to generate these phantom funds that were going to pay for all these projects they said—as I say, again I don't recall the details, but it was things like—there's going to be no inflation for the next twenty years or else it was there's going to be so much inflation. It was one or the other. It was a crazy. Or it was that there's going to be so much inflation that we have to do
everything now because if we wait twenty years from now projects are going to cost two thousand times as much as they do now. My answer to that was if they're going to cost two thousand times as much as they do now the whole United States will have collapsed like the fall of the Roman Empire, and you can't plan on that basis. The thing was crazy.

We simply refused to adopt it, or I personally refused to adopt it. The Commission adopted this program which had, as I say, two or three times as many projects as we thought there was going to be funding for, or any rational person would have thought there would be funding for. We said we simply were not going to schedule projects or bring them to the Commission for approval based on that program. We would bring projects for approval based on the program that we had developed. At which point they went to the Attorney General's Office and demanded this opinion. Didn't we have to bring projects based on their... And the Attorney General said no. And that was the end of that. That was the end of the
GIANTURCO Commission  As I say, they hung around for a little bit longer

There was simultaneously going an effort to take, to put, the budgeting of Caltrans' funds and the operations of Caltrans in general under legislative control which had not existed before. And, in that sense, I may have lost the war because what happened when I essentially... It may sound

I don't know if it sounds immodest or what, but anyway I think I can take large responsibility for destroying that Highway Commission for better or worse, although they brought it on themselves by adopting these absurd positions having to do with the expenditure of taxpayer funds. The outcome of that was the placing of Caltrans under legislative oversight and budgeting authority. The great danger there--I was very much opposed to that--is that when you have the legislature involved and what can be a pork barrel, you're going to get a pork barrel. And in a way we got a worse pork barrel with the legislature involved than had been the case when the Highway Commission had been doing it
PETERSHAGEN: Now, a major part of the corrective action, I think this is safe to say, is in—I think it was in--A B 241 that brought about the Transportation Commission?¹

GIANTURCO: No, it wasn't 241. Well, I know the legislation that you are talking about but it wasn't 241. It was some number.

PETERSHAGEN: OK, I'll have to look that one up.

GIANTURCO: You had better look that number up.

PETERSHAGEN: [Laughter] Was it 412? Well, I've forgotten, but it wasn't 241.

PETERSHAGEN: At any rate, we found ourselves with the California Transportation Commission.

GIANTURCO: Right, but a lot of other things, also.

PETERSHAGEN: And I think a lot of people tend to lump the establishment of the California Transportation Commission and the new Caltrans all into one step. You, of course, have described several years in the course of doing this.

PETERSHAGEN: Absolutely. Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: At any rate, we do now have this California Transportation Commission. Was their legal role, or their role as defined in the

¹A B 402, 1977 Reg Sess, Cal Stat, ch 1106
legislation, did they have some of these powers that the Highway Commission assumed it had?

Yes, and again in that sense I lost the war because what had happened. Go back to this battle over this multi-year program Caltrans had, as I understand it—again this would have been before my time—kind of informally developed these multi-year programs in the past and presented them to the Commission. It was all, as I say, back-door stuff. I mean, who knows how they did it? I don't know what kind of formal procedures there were or what kind of input there was from different groups, but somehow these programs would end up being the official program.

They usually promised all kinds of projects that couldn't be delivered. And one of the reasons that Caltrans got in so much trouble over the years is telling these communities they were going to get projects. Communities would plan their cities or their whatever, their urban areas, around these phantom projects and then the projects wouldn't materialize because there was never
any money for them. This wasn't a new thing that the Commission would be promising all this stuff as though money was falling off trees. It never was. Even in the good old days it wasn't falling off trees. Now I've forgotten the thread, the thrust, of your question, George. You'll have to ask me again. [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN

It was essentially to ask you what the powers of the CTC are vis-a-vis the old Highway Commission.

GIANTURCO

OK. The old Highway Commission's powers, as I say, when I managed to pin this down, turned out to be very limited. They had assumed powers way beyond what they actually had in the law. Their powers in the law were to adopt the annual budget and to I believe they had three essential powers. There may have been a few other things thrown in here. It was to approve acquisitions of particular parcels. They had the power of eminent domain. That's a very important power, but it's very limited. We're talking, you know, a few acres here, a few acres there. It's an important power, but it's certainly not determining the overall future.
GIANTURCO of California They had the power to decide whether a particular project was built in a given year by budgeting, by approving the allocation of funds for construction. They had the power to approve the annual budget for Caltrans, which was a line item budget.

What had happened in the past, though, was that Caltrans, as I say, had developed these multi-year programs somehow in cahoots with the Commission. How they did it I don't know. But somehow these multi-year programs would appear. And they were agreed that this is what was going to happen. Another thing is they were twenty-year programs which to me is insanity. Certainly for some projects you need a twenty-year lead time, but you do not say that we are going to spend X number of dollars twenty years from now when you have no way in the world of predicting what inflation is going to be, what demand. It's just insane. I don't know of a public agency that does that. A twenty-year plan is a different type of plan. It is not a capital improvement plan. It is a long-range plan. They had twenty-year capital improvement plans. So anyway, they did these
things, but they weren't in the law. They did them with Caltrans, but they weren't in the law.

So then what happened, kind of retracing the steps here, I challenged them on these more general responsibilities that they had assumed over the years. I tried to cut down the long-range planning period to a reasonable time which was six years. I cut them out of the action because I said the law doesn't give you any part of this. And the AG agreed with me. The new law, A B [402], gave the Transportation Commission the power to adopt a multi-year plan. It set up elaborate procedures for the adoption of the plan, which is not a bad idea.

What I had done when we did it for the first time, adopted a multi-year plan that was of a reasonable length, namely six years, was essentially Caltrans staff, the Highway Division, developed that plan, and then we presented it to the Commission. And then all this stuff happened. The way A B [402] set it out was that it established a much more elaborate procedure than that. It set up and gave power to regional planning agencies to
develop regional transportation plans and Caltrans would develop a statewide one and the commission would look at the regional ones in comparison to the statewide one and decide what they wanted and adopt the final one. The time period was the short time period that I had established.

They also in the law basically went along with what I had said, which is these things have got to be based on some kind of financial reality. What was set into the law was the requirement that before any plan is developed an estimate of resources has to be made and adopted by the Commission. So that was put in the law. The budgeting authority, the line item stuff that the Commission had done before, was taken away from the Commission and given to the legislature and various other things happened. Those were the most important things.

PETERSHAGEN So the CTC really did have a planning authority written into the law as opposed to the Highway Commission that had just assumed that on its own?

GIANTURCO Yes, yes. It was good and bad. As I say, I was opposed to this. I recommended that the
GIANTURCO governor not sign that bill because I was afraid of the pork barrel aspects of it. Also, my argument to Jerry Brown was that the establishment of these regional agencies which are essentially the, what the heck are they called, the MPOs [Metropolitan Planning Organizations] in the metropolitan areas and in the rural areas some kind of surrogate organizations that were set up I think maybe Caltrans did the planning for the county or something. Where there was no MPO there was some other procedure put into law to develop these plans. Well, number one, MPOs and MPO-like organizations are non-accountable to the public. They are not directly elected. I'd had a lot of experience with these organizations in my general planning work before coming to Caltrans. I think the conventional wisdom in the planning field certainly at that time was that the MPOs were extremely flawed organizations because although they presumably were to represent regional interests, in fact they consist of local elected officials who just do a lot of horse
trading among themselves rather than looking at the region as a whole

PETERSHAGEN No argument there [Laughter]

GIANTURCO So I said "Are you going to hand all this power over to these organizations which don't even deserve the power they already have, not to mention adding this important responsibility for transportation which surely is a regional issue. Not only that," I said. In addition, I gave to the governor—I thought this argument would appeal—a political argument I said, "You know, if you sign this thing handing over all this authority. First of all," I said, "I think that one of the basic," and as I've said before, George, in these interviews I'm not a particularly I'm not a partisan person. But I don't think I'm stupid on the idea of how politics works. Politics is the exercise of power.

PETERSHAGEN Let me interrupt you here because we're getting into trouble with the tape now

GIANTURCO All right

[End Tape 5, Side A]
PETERSHAGEN Adriana, as we completed our session last week you were discussing A B 402 and the real birth of the Transportation Commission and some major changes in our highway and transportation legislation. You had been talking about your attempts to discourage Governor Brown from signing that legislation. Can you pick it up there and continue the story?

GIANTURCO Yes. Just one minor correction to what I said before, and I don't even know if it is a correction. I think possibly, again you can check or other historians can check the records here, the governor has three choices to sign, veto, or let become law without his signature. I'm not positive about that third one.

But, anyway, what I was trying to get Jerry Brown to do was veto this bill. I felt that strongly about it. I thought it was bad legislation. And as I was saying at the end
of the last session, having made various what I thought were rational planning arguments against the bill having to do with the unsuitability of regional planning organizations to take on such a major responsibility as they were being given under the bill, and the pork barrel aspect of the legislature getting into highway budgeting and things along those lines, I thought that the argument—and I wasn't getting any place with the argument—I had an argument that would really appeal to Jerry Brown as an elected official, and it had to do with power.

My argument was that what he would be doing by signing the bill would be giving away a substantial amount of power that was now vested in him and his appointees. And I said "I just can't see that as a basic principle of politics. The whole idea if you're in politics is to accrue power to yourself, not to hand it away to other people. I mean that's the essence of politics, to exert power and influence over what happens in this world." There have been
GIANTURCO  many, many academic studies of this subject, and they're almost as one on this subject.

    And I said, "The irony of this bill is, the terrible effect of it is going to be that you are going to be handing away the power to decide what highway projects are built when to the California Transportation Commission and to these regional planning agencies."

    In fact, the way it was set up, the way it was initially envisioned, the regional planning agencies would have the principal power. The commission, in order not to follow what a regional planning agency recommended, had to give a reason not to follow. In other words, the burden of proof was on the commission to say that what a regional planning agency wanted wasn't the right thing. So, in any event, the regional planning agencies and the omission would be taking over powers which the attorney general had just finished saying belonged properly to the governor under current law.

    And I said, "What's going to happen is that, as a result of the public for years having figured it was the governor and his Highway Commission who decided what projects
GIANTURCO were built, the public is not going to overnight realize that there's now a new set of players here, regional planning agencies that they never heard of. Most people in most areas don't even know the name of their regional planning agency. I'm sure if you did a survey in L A "I was trying to remember in our last interview what the name of that agency is down there. And they have gone through a lot of transformations, but, at the time, it was called SCAG, Southern California Association of Governments. I can't remember the name of the one in the [San Francisco] Bay Area because a lot of its powers have been taken away and given to another one, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission. There is also a more generalized regional planning agency there, one in Sacramento. They're all over the state.

I bet if you did a survey of citizens and asked them to name their regional planning agency, number one, they wouldn't be able to give you the name. I mean only one out of a hundred people would probably be able to give you the name, and probably the other ninety-nine would say they didn't even
GIANTURCO realize there was a regional planning agency not to mention its name.

So I said, "What's going to happen is that these regional planning agencies and this new commission are going to be deciding what highway projects get built when, and when something isn't built the public is not going to blame the commission or the regional planning agencies, they're going to blame you. Because they think you have this power, and, in fact, you won't have the power any more. You will have handed it away to somebody else. You will be held accountable for something that you no longer have any responsibility for." I said, "I cannot think of a worse political position to be in."

And that is precisely what happened. Because for the remainder of the time that I was at Caltrans I cannot recall a single instance when because some project, usually a pork barrel type project, was not being built that citizens groups or Chambers of Commerce or whoever were out beating the drums for this project would go and beat the drums and say, "This is terrible! The commission isn't doing this project," or "the regional
planning agency isn't doing this project"
It was "Adriana isn't doing this project
Jerry Brown isn't doing this project " We took all the heat and got none of the credit
It was crazy I truly think that was a bad piece of legislation Now, I think the system that existed before was by no means perfect, but that what was put in its place, had some major, major flaws attached to it
But Jerry Brown, I think, had already made up his mind to sign this bill before I made these impassioned arguments, and, believe me, they were impassioned I wrote a memo about four or five pages long, maybe not quite that long, closely reasoned, going into giving examples of the kinds of things I've been talking about here Then I had a session with him that lasted for about a half an hour where I went through this and begged him practically not to sign this But he signed it

So, in summary, the California Transportation Commission is responsible to the citizenry in appearance and in theory
And in law Well, I'll let you finish your sentence [Laughter]
PETERSHAGEN: But, in reality, in the public perception, I think what you're saying is that they have the appearance of just being a board representing the governor who still may hold the responsibility for their actions.

GIANTURCO: Well, the governor appoints the commission, but the point is that once they are appointed they are independent. The whole idea of independent commissions is that they are independent from the appointing authority. There have been a few commissions in history.

I have to say I've always been shocked—by my strictly knowledge from reading—about how Dianne Feinstein when she was mayor of San Francisco made it a practice of firing commissioners, and that would be the term used—firing redevelopment authority commissioners, firing port commissioners, and so on. Unless San Francisco is different from every other city in the United States, a mayor or a governor, if he has a commission, doesn't have the right to fire except for good cause. And good cause means things like, you know, misuse of public funds—that type of thing. The whole difference between a commission and a regular appointee within
just the chain of command is that the commissioner exists independent of the appointing authority.

The problem with the Transportation Commission was that, although Jerry Brown or any governor would initially appoint these commissioners--so he had a choice, presumably could shape it to his liking in the initial appointments--once they were on there there was no guarantee whatsoever that they were going to do what the governor wanted to have done. And whatever they did, they had the full legal responsibility of doing whatever they wanted to do in terms of picking highway projects and deciding when they were to be built. And yet the public still thought that the governor had sole responsibility over this. So if the commission did something that the public didn't like, the commission didn't take the blame for it, the governor did. And there was absolutely nothing that he could do about it. Because unless you were a Dianne Feinstein type, and again I don't know how she ever got away with this, there was no way to fire these commissioners. Once they were there, they were there.
They served for fixed terms. I believe the terms are four years. There is an overlapping mechanism, also, so that the idea really is to take them out of the although you have to have somebody appoint them. So in most cases, including this case, you have the governor appoint them, although with some commissions you have members of the legislature appoint a certain number of those.

The normal thing, and it was done with A B 402 with the establishment of the CTC, is to have staggered terms, also, so that any particular governor, at least in the early years of his administration, doesn't even have the majority of people on the commission as his appointees. It's only at the very end when the four years will have turned over enough times that he has people that he picked. Not to say that he's going to be able to influence those people, but until that point he didn't even pick them. The reason for that is good. The reason is we should take this out of politics. But, of course, the problem is that these people themselves become extremely politicized.
There has been much academic research and work on this subject of commissions, too, and the fallacy of thinking that commissions are apolitical. They aren't. They turn into political bodies on their own. They develop constituencies and loyalties and wanting to do favors and getting favors back and all the rest of that kind of thing.

But getting back to the power argument that I was making to Jerry Brown, he was setting up a whole other power center, handing over his powers to these people, and yet he was going to be responsible for what held accountable, and blamed—that was the main thing—blamed because people. There were many more highway projects and there always will be. More highway projects than there is money to build projects. So the people who don't get a project have got to look some place to point the finger to put the blame. And they, believe me, they didn't then, and I don't believe do they now, point it at the commission or at the regional planning agency. They point it at the governor.
GIANTURCO

Or the director, or the director. I mean the director is the surrogate for the governor. They are one and the same thing—the Executive Branch. I mean people look to the governor and his appointees. They think they are running the state. They don't know about SCAG and complicated processes. What ordinary citizen is going to spend the time to learn about that? Or care about it or believe it really has any validity? I mean they think it's kind of, that's just the complicated red tape of government. But if the governor—I mean look at this thing with this rapist that's out now, who's been sent to Modoc County. It may be, and I believe [Governor Pete] Wilson when he says he didn't have any control over this. Local authorities had to do this and the law says that and so on. Well, most people don't want to hear any of that stuff. There is an individual layer involved, either it's Adriana Gianturco when the highway projects didn't get built or it's some terrible rapist and he's out in the streets someplace, and who are you going to blame? You blame the
person that you know, the enemy that you
know, so to speak

PETERSHAGEN

I notice you've described all this in terms
of blame and never credit  [Laughter]

GIANTURCO

Well, that's right  That's the other half of
it  Because the commission, getting back to
how these bodies like that  It's not
just this Transportation Commission  This
happened with commissions, I'd say

There's a huge body of academic literature on
this subject  Commissions tend to, when
something goes well, they take full credit

They're out there  They're cutting the
ribbons  They're releasing press releases

All the rest of it  When something doesn't
happen they are no place to be found  That's
just the way it works

PETERSHAGEN

Somehow I anticipated that answer

[Laughter]  I have read in at least one
account that there were some shenanigans with
the appointments to the commission, too  One
reporter said that the members of the
commission that Governor Brown appointed were
deliberately selected, and he even summed it
up as being some of the dumbest people
available I would think that you might take exception to that
I take serious exception to that As a matter of fact, we took the appointments process very seriously And the way it was done I'll tell you precisely how it was done

Well, first of all, an interesting thing happened The Highway Commission, the old Highway Commission, had been opposed for years and years and years to the concept of legislative budgeting This was not a new concept This thing about the creation of the Transportation Commission and the elimination of the old Highway Commission happened in conjunction with legislative budgeting And legislative budgeting as an idea had been around for a long time and there had been efforts made over the years to transform the way the budgeting was done for Caltrans So this wasn't the first time it had come up

The Highway Commission had always taken a very strong stand against it This time the attorney general had written this opinion thing that really the emperor had no clothes
It was the Executive Branch, the governor and his appointee, the director of Caltrans, who had the power in this case. So the Highway Commission reversed their position, and they supported A.B. 402. And many of them told Jerry Brown and they told me openly, and they were quite open about this, that they all hoped to be appointed to this new Transportation Commission. They were figuring that the old Highway Commission would just become the new Transportation Commission. Well, there was no reason in the world why that should have been the case.

And not only did they not get the appointed as a group, not one individual, I think, got appointed to this new commission.

Is that right? I'm not sure about that. I don't remember that. But I think that's also the case that none of the members of the Transportation Board were appointed, either. We had three boards that were being consolidated—the Aeronautics Board, the Transportation Board, and the Highway Commission. As I remember, my recommendation had been—and this is really hazy in my mind—that we try to get one or two people from
GIANTURCO each of those boards or at least one on the new board so we'd have continuity, at least some institutional memory of how things had operated before and what the projects were and the problems and so on.

But, I frankly don't remember. I think part of the problem was that there was so much, particularly among the members of the Highway Commission, such desperation to be appointed that Jerry Brown thought if he appointed one of them the others would be so devastated by the fact they weren't the ones that were picked that it was all or nothing, and he wasn't prepared to appoint this whole commission. Certainly not. I mean some of them had given him a terrible time. But still he thought let's just start with a clean slate. The main thing was, though, that we thought, as I say again, remember I had been against this whole concept, but now I was in charge because I was the only person around really to try to get it started up and make it work.

So the first issue was picking the members of the new commission and the way we did that was that the governor's appointment
GIANTURCO secretary, Carlotta Mellon, and I worked together on this. It was her job to get together candidates because I didn't know who was out there. And she tried. It seems to me, and I'm not very clear on this either, George. With the old Highway Commission, the law said that they had to come from different geographic areas of the state. I'm not so sure that A.B. 402 says the same thing about the CTC.

But, in any event, we decided that that was a good idea, that we would like to get representation from across the state in rural areas, urban areas, a broad spectrum of views. And so she tried to get together—we've forgotten how we broke it down—but, say four or five names for each vacancy. And I don't even remember how many. Maybe there are seven members, something like that.

Then we went through a process that I'm sure doesn't happen with most commissions. It was totally apolitical. What we did was we put together a sort of questionnaire of questions trying to get at the person's attitudes toward transportation. Did they think that transportation had an influence on
land use? I can't even remember. But they were really naive, academic-type questions trying to get at would this person be a serious person who would consider projects on the merits, or were we dealing with a political hack who was going to get on there and just try to do favors for his buddies back in whatever town he came from? The whole idea was to get serious-minded people who were going to make decisions in the public interest.

Our idea was that we wanted to get good people on this commission. We didn't care anything about the political party. I mean half the people we interviewed were Republicans, as I remember. Again you can check the historic record and maybe that's not the case, but it was certainly not a consideration. Party affiliation had nothing to do with it. We wanted, again as I say, serious-minded people who would look at things on the merit, who thought of transportation not just as a way of encouraging shopping center development around interchanges but as a way of shaping urban form and who would be concerned about
Gianturco

the effects of transportation on the
environment and who were multimodally-
oriented and who believed in the tenets found
in A B 69, which was the overarching
legislation for the Transportation
Commission

So for each one of those seven positions
Carlotta and I interviewed these four or five
people that she had culled down. We went
through an enormous number of interviews
And we selected the commissioners, the two of
us. Well, we didn't make the final
selection. We made a presentation to the
governor, told him everybody that we had
interviewed and the kind of questions that
had been asked and said this is the slate of
people that we think are the best for this
thing. He accepted not all of them.
He probably accepted at least 50 percent,
maybe slightly more than 50 percent. And he
had his own ideas on some of them. There was
at least one that I remember he turned down
The reason this person was turned down—and
we were very upset about this—was this
person—and I don't remember what his name
was. He came from Southern California as I
remember, and he had been or was currently a newspaper publisher. He was turned down on the grounds that if anybody was involved with the press that was an inherent conflict of interest because if he didn't like something that the commission did he could write an editorial against it, which we thought was a ridiculous argument. But anyway that was the reason. I suspect this guy was turned down for other reasons. Maybe he had crossed somebody along the line in the political end of things so he didn't get on.

PETERSHAGEN: That almost sounds like the public reason for turning him down. [Laughter]

GIANTURCO: That was the reason given to Carlotta and me.

PETERSHAGEN: Right. That may have not been the real reason.

GIANTURCO: There was another person that wanted to be on the commission. This is kind of an interesting sidelight. Now who the heck was it? She sang this song, "I am Woman," this popular singer? [Entertainer] Helen Reddy? Helen Reddy? Is that possible?

PETERSHAGEN: Uh, huh

[Interruption]
Sorry about that interruption. But anyway, so it was Helen Reddy that applied?

No, no. She was another person. She had not been on our slate of candidates, and Jerry Brown decided that Helen Reddy would make a good appointment. Was it Helen Reddy? She became famous for that song "I am Woman." She is from Australia. She was very popular at that time, and she's kind of sunk into obscurity since then.

I think that is who you mean.

It seems to me that she had expressed to the governor an interest in being on this commission. See, here Carlotta and I are doing this naive, apolitical thing of interviewing these people with these academic type questions, and in the background there is the politics going on that we weren't aware of. Well, anyway, I guess maybe through some Hollywood connection or something, it must have been, she had made known to the governor that she was interested in serving on this new Transportation Commission. I'm pretty sure this is the thing. It's hazy in my mind, but it's coming back as I'm talking about it. The reason she
GIANTURCO was interested in it was--and I don't think this is a bad reason actually--she was very concerned about the aesthetics of the highway system, that it was ugly. And she thought if better landscaping were done and highway design and so on that we could make it look a whole lot better and improve the quality of life. And that certainly is an idea strongly held by me. I couldn't disagree with it at all. But it seemed Helen Reddy seemed an unlikely appointment to me.

Well, in any event, what happened with that was that somehow it got into the paper that she was being considered for this Transportation Commission and great mockery and fun was made of this. What in the world is this? Helen Reddy on the Transportation Commission? This is ridiculous. I mean it appeared in some kind of commentary type columns and so on.

In the meantime, I had gone down to L A, been sent on a mission to L A. As I recall, this was the only person that was done this way. All the other people that were interviewed came to Sacramento to be interviewed by Carlotta Mellon and me, but in
the case of Helen Reddy I was told to go down to L. A. And I got to LAX [Los Angeles International Airport], and I was picked up in the largest limousine I've ever seen in my life. I mean it was like a block long, [Laughter] one of these stretch limos, and took me to her estate. It was a palatial estate someplace in Bel Air or Beverly Hills or something, and we went out. They had some kind of a back patio. Her husband at the time, I guess, was her manager. They later got divorced. He sat in on the interview, and the interview basically consisted of me not asking Helen Reddy those standard questions we asked everybody else, but Helen Reddy telling me how she thought freeways would look a whole lot better if we planted some geraniums here and did this that and the other thing. And I couldn't disagree, but it was certainly not your standard interview for a government position [Laughter]. So, I came back from L A., and I said Helen Reddy probably wouldn't be bad on the commission. In the meantime, the proverbial 'S' had hit the fan over this appointment so it didn't happen.
Ivan Hinderaker, who at that time was the Chancellor of UC Riverside [University of California, Riverside] was put on the commission. Why, I don't know. I happened to be in Jerry Brown's office, and I guess he had eliminated some other person. Maybe it was this newspaper publisher that they didn't like, Jerry and his advisors, because of the fact that the guy was a member of the press. They decided not to get him, but they wanted somebody else from that area and came up with Hinderaker. I was sitting right there when they called him. And, of course, people take a phone call from the governor. Jerry Brown's secretary made this call, and Hinderaker's secretary came on the line--no run around. None of this stuff, you know. An ordinary citizen tries to reach somebody like this, you'd go through about fourteen different receptionists and then voice mail and at the end the phone goes dead. [Laughter] None of that happened, though. Almost instantly Hinderaker was on the phone, and I could hear it. I guess Jerry Brown had it on the speaker phone.
The conversation went something like this, "Ivan I'd like you to serve on the Transportation Commission" And Ivan said, "What's the Transportation Commission?" [Laughter] And Jerry Brown said, "It's this very powerful"--of course, he's trying to persuade him to be on it so he really talked it up--"It's a very interesting new commission, and we really need your services We need somebody with an academic background" He's probably making this up as he's talking I don't know Although it could have all been planned beforehand I was never in on the political end of things

Well, Hinderaker was reluctant, but I guess in the same way as people who are appointed by the president to jobs who are hesitant to turn it down, he was hesitant to turn it down I guess Jerry probably also told him it's not going to take up that much of your time, and I'd really appreciate it So he accepted it So that's how he got on

Then [UC Regent] Norton Simon--I'm trying to remember how he was picked That, again, was a Brown idea
That was exactly where I was going next. I've been led to believe that Norton Simon agreed to serve only under the condition that he be the chairman.

No.

Can you verify or deny that?

It seems to me that I might have been in the office when that conversation occurred, although I don't recall it as distinctly as I do the one with Hinderaker. But no, I think the way that happened was that Jerry Brown— and, again, I wouldn't swear to this if I were in court, but I think what happened was that Jerry Brown called him and asked him to be the chairman. I think he [Governor Brown] had already decided that he would be the chairman, and it wasn't some condition that Simon laid down. But Jerry Brown figured he [Simon] wouldn't accept it unless he was the chairman, I think was the thinking.

Did he [Simon] pass your screening test?

No, he hadn't been through my screening. No, uh uh. He hadn't been on our list or Hinderaker, or Helen Reddy. [Laughter]

So the commission was as you described it probably, about half from your recommended
GIANTURCO

list and then about half of these appointments by the governor

If I had all the names and my notes from the time I could tell you exactly. But I just don't know if it was 40 percent of our appointees that got on there or fifty. I doubt that it was more than fifty. But I would be able to tell name by name if I got a list and took it and went over it and really reconstructed it in my mind. All I can tell you is it was by no means a commission dominated by people that Carlotta Mellon and I had chosen because it didn't work out that way. The chairman had not gone through our process, and a number of the other people, also, had not

PETERSHAGEN

And I've been led to believe by the one commission member that I've spoken with that, even though you describe this as totally apolitical and not necessarily regional by legislation, that his perception was that the way the selection process turned out, that it really was a broad spectrum both geographically. Apparently some effort, deliberate effort, was made to select commissioners on a political basis, not all
from the same party, but to try to make sure
that it was spread out rather than giving it
the appearance of a political group

GIANTURCO

Yes We had had that as our objective
Whether or not that was the governor's
objective the appointments that he made
reinforced that characteristic Hinderaker,
for example, was a Republican There was
another person that we had picked on there

Yes, we thought it was important that it
not be partisan Simon, it seems to me, is
also a Republican or was a Republican Of
course, he's a real maverick But it seems
to me that he was When he was identified
with party politics some time ago it was with
the Republican Party He's so maverick-like
that it's hard to say

But the political affiliation I
don't remember when we interviewed people,
when Carlotta and I interviewed people, with
our first, you know, the cut strictly on the
merits thing that we even asked them what
political party they were or had any interest
in that whatsoever It was simply not a
factor One of the people that we picked,
also, who it turned out later--I was very
annoyed by this when I found out about it
This is Dean Meyer from Hayfork. He's a
Republican. He was interviewed by Carlotta
and me. Both of us were very impressed with
him. We went through our standard list of
questions about land use and transportation
and multimodalism, and all these good things.

[End Tape 5, Side B]

[Begin Tape 6, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN: Adriana, as we were talking before, you were
describing the selection process of the
commissioners, and we were talking about the
selection of Dean Meyer. Can you continue
your thoughts on that, please?

GIANTURCO: Yes. When he was interviewed by Carlotta and
me, we were extremely impressed. We went
through our standard set of questions that we
had given everybody, and he just said exactly
what was the perfect answer to everything. I
mean, he had an answer to everything, and
we'd explore something and he would seem
right on the mark, just exactly the kind of
person that we were looking for. Now I never
confronted Dean with this, and, again, for
historical purposes if someone were writing
something, I guess the thing to do would be
GIANTURCO

to interview and get corroborating evidence.
When he was on the commission he caused, me
anyway, all kinds of problems. Real conflict
emerged very early on between him and Norton
Simon, and it really almost paralyzed the
commission. And Meyer on the commission did
just about the opposite of what I would have
predicted he would have done on any issue
given the way he expressed himself in that
interview.

What I found out later on, or what I was
told later on—and I had no reason to
disbelieve this, although, as I say, a
historian would need to check this out or get
some corroborating evidence—what had
happened was that Dean Meyer had been
involved in some way in the development of
this document that was called "The Urban
Strategy" that was put together by the Office
of Planning and Research which at that time
was under [Director William] Bill Press. And
it got a lot of attention. I guess
Massachusetts did one right before, beat
California to the punch in coming out with—I
don't know what they called theirs, but it
was the same kind of document. It said, "We
GIANTURCO are going to try to on the state level, encourage patterns of development that will preserve the environment, make best use of the existing infrastructure, in other words avoid leap-frog development, preserve good ag [agricultural] land, that type of thing"

And Meyer, as I say, had somehow been involved in the preparation of this document on an advisory committee or something or other, had worked closely with Bill Press, and had developed some kind of a relationship or a friendship with Bill Press Bill Press decided that he would try to see if he could get him on the Transportation Commission Now, this was not known to me at all, nor do I believe it was known to Carlotta Mellon She may have known that he was associated with this thing having to do with "The Urban Strategy" and that he knew Bill Press But, what we were told later was that Bill Press had somehow—and I don't know how this would have happened—psyched-out or been told by other people who were interviewed what the questions were we were asking people in these interviews and that he had told Meyer, "You're going to be asked 'this, this, this,
this, this,' and when you are asked 'this, this, this, this, this,' you should say 'thus, thus, thus, thus, thus,' and you'll make a good impression. It'll look as though you're multi-modal. It'll look as though you're concerned about transportation and land use, etc.

And so, Meyer came in there fully prepared as nobody else was and gave all the answers that we thought, "Boy, this guy is really with the program." And it turned out, as I say, later on when he was on the commission he rarely exhibited the kind of values and all that we thought he had demonstrated in that interview. So as I say, I was pretty annoyed about that. I don't know for a fact that that's what happened, that he had been pre-rehearsed and tipped off. It's like somebody taking the bar exam as far as I'm concerned and being told in advance what the questions are. It's just not kosher. You just don't do it.

Now, since we have the Massachusetts connection with you I should ask to make it perfectly clear you had nothing to do while...
you were in Massachusetts with the preparation of this statewide planning Urban strategy? No, that happened after I left. I mean I was in California. I mean I was in the Caltrans job. I was first in the assistant secretary's job and then in the Caltrans job for two or three years before either Massachusetts or California came out with these plans as I recall. I don't recall what Massachusetts called its plan. But I had nothing to do with the one in Massachusetts. It started after I left. It started under the governor that was elected in Massachusetts at the same time Jerry Brown was elected in California. It was [Michael] Dukakis. And I had worked for Sargent, the Republican Governor prior to Dukakis, so I had nothing whatsoever, I mean nothing, zero, to do with their version of "The Urban Strategy."

So from your perception as the Caltrans director whatever the CTC was supposed to be doing that would assist you was not happening because of the infighting between Meyer and Simon?
GIANTURCO Well, not only that I mean the kind of things that I had predicted happened What they did with the first planning round is every regional planning agency came up with this wish list of projects that had been hanging around for years, you know, just horse-trading Then the commission tried to accommodate everybody If they didn't actually put a project in the program, they said, "We'll study it" They went back to this old stuff that had happened for years with the old Highway Commission when the Highway Commission had assumed this power for itself of making what to me were, and still are, false promises You don't have the money You don't lead people on by saying, "We'll study it It's a great project We'll see As soon as the money's available, we'll build it"

Well, not right off the bat, but pretty soon they got into that mode of doing things Things were put on secondary lists, or they were put on lists for outer years Various devices were put to try to just keep these people, you know, satisfied that their projects were still being considered Rather
than my approach—and I said this in speech after speech—"No false promises. We have so much money, and this is what we can do, and we're not going to tell you something that's not going to happen. It's not fair to you." And I truly believe that. It is not fair to a city or a county to tell them you're going to build a freeway that would have a major impact on the shape of that urban community. You don't tell them that and have them plan around it unless you have the money to do the thing. And good intention is not enough.

Now the product of the CTC. Oh, they also, I would say, started interfering in all kinds—of course, the popular term in the last few years has been micro-management—all kinds of things that had nothing to do with them as far as I was concerned. They were supposed to be a policy body, and they had been given plenty of policy authority. I mean real authority, which is the reason I had been opposed to this thing in the first place. But that wasn't enough for them. Once they got to that they wanted to get into the nitty-gritty. Do we need a maintenance station?
GIANTURCO

with three people located in field X and county Y? You know, this kind of stuff is not what a commission should be involved in. I'm exaggerating these. These are just made up examples off the top of my head, but is so-and-so spending too long on his coffee break, this kind of ridiculous stuff that would just irritate the heck out of me. We'd have to spend all kinds of time answering these questions that would be raised by commissioners. A lot of them spent time traveling around observing the operations of Caltrans out in the field and then would come back and want to know why is somebody wearing an orange shirt instead of a green shirt or something. You know, just ridiculous stuff.

Now, I'm not saying some of those things weren't valid. They may have been. But the principle the commissioners could not seem to understand. I couldn't seem to get it across to them that there is a distinction between the execution of policy and the formation of policy. There is a distinction between staff and policy-maker. We are the staff. Although we went beyond the staff because the director of Caltrans still had policy-making
authority, but to try to draw the line with that commission was very, very difficult. Dick Silberman, who was the secretary of B and T for part of the period while—I guess he was the secretary of Business and Transportation at the time the commission went into effect, later became secretary of Finance and has had some other things happen to him since then. But, anyway, he made a good comment. He said, "The problem is that we get these commissions which we hope are not going to interfere too much with the Executive Branch's power." By my argument the Executive Branch is going to get blamed for it. "Nobody has heard of these commissions, whatever they are, Parks and Recreation, Transportation, you name it, Parole Board. It's the governor that gets blamed or the governor's appointee in that field. The problem is, though, in order to get people to serve on these commissions, we tell them that it's a very important job that we are giving them, and they believe it. And next thing you know, they're in there trying to take over your job as governor or
whatever " And that is exactly, I mean, that
is a very apt description of what happens
In general, it sounds like your difficulties,
at least in principle if not in fact, with
the Transportation Commission would pretty
much follow the same line as difficulties you
might describe with the old Highway
Commission Fair to say?

One thing I would have to say that the
Transportation Commission had going for it
that the old Highway Commission didn't was
that the Transportation Commission right from
day one understood that it was supposed to
deal with transit

The old Highway Commission was also
supposed to deal with transit Its title was
Highway Commission, but Proposition 5, the
constitutional amendment which allowed gas
tax funds to be used for fixed guide railway
transit, had passed in, I guess about 1972 or
'74, a couple of years before I became
director ¹ The Highway Commission had the
responsibility, and that was a major source
of transport Until those bond issues passed

¹Proposition 5 (June 1974)
GIANTURCO a few years ago that was the major source of state funding for rail transit fixed-rail transit, in California. That old Highway Commission had the responsibility for allocating those funds, and they had refused to allocate the funds. They had just refused. What had actually occurred was that the Highway Commission, as I said earlier on, had basically no independent staff with the exception of an executive secretary. Whatever staff they used they borrowed from Caltrans on kind of an ad hoc basis.

One of the positions that they used in Caltrans was a guy who was in the Legal Department. I've forgotten his name, but he spent most of his time actually doing stuff for the commission. And he had come up with some argument—I don't remember what the argument was, which he had sold to the commission, which they loved. I mean they bought right into it—which was that they did not have the authority to allocate funds to transit unless they first identified a highway project that would not be built as a result of using this money for transit. It biased the whole process against transit.
because what you would do And they did this They would go out to SCAG, say, the regional planning agency in L A , and say, "We've got the potential for spending"-- and I'm making up the numbers--"six hundred million dollars of Proposition 5 funds in L A County, but before we do that, we want to find out what are your most important highway projects that you would build for that six hundred million dollars if we were to give it for highways."

So they'd go out and identify what were the dearest and closest, you know, the most "hot button" highway projects And, of course, then nobody would be willing to give up those highway projects in order to put the money in transit So what the effect was they hadn't allocated, I don't think they'd allocated more than, well, it was under a million dollars for transit in these several years that this law had been in effect before I became director I handled that situation shortly after I became director by getting rid of that lawyer I mean de-assigning him I said he had been assigned too long to the commission, and we needed to have a little
rotation. And I got another lawyer who said this opinion that the first one I mean these lawyers My husband's a lawyer I can talk freely I've taken a number of law courses I mean the whole idea of the law is you take a side, and then you develop a case for it Not that you're necessarily prostituting yourself, but that's the nature of the adversary system.

Well, this new lawyer that I got in there, his job was to develop an argument that, of course, the constitutional amendment was not intended to bias decisions against transit. It was intended to free up money for transit. This business of picking the biggest, brightest, most desirable highway projects and then saying that's what we are not going to build if we do some transit was a total distortion of the intent of the law. That's what this new lawyer said. So before the old Highway Commission went out of existence it seems to me they did allocate a few million dollars there and there. It wasn't a lot, but it was a lot more than they had allocated before.
Now, getting back to my original point, though the Transportation Commission, they knew from day one that their responsibilities included transit as well as highways. So they didn't try to pull any games like that with cutting transit money in order to free it up for highways. It was different types of games, but, at least, that was not a problem. That was a big improvement.

The Transportation Commission had its own, independent staff?

Yes, not a big staff, but it had some staff.

So they weren't dependent upon borrowing from Caltrans?

No, that was one of the things, also, that I come to think of it, when I was making my arguments against the bill before Jerry Brown signed it and I was wrong on this point, I said, "What you're doing here is setting up the potential for a whole new bureaucracy because government"

And I'm really hot on this. I mean waste of money. I mean this fiscal conservatism is something that has been in my system way before it became popular. I mean it. I mean, you know, the "new Democrats"
GIANTURCO may say they're trying to save money, and I say more power to them. But that's the way I have felt ever since I've been involved in government. The waste is disgusting. And what happens with new programs is they tend to take on a life of their own. The bureaucracy grows. It never shrinks. You will always need more jobs and so on. And I thought that was what was going to happen with this new commission by giving it a staff. I was assured the way the bill was written this had been a major issue, that it would be structured in such a way that the staff would be a limited number. And I think the staff that was in the original bill--I'm trying to remember--it was maybe six or seven positions. And I don't think it's more than, maximum, maybe twenty now, if that. And that's truly amazing because what I thought would happen was first year it'll be five or six. Then they'll say, "Gee, we have so much work to do we need another five and then we need another ten." The first thing you know, you have a staff of two hundred or three hundred duplicating stuff that's done in Caltrans. And that basically has not
happened, which is one thing to the good and one thing it's fortunate I was wrong on

Now, at this same time you're dealing with a new commission, you've got a whole plateful, we'll say, of new highway legislation, new policies, that you have to deal with, under attack for some of those things and some of your own actions in the press and by some local politicians, certainly, over the diamond lanes, for example At this same time you and your husband John had been married for a period of time, but he was still in Massachusetts

Uh, huh

So as you went home from work every night what would be the basic support system for a lot of people was really not available to you, at least not in person

That's true

Did this have a major effect on you?

Well, I would have to say I would go home at night, and I was so tired because I really worked incredible hours I was, altogether, in that job for seven years After about year five I decided, "I'm just going to cut back on these hours " But for the first--I
mean a very substantial period of time—I would come into the office by no later than 8:30 in the morning and usually considerably earlier than that and work through the day, work into the evening probably until 6:30 or 7:00, take stuff home, read it at home. On the weekends I took stuff home. Another thing, initially I wanted to learn as much as possible about Caltrans in the shortest period of time, and I'm a pretty quick study. But I had the staff prepare briefing books for me on just about everything, and I took this stuff home, and I read it. I'm a pretty fast reader, too, although I've never taken speed reading. I didn't just skim through; I went through, and I learned. I think within two or three weeks I could have named by number 90 percent of the highways in the state of California, and in the most obscure counties. Plus I had familiarized myself with the whole system of highway finance, which I had known generally before, but it's extremely complicated.

Anyway, my point is I had so much to do, and I was so busy. I was testifying before the legislature. I'm having
GIANTURCO

interviews with the press I'm trying to get on top of what's going on in Caltrans, and I didn't have a whole lot of time to be sitting around feeling sorry for myself or feeling I wasn't getting support I mean I would go home, and I would be so exhausted I would just fall into bed and sleep like a log until the alarm went off the next morning, and then I'd hop out of bed and just start right in on this again That was about the first year

The second year that I was in the Caltrans job my husband came out to California for a year He was a visiting professor at McGeorge just for that year Then he went back to Boston Then he came back on a permanent basis after that There was only a period of two years, say out of that seven that I was living by myself During both of those years I was so busy that there wasn't much time to, as I say, feel sorry for myself It sure would have been nice to have support, but we were talking on the phone all the time I would tell him what was going on Boy, did we burn up those phone lines! Because I'm telling him about
stuff that's three thousand miles away, and I'm having to describe whoever it is, [Caltrans staffer] Gene Cornelius or you name it, somebody who's giving me a hard time I'd have to give him the whole background because, of course, he wouldn't be reading the newspaper. I'd have to say the Sacramento Bee says this and then tell him what the philosophy of the Sacramento Bee was and give him the whole picture before I could get to the specific thing and get his advice. I got a lot of good advice from him, though, from long distance. In a way being removed from the situation And he's got a very rational mind and a lawyerly way of looking at things He would say, "Well, you know, don't take that so seriously," or, "Put that on the back burner," and "Don't get too involved here," or whatever.

At some point in time, though, in all of your difficulties, and I realize I'm way off in chronology here, but it might be a point to bring up You were called to testify before, I believe it was, a state senate committee, and, on the same day you were
supposed to be testifying, was when John had the bad traffic accident

GIANTURCO

Uh, huh That was at the end, toward the end

PETERSHAGEN

Toward the end of your tenure

GIANTURCO

If there is one thing that I would be bitter about my tenure at Caltrans it be that sequence of events And the—and I use the term—"son of a bitch" who caused that situation has later shown his true colors and that's [State Senator] Paul [B ] Carpenter, who is now a fugitive from justice in Costa Rica

It was right before Christmas, one year before the end of the administration Paul Carpenter was running or intended to run or was doing the preliminary work to run in the Democratic primary for U S Senate, and Jerry Brown was going to be, was, his opponent basically I don't know that either of them had declared at that point, but, anyway, it was in the works That was the election that Jerry Brown lost to Pete Wilson This is a long story, and I don't know how to cut it short Maybe I'll just get to the accident aspect of this, and then if you want to hear
GIANTURCO

some the transportation stuff in connection with it I'd be happy to talk about it too because it symbolizes The transportation aspects of it are a metaphor for a lot of other things that were going on at Caltrans that I was trying to do something about kind of in my Joan of Arc mode But, in any event, Paul Carpenter, who is in my view a person of so--I don't know how to express this--such minimal ethical standards it's hard to find somebody you could even compare this snake to I mean I cannot speak of him too strongly in these terms, and, as I say, he has shown his true colors I don't think I'm being paranoid or super hostile or aggressive or anything to say this, but I experienced this before the public went through this same thing with Carpenter A true disgrace to his profession, too, I should say I mean he's a clinical psychologist He kind of reminds me of this guy [Psychiatrist L] Jerome Oziel who was testifying in the Menendez Brothers trial and turned out to be such a scumbag that the state has taken away or is in the process of
GIANTURCO taking his license to practice psychology as a therapist

Well, anyway, Carpenter is either running or preparing to run in the Democratic primary, and he's trying to get publicity for himself. And that's all it is. He is trying to get publicity for himself. He gloms onto—I believe the issue was this bridge, I'm not positive of this—but I think this was the issue, and this is a very interesting story in itself.

The issue I think was a bridge in Mendocino County in the Round Valley in the town of Covelo where a certain element of the Caltrans establishment is trying to persuade me—here I am a Phi Beta Kappa, and I am not stupid—that we need a forty foot-wide bridge on a road which is twenty feet wide for its entire length and which has a traffic count of six hundred vehicles a day. And it's going to cost us some millions of dollars to do this. And there's never been a forty foot bridge. The road's twenty feet. A twenty foot bridge, twenty foot road, that we're going to expand out and build something that's a mini-version of the Golden Gate.
GIANTURCO

Bridge over this creek that's dry three quarters of the year and that we're going to spend taxpayers' money. And that came to a knock-down, drag-out fight between me and, as I say, the Neanderthal element of the engineering establishment of Caltrans. Talk about gold-plating a project. And this is also taxpayers' funds used. This frosts me. I mean it frosts me at the federal level, too. All this talk about our crumbling infrastructure and raising taxes time after time to fix our crumbling infrastructure, and half the time these funds don't go into fixing any crumbling infrastructure. They are used to fix things that are considered to be functionally obsolete, not structurally obsolete. That means that we no longer have a standard of twenty foot road, say for example, its forty feet wide. Fifty feet is, you know, half a football field. So forty feet is a big road.
GIANTURCO It's a high standard road It's not a little, rural road

Anyway, Paul Carpenter gets onto this I'm kind of skipping around here, and I'd be happy to get back to that whole issue over that bridge, but I believe that was the issue he gloms onto He decides to have hearings about it It's nothing that the legislature should give a damn one way or the other What do they care about what's happening with some bridge in Mendocino County that's got a traffic count of six hundred a day? And to put that in perspective, at the time the traffic on the Santa Monica Freeway in Los Angeles is 240,000 a day And they're going to waste staff time and everybody's time dealing with this little project where I happened to be having a battle with the engineering--as I say, a limited part of the engineering--establishment in Caltrans over this thing

So Carpenter calls this hearing, and he calls it for--I'm trying to remember if it

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1Half a football field length would be fifty yards
Nevertheless, forty feet still represents a high-standard rural road
was Christmas Eve or the day before Christmas Eve.

I think it was the twenty-second or the twenty-third.

It was an absurd time. As I remember, Christmas—we could look up the calendar—but say Christmas that year was on Monday, and he's calling the thing for Friday evening, something like that. Now, at the time my father was in a nursing home and in very bad condition. He had lost all kinds of weight. He weighed about seventy-five pounds. Well, he's now dead, but he was five feet eleven, weighing seventy-five pounds. He was desperately ill. I had planned a trip east to see him and also my mother who had had a stroke about maybe three months before this, and I hadn't seen her since she had the stroke.

I planned this trip, got the tickets, and was all set to go, and at the absolute last minute like on Thursday, I get this thing from Carpenter. It comes through our legislative office, saying Carpenter is holding this hearing. I had intended to leave—I'm not sure of the dates here—but,
GIANTURCO

say this hearing was on Friday evening, and I was going to be leaving on Friday morning to go east and stay through Christmas. As I say, Christmas was coming right up. It was two or three days from then, and I was planning to stay through that Christmas/New Year's week and come back out. You know, come back to California right after New Year's.

So when this thing comes through our legislative office like Thursday before Christmas, our legislative office responded to it by saying in the most polite way, which we always did, nothing unusual, these kinds of things happen, "This is just a very bad time to be having this hearing, and Ms. Gianturco has planned this trip to the east coast to see her father for the last three months, and it's right before Christmas, and could we defer this hearing?" There was no reason in the world why it had to be held on that Friday or whatever that date was. "Could we defer it until after the holidays?" The answer comes back in the form of a subpoena that I have to appear at this hearing. He's not deferring the hearing, and the hearing is
going to be on that Friday or whatever that date was

Come to think of it, no, it wasn't

Because I'm now remembering the days. I remember this because it happened after the weekend. The hearing was to be on Monday, and I had planned to leave that weekend. Christmas was coming, say, Tuesday or Wednesday, and I had planned to leave the prior weekend, see my father, stay there for Christmas, stay there for New Years, and come back. And then Carpenter is scheduling this hearing for two or three days after I was going to be gone. Right before Christmas, he's scheduling. So anyway we say, "Could we please defer this until after the holidays?" Plus, it's crazy! There's nobody around. I mean it's not the time to be holding hearings, in any event, whether or not you've made plans.

First of all, I contact the governor's office, and the governor's office was very antsy at this time because the political season is upon them and this primary is going on and all this. What I wanted to do was get this subpoena quashed, which you can do.
Just say it was unreasonable, go to court and say it's unreasonable, and you had prior plans. There was no reason this can't be put forward, or at least threaten to do that, and stop it. They didn't want to do that. And so they told me you'd better just cancel your plans and go to this hearing. So I did. I canceled my airline reservations, go to work on Monday. Meantime, my husband—we were planning to go together—took the flight that we had been scheduled to take, and our plans had been to go to Washington, D.C., where my father was in this nursing home.

[End Tape 6, Side A]

[Begin Tape 6, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN: Adriana, would you please continue the story now as you left it with John flying east to visit your father essentially in your stead.

GIANTURCO: Right. Uh huh. Well, actually, no. Our plans had been we were going to see my father and then he, John, also had a mother who is now dead, who was in a nursing home in Connecticut. So we were going to go to Washington and see my father and then go on to Connecticut and see his mother as part of this Christmas deal. He may have flown into
GIANTURCO

Washington I don't recall But he immediately starts out for Connecticut.

He was driving to Connecticut on Monday. And it was bad weather on the east coast. I mean they were having some kind of a blizzard or there had been one, and there was snow all over the roads, and they hadn't cleaned it off. His mother was in a nursing home in some rural area way away from everything. I mean not in Hartford or anything like that.

Late in the afternoon on Monday I get a phone call from a doctor in a hospital in some small town in Connecticut who says my husband has been in this automobile accident that could well turn out to be fatal and that they have transferred him. The only reason that he is alive today is because it so happened that wherever this accident happened was in the catchment area for a trauma center which is at Yale/New Haven Hospital. I guess New Haven is thirty or forty miles away from where this accident happened.

What happened was the road was slippery. It was at night, and somehow he'd got into the left hand lane, and a car pulled out of a
driveway—nobody knows exactly what happened. But, in any event, there was a head-on collision between him and this other vehicle. They had to use one of these [jaws of life] things in order to get him out of the car. The whole car that he was in, which was a rental car, was just collapsed like an accordion. And he suffered massive, massive injuries and was taken to a community hospital which was close by, say five or ten miles. They were not equipped to handle this kind of thing, this trauma, but this Yale/New Haven Hospital was within a reasonable distance. I don't know if they took him there by helicopter or what. But, anyway, they got him there.

In cases like that, as I've learned about this since, it's very important that the person be treated immediately or else they're gone for. They had him in plastic surgery. I mean reconstructing. I mean his head was all smashed in, and the most serious thing, though, was that his head...
GIANTURCO went through the windshield, as I remember, that he had some kind of injury at the base of his skull. If that had swollen, I mean, that would have been it. So he was in critical condition, and he was in intensive care in the critical care section of this Yale/New Haven Hospital. First, he was in surgery for something like seven or eight hours. He had this whole team of people they have because that's what they do in trauma centers. And then he was in the intensive care in critical condition for maybe a week after that.

Then miraculously he started to recover, but he had terrible injuries. One arm was broken in something like thirty-two places, and ribs broken, and all these head injuries, and fortunately it didn't affect his brain. But it damaged some nerves on one side of his face, meaning that his face just kind of collapsed on one side. He had surgery three or four times to try to correct that, and they were unable to do anything about it. It just severed the nerve.
Anyway, this was a very serious accident, and this would not have happened, in my opinion. I mean, you know, it's easy to second guess these things. But he was driving on that road alone, and the only reason that he was driving on that road alone at that time was because this Paul Carpenter and this ridiculous, stupid thing about, you know, because he's trying to run against Jerry Brown in the primary.

Well, so, I missed his damned hearing. When that happened I don't remember if I called myself or I had the legislative staff call Carpenter's office and said basically, "Screw your subpoena. Her husband has just been in what appears to be a fatal accident." And I got on a plane. And the airlines at that time—and I'm sure they have it now—with a situation like that they'll get you on a plane one way or the other. So within an hour or so, I was out of here and had flown to New Haven. And so Carpenter obviously had to defer his hearing.

I stayed there for about, probably, three weeks. I hadn't been back more than
three or four days before Carpenter rescheduled that hearing

He was going to have that hearing no matter what

[Laughter] Then he had the nerve to say at the hearing, when the hearing opened

Oh, as a matter of fact, what he did, though, was to have another hearing. It seems to me he had another hearing in my absence, not the original one, not the one that would have happened on Christmas Eve or whatever. But right after New Years, when I was not back because I'm sitting around in this Yale/New Haven Hospital. As I say, my husband was in intensive care in critical condition for a long time. This was not something that just was, you know, you just snap right out of it. It wasn't that at all.

Seems to me, that Carpenter held another hearing in Los Angeles where people were getting up and making jokes about this situation, or Carpenter himself was. I was just shocked when I heard about it when I came back. I know the Professional Engineers in California Government were making some
remarks along the lines of, "Well, she got what she deserved," or something like that. I just couldn't believe it! It really, truly disgusted me the way this whole thing evolved.

When I got back, and Carpenter did have his hearing, I remember he said to me, his first remarks were, "Well, I hope your husband is doing well," and I just gave him the coldest, fish-eye stare [Laughter] that you can imagine a person would do.

I should think so. Now, if we can go back to the subject of the hearings. The way that I have recreated this, the way I think it happened, was that for whatever reasons those engineers in Caltrans that were upset with you got that way, they took this issue to Carpenter or to the legislature at any rate and there was in the background of this.

The reason that the legislature should get concerned was that if the bridge wasn't built to the forty foot federal standard, I think was the way it went, then, of course, the state wouldn't get the money to build the bridge at all. So I think it was the loss of
money, as much as anything, that was perhaps
the Carpenter public case on how we should
approach this

No, no  The public case was I was going to
create an unsafe situation  The federal
money was secondary in this instance
Anyway, there are all kinds of ways around
that  The federal government is human
beings, and they're not totally unreasonable
As a matter of fact, the people in the
Highway Administration are pretty reasonable
I usually had pretty good dealings with them
Sometimes they would dig in their heels and
insist on some bureaucratic thing, but they
are not, you know, living on Mars  This was
just a patently ridiculous thing

No, the argument that was being made
publicly was that I was not an engineer and I
was interfering with engineering decisions,
and the engineers--they are this breed of
people whose concern and whose whole standard
is safety--and I was threatening people's
lives by interfering with this  My response
to that is this road had been there  I
don't know when it was built, say 1910
GIANTURCO

There had never been, as I recall, a fatal accident. The accident rate on that thing was so low that it was way below the statewide standard. It was absolutely no problem whatsoever. We weren't talking about the structural integrity of this thing which I would never have dreamed of questioning. I never questioned anything.

See, something that is obscured to a lot of people, but I caught on to pretty fast working with the engineering establishment, when you're talking about engineering standards there are basically two kinds of standards, structural and functional. Structural has to do with things like the tensile strength of steel and whether the columns are properly spaced or with these seismic things whether they'll vibrate in the right way. Well, I don't know a thing about that. I don't want to know about it. I leave that to the experts. But it does not take an expert to know that you don't build something—again I'll give the analogy of the Golden Gate Bridge—over a creek that's dry three quarters of the year, that has six
hundred vehicles a day passing across it, and where there's never been an accident.

And, when we're talking about the width of things it's a whole different story. The scale of a road or whether the road should be straight or whether it should curve. The mentality that says, which has changed over the years, but it certainly existed at one point, that if you're going to build a freeway it's between two points and you take the straightest route. And if that means tearing down half the city so be it. Well nobody is going to tell me that the engineering answer to that is the answer, that that's the way it has to be. It does not have to be that way. You can run the road, you know, at a curve and run it around the city. Those kinds of decisions are perfectly well considered and entered into and interfered with, if you will, by non-engineers, by people who have some kind of common sense. Plus, I'm educated in the general field of transportation planning. I'm not going to suggest putting a five foot
GIANTURCO bridge where a road's twenty foot wide obviously

I think I said earlier in this interview I don't want to leave the impression that the staff of Caltrans is or was a whole bunch of Neanderthals That is absolutely not the case There are many, very talented forward looking people there I was extremely impressed with the general quality of the staff But there was a certain element there that, you know, were still living in the 1960s, or was at the time that I was there

And I was told by many of the more progressive types--not just one person, but a number of people--that what was really happening was this was the final year of the administration And this element of the engineering staff that was living in the past was kind of starting to feel its oats feeling there was going to be a change of administration and now is the time to distance themselves from Adriana and from this different way of thinking So that when the new administration came in they would be associated with this scientifically inclined,
build the roads, build them the way we used to do it type of thing which was in the air if the administration changed. And it was for this reason that this became an issue.

PETERSHAGEN: Certainly the bridge in Covelo is an interesting thing as remote as that community is. For the whole state government.

GIANTURCO: Oh, by the way, as soon as I left they built the forty foot road as I understand it.

PETERSHAGEN: I think that's right. Yes.

GIANTURCO: It stopped. I stopped it. I stopped it. I said, "I'm not wasting taxpayers' money on this stuff. Paul Carpenter can hold fifty hearings on this. I'm not spending, whatever it was, 1 2 million dollars of hard-earned taxpayers' money to build a forty foot wide road." I mean I went up there. I don't know how many Caltrans directors do this, but when there were cases like this I would go and look at the thing. And I went up there with one of my deputies, and it took us a whole day to do it. Although we had private planes at Caltrans because we had this Division of Aeronautics, we didn't want to be abusing that. So the two of us took a whole day, and
GIANTURCO that's a long drive  We just drove straight up to Covelo  We drove down the road  We were driving through this Round Valley  I don't know if you know this, George, but it's very controversial also because it had to do with a dam project, I guess under the, maybe Edmund G Brown [Sr ] Administration, when the water stuff was really hot stuff  They wanted to flood the whole valley, and that was stopped somehow

But this little road is winding around  We are in the boondocks! Talk about, you know, that rapist that they put in Modoc County  He could go to this Round Valley and just be lost in those hills, and nobody would ever see him again  [Laughter]

We go off Route 101  I guess we're going up, and we go off some other road  Then we are on this little road, and it is winding around  Pretty country, there's a little river there  It's winding around

All kinds of bridges  It's not as though there is just this one bridge  We must have crossed four or five bridges, all of which were twenty feet wide  So what's so special
about this one that all of a sudden this one is a terrible danger to public safety?

We get there. The town itself, Covelo, is a cute little place. I mean it's just nothing. It's a little tiny community almost out of another century. People are just living a way of life probably the way it was in pioneer times. Right as you go past the town, as I say, I know this because we went up there. This big deal is being made out of this project. Here I am directing this program, spending billions of dollars, and yet, because of Paul Carpenter, this deputy and I are spending a whole day going to look at this foolish thing. But we want to make sure we're right here because we are hearing what a terrible safety problem this is. Anyway, right beyond the town is an Indian reservation. The road just kind of peters out. There is no road. It turns into a dirt road, and then you're in the Indian reservation. We couldn't believe it! I mean we thought this is unbelievable. So we come back, and if there had been any doubt whatsoever about whether or not there ought
to be a forty foot bridge there that trip disproved it as far as I was concerned.

So I had seen this thing on the spot, and nobody was going to tell me, show me any statistics or abstract analysis. Oh, another argument that was made—I couldn't believe this [Laughter]—was that there was a lot of bicycle traffic on this bridge and that this was unsafe for bicycles. Well, we had somebody—it seems to me that I had this deputy assign somebody—to stand out by this bridge and count bicycles. And he stood there, now I'm making this up, George, but it's probably in the records someplace. It seems to me that he stood there for like two weeks, and maybe two bicycles went over the bridge [Laughter] The EIR [Environmental Impact Report] had said substantial bicycle traffic. When we came through with that thing they said, "Well, maybe we made a mistake on that substantial bicycle traffic." [Laughter]

I guess one of the questions that has to be asked is where was the California Transportation Commission in all of this?
And where was this project in the STIP [State Transportation Improvement Program]? That's a very interesting question. You know, I just don't know where it was in the STIP. It must have been in the STIP, but I think the California Transportation. This is a good instance of what I was talking about with A B 402. They were making themselves scarce while this stuff was going on. [Laughter] You wouldn't have known that they had anything to do with this bridge thing at all. [Laughter] It's Jerry Brown, me, and Paul Carpenter slugging it out. [Laughter]

I think I understand. But that leads us to an interesting follow-up question.

How could it have been in the STIP?

[Laughter]

I have not seen anyplace where this was a major local issue.

No. The locals didn't care about it at all. As a matter of fact, it seems to me somebody wrote an editorial up there. They had a little weekly newspaper, and they said what is this big deal with this bridge? What's
going on in Sacramento? Have they gone crazy down there? [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN Well, it's been my experience that if there is a controversy like this that's real, what you have is the locals probably want to preserve their charming historic bridge or something like that.

GIANTURCO Not necessarily. This had nothing to do with the locals, although what you say That is an element of a lot of situations. This was strictly, as I said a little bit earlier, I believe, a thing about certain elements of the engineering staff of Caltrans staking out a position in anticipation of a change of administration coming up, that they were going to be standing for these high moral things about public safety and distancing themselves from "Governor Moonbeam" and his far-out, maverick transportation director That's what it was. The locals didn't know what the heck was going on.

PETERSHAGEN Let's take up a different one, then, that's of the same vein and involved, at least as I understand it, pretty much the same handful
of engineers at Caltrans, and that has something to do with the striping on Highway 44, east, I think, of Redding? You're giving me a puzzled look, so you don't recall that.

GIANTURCO: No, I don't remember that one.

PETERSHAGEN: There are some newspaper articles that lump those two together, where, again, the statement is made that you, the non-engineer, were interfering in a safety decision.

GIANTURCO: I don't recall that at all. I don't remember that instance in the slightest, but there were a number of instances where.

Well, I'm thinking of two different things. There were cases where Caltrans, the same engineering element—I mean I could pin it down and actually use some names and maybe I will at some point, but it's not necessary at this point—wanted to widen roads in rural areas that had very low traffic volumes to this forty foot section. It's very interesting because the Federal Highway Administration, as I understand it, has now changed its standards [Laughter] for the specific reason that it is just a tremendous waste of taxpayers' money to have this...
GIANTURCO standard apply regardless that it's going to be forty feet wide whether you've got two cars or bicycles or whatever a day or 240,000. It's just ridiculous. But at that time the forty foot standard was the standard, and I questioned that. You did not have to build roads at a forty foot standard. There were also standards of twenty-eight and thirty-two feet, as I recall. The forty foot standard involves two twelve foot lanes and two eight foot shoulders. The reason for that is a twelve foot lane is a wide lane. A ten foot lane is perfectly adequate to accommodate an automobile. A forty foot road will accommodate truck traffic—heavy truck traffic, big truck traffic—going both directions with full space for those trucks to break down on the shoulders. Well, that's not what's happening on those rural roads. That's just not the traffic situation. But that's what that standard meets.

There are also standards for thirty-two feet wide roads, and I've forgotten what that is. I guess it's, again, two twelve foot
lanes and four feet shoulders. Would that add up right?

PETERSHAGEN: That would be thirty-two.

GIANTURCO: That's the thirty-two, and then there's another standard which is twenty-eight, which is two ten foot lanes, I guess, and four foot shoulders, which would be the lowest standard in a rural road, which would have been appropriate probably for this Covelo situation which actually had twenty-two feet, as I remember. It was built a long time ago.

But, anyway, people kept suggesting these forty foot sections in these remote areas with very little traffic, and I questioned them. There are a lot of games going on in organizations, not just Caltrans. This is human nature, I guess, and it shows itself in any organizational form. People knew I was interested in multimodalism, and one aspect of multimodalism is encouraging bicycle traffic. Well, I'm all in favor of bicycle traffic, but I don't think it's appropriate or going to be important in a place like, say, Route 44, although I do not remember this example you are bringing up.
assume this is a rural road, probably Shasta County, someplace like that?

PETERSHAGEN
Right   Going east from Redding

GIANTURCO
So what they would come back at me when I would question one of these forty foot roads out in some remote area is "Oh, we need those eight foot shoulders for bicycles "

PETERSHAGEN
Oh, so they were trying to throw your own philosophy back in your face?

GIANTURCO
Yes, right   She won't buy it on the basis of the heavy truck traffic because we can't show there is any   And I would always ask for documentation   I would say, "OK, if there is heavy truck traffic I want to see those traffic counts "   And, of course, they wouldn't exist   They'd just melt like an ice cream in the sun as soon as you started looking at these numbers   There wasn't anything there   So then they'd come back and say, "Now we need these for bicycles "   That may have been a case like that   I don't know

Another thing that I was really hot for--I followed a lot of things   I tried to keep continuity going in Caltrans with what had
GIANTURCO happened before I was there. Before I came to Caltrans under the Reagan Administration they had hired McKenzie and Company—which I guess is now merged. It doesn't exist. It's one of those big, you know, accounting type firms—to do a study of how California could spend its highway dollars more efficiently and effectively. And I glommed onto that study very early in my tenure. I thought it was brilliant. What it said was you get a much higher bang for the buck if you spend your dollars on small projects as opposed to large ones. The kinds of examples were, if you've got traffic backing up on a two lane road, rather than four-laning that road, put some passing shoulders here and there. It costs a fraction of what four-laning it does. You can do it in many more locations. And you add up the benefits from the total dollars spent from spreading around money on passing shoulders as opposed to four-laning a single section, you get much better traffic flow, I mean in terms of numbers, for the same dollars spent.
Same thing with left turn lanes. If you have a back-up problem at an intersection, rather than four-laning that intersection or putting in an interchange or something fancy, put in a left turn lane and put in an arrow signal. And, again, you spread the money around, and you can handle fifty situations for the cost of doing an expensive gold plated project in one and have much greater traffic. I really hit on that philosophy at Caltrans. This Shasta 44 situation may have been one of those things, too, where they wanted to four-lane, and I said, "Let's do some passing lanes." I just don't recall. It could have been one of the McKenzie-type projects that happened. We had many, many cases like that. I mean that was an on-going theme that I tried to push.

One of the things that the study, the McKenzie study, didn't recommend to save money was that the director serve without salary. [Laughter] But there is an incident where you had to deal with that.

Seems to me that was two years running come to think of it. Yes.
PETERSHAGEN: I think so. Would you care to describe that for us?

GIANTURCO: Yes, that's right. I had forgotten all about that. I think it was [State] Senator [Alfred E ] Alquist who was really mad at me because I did not want to build this road in his district—Route 101, San Jose 101.

PETERSHAGEN: And I want to make this clear. I think that the difficulty in this case. It was more of the bringing home, the pork home, to the district rather than him just trying to make a political name seeking office—that kind of a thing.

GIANTURCO: No, no. This was an entirely different situation. He was in a very powerful position, head of the senate—unfortunately for me, I mean—head of Senate Finance. But he was hot for this road, 101 in his district, from someplace to Gilroy, San Jose to Gilroy. I've forgotten where exactly. It was about a twelve-mile section of road. My idea was we could take the existing road—there was an existing road—and up-grade that for a fraction of the cost of building this by-pass freeway. Ultimately the by-pass...
freeway was built. But anyway that was what the issue was. He wanted this by-pass freeway, and I didn't want to put it in the program because I thought there was a cheaper, more cost effective solution, and so I was really on his bad side. His way of dealing with that was to eliminate my salary from the Caltrans budget. This is after we went under legislative budgeting. I mean that couldn't have happened before. [Laughter]

And, of course, at least symbolically if he eliminated your salary he then eliminated you because nobody would do this for nothing.

Right [Laughter] But I did get paid. I don't remember how they paid me, come to think of it. I just don't remember that. There is some totally legal thing that you do in situations like that. This is not the first time that this has happened in state government. There is some other way of paying people other than through. I just don't remember what it was. It was nothing under the table, but I continued to get paid. It was a symbolic gesture. He
knew I was going to get paid, but it sounded good

PETERSHAGEN

But I believe your response was that you would continue to do it without pay

[Laughter]

GIANTURCO

Right I would have kept right on going without a paycheck Didn't make one bit of difference to me as far as changing my mind as to whether that was worth spending taxpayers' money on that road I mean that was not the way to bribe me I frankly consider myself unbriable [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN

You're describing this as if you mean that seriously I will be the Caltrans director without pay if that's what I have to do?

GIANTURCO

I am No, I wouldn't say I'm going to be the Caltrans director, but I would say I'm not going to back down on principle You take away my pay? Take away my pay That's not going to make me think that is a better road What has that got to do with the road?

PETERSHAGEN

That's an interesting response I guess the next area that I'd like to explore gets us back into the diamond lanes, and that has to
do with one in San Diego. This has to do with a sign that I believe you had put up
It was the San Diego Freeway in Los Angeles
Oh, excuse me. Yes, that's correct. It was on the San Diego Freeway. And you were going to put a diamond lane on there and, I think, forced not to. And your symbolic gesture of surrender, it was described in one account, was to put a sign up with a "happy face" on it
It was my idea to put this sign up
And that was your idea
Yes. If you want this lane open, OK. I mean, I'm a realist. [Laughter] There's no way that Los Angeles is going to accept another diamond lane even though this was a diamond lane paid for specifically. It was a new lane, an added lane. It wasn't taking a lane away from general traffic. But people were making such a big stink out of it that I was. You know, I'm not a dictator. I can't force people to drive on it. So I accepted defeat, gracefully, hopefully. I said, "OK, let's put a sign up."
But that added lane was added specifically to be the express lane.

Oh, yes Oh, yes Caltrans, in response to these clean air amendments, had come up with this plan that involved three different types of diamond lanes a separated facility which had already been built, the San Bernardino Freeway, taking a lane away which was the Santa Monica project, and adding a lane to an existing facility, and that was the San Diego project.

The San Diego lanes were under construction when the Santa Monica Freeway opened. When they were completed the question was what do we do? I mean there had been such an outcry over the other ones, and it was Jerry Brown's decision that we would just open them to general traffic I fought against that, but I could see it was a losing battle. As I say, I'm not unrealistic I'm not set in my ways, even if I'm coming across that way. I recognize when the situation is such that there is no point in beating your head against the stone wall. There was no way that people were going to accept another
carpool lane in Los Angeles, even if it was an added lane, and even though that had been the principal argument made against the Santa Monica lanes. The argument repeatedly was you took a lane away. Well, of course, now we are adding a lane. But I knew the argument would shift to some other ground so

PETERSHAGEN There's an interesting thread running through all of this. It's always you, or it's always Governor Brown, and I never hear mention of the CTC in any of these things.

GIANTURCO They stayed away from anything.

PETERSHAGEN They went home whenever there was a sign of trouble, I take it.

GIANTURCO There was no sign of them around when any of these kinds of things happened, which is what I tried to tell the governor. Not a sign. Not a peep. You wouldn't have known they were there.

Now I say that in a blanket statement, and if I look back I might be able to think of a few examples of real courage on the part of individual commissioners. And they may even on occasion have passed resolutions in
support of some of these controversial things. But the real point is what I said. In terms of public perception and all, commissions don't mean anything. They're too abstract. They're too hard to understand. A person with a face whose name has been in the paper, people can understand that, whether it's Adriana Gianturco or Pete Wilson or whoever it is, Bill Clinton. You know, they don't relate to some kind of complicated bureaucratic structure with a lot of faceless people associated with it part-time. It's very hard to understand that or to hold it responsible or whatever.

By the same token, the press, I think, seems to take advantage of that too. Because you never hear mention of the CTC.

And the press, too. The press personalizes things. Yes. Well, I remember one of my press people telling me. We were doing some project, alternative fuels, and we were doing it with General Services. It involved trying. I don't remember what the fuel was—ethanol, methanol, or something. Maybe it was an electric car. I just don't recall.
Anyway, we were going to put several of these in service in the state fleet, so we had a press event to introduce this. It was held, as I remember, under one of those, the X Freeway or the Y Freeway or whatever it is, 80 or Business 80 in Sacramento, in one of these areas which is used for storage and parking and so on, kind of a good area. So it was easy to set the car out there and Dave Janssen, who was head of the Department of General Services and I appeared at this thing. They had a little microphone set up. They invited the press and got a huge press turnout for this because I was so controversial it didn't matter what it was they would turn out. So, we got this huge turnout of people, and Dave Janssen did his thing, made some remarks. And really, it was more of a General Services project than a Caltrans project because they were going to be running this vehicle, as I remember. Caltrans had had something to do with developing it or funding it but it was going to go into operation under the auspices of General Services. Well, anyway, Dave Janssen
GIANTURCO made his remarks, and the press were kind of looking around and, you know, studying their fingernails and talking to each other and so on. And then I did my thing. Instant attention. I mean you would have thought I had just died. I don't know. I was Zsa Zsa Gabor and had just slapped that policeman. The world's attention is directed. And I thought, "Boy, this is bizarre. Why are they so interested in me?" This press person that worked for me said afterwards, "Well, it's just more interesting. Here's this woman, never been a woman director of Caltrans before, and you've been in the paper. You're more interesting to cover than [Director, General Services] Dave Janssen."
SESSION 5, April 13, 1994

[Tape 7, Side A] 323

Relationship with press—Need for precision in communication—The Los Angeles Times—Principles of long-range planning

[Tape 7, Side B] 350

Self-reflection—First press conference—Relationship with Bee chain—Accusations by press

[Tape 8, Side A] 371

Relationship with Bee—Threats received—Unflattering photos used with negative reporting—Antioch (John Nejedly) Bridge

[Tape 8, Side A] 298

More on the Antioch Bridge

SESSION 6, April 20, 1994

[Continue Tape 8, Side B] 402

Caltrans' organization—Span of control—Gianturco management style—Matrix organizations—Reorganization

[Tape 9, Side A] 424

Line vs staff organization—Position of Chief Engineer—Authority of District Directors—The Environmental Process—CEQA—NEPA

[Tape 9, Side B] 450

More on the Environmental Process—Headquarters to District relationship—Overcoming delays in project delivery

[Tape 10, Side A] 478

Role of the engineering establishment in Caltrans—Director's "open door" policy
SESSION 7, April 29, 1994

[Continue Tape 10, Side A] 496

Comments on reported 1994 Caltrans problems--Alternative transportation modes

[Tape 10, Side B] 506

Division of Aeronautics--Defining the state role in mass transit--Highway funds vs transportation funds--The "Washington Monument" funding game--Responses to the 1970s oil embargoes--Senate Bill 625--State role in intracity trains

[Tape 11, Side A] 530

The "Washington Monument" funding game--Responses to the 1970s oil embargoes--SB 625--State role in intracity trains

[Tape 11, Side B] 555

State partnership with Amtrak--The "San Joaquins"--Condition of trains--"The Grizzly" experiment--Steam trains--San Diego's "Tijuana trolley"--Interstate Transfer Program

SESSION 8, May 5, 1994

[Tape 12, Side A] 578

Rotation of District Directors and Headquarters managers--Proposed "Tahoe trolley"--Sacramento light rail system

[Tape 12, Side B] 601

Caltrans' role in Sacramento light rail system--Embarcadero Freeway--Rail vs truck transport systems

[Tape 13, Side A] 627

Southern Pacific's executive car--High speed rail--Lack of support by the "environmental community"--Buck Rogers vs Governor Moonbeam--Private high speed rail enterprises
Condemnation of idle rights of way--Los Angeles-Oxnard Caltrain--Peninsular Commute Service--Caltrain

Appendix A - Names
PETERSHAGEN    Adriana, I've shown you the memo you
corrected from March of 1977 and all the
publicity that I've gathered that surrounded
that whole affair. Would you care to discuss
that a little bit, and especially with regard
to how the press handled it?

GIANTURCO    Well, the history of it was as I look back,
and, of course, it's not fresh in my mind,
but I do distinctly recall this. By March 9,
1977 I guess I'd been at Caltrans for one
week less than a year, and I was continually
getting things, memos, etc., that were
written to me that had both typographical
errors in them and errors of grammar, errors
of English usage, numerical errors, as far as
that goes— all kinds of errors that would go
through. Typically in Caltrans, by
the time something reaches the director's
desk it's gone through—it wouldn't be
unusual for it to have gone through— ten
levels of review. And not one person along
GIANTURCO

this chain of command would have picked up
this error

I guess the straw that broke the camel's
back was that I must have received a memo
which used the word criteria as though it
were a singular. As I say, that was the
straw that broke the camel's back. It must
have been. And I whipped off this memo
saying I would appreciate which I
sent to deputy directors, assistant
directors, and division chiefs—this would
have been the top brass of Caltrans—saying I
would appreciate you all being a little more
careful in sending. When you send
stuff to me, either memos or letters that you
want me to sign or whatever, to make sure
that they're grammatically correct and they
don't have typographical errors. And I used
as an example, unfortunately as it turned
out, two words with a Latin root—criterion
as the singular and criteria as the plural,
and datum as the singular and data as the
plural. I pointed out that this was the
case. Criteria is a word that is continually
used around Caltrans, and it's used as though
it were singular. And it is not singular.
Data  I'm willing to recognize, looking back on this episode has moved into the English language as a singular word even though it is, in fact, not. It's the plural of datum. As I say, I wrote this thing so fast that I must have written it in response to something that I got that had misused, probably, criterion.

But I used those words as examples of misuse of the English language. Well, this caused a real uproar, this memo that I sent. It was picked up by the press, obviously leaked to the press. All kinds of really nasty "Letters to the Editors" were sent to various newspapers. I remember "Letters to the Editor" in the LA Times, also in the Sacramento Bee, saying, making comments, like didn't I have better things to spend my time on, what a small-minded person I was, how pedantic, and how unimportant this question is, which I simply disagree with. My view is that the purpose of the English language or any language is communication, and it is important to communicate clearly. To write memos or letters which are fouled up either because nobody bothered to read them to make
GIANTURCO

sure the sentence doesn't have a word misspelled or is typographically in error or whatever shows to me sloppy thinking and lack of thought. This is not an abstract question. It goes beyond that, and there's no reason for it. It should not be that in a large organization it's the director of the organization who finally gets a letter which is supposed go to the U.S. Department of Transportation or the president of the United States and is going to contain some egregious error. That was my point, and I don't back down from it. I feel exactly the same way now. I feel even more strongly, if anything.

I give another example which is not only the misuse of language, words, but misuse of numbers. Remember, I'm the head of an organization which is essentially an engineering organization. Well, the science of engineering is the science of numbers, and if you don't understand the basic relationships, mathematical relationships, and concepts, you are in deep trouble. And recall again that I was not an engineer, but I happened to have been trained in mathematics to quite a high level and did Ph
D exams in the field of statistics and was at least aware of simple arithmetic.

In one occasion, which just absolutely blew my mind at the time, I received a memo which, again, probably had gone through ten levels of command before it got to me. It came to me from a deputy director. It had to do—I've forgotten what the issue was—but it had to do with some important decision that we were making, and the decision depended on the numerical status of something or other. And, in this memo, the person who had written the memo, and, as I say, it was signed off on, or it was sent to me by a deputy director, had confused the numerator and the denominator in a crucial equation that determined whether or not we were to take this particular course of action. I just could not believe it, that the director again, is the person who's the only one in that organization that understands the difference between the numerator and a denominator.

I sent it back to this deputy director. This, as I say, probably went through ten layers of trained engineers who should, at
the very least, understand elementary arithmetic that you learn in the third or fourth grade. And it was shocking to me that it could have gone that far and that the decision, had I not picked it up, a decision would have been made based on an entirely faulty conceptual analysis of this problem.

So this is part and parcel of the same thing. To me numbers and language are not abstractions that only small minds are concerned with. They are fundamental to human communication and human conceptualization. It's as simple as that. If you can't conceptualize, you are probably, almost by definition, not properly analyzing problems, not to mention thinking of the correct solutions to those problems.

Now this editorial in the Times, rather than attacking you, I took it to be somewhat of a tip of the hat, but indicates that the Times had been an opponent of yours or that the relationship between you and the Times was somewhat antagonistic, I think. And in their final paragraph they point out that you can be a strong opponent, but they acknowledge that I think, in a respectful tone rather
than the way some of the letters to the editor that it attracted, really addressed to you. Did you sense when you were the director that you were really opposed by the Times?

GIANTURCO Well, I had a stormy relationship with the Times initially. I could recount that whole history, which turned around and became a very positive relationship with the Times. What happened was that after I was named director, or as we've discussed previously, the very day that I became director, the diamond lanes on the Santa Monica Freeway started in operation. The same day! I clearly--I think I explained before--had nothing to do with planning them. But I did support them, and I believed in them and I became their champion. The Times took the opposite tack. The Times was violently against these lanes editorially. Why I could never figure out. My deputies, assistants, and I used to sit around and try to figure out what was this that so got under the skin of the Los Angeles Times that they were so dead set against these diamond lanes, but the fact is that they were. In the lawsuit that
GIANTURCO was brought over these lanes one of the pieces of evidence that we submitted was the role of the Los Angeles Times in affecting public opinion on this project. Our lawyers brought forth the fact that the Los Angeles Times editorialized more frequently on the diamond lanes than they did on the Vietnam War, which says something about the preoccupation of somebody on that editorial board or the publishing side of the operation about these diamond lanes.

In any event, they had written editorial after editorial about these diamond lanes saying how terrible they were and blaming it all on me, dragging me through the mud essentially. It was clear that I didn't have a good relationship going with the L.A. Times. They had one reporter at the time Ray Hebert, who was covering transportation exclusively. Ray Hebert wrote many, many stories on Stories, these were, not editorials on the diamond lanes. The straight reporting coverage of this project was also massive. They had practically daily updates of what was happening with these
GIANTURCO diamond lanes, not to mention the frequent editorials

I don't know that Hebert as a reporter was particularly opposed to them, but he dealt with them in detail. Our daily counts of how many cars were using the carpool lanes and if we changed a sign, all this appeared in the Times. Overall the Times clearly—getting back to the editorial side—was anti-diamond lanes, no question about it. At the conclusion of that project which we were forced to stop by court order, and it was on a technicality. It had nothing to do with the merits of the lanes. The decision that was made by the court in the lawsuit that stopped them related to the court's determination that Caltrans had not filed the proper environmental documents for this project, which again, predated me because all this work had been done before I was at the department.

It was kind of a "catch twenty-two" type decision. The decision said that since this project was controversial, controversy in itself triggers the requirement to do the full-scale environmental analysis. Well,
GIANTURCO there was no way to know they were controversial until they had opened You can't win for losing in a situation like that. In fact, as we made the point in court, in the lawsuit, there had been lots and lots of groundwork done to bring the community along and inform people about this Yes, there were controversies, and it was for that reason that it took so long for Caltrans to plan and execute this project because they were trying to meet with every possible group and get the word out and so on. There had been a massive citizen participation effort launched in connection with this project And there was no way to know that when the project actually opened that there would be the kind of controversy there, in fact, was Fueled in large part, I will say again, by the Los Angeles Times. I'll get back to that if we want to deal specifically with the Times.

I may have mentioned this before, but when the diamond lanes opened on Route 101 north of San Francisco over the Golden Gate Bridge through Marin County, which also predates my time, I was informed by my people
GIANTURCO at Caltrans that they had also been controversial when they were first opened, but there was very little press coverage of this. The *San Francisco Chronicle* basically didn't take an interest in it. They may have written about it a couple of times, but the story didn't have legs, as they say. The only media outlet that was interested in it was some weekly newspaper up there that didn't like the project, the *Marin Daily*, the *Marin Weekly Blab*—I'm making up the name—but it was some small newspaper that, you know, has a very small readership. In the absence of this symbiotic relationship between public opinion and the press, it just never developed into the kind of controversy that the diamond lanes on the Santa Monica Freeway did. I mean the press can feed these things and keep them going. It's not just the press reporting public opinion. The press is shaping public opinion, and anybody who doesn't believe this doesn't understand how the fifth estate works or the fourth estate, whatever it is in our society.

In any event, when the diamond lanes were shut down by court order on this
GIANTURCO technicality, that the proper environmental documents had not been filed. I believe specifically that Caltrans had either done, had either asked for, an exemption and filed some kind of maybe ten-page report saying why this project should be exempt from the requirements of either a Negative Declaration or a full-scale EIR, the grounds being that the project's purpose was positive environmentally and that its effects were, not even the positive ones, were not going to be significant enough so that you would have to deal with them one way or the other. As I say, I've forgotten whether this was the grounds for asking for either an exemption from any report requirement or whether the department filed a Negative Declaration instead of an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement], and the court said it should be an EIS. In any event, their final decision, as I recall, was there should be a full-blown EIS, and they enjoined the project until such time as an EIS could be prepared. Well, given the slowness of Caltrans, which is like molasses on EIRs, EISs, this would have meant, probably, two or three years' worth of
That decision must have come down in probably--I'm guessing--in the Fall because that project lasted approximately, maybe, six or eight months. The decision probably came down in October. At that same time, during those same first six or eight months that I was at Caltrans, I was dealing not only with the diamond lanes, but with a second major issue, in a way a much more important issue, which was trying to bail Caltrans, the highway program in particular, out of bankruptcy--literally how to bail it out of bankruptcy. We had gone through this big layoff of staff, which was still going on when I became director. I became director in March, and we didn't stop the layoffs, as I recall, until the end of May or early June. There were no contracts being let for any projects whatsoever except for emergency type things. The place essentially in the highway program was shut down, and there was no prospect, or nobody had figured out how to get the thing going again, how to start...
GIANTURCO getting some money into the coffers and reinstitute the highway program

So the first six months or so of my time there was spent dealing with these diamond lanes, which was a complete surprise, that I had to deal with that, to me, and, secondly, trying to straighten out the highway program I would get to work by eight or eight-thirty in the morning, and only infrequently leave before seven-thirty or eight in the evening day after day, and on weekends I took documents home to read There was a lot to try and deal with all piled on at once

But, as I say, this bankruptcy of the highway program was a very serious, serious problem, and what we had managed to do, I and the top deputies of Caltrans, and there were three principal people involved, as I remember I was clearly involved [Deputy Director] Heinz Heckeroff was the head of the Highway Division [Deputy Director Robert] Bob Adams was the head of, I guess the name of the division was, Budget, and he had an assistant, [Deputy Director Ronald] Ron Herbold, who was intimately involved in this Probably the principal players were Ron
GIANTURCO

Herbold with Bob Adams, Heinz Heckeroff, and I trying to figure out how to make the highway program whole.

After several months of work on this we were able to do it. What we did was to come up with this strategy which involved stretching state dollars to their maximum so that virtually every state dollar that we spent that was not spent on maintenance would be matched against the federal dollar. That way we managed to multiply the resources. We were highly criticized for this later on.

This is another issue which I could get into later. We did come up with a way to finance the highway program with no increase in taxes and to take it from virtually zero spending to a level of spending of one billion dollars a year with no increase in taxes by doing this very careful matching and juggling of state and federal funds.

Another thing was that in the past Caltrans had in the highway program come up with these long-range programs for highway development, like ten, twenty years out into the future in which projects were like a Christmas tree list. I mean who could tell
GIANTURCO what is happening ten or twenty years from now? They were meaningless. They promised projects to everybody. Some community is agitating or the Chamber of Commerce is agitating for an interchange because a shopping center is going in or something. Rather than saying, "No, this is ridiculous, the state shouldn't be spending taxpayers' money on this," you just stick it in the twenty-year program.

This is part of the way, in my opinion, of how Caltrans got in trouble in the first place and went bankrupt, which happened under the Reagan administration—another thing that I never blamed on the Reagan administration. In the same way that it never occurred to me to blame the diamond lanes on the Reagan administration, it never occurred to me to blame the bankruptcy of the highway program on the Reagan administration, although that was when it developed. [Laughter] Here I was, stuck, trying to solve this problem.

In any event, Caltrans' practice had been to come up with these long-range programs including everybody's project. If there was a gleam in somebody's eye, it would
appear in the program. And, of course, communities would start making commitments around these things. They would say, "Well, we're expecting this interchange," so they'd start changing their zoning to reflect this or make various commitments to developers or whatever. It was really, in my mind, an almost unethical way to behave on the part of Caltrans. My view was, really, that it was unethical, that if you are not able to deliver something, you have no right whatsoever to promise it under the guise of some phony long-range program. So I said, "We are simply not going to do this anymore."

I gave speeches all over the state of California during my first six months in which the theme was no more false promises.

Well, I found out politically also—-I'll be the first to say I was in some respects extremely politically naive, although I don't know that I would do it any differently now—is the way politicians operate is continually to make false promises. That's one of the essences of politics is to tell everybody you're going to do something for them. I remember when I was
GIANTURCO at Smith reading about Lincoln I mean President Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln, one of clearly the great men of American history and how he--of course he was a politician--before the Civil War, he gave speeches in the North and the South, political speeches, you know, when he was running for election. When he was in the South he would give people the impression that he was pro-slavery. I couldn't believe it. And when he was in the North he would say what a terrible thing this is. In those days they didn't have a national AP [Associated Press] or anything, I guess, to follow him around to correct this [Laughter] The man had no compunction about telling people what they wanted to hear, and that is one of the essences of politics is that you tell people what they keep them off your back, keep them at a distance, promise something that's a little vague, and then kind of wiggle out of it later on, but you'd be juggling all these balls and keeping things going. Well, that is not my style, and I think it's dishonest.

And I went around and I told group after group that things were going to be done
GIANTURCO differently from now on Caltrans had put itself into a position of bankruptcy by overcommitting to projects that it was unable to deliver and actually had gotten to the point where it had made firm commitments to more projects than it was able to pay for, and it, therefore, put itself virtually in a state of bankruptcy--no different than a private individual who goes out and buys some house he can't afford and a Mercedes or two and so the next thing he has to declare bankruptcy Well, that comment is analogous to what happened to Caltrans I said, "When we get this thing back together we're not going to do business like that anymore We're going to come up with a realistic program We're going to figure out what money we actually have, and we're going to commit only the amount of money that we can reasonably expect to have to a number of projects that will use up that money"

Another thing that I said was, "We are not going to be doing any of these cockamamie twenty year programs This is not the common way of doing business I know from having been involved in public works, in particular
GIANTURCO  

I have quite an extensive knowledge—this is academic, I haven't worked in the field—of how water projects are planned and how city budgets are done. Typically the capital budget for an enterprise involved at the urban level or the federal level in these public works projects is five to six years because you can come up, of course, with a twenty year plan if you want to, but it is no longer a capital budget. It's something else. It's just your guess about what the future might be. But in terms of making real commitments of resources it is unrealistic to do it for more than five or six years.

I picked the period six years, and Bob Adams, Ron Herbold, Heinz Heckeroff and I put together, having figured out how to finance this, a six year program. The first year was the budget year, and then there were five follow-on years so we would know how to allocate resources to do the engineering work to get these projects ready to be delivered in those five subsequent years.

When we came out with it, this program got wide publicity. We had a press conference to announce it. I recall the L A
GIANTURCO

Times had a banner headline about this
"Caltrans Unveils Billion Dollar Spending
Plan " The sub-head was something like
"Organization Figures Out How to Get Out of
Bankruptcy " Obviously it was worded in a
more pithy manner People were stunned
They couldn't believe that somehow--the
coverage was positive--that this organization
which had been down in the dumps, somebody
had figured out, or a group of people had
figured out how to get it back on track and
now they were going to be spending a billion
dollars a year Which, in fact, we did I
mean, we did spend it It was a realistic
program

I decided in connection with this--this
is all background to my relationship with the
LA Times--that I was not going to let
myself get behind the eight ball with the
press, or sort of always be on the defensive
the way I had been with those diamond lanes
With those diamond lanes what happened was,
as I say, they opened when I started I had
no opportunity to go around and talk to
editorial boards or call reporters in and
explain to them what was happening so that
GIANTURCO: There was some warning about this and some sympathy built up in the press.

Although I had had dealings with the press before in my previous jobs, never had I had the kind of sustained contact that I did as director of Caltrans. And, so, I didn't know that much about how it operated. My way of dealing with the press had been before in my previous jobs and the way it happened with these diamond lanes because they hit me over the head with it right off the bat was I was constantly on the defensive. It was me answering questions. It was somebody calling up and saying, "Why is this terrible thing happening? I understand the accident rate is a hundred times what it should be on these diamond lanes," or something. I was always reacting to something. I thought, "With this six-year program, I'm not going to let this happen."

I should say that, at the time—I'm trying to remember how many people we had in the press operation, maybe three or four at headquarters. They were very competent, but they had never dealt with a director who had gone through the kind of publicity siege that
I had So, they were kind of feeling their way, how do we handle this stuff, too As I recall it was my idea, and I didn't even know that this was a common practice that the one thing we might do so that we could make sure with this six-year program that people understood it, and we didn't start getting on the defensive about that was what I ought to do was go around and talk to editorial boards I don't think I had even realized that newspapers had editorial boards, but I learned that I figured, "These editorial boards must be doing something with their time other than sitting around and talking to each other I bet they talk to people from the outside"

So just on that, with that in mind, I called up the L A Times I talked to Ray Hebert, who had been the person covering the diamond lanes, and I suggested that I do two things One, that I come down to L A and talk to him, Ray Hebert, about this six-year program--I don't remember if we had already unveiled it at that point or if we were about to--because I wanted him to understand it from my perspective before people started
GIANTURCO taking pot shots at it and then I would just be on the defensive from then on. I talked to Hebert. We had a long friendly conversation and shortly after that, I believe, I met with the editorial board of the Times. And I laid out this six-year program and explained what we were trying to do, and I got a very positive reception. I would say from that time forward the coverage of what we were doing at Caltrans, in the L.A. Times was generally favorable, which is kind of hard to believe, but it's true. I repeatedly met with their editorial board, and I never pulled any punches. It's very impressive, the Los Angeles Times Editorial Board.

As a matter of fact, there's a kind of a humorous incident in connection with this. Altogether I may have met with them three or four times, maybe four or five times, quite frequently. It turns out it's a big, huge, fat deal to meet with the editorial board of the L.A. Times. The way they do it is they invite you to a luncheon in the private dining room of the Times. They serve absolutely delicious food with all kinds of
waiters standing behind every chair. I mean it is very posh, very elegant, and obviously very exclusive. They don't do this for everybody. Those were the circumstances in which I met the editorial board several times, quite a few times, that I did during my seven-year tenure at Caltrans. One time I was supposed to meet with the editorial board, have a luncheon with them, and something came up at the last minute. I mean really the last minute. It was like five o'clock the afternoon before this luncheon was scheduled, and I was unable to go. So I had my press person— at that time it was Jeff Rupp— call up whoever it was that handled this editorial board stuff. I think the guy's name was Tony Day. I think he's retired. But he used to be the person in charge of the editorial page, and he would put together these editorial board meetings.

Jeff told Tony Day that I would be unable to come to this lunch the next day. Tony Day was just shocked that I wasn't coming. It wasn't that I was sick. It was that something else had come up that was more
GIANTURCO

important for me to deal with Tony, or whoever this person was, told Jeff Rupp that in his entire time organizing these editorial board meetings, luncheons with the L.A. Times, only one person had ever canceled out before, and, as I recall, it was [President Gerald R.] Jerry Ford. In other words, it was the president of the United States. [Laughter] They couldn't believe that something could be more important. But anyway, they took it in good grace and rescheduled the lunch, and I did have that meeting with them.

As I say, to conclude this long saga, starting with that thing about use of grammar and the positive editorial I got in the Times, generally speaking, after my having established relations with the Times on a different footing subsequent to this terrible diamond lane experience, the coverage generally I would say was positive, both in the news coverage and the editorial coverage. I think what may have also happened is they started to think back over, what did this opposition to diamond lanes that they were having really mean? I mean times are moving
I think maybe some people associated with the Times started to think maybe we didn't do the right thing, being so against those diamond lanes. In any event, I established a relationship with the people there which turns out to be very important in dealing with the press. If you're straightforward, you're giving them the true story, you're giving them your side of the story, it makes a huge difference in how the press treats you. I found out.

PETERSHAGEN

So your relationship fairly early in your tenure with Caltrans turned around with the Times?

GIANTURCO

Yes, and when I left Caltrans at the conclusion of my tenure the Times wrote an editorial which was, I just couldn't believe how laudatory it was. How I had done more for the state of Cal. I mean, I'm making this up. I don't remember precisely what it said, but it was along the lines that I had done more for the state of California than any public official in fifty years, that I was before my time, that I had all kinds of courage, and I had finally gotten
transportation on the right track and so on and so on—not one negative word. It was the main editorial in the paper. I'm not saying there wasn't some negative stuff along the way, but generally speaking the coverage was positive.

I could also tell you my experiences with the *Sacramento Bee*, which, it just happens, is the hometown paper. It is kind of interesting how that happened.

[End Tape 7, Side A]

[Begin Tape 7, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana, would you please continue now in your description of your relationships with the press with how you got along with the *Bee* here in Sacramento.

GIANTURCO Well, maybe I could speak a little more generally first. I would say in more general terms that the press took a tremendous interest in me from the day that I became director. There were several reasons for that, two principal reasons. One was that I was a woman in a traditionally male job. There had never been a woman director of Caltrans. There had never been a woman in any kind of comparable position in California.
or any other state before So that was inherently of interest What was this women going to do who was moving into a field where it had been completely male dominated?

The second thing was that my personality is to be direct, outspoken, to say what's on my mind, not to pussyfoot around, not to make false promises, whatever That means you say quotable things Asked a question by some member of the press, I wouldn't give a wishy-washy answer I would give the answer that I thought was the truth This is much more newsworthy clearly than somebody who is going to just jammer on using a lot of bureaucratic jargon Nobody can understand what they are saying I would have definite opinions on things, and that was of interest

The third factor was that I began to draw fire like a lightning rod from other politicians who, a number of them, started making it their practice of criticizing me to the press, I'm quite convinced, because they knew that was how they could get their own names in the paper Because I became so well known that by attacking me a politician could get some recognition I mean, that's the
important thing in politics. You know, just make sure you spell my name right. Doesn't matter what you say as long as I get to be known. [Laughter] That's another, of course, little lesson in politics. Those three things were at work here.

To go back to how things evolved. The first contact that I had with the California press was when I was named to the job. Some reporter asked me did I have a driver's license. I couldn't believe that. Of course I had a driver's license. Then I was asked by somebody—it may have been the same person or somebody else—what kind of a car did I have? I said, "I have a 1972 Plymouth." Well, this got mixed up when the reporter reported this back to whoever it was. It must have been something, like AP [Associated Press] because it went all over. They got it wrong, and they didn't say it was a 1972 Plymouth. They said it was a 1932 Plymouth. [Laughter] Of course, a 1932 Plymouth would be worth a whole lot more than a '72. That would be an antique car. But, again, it added to the feeling or the impression that was being created of me, before my even being
on the spot or being seen by anybody, that
this is some kind of a nut who is driving an
antique car around She does have her
driver's license, but she drives a forty-year
old car [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN If you think of some of the "Governor
Moonbeam" criticism, this puts you right in
that boat, too, with the old car [Laughter]

GIANTURCO Exactly To correct that took weeks Once
it got in that one story it was picked up
The reporters read each others' stories, and
all the stories go into these computerized
systems NEXUS, I think, is the one that
handles most of the journalistic stuff You
just punch in, and you can get every story
printed out for the last ten years

After I got to Caltrans, I think I
mentioned before that because of the diamond
lanes opening, the governor asked me to start
the job something like three days after he
offered it to me So I just literally threw
stuff in a suitcase--I had no time to take
any vacation or prepare for this at all--flew
to Sacramento, and the next day was
confronted with the opening of the Santa
Monica diamond lanes Well, within that
first week there was great interest in the Santa Monica diamond lanes and, also again, interest in the fact that this is the first woman director of Caltrans, heading an agency that was affecting the lives of everybody, almost everybody, living in California. So there was a lot of interest in this oddball driving this forty-year old car, who is a woman, and who's coming to head the agency.

So I guess my press people suggested within in the first couple of days that we have a press conference and just invite all the capitol press to come and ask me anything they wanted to just to kind of introduce me to this press corps that was deluging our phone with calls about my '32 car and all the rest of this stuff. We had this press conference, and as I recall, this was the first press conference, I think, that I had ever been the center of. I had been to press conferences before, but I had never been the subject of a press conference. I felt quite comfortable as I remember. And, also, I was pretty confident of what I was doing, even though I didn't know the details of the program obviously. In that first week I had
enough of a grasp of what was happening to feel that I could intelligently answer questions or at least be honest—if I didn't know, say I didn't know.

I remember one of the first questions I got in this press conference was from Dan Walters who is now at the *Sacramento Bee*, then was at the *Sacramento Union*, the political columnist. At that time he was a reporter essentially. I don't think he even had a column. He said in this accusatory term, "Is it true that you're an environmentalist?" I mean, as though the sense of the question is, is it true that you're a serial murderer? You know, this is something terrible. Will you admit to this awful thing, being an environmentalist? And I said—and it didn't take me two seconds. It came right off the top of my head—"Of course, I'm an environmentalist." I said, "Isn't everybody an environmentalist? We all breathe the air. We all drink the water. We all have to live on this earth. How can anyone be anything but an environmentalist?"

Well, I think that might have been the first time ever that Dan Walters was shut up in a
GIANTURCO press conference I don't recall his asking any more questions after that [Laughter] I think generally the press conference went pretty well

I made the same practice with the [Sacramento] Bee, as I did with the [Los Angeles] Times of going and talking to their editorial board periodically I did the same with all the other major papers in California I would go talk to the San Diego Union, and I would talk to the San Francisco Chronicle, and the San Jose Mercury News I tried to do this as much as possible also with major television stations They don't have the same kind of set up so it's harder to do, but whenever I went to visit a district I would make a practice, and I did that periodically I thought it was important that the director get out in the field and see what was going on where the rubber hits the road, where the workers really are I would make it my practice to go and visit whatever media outlets there were and talk to whoever there was to talk to If it was a reporter, fine If it was an editorial board, fine So I not only
GIANTURCO talked to the major media people, but I talked to the ones in Bishop and, you know, small towns where Caltrans has operations.

The Bee had a couple of reporters assigned in sequence to Caltrans, covering basically only transportation. And, now I've forgotten the name of the first guy. The second person, his first name was Jeff, and I can't remember what his last name was. Anyway, both of these people appeared to have some inside line to this individual by the name of Gene Cornelius, who was some low-level staffperson in Caltrans—who was dead set against everything I was doing, and who saw his role in life as exposing me and the terrible things I was doing to the highway program, and who was continually on the phone apparently to his sources in the press telling them these terrible stories about how I was destroying the highway program. I just couldn't believe it. I was battling this Gene Cornelius. Questions would come back, "You're squirreling away all this money,"

1More than one reporter named Jeff authored articles on Caltrans-related issues for the Bee during this period of time.
you're not building any projects"

Cornelius, too, was smart. He was very informed about highway financing.

PETERSHAGEN
I don't think he bought the idea that the agency was bankrupt when you came aboard, and he seemed to have his own set of numbers that he worked from all the time.

GIANTURCO
That's true. I never talked to this man. I don't know that I even met him face to face. But he was operating from an entirely different reality. It was very hard to deal with him. I think maybe that's the first time anybody's said that to me, George, but when you say that I think maybe you hit the nail on the head. He did not believe that Caltrans was bankrupt.

PETERSHAGEN
It was almost like you upset his personal apple cart, I think, is the way I see it.

GIANTURCO
But the fact is, it was bankrupt. These people who were telling me it was bankrupt were not Brown appointees. They were the civil servants, the senior engineering staff and the financial staff of Caltrans. They were showing me the books, and I'm perfectly capable of reading balance sheets, and we were. But Cornelius obviously thought there
GIANTURCO was something funny going on here. He kept churning out these crazy numbers. It was just bizarre. As I say, he had several sources that he fed this stuff to, and I think his principal source was probably this initial reporter at the Bee, whose name I don't recall, who kept writing stories about how these funny things were going on at Caltrans, finagling the numbers, and I was doing all these bad things. I think I pretty much managed to stop that to a certain extent when I finally figured out about talking to editorial boards.

At some point fairly early on in the game, probably at about the same time that I went to see the editorial board of the Times, I went to see the editorial board of the Bee. The Bee is strange. I have never figured out this Bee. On the one hand, the Bee is very liberal. On the other hand, though, it's a real civic booster type thing. It's a schizophrenic kind of paper, particularly when it comes to transportation. In terms of overall philosophy about balanced transportation and encouraging mass transit and not destroying the environment and
maintaining the roads as opposed to pork barrel projects, they were all on the side against the pork barrel, and pro-environment, pro-good management of the highways. But when it came to any local project in the Sacramento area, it wouldn't matter what it was, they were in favor of it. If it was going to be in Sacramento they were pro that project. If I was against that project or didn't have it in the program, they would excoriate me in these editorials. And they also, as I say, had this reporter with this pipeline to Gene Cornelius, and this continued.

There were a couple of incidents, or one in particular, that I recall. I'll tell you about two of them which I was absolutely shocked over. One happened probably four or five years into my time at Caltrans. We set up this new procedure of doing these six-year programs, capital programs, and every year when we came up with the new program we would have a press conference and present it to the press. And I would have all the financial people and the highway people go through the program in detail. We would give them all
the documents, all the back up, and then spend as long as they wanted asking questions about projects or timing or financing or anything. At some place along the line here, A B 402 had passed, and so it was down to a five-year program. But we continued to do this same thing with presenting the program yearly. I had a real hand in developing the program, so I was fully capable of answering probably 90 percent of the questions that were asked about any of these programs. Maybe 10 percent got into such technical detail that I wasn't and so, as I say, I would have all the staff that knew anything about it available to answer questions.

As I remember, there were two ways you could calculate percentages of how we were allocating the funds between highways and transit. By this point, which must have been subsequent to the passage of A B 402, the program that we developed included not only highway projects, but also mass transit projects. I don't remember for what reason this was, but if you looked at the numbers.

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1A B 402, 1977 Reg Sess Cal Stat , ch 1106
from one angle you would get a certain display of numbers, and if you looked at them from another angle, the numbers would be somewhat different, or the percentages would work out somewhat differently. Maybe it was on a cash basis versus an obligation basis or something like that. It was some technical difference. It didn't make any great difference in the ballpark numbers. But the numbers would shift slightly or the relationships between the amounts of money, total amounts going to mass transit or highways, aeronautics or whatever, depending on the way you looked at it.

So in this presentation of the program that we did this year we had worked the numbers both ways. In reality they are different methods of accounting, you can do accounting on either a cash basis or an obligation basis. To make sure that we were not trying to pull the wool over anybody's eyes, we displayed the percentages both ways. We had a press package that went out in connection with this which was maybe this big [several inches thick], but it had a cover thing on it which was possibly five or six
pages long, doubled spaced, which in summary terms explained the overall program. And we went to great pains in this summary to state that these numbers in the package are presented both ways in terms of And again, I don’t remember, but let’s say it was cash versus obligation.

OK, so we have this press conference. Everybody was there, all the Capitol press and people from the papers, and the other Capitol correspondents of papers and TV stations across the state. At that time, on the TV level, there was a lot more coverage of Sacramento than there is now. We went through this presentation. I do the summary answer all kinds of questions. I specifically pointed out about if you do it on a cash basis, transit is 3 percent, if you do it on an obligation basis, it's 4 percent, or whatever.

The Bee wrote this story, which was a straightforward story, the next day. Every time the Bee did a story on me, they would have my picture. This was typical of coverage. The press coverage of Caltrans during my tenure was extremely personalized,
which it had never been before or has been since. The stories were never about Caltrans in the abstract. It was Adriana Gianturco, the director of Caltrans, who was personally doing whatever this is. It could be something that some maintenance worker did that I never even heard of, but it would be reported as though I personally had gone out there and filled that pothole wrong or whatever it was.

So the first day, as I recall, after this press conference, the story ran on the front page of the Bee, and it said, "Caltrans Presents Latest Six Year Program Total Spending Twelve Billion Dollars" or whatever it was at this point. And the story straightforwardly went through and presented what it was. But the next day they wrote a second story, and this was also on the front page with a photograph of me, and the headline was along these lines—"It may not have been quite this bad, but it was almost this bad—"Gianturco Lied About Six Year Program." And then the lead paragraph was, "Yesterday Adriana Gianturco, Director of Caltrans, told the press that mass transit
GIANTURCO accounted for 3 percent of the overall Caltrans budget. Today it was revealed that it's actually 4 percent! I could not believe it! I was infuriated! First of all, we had hidden nothing here. We had gone to great pains to make it clear so that nobody could possibly accuse us of obscuring numbers, to present these numbers in the only possible ways they could be presented. It happened there was more than one way you could present them, so we presented them in both ways.

I had hammered home on this point in my verbal remarks. It had been right up front, in the press package that we handed out. There was no effort to deceive whatsoever. And, on top of that, the thing they were talking about was a pimple in the face of the overall program. Whether it was 3 percent or 4 percent, the point was it was hardly anything. Is mass transit 300 million dollars out of three billion or is mass transit 300 1 million dollars out of three billion? It was just ridiculous! The story was a terrible story. The thrust of the story was that I had lied to the press and
GIANTURCO said one thing and the other thing was the case.

The people in Caltrans, not only I, but my executive staff, just could not believe this, that something like this had happened. I remember I wasn't in Sacramento. We wanted to nip this in the bud. I had one of my deputies, Ron Herbold, who was the principal deputy of the department, I told him to call up [Newspaper publisher] C K McClatchy and to say that he wanted to come in and talk to him about this egregious thing that they had done to us. McClatchy agreed to see him. And Ron Herbold went in and laid it on McClatchy, "What is this?" This was not the first time something like this had happened.

Ron Herbold went in to talk to C K McClatchy. I guess they had the reporter there also, the one who had written this story, and maybe a couple of editors. McClatchy was very involved in the direct operation. He wasn't just the publisher. He was not a figurehead. He apparently was extremely distressed by this. I heard later through the grapevine that he had told this reporter and told the editorial staff that
GIANTURCO

this was outrageous, what they had done with this second story, and it was never to happen again. Well, it did happen again, and maybe I'll tell you about that if you're into the life history of the Bee.

This is a classic press story. This happened toward the end of my tenure. It was probably the last year I was there. What had happened was that we had put together again a six-year program or a five-year program, and there was some issue which had been a continuing issue at Caltrans. Are people, the engineering staff, authorized to work on projects which are not in the program? One of the reasons Caltrans had gotten itself in so much trouble early on was that the resources had been expended—I mean millions of dollars worth of staff time—on doing engineering plans for projects that were twenty years off. And then, the projects that were ready to go, the plans wouldn't be done for them. In any event, it was a completely out of control situation because it meant the director or, as far as that goes, the Highway Commission or the Transportation Commission had no control over
GIANTURCO

what was ready to go. The staff were working on whatever projects they wanted to work on. Early on in my tenure at Caltrans, probably within the first year, I found out that this was going on. Assignments were being made to engineering staff in the field, and Caltrans, as you probably know, is a hierarchical organization with all kinds of layers. And the district directors had a lot authority within this structure. It was common practice for the district directors to just kind of take these twenty-year programs that they had and then assign staff to whatever projects they happened to like. Whether those projects were likely to be built or not was of no concern.

As a matter of fact, having read a book, *The Biography of Robert Moses in New York,* I'm familiar with. I mean I've read a lot about the games that go on in public works. What you do is you get a certain project ready, and then if funds become available, it's the only project that's ready. Even though it may be a low priority project, it will get built because you will lose the funds if you don't put it on
something. And this was a way for staff at lower levels of Caltrans, in a very indirect way, to control what was being built totally contrary to what the Highway Commissioners, the director, or anybody would be saying.

So, I put a stop to that. The engineering staff in headquarters didn't like it any better than I did. The chief engineer, [Carleton] Carl Forbes, and I put together this thing, and we said nobody is authorized to work on any project which is outside of the program without the express approval of headquarters. We established a whole formal process whereby the districts would, in a formalized exercise, submit to headquarters a list of projects that they thought should be worked on in addition to the program. And then headquarters would approve those, some of them, not necessarily all of them, and then they were authorized to work on them as well as the ones in the program. Although the ones in the program were always to take priority so that if there were a shortage of staff or there turned out to be more work on something than had been expected, it was the one in the program that
GIANTURCO took Anyway we had a formal process for this. Nobody was authorized to work on projects that were out of the program.

And, as a matter of fact, it turned out that I hadn't, wasn't, the first Caltrans director that had been concerned about this. This kind of thing had come up kind of episodically before, and directors before had gotten furious at finding that all the staff in some district had been working on some project that was never approved. You know, they were unprepared to build the thing that the Highway Commission thought was supposed to go to contract or whatever. But nobody had handled it as systematically as I had.

But, as I say, it had been a longstanding problem. There had been many memos written on this.

My last year at Caltrans, we had put together the program. I had it set up so that I had four principal deputies reporting to me. The deputy for Planning and Programming sent a memo to remind the districts of this policy that they were not to work on projects other than those in the program without going through this process of
getting approval for it He sent out this memo Somebody leaked it to the Bee, actually they leaked it to the Fresno Bee

[End Tape 7, Side B]

[Begin Tape 8  Side A]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana would you continue with your description of your relationships with the press and with regard to the issues you were describing at the end of the last tape

GIANTURCO Well, I was describing specific issues because I think they are more interesting than the general Overall, I would say that the coverage I got from the press was generally fair, but there were certainly instances where it was not fair at all, and I was beginning to describe a second incident with the Sacramento Bee As I recall what happened, we had come out with the multi-year program, probably at that point, a five-year program We had certain projects listed in it, and, as was common practice by this time at Caltrans--it was supposed to be known in all the districts--the only projects districts were authorized to work on were projects in the program unless they had gotten special approval to work on something
else so that the resources wouldn't be diverted from what we were committed to, to those that we weren't committed to. And, this went out in the form of a memo from my deputy for Planning and Programming, who at that time was John West. We sent a memo to the districts telling them this. Somebody leaked this memo to the *Fresno Bee*, which is under the same overall management as the *Sacramento Bee*, part of the same chain, same ownership, although separate editorial, separate staff.

Let's say it was Route 41, which was to be turned into a freeway, and it took five or six stages to do that. I'm not sure this was the example, but it was a situation like this. We had in the program, maybe the first two stages of Route 41, but not the remaining three stages because they would happen later on, or we didn't need to be working them, there wasn't enough money for them at this point. And, so, the district had no right to be working on these later stages of the program. If they did work on the later stages, they'd probably fall short on preparing the plans for the earlier stages,
which wouldn't have been anything unusual
Again to repeat myself, this happened all the time. It was a problem. It was a real problem of managing Caltrans. With this huge organization trying to exert control, this staff spread out with this decentralized structure, and so on, was a situation that I was absolutely unwilling to put up with. I was being held responsible for delivery of a program, which is another thing we may want to get into, and here people were doing things on their own that were making it impossible to deliver the program. One of them was diverting resources. And as I say, I set up procedures to make sure this would not happen, and the procedures were well in place. They hadn't started with me. It was just that I made them more systematic than anybody had before. John West sent out this memo telling all the districts that they were not authorized to work on anything except in the program, which was standard operating procedure at this point.

This memo was leaked to the Fresno Bee. The Fresno Bee looks at the program. They see that stages three, four and five, or
whatever they were, of this project are not in the program, and the person who leaked it to them is telling them, "This means that Adriana"—it always was on a first name basis with me—"Adriana is personally stopping this Fresno freeway," or whatever the heck it was. I could not believe it. And a story appeared in the *Fresno Bee*, and it was written in a terrible, terrible way. Whatever this project was, they managed to formulate it in such a way that it looked as though I was killing people by not doing this, which was a standard technique in these kind of "hit" pieces that were done on me from time to time. Whatever project it was, it was something that was going to replace something else that had, let's say three fatalities a year, maybe out of three hundred million vehicle miles traveled a year. Anyway, the new project would bring that fatality rate down to one hypothetically. The way this story was slanted is Gianturco will be responsible for deaths of ten people over the next five years, something like that. It was absolutely outrageous, and I could not believe it when I read this story.
GIANTURCO couldn't believe that somebody had taken this and twisted it, had put it in this framework, had conceptualized it in this way, had tagged it on me, and written a story with my picture, front page story, could have been the main banner headline for all I remember, in the Fresno Bee. Well, this story appeared, say it appeared on Wednesday.

By this time I'm experienced enough to know how the press operates that stories take on a life of their own, and a story run one place will be picked up elsewhere, and they'll run the same story, and there may be even more distortions in it. I thought, "This is not going to go away. Not only that, but this Fresno Bee is connected to the whole Bee chain. There's the Sacramento Bee. There's the Modesto Bee. And the Bee is widely read by other people because they have the most complete coverage of the Capitol, and, God knows, what's going to happen with this story." It was a terrible, terrible story. As I say, it made me look like a murderess, as I recall. So, I decided I had to stop this. I guess I must have called the editor of the Bee there. Got no place with
GIANTURCO

this guy I was sure the story would not stop. It would be re-run, and then it would be picked up. And it was a question of stopping it, nipping it in the bud, before it got completely out of hand.

Maybe it was over a vacation period, and the right people weren't around. But, anyway, I recall that I ended up actually talking to the ombudsman for the Sacramento Bee and I explained the situation to him—this is Art Nauman. He's still writing the ombudsman column. He knew perfectly well who I was, and I said, "I'm not able to get hold of the right people. But this is going on, and this is going to get worse." Probably by this point, I'm practically hysterical. As I recall, he was very sympathetic, but the ombudsman is a person low down on the chain of command in the newspaper, unfortunately.

Nothing happened, as I recall, as a result of my conversation with Nauman.

The next thing that happened was a similar story appears in the Sacramento Bee. It was blown up even worse than the one in the Fresno Bee. It was written by, as I recall, this same reporter who had done the
GIANTURCO story about me lying about the percentage of mass transit being 3 percent when it was, in fact, 4 percent, or whatever that crazy thing was. This story appears in the *Sacramento Bee* and it's broadened. I mean maybe they even brought in more projects, and they said this had never been done before, and the director is trying to stop projects. It was an unbelievable story. As a result of that I started getting letters which were death threats. I was frantic! By the time I finally was able to set up a meeting with the editorial board of the *Bee*, including C K McClatchy, probably four or five days had elapsed, and this had just gone on and gotten worse and worse as I had known it would from reading that first story in the *Fresno Bee*

And so, I had a meeting set up with McClatchy and the editorial board, and I told them what had happened, and how outrageous this was, and how I was getting death threats and all this stuff. I was so upset about this—and this only happened to me twice in my entire tenure at Caltrans, in seven years—I started to cry in the middle of this.

Boy, those people. This just
GIANTURCO froze them into total shock. I was weeping, tears were coming streaming down my face, but it didn't stop me from talking, George not any more than I'm talking now. I went right along with these tears. They couldn't believe it. I saw every one of those editors, all of whom, as I remember, were men—maybe there was one woman in there—just wanted to crawl under a table. They just were shocked! This had never happened before. [Laughter] I was talking as if I were [Attorney] F. Lee Bailey, making the case that the Bee has done this terrible thing to me, and this has gone beyond just bad stories. My life is being threatened as a result of this irresponsible. Tears are streaming down my face. Well, anyway, the meeting concludes.

I guess McClatchy offered an apology to me. I don't remember. It ended on some positive note. That was the end of this story. The Bee never touched it again. It may have had some ripples some other place. I heard afterwards that after I left, he absolutely reamed out the editorial staff and told this reporter, who is the same one who
had written the other story, that if this ever happened again he was going to be fired. So, anyway, I tell that story just because it happens to be a striking episode of.

**PETERSHAGEN**

Just as an aside that might interest somebody, how did you deal with the death threat letters? Is there a process where maybe the [California] Department of Justice's Bureau of Investigation gets involved?

**GIANTURCO**

There was only one case where we thought there was really a serious death threat, and that was a guy who had been

**PETERSHAGEN**

By "we" do you mean Caltrans?

**GIANTURCO**

I mean my deputies I mean the top staff of Caltrans

This was somebody who maybe had been employed by the department, either was an employee of the department, or was a consultant or part-timer or something or other I don't know that he even worked in headquarters He thought he had been done wrong by his supervisor, and the man was crazy When I say crazy, I mean he was crazy He was going to see a psychiatrist, and he told his psychiatrist that in order to
GIANTURCO get back at this terrible injustice that had been done to him. As I say, he was somebody I had never met. He was way down in the organization, could have been in some district for all I know. He told this psychiatrist that he was going to kill the director of Caltrans. And, under state law, I believe, the relationship between doctor and patient is strictly confidential, and psychiatrists or psycho-therapists come under this except if there is a threat on somebody else's life. And this psychiatrist took it seriously enough that he called up—I don't remember if he called us, or he called the [California] State Police.

In that case the State Police followed me around, as I recall, for at least two weeks because they were afraid that this guy would show up with a gun and shoot me. You know, I could be driving home in the evening or something, and he could get me as I came out of the car, break into my house and get me, or something. I don't remember how it was resolved. He was locked up—something happened—and the threat was removed. These threats would be usually anonymous, you know.
They were just somebody writing a letter

I'm going to kill this woman. Or, I hope a truck hits her when she crosses the street, and I'll be talking to my friends to be sure there is a truck there or something. There would be things like that. But they were very upsetting! The entire time I was at Caltrans, the staff that opened the mail for me—I mean we went through the mail because we got volumes and volumes of mail addressed to the director—would shake things and look at them, to make sure there weren't bombs inside these letters and packages we got.

PETERSHAGEN: Now, you began your professional career as a reporter?

GIANTURCO: Yes.

PETERSHAGEN: So, the question may arise on the part of somebody, why weren't you more in tune to the way the press works?

GIANTURCO: Well, I think I was, George, given the controversy associated with what I was trying to do, which in my mind was just the logical thing to do, try to save the taxpayers' money, build a good transportation system, don't ruin the environment. It was all motherhood and apple pie as far as I was
GIANTURCO

And, it was in the law, but, nonetheless it was very controversial. Given that fact, I can't fault the press in any way for having given this a lot of coverage. The fact that it was so controversial, it was inevitable that some of it was going to be negative because they were reporting not just the stuff I said, obviously, but as I mentioned earlier on, some politicians early on realized they could get their name in the paper by attacking me.

I believe [State Senator] Barry Keene may have done this at one point. So many people did it that I don't even remember who they were. But, I remember [Assemblyman] Lloyd [G ] Connelly did it. I couldn't believe it when Lloyd Connelly did it because I thought Lloyd Connelly was truly an honorable person. But anyway, he did it held a press conference and was accusing me of some dastardly stuff for not building a project that a political contributor of his wanted. You know, they get their name in the paper, and it would be a bad story. It would be, you know, so and so says Gianturco is withholding highway funds for critical
GIANTURCO project, or whatever they came up with would be reported legitimately

You know, it's like this Whitewater. I don't know one thing or another about Whitewater or whether it's true or not. But, if [U.S. Senator Robert J.] Bob Dole goes on TV or has a press conference and says it was a conflict of interest when [Wife of President Bill Clinton] Hillary [Rodham] Clinton represented Madison Savings and Loan at the same time that she had an investment in a something or other, that's a legitimate news story. It may or may not be the case but it's legitimate that the person made the statement. And so, obviously, there were a lot of people saying negative stuff who were basically the old highway lobby, who did not like to see the winds of change in the air. They didn't like it one bit, and they made their views known to the press, and those views were expressed. Nonetheless, I would say, overall, I have no real complaints about

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1Whitewater case--Real estate development involving President and Mrs. Clinton in alleged misconduct. L.A. Times, 1/16/94
my treatment in the press I think it was generally fair

Given the fact that they did that, one thing I did think was unfair I'm very interested in the press, and the role of press in society, so I follow this and I've done a lot of reading on it, and I watch C-Span all the time, these round tables where people are discussing the role of press in politics and so on. This idea of objectivity, where you are going to give equal play to two sides, even if one side is all wet, is ridiculous I mean this was done over and over in the election. Dukakis against [President George] Bush—where Bush would say things that were not objectively true, and the press would give equal weight to his making that statement and Dukakis' presenting objective evidence that it wasn't true. And that's known as balance. Well, many people in the press, themselves, have commented, and scholars of the press, that this is not objectivity, to act as though there are two equally legitimate sides.

It's like saying in what's going on in Yugoslavia now, or ex-Yugoslavia, that this
is just a civil war. The Serbs may be the aggressors and bombing the hell out of these Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo, but we act as though it's two equal things. It's just a civil war. You've got an aggressor and you've got a victim, you don't treat them the same. The press has a tendency to do that, to treat the aggressor and the victim the same, in politics.

The classic example would be [Assemblyman] Walter Ingalls. Some absolutely outrageous, insupportable statement about me, and I would deny whatever this was and present the evidence that it was just completely ridiculous. And, the story would be presented as a feud between Ingalls and me as though it were a battle where I was accusing him equally of things that were not true. You know, a lot of that happened. And that I fault the press for. But in terms of overall coverage, with the exception of the kind of episodes that I described—the ones with the Bee—and with the exception of this thing about this equal treatment, the distortion of objectivity that's crept into a
lot of political coverage, I think the press coverage is generally pretty fair.

Let me bounce a couple of my own observations off of you. One is this thing with the pictures of you always associated with the articles. In some that I've seen, it looks to me that there may have been a deliberate attempt on the parts of some to use unflattering pictures.

Unflattering pictures of flattering pictures at some times, and then unflattering pictures with the very negative reports.

Absolutely. There's no question about it. And, as a matter of fact, it's interesting you bring that up, George. The first year I was at Caltrans, the *Sacramento Union*, of course no longer exists, but has always been the conservative voice in Sacramento, and their inclination was to be against me. I don't remember that they ever covered Caltrans, anyway, as extensively as the *Bee* did. At that time Dan Walters was working for the *Union*, and he was interested in transportation. So they did have some coverage, and they were using this terrible picture of me. And, actually, I don't mean
GIANTURCO to sound immodest, but I can look very good in photographs [Laughter] It's not that I'm some terrible looking person that looks like, you know, Quasimodo or something, and any photograph is going to be bad. That's not the case. They were running some photograph of me that made me look like Quasimodo. I couldn't believe it. You'd barely recognize it as being me, and every story they ran had this awful picture.

Well, at the time, I happened to be living in Governor's Square, which is this apartment complex, downtown at Fourth and N, or something like that. And, as I recall, one of my neighbors worked in the photography department because the Sacramento Union, or where it used to be, is right across the street from Governor's Square, so there were a lot of Union employees that lived in Governor's Square because it was so convenient. They could literally walk across the street. One of my neighbors in there, as I recall, was in the Photography Department, maybe even head of the Photography Department of the Union. And I commented to him, one day, maybe we were sitting around the
swimming pool or something. I said, "I just can't understand why the Union keeps running this terrible picture of me. Don't you have some other picture you can use?" The guy said, "Let me look into this." And next time I'm sitting by the pool—I don't remember that these were the circumstances, but that's generally how you met your neighbors in Governor's Square—the guy told me he'd taken care of it. "Don't worry about it, Adriana, I took that photograph." He'd gone into the files, taken that particular photograph, destroyed it, and he said, "You don't have to worry about that anymore. We'll run a photograph that looks like you from now on." They ran pretty flattering photographs of me from then on.

[Laughter]

One other thing. The Bee, towards the end of your tenure, and this is specifically, I think in conjunction with the Town Creek Bridge once again in Covelo, accused you in one editorial of having some sort of a cozy relationship with some people at the Federal Highway Administration. Do you recall that charge at all?
GIANTURCO

No, it couldn't have been that. It wasn't the Covelo Bridge. I don't remember that the Federal Highway Administration was involved in that issue at all.

I do recall a situation which had to do with another bridge, which was the Antioch Bridge. I don't remember if it was a drawbridge. It was not a high-span bridge, and it was in the program to replace the Antioch Bridge with a new Antioch Bridge. Boy, and talk about gold-plating! When I drive over that thing I just can't believe it. You're driving down this little road, and here is this huge structure emerging off the ground and going up the height of the Empire State Building and back down. It's just unbelievable! [Laughter] But anyway, it was in the program.

I rarely questioned the design of bridges. Anything structural I never questioned, but I did question number of lanes. The geometries of things is something else altogether. It's a policy issue, and nobody is going to tell me otherwise. And, anybody who is willing to look at that question objectively would agree with me,
whether you have two lanes or four lanes, or whether you go through the heart of downtown or go through a Black neighborhood or go through a whatever. That is a policy issue. It is not an engineering issue. So, in any event, this bridge, as I recall it was the Antioch Bridge, was in Caltrans' plans. I had no opposition to this bridge. It was in the program. We were going forward with the plans for it. The engineering staff had designed it as two lanes, but I believe probably forty or fifty or maybe even sixty feet in width. It was very wide. I believe it had shoulders wide enough so that if a vehicle was disabled it could pull over, but that I'm not absolutely positive of because that was one of the issues that came up.

What happened was that the people in one of those communities affected by the Antioch Bridge had heard about Or somebody whipped them into a frenzy. And how this got started, I have no idea. Some accident had happened on another Bay Area bridge, it could have been the Benicia-Martinez Bridge, which was a situation also of two lanes going in opposite directions on the single span as
opposed to having divided traffic on one level, or one direction like the Bay Bridge. The other option is to have a barrier down the center.

And what had happened in this other bridge was some terrible accident that had happened quite a few years before. I believe, actually, it may have happened when I was an assistant secretary in the Business and Transportation Agency. It was fresh enough so that it wasn't twenty years before but it had not just happened yesterday. It was like five or six years before that this accident had happened. And, the people in this town, for whatever reason, got whipped into this frenzy that if the Antioch Bridge were constructed the way that the Caltrans engineers wanted to construct it, which was two lanes of traffic moving across Very little traffic, hardly comparable to this other Bay Area bridge which had a huge volume of traffic on it. This was more similar to the bridge that goes from Eureka to the Island of Samoa--little traffic. The engineers in Caltrans had followed all the standards in designing this bridge, and it
GIANTURCO came out with these two lanes. And it did not have a barrier down the center, but they decided we didn't need a barrier down the center given the volume of traffic and the design of the bridge. But these people got in a real state over the fact that they were afraid there was going to be a terrible accident on this bridge just the way there had been on this Benicia-Martinez, or whichever bridge it was before where there had been a bad accident. They thought the solution to this was to put a barrier down the middle.

Well, in fact, this is contrary, as I recall, to federal design standards because it's thought that having a median barrier makes the situation more dangerous on a two-lane bridge because there's not adequate room for recovery. What happens if you have some drunk driver driving ninety miles an hour, and he's coming up? I'm just making up this situation theoretically. I was very familiar with it at the time. I informed myself on all the wrinkles of this. But say, for example, you have somebody driving ninety miles an hour. There's another car in front...
GIANTURCO

of him driving the speed limit, fifty-five miles an hour. He sees this guy coming ninety. There's no place for him to move over. You can see, if there's no barrier, he could conceivably cross to the left hand side if he saw this, and let this drunk go. He is stuck. It's a death trap with just this narrow tunnel on either side that traffic is going through, but they were bound and determined to get this central barrier.

Now, the engineering staff at Caltrans told me. Their first statement to me was that no engineer, no licensed civil engineer, would sign off on plans which included a central barrier because their license, you know, is on the line. When you are a licensed engineer, you are bound under the law to protect the public health, welfare, and safety, and this would be creating a dangerous situation. That was the first thing. They wouldn't sign off on it. The FHWA [Federal Highway Commission] said the same thing. They were going to fund this thing partially. The [FHWA] engineers said, "Absolutely not. It doesn't meet our standards. We are not going to fund it. If
GIANTURCO: you want to build a bridge that is dangerous, we're not going to be implicated in this in any way, shape, or form. You're going to have to use state money for it. And the [Caltrans] engineering staff is telling me, "We're not going to sign off on it because it's unsafe."

Well, as usual, I'm the one who took up the battle cry. What I probably should have done is not allow my name to be used in connection with this situation at all. In fact, I did have the top engineers handling most of the questions on this. But, inevitably, because I was so prominent in this organization, and everybody always thought I made every last decision down to where a pothole was filled, they were laying it on me. And, finally, to my real distress because I went out on the line for the engineering staff—and I had forgotten this. Boy, I was really angry at those licensed civil engineers over this. I carried their cause so many times, and that PEG [Professional Engineers in Government] was always on my back and never recognized it for one moment. Of course, as soon as I left,
the next administration started doing what PEG's greatest fear was, which is contracting out work, and my thing was absolutely no contracting out. I want all Caltrans staff to do the engineering work, and they were too stupid to realize I was on their side. So, PEG was constantly attacking me. But, in any event, I was usually coming to the defense of these engineers, not doing anything against them, but that wasn't the impression they had.

The engineering staff at Caltrans, the top engineers, had told me that no engineer in Caltrans would sign off on this plan with a barrier, that it was unsafe, and they would be personally responsible if somebody were killed as a result of not being able to get out of the way. And I had repeated this to [State Senator John A] Nejedly, who took up the banner on this. I repeated that no engineer will sign off on it. It can't be done. It's unsafe. We will not do it, etc. It didn't stop things at all. The locals kept on the pressure for this barrier. And, to my utmost dismay, after I'd gotten out on a limb for these civil engineers...
GIANTURCO didn't know one way or the other about a barrier, that is the kind of thing, an engineering issue, that I would never dream in a million years of interfering with. You know, they were constantly saying I was interfering with engineering decisions. I am perfectly aware of where professional responsibility stops and ends and the responsibilities of different professions. I am not stupid at all in that regard. And never in a million years would I have second-guessed a licensed civil engineer on a question like that, having to do with whether there should be a physical barrier on a two-lane bridge or not.

When the pressure kept on for this barrier, the engineering establishment at Caltrans did an about-face, and they said somebody would sign off on the plans. I could not believe it. I just could not believe it. Well, boy, was I furious! As I say, they had put me out on a limb. I'm defending their position, and then they cut off the damn limb. So somebody signed off on this thing. I bet they had a lot of discussions within the chief engineer's
GIANTURCO office, or whoever was in charge of things at this point, or Project Development, about which engineer was going to sign these plans because nobody wanted to, but they had decided. They backed down. The engineering staff at Caltrans, or some of them anyway, are highly politicized, and, any idea that they're outside of politics is totally at variance with the facts. They're fully aware of how these things work, and they respond to pressure like any human beings. But, these civil engineers, none of them, did want their names on this plans because it was in violation, and they could have been held liable, personally liable, lose a license, be put in jail for thirty years, whatever happens if you do something like designing a high-rise building that doesn't have enough steel girders or whatever. We're talking about a similar situation. So, they got somebody to sign off on the plans, though I was out of it at that point. I washed my hands. Fine, you think this is OK after you told me it was so terrible, and I took your side and said we're not going to do it, and got out on a limb for
you

Now, you want to do it, fine. I had nothing more to do with that project.

[End Tape 8, Side A]

[Begin Tape 8, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN

Adriana, would you please now finish this story of the dispute between you and the engineers, if I can use that term, over the Antioch Bridge that you've been describing before?

GIANTURCO

It wasn't a dispute between me and the engineers. It was my taking their side, and then their stabbing me in the back is what happened. So, I took their side, and I said, --parroting what they were telling me--"This would be unsafe, and no engineer will sign off on it, and I, as the director, can't override the opinions of a licensed civil engineer."

Now, I'm being told that this is unsafe, and I report that back to, as I recall, Nejedly, who the bridge was ultimately named after, who was the state senator from that area. Then, the engineering staff does an about-face on me, and all of a sudden, they say they will sign off on it, and they get some engineer, I don't know who it was, to
sign the final plans. Probably, they got somebody low down in the organization that was too stupid to know any better. Anyway, he signed the plans. That's the end of my involvement at a political level, or so I thought. I was pretty upset about it, but I didn't do anything about it publicly. Nor did I, as I recall, make any big issue out of it with the engineering staff. I made it known that I did not appreciate this kind of thing.

Next thing I know, I don't remember how I found this out, but what happened in an ordinary course of events the way projects are done, is that Caltrans draws up the plans, and they submit them to the FHWA and the FHWA signs off on them for the FHWA funding. And the FHWA turned it down on the grounds it was unsafe. I had had no contact, whatsoever, with the FHWA, none, zero on this project. And it came as a complete surprise to me because if anything, I would have figured because the engineering staff at Caltrans is in constant contact with FHWA—they work cooperatively—I'm surprised they didn't check it with FHWA, but
GIANTURCO apparently they hadn't. They changed their minds because they responded to this political pressure and hadn't worked it out with FHWA. And FHWA stuck to this original position.

Well, this Nejedly guy, then, accuses me of having gone to the FHWA to stop the barrier. He made this up out of whole cloth. I mean it was absolutely untrue. There was not one shred of fact here. I had had zero contact with the FHWA on this. That I had gone to the FHWA after the Caltrans engineering staff had decided it was OK, and I had worked this out with them, that they would pull the rug out from underneath the Caltrans staff by trying to stop the project. I had engineered this whole thing. I just couldn't believe it. Of course, again, I deny it.

But, getting back to this press coverage, it was all in the press, that Gianturco colludes with FHWA to build unsafe bridge, or whatever the heck this thing was. This shocked me also, when the Caltrans engineers told me that they were against it, they had told me FHWA was also against it.
was stunned to see, after the pressure then went on the FHWA, the same thing happened with the FHWA. They backed down, and having said subsequent to the Caltrans staff having approved it that they wouldn't approve it, that no engineer in the FHWA would sign off on it, they decided to sign off on it. And, so, that bridge was built with a barrier.

PETERSHAGEN: Amazing

GIANTURCO: Every time I drive over it, I think "My God, if there were an accident" I'd say this—and I probably shouldn't say it for the State Archives—whoever was in that accident would have a very good case against the state of California. No question about it.

PETERSHAGEN: And this is the sum total of your "cozy relationship" with the FHWA then?

GIANTURCO: Over this bridge? That's the only issue I remember. I had many dealings with the FHWA, not extensive, but, from time to time on various things. That was the major one.
PETERSHAGEN Adriana, you've been saying that you wanted to discuss Caltrans' organization, so I want to give you that opportunity to do it. As you expressed the desire to do, why don't we just start with what the organization was like when you took office, what you saw on the organization chart, and begin with your early impressions of what changes needed to be made.

GIANTURCO Well, I'm going to be talking pretty much off the top of my head because I have not organized my thoughts on this subject, although I have given it quite a bit of thought and have even thought about writing about it myself because I think it's an important subject, how a large organization operates and what an individual can do or cannot do to try to improve the operations, the efficiency and the effectiveness of the way it's structured so that the work gets done, hopefully, in a better way. But, as I
GIANTURCO say in these remarks, this is not going to be highly organized because I have not gone through it and really sorted through what the various categories of things are that ought to go into a discussion of this kind. But let me just start with my first few days on the job.

The way that it's set up at Caltrans, the director has one or more executive assistants because we're talking about a really big organization here. It is simply not possible for the director to follow up on all the things that the director personally has to do, like letters that the director has to answer or phone calls that the director needs to make, following up on assignments given to people, and so on. So there is a director's office staff in addition to the regular line organization of the whole operation.

At the time that I became director, there were actually two people with the title of executive assistant who split the work because there was so much of it, and they both worked very hard. I must say this was not any kind of a thing where there was a
superfluous position here One of them also handled public affairs, public relations I guess it's called public information in state government He handled that and had a staff reporting to him in that capacity, and he also shared the duties of executive assistant with a second individual whose full-time job was performing the executive assistant job.

One of the things they do is control the calendar, decide what's important. This was always discussed with me. This is not a kind of a situation like Nixon with [Presidential Advisor H. Robert] Haldeman and [John] Ehrlichman and people, you know, sort of as watchdogs. You need people who will make sure that your time is allocated—and it goes beyond secretarial duties—that you're seeing the right people, that your priorities are in line with the pressures that are on the organization at a point in time, and so on. As part of that function, in the first few days that I was at Caltrans I received numerous briefings from various people in the organization about different aspects of the organization.
One of the things that I was shown immediately was an organization chart so I would be familiar with how the place was set up. One of the first things I noticed when looking at this organization chart was that it had—I don't remember the number, what's sticking in my mind is twenty-three—twenty-three people reporting directly to the director. Well, from what I know about organizations, and I don't claim to be an expert, but I think I do know more than the man in the street, that is an impossible situation. One individual cannot supervise the work of twenty-three people.

The reason that it happened this way, I believe, is that Caltrans started off as the Division of Highways. Then various functions were added on, and with some of these functions they just didn't know where to put them so they had them report directly to the director. With some of the other functions, the function was thought to be of great importance by whoever was pushing this function, and I would give you as an example, affirmative action, so that Caltrans was compelled one way or the other to have this
function report directly to the director to highlight its importance. This had grown like some kind of pearl that had formed all these layers and layers and layers, all reporting to the director. The director, obviously, could not possibly keep track of what these twenty-three or however many people, each one of which had a staff organization behind it, was doing.

PETERSHAGEN: Excuse me. Was each one of these two dozen people a deputy director?

GIANTURCO: No, they had all kinds of different titles. Some of them were deputy directors. Some of them were assistant directors. Like affirmative action was Affirmative Action Officer, I believe. There was just no rhyme or reason to it. It had just grown like Topsy over the years, and no, they were not all at a similar level. One of them, one function, the chief engineer, had something like three-quarters of the organization reporting to him. Yet, in terms of the organization chart and his authority as it was displayed there and presumably was acted on, his responsibilities with regard to the director were equivalent to the Affirmative
Action Officer who had like three staff people reporting to him. It was just crazy. And the chief engineer was strictly a highway role, correct?

Yes. That was one of the main features of this organization, that it had the director.

Well, there's another thing I should say here at this point which has to do with management style. People were always asking me, "What's your management style?" That's a question I don't know how to answer. I just don't know the abstract language to describe management styles, but I will say this about my management style. I want to be in control. It is my feeling that if you're the director of an organization and you are held responsible for what goes on, you have to be able to control what happens. Otherwise, people are running around doing all kinds of stuff, and you don't know what it. Something goes wrong, and you're taking the blame. Well, that doesn't make any sense.

[President Harry S. Truman] said to [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower when Eisenhower became president, "Eisenhower has got a complete misconception about what the
presidency is He thinks that when he sits down in the Oval Office and gives an order it's going to be carried out because he's thinking along military lines That's not what happens around here" [Laughter]

Well, you have the same problem at Caltrans There's so many layers, and it's so diffuse, and it's so decentralized that by its very nature, even if you have the most perfect organization in the world, it's hard enough to control But, if you've got twenty-three people who are running in and out of your office all day long you don't have a prayer of directing that in any coherent fashion So, one of the first--it may seem like a minor point, but it was actually a rather major point to me--was I had to cut down on the number of people that are reporting to me This is just crazy the way it's set up

PETERSHAGEN It may have been a minor point, but I think it's important Now, you weren't a total rookie when you walked into this You had been with the Business and Transportation Agency, so you did have some prior knowledge of this organization
GIANTURCO I had no idea there were twenty-three people reporting to the director. I knew there were different functions in the organization. I knew there was a chief engineer. I knew they did environmental planning somewhere. I knew that there was a budget shop. I may have seen this organization chart, but I never studied it and thought what does this mean in terms of running the place? It's something entirely different. Now, all of a sudden, I'm sitting in the director's chair, and, as I say, these people are coming into my office all day. It just couldn't work like that.

I decided as one of my early goals to rationalize that structure at the top. I am not one of these people who is under the illusion that shifting boxes around in an organization is going to make any great deal of difference. It doesn't. However, if you have too many boxes so that your time is split and you can't concentrate on anything, then that is going to have a negative effect, clearly. It may not be positive. It may not, in itself, creative positive results to rationalize organizational structure, but if
you have a bad organizational structure, that will surely create negative effects.

The staff didn't seem too concerned about this structure. They were used to it. It had grown up over the years the way it had, and so, you know, they were accustomed to having this weird deal with all these people with different titles reporting to the director. The question I kept getting asked by not only the staff in the director's office, but district directors and other people I came into contact with, was—the question was always posed this way—"When are you going to bring in your own people, Adriana?" This is a concept that I've never really been able to sympathize with, and it happens at all levels of government. It is thought when a person moves into a job that you can't trust the people who worked for the previous occupant of that job, that you have to have your, "own people." Well, my notion was, if these are good people, no matter who they were working for, I want to keep them. If they aren't, I want to switch them around or get rid of them. The only way I'm going to know who I can work with and who works...
GIANTURCO well is by actually working with these people.

Also, I had very little flexibility in bringing my so-called "own people" into this organization because at the time I became director, I don't think I had more than five CEA [Career Executive Appointment] positions, and maybe not even that I think it was fewer than that I think I had three CEAs, and maybe one exempt, one or two exempt. That was it for an organization that had seventeen thousand employees. Everybody else was in the regular civil service, and so I had no choice about bringing my own people in. The idea that I could just wholesale start changing departments or division chiefs or whatever or bring in people that I had known or from other organizations or whatever, who had a good reputation, it was not possible to do. Not only that, but under the law, the director of Caltrans at that time had a total of, I'm going to say, five or six exempt positions. What had happened was that over the years, these exempt positions had been, "loaned out" to other entities, namely the Business and
GIANTURCO Transportation Agency had taken several of these exempts and the governor's office had taken one or two of the exempts, leaving, as I say, not more than one or two remaining at Caltrans itself.

The other thing was that Caltrans had not taken advantage of this CEA possibility. I don't know if I need to describe this on the tape, but this is the sort of the super level of the civil service where people are taken out of the regular civil service and put in policy making jobs, given this special designation CEA, and they have return rights to civil service. It's sort of half-way in between exempt and regular civil service. The idea is that California, and I think this is the correct attitude, does not want to have state government run by patronage with all political appointees in jobs. And, exempts have that definite downside to them that can be misused, bringing in people who are not part of the civil service at all. On the other hand, you have to have some flexibility in order to run an organization, the freedom of picking, and shifting people around, and so on. It's not possible, or there are
limited possibilities of doing that working with the regular civil service. So, this other category sort of halfway in between, for academic purposes, has been created—the CEA. I'm trying to think what that stands for Career Executive Appointment.

GIANTURCO: Career Executive Appointment, right. Again, on this point, Caltrans, at the time that I was there, the number of employees fluctuated, but let's just say, for purposes of kind of an average, it was maybe around someplace between fifteen thousand and seventeen thousand. The district directors were all CEAs. Outside of the district directors, there were, maybe, three or four more CEA appointments. So, let's say there were a grand total of fifteen in the entire agency of fifteen to seventeen thousand. On a per capita basis, this is like one per thousand. If you had compared that at that point in time to any other state agency, the number of CEAs, would have been like—again, I'm making up the numbers, and somebody would have to do some detailed research to figure this out, but I think it was probably more
like one per two hundred in other agencies
Caltrans simply had not gotten into that mode
of functioning like this because it had this
old-line staff that had been there for years
the professional engineering staff, and
they'd just never seen the need to go with
this more flexible opportunity that was
offered by CEAs  The number of CEA positions
has to be approved by the State Personnel
Board, or something I forgot Anyway, it's
not up to the agency to decide that You
have to request specific positions, which I
did at a later date But, getting back to my
looking at this organizational chart, and
thinking that I've got to cut down on the
number of people reporting to me

PETERSHAGEN Before you get into that, let me ask one more
question about this "bringing in your own
people " Was there a particular group you
can identify that originated the questions,
or was this coming essentially from all
sides?

GIANTURCO It came from all sides I heard it most
often from my executive assistants, the two
executive assistants But I heard it every
time I went to a district directors' meeting
They would always be very curious about this. I think what people thought was their own jobs were in jeopardy, that I was going to bring in my own people, there was going to be a sweep of the organization I don't know how they thought I was going to do this. As I say, I had hardly any flexibility at all to do it. But, they were under the impression that this was a possibility, and I think people were just worried about their own jobs.

PETERSHAGEN So, it was largely fear driven?

GIANTURCO Yes. From day one, I assured everybody that I didn't have a group of my own people waiting in the wings that I was going to bring in as soon as I figured out how to get around civil service and exempts and CEAs and all these things, that what I intended to do was to function with the staff that were there, see how I worked with these people, and see how they performed. And then, at an appropriate time, maybe six months down the line, I might start making some changes. I should say another thing was that, of course, what was going on during this time were two major crises. One was the Santa Monica...
diamond lanes, that I believe we discussed, which was taking up a major portion of my time, and the other thing was the fact that the program was bankrupt. So, I was trying to deal with how do we get this place on a firm financial footing. And, bringing in my own people was really very low on my priority listing because I had none of my own people, and, number two, if I had, to repeat myself, there was no way I could have brought them in anyway. So, I worked with the existing staff, but my goal was to rationalize the organization as soon as things calmed down a little bit to cut down on the number of people I thought I could at least do that without knowing how well everybody works or whatever I could start in that direction. Within the first month or so I had in my mind's eye, I don't know that I had actually drawn this up as an organizational chart, figured out what I wanted the organization to look like, at least in so far as its headquarters operation went.

I should say here also that Caltrans, at that time, had gone through numerous studies by outside consultants who had come in and
GIANTURCO looked at the organization and made suggestions about how it could be improved, and some of these suggestions had been adopted again. Again, it was a situation like, you know, a pearl with all these layers on it, or growing like Topsy, these accretions. They would have accepted half of a set of recommendations by Peat, Marwick [and Co.] Somebody else said something else, and they took two of those. This was all just glommed on together, and it didn't make any sense. Well, I was going to say in connection with that, some consultant along the line, I don't know who it was, had convinced the Caltrans top managers that an organization such as Caltrans should be organized as a matrix organization. I wasn't familiar with that term, but apparently that was very hot, trendy, chic stuff in those days.

So, in some respects, Caltrans was organized as a matrix, and what that meant was that it was like a three dimensional organization as opposed to a two dimensional organization. This complicated things no end. I mean, not only do you have twenty
—three people reporting to the director, but it wasn't just on an organization chart in two dimensions. Each one of these people, or some of them, maybe not all of them, were also members of a second organization which was organized differently. As I recall it, the concept of the matrix was that we were going to be able to slice this organization, this agency—I'll get away from the term "organization" as it applies to Caltrans, and use "organization" to mean structure—Caltrans, could be looked at if you sliced it one way, and put people in boxes, you came out with one structure reflecting the functions that were being performed—administration, I don't know, project development, maintenance, operations, whatever. Then, if you sliced it another way, you would come up, I think the other way was modally—highways, transit, aeronautics, whatever. Well, as I say, it was all bollixed up with these two ways of looking at the organization. People would have two jobs, and actually this reflected itself way down into the innards of the organization down to the lowest level. You would have
some individual out in the field whose regular job was a maintenance supervisor, say, but he had a second title which wouldn't have shown on the official organization chart, but it would have shown on the program chart, which was that he was the program advisor for, let's say, new landscape. And you'd have somebody else whose job was, again, maintenance supervisor, and he would have responsibility for snow removal statewide. It was just crazy.

Anyway, in my mind, I thought that the way to set this thing up, and I gave this a lot of thought. I usually didn't think about it at the office, it was one of these things that kind of preoccupied me when I'd be lying in bed at night. I'd be thinking, "How can I make this work better?" And, as a matter of fact, at one point I went to talk to one of my Well, it was my next to immediate predecessor, a person by the name of Jim Moe. I had talked to my immediate predecessor, Howard Ullrich, a number of times because I thought I could learn some things from these people, which I found out after leaving Caltrans, this is practically unheard of
GIANTURCO

Usually, you know, the new director doesn't want to have anything to do with previous directors, and the idea is you bad-mouth that previous director as much as you can and blame everything that's wrong on what the previous director did. But I didn't have that attitude so I sought out these previous directors early on because I wanted to know from them what they had experienced with this organization and any ideas they might have that I might do to improve it, and it turned out that, I remember, Moe, in particular, had been thinking very much along the same line that I was thinking along, of organizational change. And I discussed it in quite some detail with him. At that time he was working for Bechtel [Corporation] and still is, I believe, in a high position there. What I thought ought to be done, and he pretty much encouraged me, said, "Yes, that's pretty much exactly what I had in mind, too."

What I had in mind, to cut to the bottom line here, was to set this up so that there would be four deputies, and those deputies would be functionally organized. They had the Legal Division buried someplace, legal
GIANTURCO advice was filtered through a non-lawyer which, to me, was absolutely insane. If there is an important staff function, legal is it. So, I guess it had been combined with something else, or reported with something else. I kept that as a staff function. I decided to set it up with four line deputies. They were Administration and Finance, which before had been like five different people reporting to the director. That was all the paperwork aspects of the organization, including budget, which is a very important function, of course. I don't want to downplay the importance of administration at all because I think it's a very important function in any organization. I collected all the administrative functions, and they were going to be under this deputy for Administration and Finance.

I had a second deputy for Planning and Programming because I thought, "Now, going beyond organization itself, personnel matters, budget, etc. what are we set up to do here?" Well, we need some part of the organization that decides what the program is, and we'll have this deputy who's in
GIANTURCO charge of deciding what the program is, and we'll have all the modal functions reporting to him. He had under him four divisions—Highways, Mass Transit, Aeronautics, and Planning—Planning being the over-arching one that had general responsibilities for pulling things together, coordinating and so on.

Then the next deputy was for Project Development. I figured, "Once we've figured out what we're doing, we need a deputy and a number of divisions that will carry it out, that will design the projects essentially, design and carry through the implementation whatever the project is, if it's mass transit, highways, whatever. And we put all the divisions and functions having to do with that type of activity under this deputy for Project Development.

Then the last deputy was for Maintenance and Operations because I thought, "Once we have something built, or underway, we need to maintain and operate it, and that deputy will be in charge of that and all the various divisions and so on that had to do with that." It fit very neatly.
When this organization occurred to me, when it all came together I mean it was like a revelation, it was so logical. It just made perfect sense. I don't mean to sound immodest, as though I'm the great genius in organization, but the way I arrived at this was by observation of the organization itself, how it was functioning and how these various things interrelated. Where there were these things going on, where were these things happening and what was a logical grouping and how could I group things logically that fit together and cut down my own span of control at the same time and get a better handle on what was functioning. Well, those were the four. As I say, I had four line deputies.

Then I tried to reorganize the staff functions. Legal, as I say, I considered to be a staff function that needed to report directly to the director because legal advice, as I say, it doesn't make any sense at all to filter it through somebody who's not a lawyer. And public relations was the second staff function, and that meant, basically, how we presented ourselves to the
outside world, namely the media. And the third staff function was legislative affairs, and that was relationships with the legislature.

[End Tape 8, Side B]

[Begin Tape 9, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana, would you continue now with your thoughts on the organization? Where we left it was, you were identifying the staff functions, so, I guess the first question should be were those three functions the only ones?

GIANTURCO Oh, there was one more. I just didn't get a chance to mention it before we stopped that tape on the other side. There was a fourth one which I was forced to have report directly to me because of the importance of this function and how symbolically important it was, and that was affirmative action. I had to continue to have that report to me. So I had four line functions -- four deputies and four staff. So, I cut down the number of people reporting to me from twenty-three to eight. Eight, in my view, is about the maximum that a person can supervise. I think the rule of thumb is that the ideal span of
GIANTURCO control is about five, and it may be as small as three. It could possibly go up to seven or even eight, but anything beyond that you're spreading yourself too thin.

But, obviously, I spent more time on some of these functions than I did on others, like the affirmative action pretty much ran itself. We had rules about that, and each person reported to me, and I spent quite a bit of time, but I didn't spend nearly as much time with that individual as I did with my deputy for Planning and Programming or the one for A and F or any of the line deputies as far as that went. And the Legal would come in sporadically.

So, this was in my mind a concept that took me almost the entire time that I was at Caltrans to put this organization in place. I moved towards it incrementally, as opportunities arose. What I was able to do immediately, was to group the modal functions, Highways, Division of Highways, Division of Mass Transit, Division of Aeronautics, and Division of Transportation Planning under this new position which had not existed before, deputy for Planning and
GIANTURCO Programming So, I created that deputy and put those four functions underneath it, and I also created the deputy for Administration and Finance Administration was combined with, as I say, Legal, I think before—some weird thing There was a deputy position there, but it didn't cover exactly the functions I wanted it to span I regrouped those functions and put that deputy in place Then, the two remaining line deputies, which I was not able to implement immediately had to do with Project Development and Maintenance and Operations

The reason I wasn't able to do this immediately was because there was in the organization, at that time, a position which held great symbolic importance for the organization, for people in the organization, and that was the position of chief engineer, which had been a major deal when Caltrans was created, when it went from being simply a Division of Highways, to being a California Department of Transportation The question had been what's going to happen to the position of the chief engineer because the way I understand it, before Caltrans was
Caltrans, the chief engineer was the de facto head of the organization, and the director, whatever his title was, I assume it was director, was basically a ribbon cutter, a glad-handler, you know, went and showed his face to the legislature from time to time But it was the chief engineer that was running things Well, getting back to the point I made earlier on about management style, if I have to say one thing about my management style, it's hands on I want to be in control, and I'm not going to be the person who takes all the blame—and I'm the kind who will take the blame—but who is not making the decisions So, I in no way was going to give up my functions which were in the law to those of the chief engineer

Now, it happened at the time that there was a very talented individual in this position, Carl Forbes, who had great respect from all kinds of quarters The engineering staff deified him They thought he was the greatest The legislature loved him He was extremely competent As my husband said the first time he met this Forbes was, "Carl Forbes has real presence " If he walked into
GIANTURCO

the room, you immediately felt this was an
intelligent person with personality. I'm not
saying he was a show biz type at all. He was
very soft-spoken, but he emanated competence
and power. Well, I got along with Forbes
pretty well. We formed a working
relationship right off the bat, and, although
I disagreed with him on a number of issues, I
didn't have any major problems working with
Carl Forbes. We reached an accommodation
early on, and he did his thing.

He saw clearly--Forbes was forward-
thinking--that this old organization, the old
Caltrans, was no longer, the old Division of
Highways didn't exist anymore. We were
moving into the future. And so he was, even
though he'd grown up in the old tradition, a
forward-looking person, and I found it easy
to work with him. Although, as I say, there
was one disturbing, though I don't think it
had a negative effect, was that the guy was
such a powerful personality that he was not
somebody you could push around, not that I
wanted to push him around. He was also very
intelligent. If we had a disagreement, we
would discuss it, and he knew who the boss
GIANTURCO was If I finally made the decision he would loyally carry it out. He was certainly not a "yes man," where you would just bring him into the office and say, "I want you to do this," and he'd say, "Yes, yes, whatever you say." He wasn't that type at all.

When Caltrans was created, the issue of what was going to happen to that position was a major issue in the legislation, A B 69, that set up the department. And I gathered that there was one faction which wanted to put in the law that the chief engineer would maintain whatever functions he had previously had—write it into the law—and another faction that said, "If we're moving into the future, and we've now got another organization, we've got a director, and we've got functions other than highways. We are not going to say that there has to be a chief engineer who has such and such duties and it was that second faction that won. So, it was very vague in the law what the chief engineer did. I don't know that it even said what the chief engineer did. I think A B 69 says, "There may be a chief engineer," something like that. I mean it wasn't much stronger.
GIANTURCO than that The people on the other side had wanted it to say, "There shall be a chief engineer who shall have complete charge of any function that in any way, shape, or form touches on the work of licensed engineers." They wanted something like that. They didn't get it. But, the position was written into the law. It was mentioned in the law. And there happened to be this individual who commanded great respect in the job--Carl Forbes. He had reporting to him all the functions relating to Project Development and Maintenance and Operations which I wanted to split up into two separate things under two deputies. He also had reporting to him all the district directors.

Now, this gets into another whole aspect of Caltrans that I hadn't mentioned before, which is the decentralized structure of the thing. Most of the staff is actually not in Sacramento. As I remember when I was there, it was actually like fifteen hundred to two thousand people in Sacramento, and the others, thirteen to fifteen thousand were out in the field in the district offices. And, many, many decisions were made out in the
GIANTURCO

field It had traditionally been the case that the district directors were allowed great latitude in deciding what projects were built, how they were designed. I mean to the extent that--this is truly crazy--that a highway could be built, that where it came up to the district line, it might be eight lanes, and when it went over the district line it went down to four because the district director in the adjoining district hadn't thought it was as important as something else. There was nobody in headquarters calling the shots, and pulling this all together--crazy, just crazy

Somebody told me a story about this, I believe it was not an impossible story. It was the truth, or it was presented to me as the truth, and I believe it. I was always kind of curious, driving into San Francisco, about why Interstate 80 is only six lanes--or was at that time, now, of course, they want to widen it--going from about Vallejo to Richmond. At some point, it's bigger, and then it gets smaller. And it gets smaller at exactly the point where the traffic starts building up. Well, I was told that the
GIANTURCO reason for this was that the district
director in San Francisco when Interstate 80
was built did not consider—this would have
been a long time ago, that was one of the
early freeways—didn't think, didn't want, a
wide freeway Because the money is allocated
between the districts, he had other projects
he wanted to put the money in so he wouldn't
go along with eight lanes He wanted six,
and that's why it went down to six It's
been a continuing problem, and a major
environmental problem in the last few years
because of the fact that Caltrans has wanted
to widen it, and that means all kinds of
negative or potentially negative
environmental effects in making this
widening But the reason it wasn't done in
the first place was because of this thing of
the district directors making decisions on
their own

So, getting back to the point I started
off with, the chief engineer also had all the
district directors reporting to him Well
as I say, the real power in the organization,
because it's decentralized, was out in the
field, which meant that this chief engineer,
GIANTURCO even though I was the head of the organization, was telling these district directors what to do. Well, I soon got onto that, that this was happening here. As I say, I had a good working relationship with Forbes, and I would tell him I want these district directors to do whatever I wanted them to do. He would pass the message on, but it was my intent that when Forbes left that job which he clearly was going to do, or most likely was going to do sometime during my tenure, I was then going to reorganize and I would have the district directors report to the director in the same manner that they had reported to the chief engineer.

Now, by that I don't mean that I would have eleven people reporting, eleven more people going back up towards this number twenty-three, but they would report to me through the line deputies. If they had a problem having to do with Project Development, it would go through my deputy for Project Development, who spoke for me. It was the same thing as talking to me. Or, or if it was a thing in Maintenance and Operations, they go through that deputy, and
that deputy spoke for me. And so, we would have consistent policy coming out of headquarters that would emanate out into the field. There was another very important reason—and I'm skipping ahead of my story here and talking about this decentralization, but I'll just bring this point up before I forget it—which is that during the time I was at Caltrans, of course, this A B 402 passed—legislative budgeting among other things. It also created the CTC, but it had the legislature do the budgeting, and it created a situation where there was more oversight of Caltrans than there had ever been in the past. Prior to the passage of that legislation, essentially the only oversight of Caltrans was the Highway Commission, a part-time operation with an executive secretary who was on loan from the staff of Caltrans, political appointees who'd spend a few hours every month, you know, on this job, and that was it. Caltrans did what it wanted. Well, with legislative budgeting that changed drastically because once the legislature gets its fingers into your budget, they've got their fingers in
GIANTURCO

everything. And they were holding the
director, obviously, responsible. They're
not going to be dealing with eleven district
directors and chief engineers and twenty-
three assistant directors. They're looking
to the director, and the director is at this
point, in actuality and reality, no matter
whether he or she is a hands-on manager or
not, going to be held responsible. It is
extremely important, under those
circumstances, that the director be in
control.

So, anyway, part of my long-term plan
was if the chief engineer position became
vacant, which it did, that I would then carry
out the last part of this reorganization
which was to, in essence, eliminate the job
of chief engineer, although I think I
maintained the title because there was
something in the law, as I remember, that
said you had to have the title. Or there was
some reason, I've forgotten, maybe because I
wanted to be sure that there was some
engineer who would be the top honcho in terms
of signing off on plans so that we wouldn't
have bridges falling down, you know, that
GIANTURCO kind of thing. It gets back to that matter I was discussing before about the Antioch Bridge where the legislature was telling me that they wanted a median barrier, and the professional engineering staff was telling me this was dangerous. And a director shouldn't be an engineer in my view. You're not drawing up plans. You've got many more things to concern yourself with than looking at the design of a bridge to see whether it's safe or not. You need somebody who is going to take final responsibility for those decisions. And so, I designated, as I recall, when I finally managed to accomplish the last stages of this reorganization, I believe I designated the deputy director for Project Development as the chief engineer, also so he had a double title. If there was any engineering question that had been unresolved by a licensed engineer at a lower level, it was the responsibility of that deputy to make that decision, not the director.

Well, anyway, that was the major reorganization that I carried out, and I think it functioned. In terms of the four
GIANTURCO

line deputies, the four staff positions, it functioned very, very well. I have to say that one of my great disappointments after I left Caltrans was immediately, I mean within a matter of a month or so, they reverted back to this crazy thing of adding functions on.

As I remember, they made some combination to put Mass Transit under Administration. They reconstituted the chief engineer's job as it was. It was just a mess. It just turned it into the same kind of mess as it was when I came in.

A tremendous amount of work went into this. When we grouped these functions, and, as I said, this was an incremental process. It was carried out over the seven years.

There were political appointees made immediately by the new administration, brought in, and they had to be given things to do, and new functions were dreamed up that reported directly to the director, and things were shuffled around. It just turned into a complete mish-mash again. I don't know what kind of organization they have now, but I suspect it resembles more that first chart that I looked at than when I left.
PETERSHAGEN: Well, I think you're right, and, of course, since your tenure the trend has been to decentralize. Maybe we can address that for just a second. Former Senator Carpenter, who's in the news once again—I believe it was in his hearings with you that occurred towards the end of your directorship—made an accusation that you were using the environmental process to hold up projects.

GIANTURCO: I'm not surprised. I don't recall that, but I wouldn't be surprised that he'd come up with something like that. A convicted felon. I mean, consider the source, but, anyway, yes. [Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN: The point I'm trying to get to is that I think that this centralization that you brought about with this organization was accused of being the delay, if there ever was any, in project delivery.

GIANTURCO: Oh, yes. I want to deal with that, George.

PETERSHAGEN: The immediate answer to that is to decentralize.

GIANTURCO: That's garbage. I'm glad you brought up these issues because these are things I'd forgotten about. Environment, let me deal with that first of all. I think I mentioned
that the first press conference that I had at Caltrans within the first week I was there, Dan Walters asked me this question, as though, are you a child molester, "Are you an environmentalist?" And I said, "Of course, I'm an environmentalist, isn't everybody?"

I take CEQA and NEPA very seriously, and I take them in the spirit in which they were written, not the words on pieces of paper. The concept of doing environmental reports, to my mind, has degenerated into a meaningless shuffling of paper which does not particularly aid the decision maker. The idea behind it, though, the concept that both NEPA and CEQA are trying to express in my interpretation is that a decision maker, before he makes a decision should look at various alternatives, should look at the impact of those alternatives, should consider those impacts, and only then make a decision. That's what the environmental process says you do, and it's not a new concept. I mean this is what you do with cost benefit analysis. With water projects, the Corps of Engineers really pioneered this way of looking at things. It just makes good sense,
GIANTURCO

it seems to me, in public policy that talking about spending taxpayers' money, we want to know what the effects are of spending that money before we spend it. And so, I saw the environmental process or an expanded environmental process, not just, you know, writing something that conforms. It's a thick document that took ten years to put together, and nobody has the slightest interest in what it says and goes into meaningless technical detail on stuff that nobody understands or cares about. I saw the environmental process as an opportunity to rationalize decision making. I saw it as being at the core of decision making on actual projects, so I upgraded this process.

Let me say another thing, though, I don't want to create the impression which maybe I have here that I pulled everything into headquarters. I, by no means, pulled everything into headquarters. I tried to rationalize the division of functions between headquarters and the field. I mean many functions, most functions, were left out in the field, but the key decisions were made in Sacramento. If they had statewide
implications, or they had involved the expenditure of substantial sums of money, or if there were potential conflicts between what we were doing in one area and another, then it was headquarters that would make those decisions. But, the environmental planning process at that time, when I came in, was considered Let me say two things about this, one of which I was able to change, which I wanted to change. The environmental reports were done in the districts. They were not done at headquarters. Now, I was under the mistaken impression for something like the first four or five years that I was at Caltrans that headquarters was doing environmental reports. They weren't. They were being done out in the field, and they took years to do these things. Having it decentralized was absolutely insane. What would happen is a group of environmental planners in District Four or District Seven, or wherever, would take two years to put together, and I'm not exaggerating. The amount of time these reports took was absolutely ridiculous, and I
GIANTURCO also am going to get to your other thing about project delivery

I happen to be a go-go, action, get-things-done type person. I am not a foot-dragger. I mean that accusation of me could not be more misdirected. [Laughter] It boggled my mind every time that came up because I am the opposite. The entire time I was at Caltrans it was as though I was fighting in a stream of molasses where everybody was dragging their feet and I am saying, "Let's just get this out of here. Let's get it done. Let's do it, and move on." It was a constant battle. But the way I was portrayed in the legislature and in the press was that I was holding things up. I just couldn't believe it. But, anyway, the way they did these environmental reports is, and as I say, it took me four or five years before I finally realized that this was one of the reasons they were taking so long and were so crummy in many instances. They were done in the field by environmental planners working for these districts who then would submit drafts of various things to a headquarters environmental staff who would
GIANTURCO: Sit on them for God knows how long, two or three or four or five months. Then if there were any changes to be made, I couldn't believe this. When I found this out, I either just went into a catatonic state, or I went ballistic. Rather than have the headquarters person that reviewed the report, rather than his making the change, say he discovered some egregious error where they mixed up the numerator and denominator— the case I gave you before—or whatever. They had misidentified something or they had failed to realize there were spotted owls and they were all over this place, or whatever the situation was. Rather than having this headquarters person who discovered the error, who was the reviewer, make the change, they would send it back to the district with instructions that the district was to make the change. Well, you know, that would add a month right there because the person at headquarters would write some memo, "You should consider on page thirty-five making the following kinds of changes," and then it would have to go through
Another thing is we didn't have faxes or word processors. We had five secretaries typing up this memo. Then it goes through inter-office mail. It takes a week before it gets there. It sits on the guy's desk another week. Then he makes the changes. It takes another two weeks to get back, and you've lost a month right there. Whereas, this person who discovered the thing about you've forgotten to mention the spotted owl, or whatever that is, could have made that change in five minutes there in headquarters. It could have been done! Insane! Well, as I say, I was never able to change that. I discovered it too late, and it would have meant major organizational change. By that time, I just didn't have enough time to put it in place. Although if I were still director, that would be something I would be working on to rationalize that environmental process.

They had the environmental review function in headquarters buried in the chief engineer's office under, as I recall, a person who was in charge of landscaping. That in itself, is so symbolic, to think
that "environment" means you have nice plants growing along the side of the road. The symbolic significance of that was "environment" means does the landscaping look good beside the freeway. It had nothing to do with how do you make decisions or anything like that I said, "We're going to have these reports reviewed," I believe I said, "by the Division of Transportation Planning." They hated that because, since it was under the chief engineer's office before, it had meant that these environmental planners, even Let's say that the environmental planner out in the field was a dedicated spotted owl fan, and he had said, "We can't build this highway here," or, "We've got serious problems because we're going to kill two thousand spotted owls." Well, his report would go through on its way to headquarters, the engineering staff, and they would say, "What do we care about spotted owls?" You know, they'd cross out that part of the report, or whatever I'm exaggerating, but in any event, it was not going through.

The whole point is that, on the one hand, you've got the sheer technical questions of
Then on the other hand, you have impacts which go beyond just sheer technical engineering, impacts on air, water, whatever, and these are policy questions, and they are subject to debate. You don't just bollix it all up and have the engineers say, "We don't care about spotted owls. We're building this highway anyway." And that was, essentially, what the organizational structure told the organization by putting this environmental function under the engineering function.

I'm not absolutely certain of this, George, but I do recall that there was a lot of controversy over this. People didn't like this at all—the engineers—when I started giving the planners the planning function. The thing that held those divisions together, including Transportation Planning, was these were the people who were going to make the broad policy decisions of what we're going to do. And, my notion was the environmental process is an integral part of that so they should have a role in this environmental report preparation. And, as I say, the engineering staff didn't like that one bit.
I also changed the way that these reports were done. Any report on a highway

Well, I'll start with maybe the most trivial, but in some ways the thing that got me in the most hot water. For any project that had controversy attached to it or that cost over fifty million dollars—I had some cut-off thing—I personally read the environmental report because I figured it was important enough that the director should be making the final decision and be informed about what these impacts were. So, I read Environmental Impact Report after Environmental Impact Report. I doubt very much that there was any other director in state government that ever read an Environmental Impact Report. I read loads of these things and these tend to be big documents. I must say I did not read the supplements. You read the supplements, you're talking about reading a whole library of documents on a single project, but I would read the main documents which would probably be, typically, two hundred or three hundred pages long. I should have taken speed reading, but I read pretty fast. And I found
a lot of things wrong with these reports, too. I mean I found, again, the kind of mistake—sloppy work—that I mentioned before, that numerator and denominator thing.

I found things in these reports that were totally illogical. There was an Environmental Impact Report done for— I've forgotten what it's called—the Hoffman Freeway, maybe. It links up 80 with the Richmond Bridge. And, this had been a long-standing project, controversial, very expensive, displaced a lot of people. I read the EIR [Environmental Impact Report] for that. In the course of reading that EIR I discovered that the traffic figures didn't add up right. Now, the traffic figures are very important. They are key. If you say there are going to be half a million vehicles a day, that makes a big difference as opposed to five hundred vehicles a day.

Well, in some places, and I don't remember exactly what the situation was, the numbers just didn't add up, or they were inconsistent in different parts of the report, and it came all the way to the director before that was found.
GIANTURCO

I think it may have been at that point that I said "These things are going to go through Environmental Planning to have them pick up this type of stuff. This is absolutely outrageous that it's the director that has to pick this up." Of course, the reason it didn't matter before was that these environmental documents were produced to comply with the law, and they were essentially ignored. You come in, and you write this report, and you say all this stuff that nobody has the slightest bit of interest in. They would focus on these tiny little details and totally ignore the major issues, and the report would just go to Washington, or wherever they go. If it's a Federal EIS [Environmental Impact Statement], the FHWA is a participant, presumably, in this process. And then the project would be approved. It didn't really make any difference if the Environmental Impact Report said five hundred million vehicles in one place and five vehicles in another because nobody read it and nobody cared. But if you were going to use this as a decision-making tool, it makes a great deal of difference. So, as I say, it
may have been at that point when I read that report for that Hoffman Freeway and discovered these egregious errors in the report itself that I said that we are going to start doing things differently around here, and these reports are going to be reviewed by the Division of Transportation Planning when they come in.

[End Tape 9, Side A]

[Begin Tape 9, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN So, Adriana, if you'd care to now, please continue with your discussion of the review of Environmental Impact Reports and Environmental Impact Statements.

GIANTURCO OK The other thing about the environmental process, looking at it from another angle, is that as it's set up in both CEQA and NEPA it's a two-part process in the sense that you do a draft and then you do a final. Let me say, the way it was done, the whole thing was done, before I got to Caltrans, Caltrans would decide on what project it wanted to build. Caltrans would decide we want to build an eight-line freeway, and this is the alignment. They would even start acquiring right of way. This is basically what it
GIANTURCO looks like—I mean some of the design details would still be up in the air—but the basic project was laid out. And then they would do an Environmental Impact Report which said this is the project and dream up some phony alternatives to the project because the environmental law requires you to look at alternatives. So they would think up some absurd alternatives. They'd never thought of alternatives to start off with. It had been the gleam in somebody's eye for twenty-five years that they wanted this freeway or interchange or whatever it was. One is required under the law to look at the no-build alternative so they would put that in there, and then all the numbers would always justify this predetermined, preselected alternative.

Well, that puts the process on its head.

I'm thinking of something from my undergraduate education, reading about [German philosopher and socialist Karl] Marx and [German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel. I think Hegel said that it was ideas that governed the world or something like that, and Marx said that it's
GIANTURCO economics that governs the world People made the comment, or maybe Marx himself made the comment, "I've turned Hegel on his head " Well, that's what they'd sort of done with this environmental process They'd turned it on its head Rather than collecting information on alternatives and then looking at these alternatives without predeciding which one and then making a decision based on the merits of each alternative, they would decide on the alternative then dream up all kinds of stuff--phony alternatives--waste years documenting these alternatives that nobody had any intention of going with, and which always turned out to be terrible It was just a complete waste of taxpayers' money

So I said, "We're going to do this differently " I don't know that anybody's doing it this way, as a matter of fact, but I said, "What we're going to do is we're going to take advantage of the fact that this is a two-part process, you do a draft and a final At the draft stage, I want no preferred alternative " The terminology used in this environmental business is the preferred
alternative versus the other alternatives. I said, "We are not going to select an alternative as our preferred alternative until we have looked at the other ones, and then we will see out of this constellation of alternatives which one is preferable." I said, "We'll use the draft stage to devise alternatives, to look at all of them objectively, to compare them, not to have a preferred alternative. But at the end of the draft, we will then review the draft and make a decision which one of these looks the best, and then we will put that in the final. The final environmental report will have a preferred alternative. It will lay out the impact of that one, and it will lay out the impacts of these rejected alternatives which we looked at in a very factual way in the draft stage."

**PETERSHAGEN**

Let me offer this because I think this is crucial. So, your idea of the draft environmental document was a true, decision-making, choice-identifying tool.

**GIANTURCO**

Exactly, which is what NEPA says.
By which you would then develop the preferred alternative, rather than starting with the preferred alternative.

Absolutely. And if you read NEPA and you read CEQA and you read the congressional discussion of this, this was the concept. It's the heart of the idea of doing Environmental Impact Reports. It is not to make a decision and then justify that decision—use environmental data to justify the decision after you've made the decision. It's to build the environment into the decision making process. So, you've captured it exactly. The first thing is you look at various alternatives and their impacts, and you use the information that you gather from that process as a decision making tool to select an alternative which you then write a final Environmental Impact Report on, saying, "Having looked at all these alternatives, this is the preferred one. These are its impacts. These are the other ones we looked at, and we rejected. These are their impacts." Hopefully, the one that you picked is the best one environmentally, but it doesn't have to be. There could be
overriding reasons why you would pick an alternative that has more negative impacts than some other alternative. But then, in that case, you should be prepared to justify why you are picking it despite these negative impacts.

If you're going to tear down three or five or whatever it is historic districts recognized by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and something like—I don't know—six hundred houses that are on the register or should be on the register, could be on the register, and destroy the downtown business district of South Pasadena, you better have some pretty good reasons why that is the preferred alternative, you know. There are other laws that are along the same line. Section 106 which has to with park lands. It may also have to do with historic stuff. I've forgotten if that's both historic and parks or open spaces, or if it's just a park and open space issue.

But, in any event, under the Section 10...
Historic, OK. Under that law, the law states that you must pick the alternative which is environmentally benign unless there is no feasible alternative. So, the law is pretty clear on these things, but the way the bureaucracy, and not just at Caltrans, but the rest of state government and, I'm sure, bureaucracies across the United States have twisted this around, completely distorted and lost the meaning of these laws when they were passed. And, I will say again they were passed under a conservative Republican administration, not by some flaky, wild-eyed tree-huggers. It just makes good sense in terms of making decisions to me that you try to predict the outcome of your action before you decide on that course of action.

I think if we can review the bidding on that, you probably mentioned this, but NEPA came about out of the Nixon Administration and I think CEQA came through the Reagan Administration.

That's correct. That's correct.

Perhaps I should clarify one point. I've used the term "decentralization" to discuss
the trend in Caltrans today The official word is "delegation"

GIANTURCO Oh, OK I had delegation That is a word that would have characterized my approach to it We will delegate authority, but we are not giving away the essential authority having to do with our responsibilities to the public and the legislature to some lower level which can make any decision it wants without ever being second-guessed or reviewed by headquarters And that's essentially how things operated when I went to Caltrans

PETERSHAGEN Now, this is getting a little far off the subject, but one of the things that's important, I think, is perception versus reality and of course, it's gotten popular in describing Washington, to say perception is reality, whatever that means But, I've noticed that in all these issues we've discussed that Adriana has done this, Adriana has done that It's always the director that catches the flak and the district director is, I don't know if he continues on the Rotary Club speaking circuit or not throughout that, but he's not to be seen in the newspapers
GIANTURCO: You mean while I was there? You're talking about at the time?

PETERSHAGEN: Let's say the diamond lane issue, for example.

GIANTURCO: It's interesting you bring that up, George, because it took me a while. I mean I don't know that I successfully accomplished this, to rein in these district directors from doing their own thing, but many times it happened. And this is the reason why I said this is an intolerable situation because these district directors would make some decision, I was never informed about it, and the next thing I know, I'm being called before some legislative committee to explain why did this crazy thing happen. This happened time after time. Newspaper stories would come out, and I'd say, "What in the world is going on here?" This is the first I heard about it. And I'm the one, because I'm the director, and rightfully so, I'm taking the blame for this. I can't operate like this. I need to know what's going on, and we need to have some understood policies that the districts understand what headquarters expects and we keep track, we monitor them."
Of course, we delegate authority. We don't want to make every decision at headquarters. That's crazy. You can't possibly operate like that.

On the other hand, with the big decisions, they should go through headquarters, and the director should be informed. And if the director doesn't like what's going on, she changes it. And if a district director doesn't want to go along with the program, then, you know, go back to the civil service ranks. But, you're absolutely right, George. It would happen time after time that there would be something that would happen that I hadn't a clue that whatever was going on, and the first thing I know about it is a headline in the newspaper, "Adriana failed to remove snow on Route 13" or something or other. You know some ridiculous thing. Or, "Adriana did that." It would be something I knew nothing about, whatsoever, they had done entirely on their own.

Now, earlier you had described an attempt to tighten up the reins a little bit whereby you had the district directors accountable to
you but usually through your deputies as you worked out your organizational changes.

GIANTURCO This is something I was only able to do at the tail end of my time at Caltrans because what happened was Carl Forbes, the person who had been in the position of chief engineer, got cancer. He died. Actually, he left--this is a detail--he left three months before he was diagnosed. Then he had terminal cancer, and he died. Well, at that point, that was my opportunity. I liked this guy very much, but once he was no longer there I had no intention of refilling that position. At that point, I eliminated that part of the structure that had the chief engineer with all these hundreds of functions and district directors reporting to it, split it into two, a deputy for Project Development and a deputy for Maintenance and Operations, and I had the districts reporting directly to the director's office.

The way they reported to me was similar to the way that they reported to the chief engineer. The way that position [chief engineer] was set up before I went through this reorganization was, he had various
people that worked for him. If a district
director needed to get a question answered,
or whatever, they didn't go to Forbes. They
went to one of Forbes' deputy deputies, or
whatever he called them.

Well, in the same way, I had my line
structure. If a district director had a
problem or something, they would discuss it
with my deputy for that function. The idea
was that the deputy spoke for me, basically,
but if the district director truly could not
accept the decision or thought that the
decision that the deputy was making was
something that they really wanted
reconsidered they could appeal to me over the
deploy, and I would make the final decision
Otherwise, the deputy's word was my word, it
was the same as my word. It was a cabinet
structure, and it worked. I think it worked
very well.

The other thing was that it had been the
case before that Forbes, as the chief
engineer—he was the only chief engineer I
ever knew because he was in the job when I
came, and as I say, when he died, I
reorganized that part of the organization—
GIANTURCO had met periodically with the district directors. I think like once a month he'd have them all come to Sacramento. They had been dealing with his deputies on individual questions, but he thought it was important to have a face-to-face contact and discuss problems that involved all of them in a group setting. So, I took over that. For like the last two years I was at Caltrans I had a monthly meeting. We would have an all day meeting where we'd bring in all the district directors. The meeting was attended by the district directors and the headquarters staff that reported directly to me, the deputies and the assistant directors. The people in the staff capacity all had the title assistant director. The line people had the title deputy. We had the district directors in, and we would hash through various things we always had a full agenda of things that they wanted to discuss, my deputies thought was important, or I thought was important. So that's how we functioned from then on.

The other thing we were going to talk about, George, in connection with this, which gets back to the environmental thing, is
Before we go on to project delivery, let me ask you about one of the questions you brought up as we began today, and that is when you got to the district boundary the eight-lane freeway went to four lanes, or that sort of a situation. Do you feel that you were able to resolve some of those issues during your tenure as the director?

Yes, I don't think that happened when I was there. I'm not aware of any case, but the kind of case that I was faced with. That type of thing had happened thirty years ago. I think it was probably no longer happening by the time I got to Caltrans, although the potential for it to happen was certainly there. I mean because the structure was such that these district directors had such absolute power over what happened up to the district line that if they wanted to do it that way, that's the way it would have been done. I think they'd gotten
smart because a few examples like that makes the department look pretty stupid

So, this was really not an issue that you had to attack head on?

There were many things, though, that cut across district lines, where the treatment of things was not uniform, and there was no reason for it. A good example would be use of salt on roads. I can think of that as a fairly minor example, but it's one that comes to mind, where one district would be salting the hell out of the roads, which has a very bad effect on vegetation and gets into the water supply and does all kinds of bad things. At the district line, it would be the same road, just going across the district boundary. On the other side, that district director, for some reason, didn't believe in salting roads so much or liked to use a little sand mixed in with the salt or whatever. Well, we pretty much put a stop to that kind of thing. We developed statewide policies that were going to govern everybody. You know, there are some things that maybe in some districts the conditions are different. I am not saying that things are the same in
Eureka as they are in San Diego. That's why you have two separate districts, but some things are the same. If they're the same, then they ought to be treated the same. I mean, we are all taxpayers of the state of California, and why should one place be doing something in a half-assed way, and another place be doing it in another way that makes more sense? I can't go along with it, and I don't think the taxpayers can go along with it. I would get calls from legislators saying so and so is doing something, you know, just down the road from someplace, and why aren't we doing whatever it is? The reason would be this is one district, and they've decided to do it. Three miles down the road is another district, and they've decided not to do it. So, I pretty much put a stop to that. Of course, we had to tackle this kind of issue by issue. I remember salt because that was something that we had an ongoing study which must have been going the whole time I was at Caltrans, trying to figure out a consistent policy and how and in what circumstances to use salt and not use salt, how much salt to use, whatever.
PETERSHAGEN

Well, maybe this would be a time to kind of shift direction a little bit and talk more about project delivery. Would you like to get into that?

GIANTURCO

OK. Well, it relates directly or it certainly has a link to the environmental stuff we were talking about before. There was a terrible problem with Caltrans from my perspective. As I said earlier on, I'm an action type. I like to get things done. I am not the type who sits around and likes to consider things for years. That's just not my personality type. Now, one would think from reading, if you read the literature on the mind of the engineer—and there have been a number of psychological studies done on what attracts people to the field of engineering—that engineers are action-oriented people. Well, maybe, some engineers are, but believe me, there are plenty who are not, because I just could not believe how long it took projects to get delivered.

We were continually behind. I believe I was the first director who ever did this. This just drove me up the wall. I just can't take this. I would be told that we were
GIANTURCO  going to be starting construction on some project or letting the contract on such and such a date. That date would come and go. Nothing would happen. Months would elapse, and then we would start getting calls or whatever. The thing still wasn't ready. It was just totally out of control in terms of having projects on a schedule that were being tracked and that were being kept onto that schedule. It just was not happening. So, I made a major attempt to rationalize and speed up this project delivery process. As I say the great irony is one of the major accusations against me when I was director was that I was trying to slow down projects. That was absolutely not the case.

I'll say this, the projects that I considered to be disastrous like the one in South Pasadena or this Devil's Slide Project which, by the way, were not in the program were not approved projects. Yes, I did nothing about those projects. I didn't want them to happen. But, if something was approved even if I disapproved of it, even if I had recommended against it, if it was adopted as part of our program by the
California Transportation Commission or put in our budget by the legislature, I made every attempt to see that this thing was done. And the way I did it was, one, I had changed the organization. When I got the organization changed so that I had a deputy in charge of Project Development, that person's chief responsibility—and nothing was to detract him from this—was to make sure those projects were delivered. And I went beyond just giving it to this deputy.

Before I had that organizational change in place, and I think within a year or two of my becoming director, maybe the second year I was there—-it could have been the third year.

The first couple of years were so tied up with this diamond lane and then getting the program out of bankruptcy and trying to straighten out the Mass Transit Division and some others things that we haven't talked about, that I didn't have time to get on top of this. But I, fairly early on in the game, did become aware of this as a major problem. I started, instituted, a process whereby all the people at headquarters that were involved in project delivery, and again, we had this
GIANTURCO

mish-mash of an organization which I, because of this situation with the chief engineer, wasn't really able to deal with head-on until I was able to restructure that.

But, taking the organization as it was, I had all the people that were involved in project delivery meet with me once a month. I had them schedule out every project. We took every single project, and we put every key date for every project that was in the program, and then every month they would have to report to me on what is the progress. Have we met this date? If we haven't met the date we'd go project by project. These meetings would last at least a half a day. I'm not talking about small projects. I mean stuff like replacing some dead landscaping didn't come into this. These were projects, probably projects over a million dollars, that we had on this schedule which would have been still substantial numbers of projects I've forgotten what the cut-off was, but we had some logical cut-off. As a matter of fact, I think, as I recall, that Caltrans distinguishes between major and minor projects, and it is some dollar amount. And
GIANTURCO for minor projects, they go through much more simplified procedures for everything. It is the major ones that cause the problem.

We would go through this listing which everybody got a copy of, which had never existed before, and we would go through project by project, date by date, where are we on this? If it's behind, why is it behind? And then a discussion with the whole group sitting there, what are we going to do about this? And try to catch up the next month. And could we shift some resources from here? We went through this process every single month, and that certainly did speed things up, and, boy, was it an eye-opener for some projects.

I'll tell you about one in particular. I just could not believe this. We had a project which was a sound wall in Los Angeles, and it was several million dollars, three or four million dollars. That's why it was a major project and was on our list. And month after month, this thing kept missing the deadline. It just wasn't moving anywhere. I just couldn't figure out why every month I would get a different
GIANTURCO explanation It would be one thing one month, and then the next month, here it was, and this project is no further along than it had been before. It had missed two more dates, hadn't caught up and was even further behind, and whoever was in charge of land

Because this matrix organization There were still some remnants of that around because, as I say, I hadn't reorganized the chief engineer function. Two or three people would tell me different stories about this or that and just confused. I didn't know what the heck, and this thing just got to be practically an obsession with me, this sound wall. Why isn't this sound wall getting built? I mean what is the problem?

It must have been at least six months into this, George, going month after month, tracking this project along with several hundred other projects that I discovered that the reason this project hadn't moved anyplace. The way I discovered it was, apparently, in like the fifth meeting we'd had where this project had come up, I had gotten so enraged in this meeting about this project not moving along that somebody got
his act together and went down to Los Angeles to see what was the problem. Nobody had bothered to do this before. This was also the thing with decentralization. You know, Los Angeles had this project. They're in charge of doing it. We'll just call them up the day before the project delivery meeting with Adriana and see where the project is. That's not how work gets done. Then they'd give this person in Sacramento, whoever called up. The L A person would give some phony excuse why it wasn't done, and that would be presented to me the next day, and this had gone on for, as I say, like five months. And like the fifth time it happened, I must have just hit the ceiling, and said, "This is intolerable!" I mean I want to get to the bottom of what is going on with this sound wall. What is a sound wall? It's nothing. It's not like building an interchange. It's just some blocks set one on another, and you've got to make sure that the foundation. I don't have to be an engineer to know that there's no big deal in building sound walls." So, I got somebody interested enough. I guess they were all
frightened by this time. We need to do something about this sound wall. Somebody went down to L.A. to see what was going on, and they found out that the reason this project hadn't gone anyplace was because things had gotten lost in between the cracks, and nobody had ever done the first step that you do with sound walls which is measure the sound levels in that area. And that's why it hadn't happened. At the time, it just completely blew my mind. Then we had the sixth meeting, and this project came up again, and you know, they were very embarrassed, whoever were the people who were supposed to be tracking this. We'd found out what it was, that they'd never done the sound measurements.

Besides this sort of a thing which was largely an outgrowth of not being prepared to meet your meeting schedule and the demands of the planning process, there must have been some resistance, just on its face, when you started these planning meetings.

You mean project delivery? Could be that they resented the director even asking about this because the director had never been
GIANTURCO involved in this before. The districts did their thing. They delivered the projects whenever they felt like delivering them. I mean, the interesting thing is—and I have to say, it's been very gratifying since I've left Caltrans—when I was at Caltrans, I was excoriated time after time after time for slowing down project delivery. Adriana is stopping these projects. Well, what I've been reading in the paper for the last ten years or twelve years is, Caltrans can't seem to deliver these projects. They haven't even done the stuff in the San Francisco Bay Area after that earthquake. Of course, they've got a million excuses for this, but the project delivery is. It sounds to me as though it's a much worse problem now than it was when I was at Caltrans because, at least when I was there, I was flailing the whip to get those projects out. And we had another thing going on when I was there, which was a systematic way of tracking projects. When I said, "This is intolerable. It's so slow the way stuff is getting out, and they're not coming out on schedule," that we started this meeting thing
But this was not organized in the sense that you can truly organize. There are techniques, management techniques, and computer schedules that you can set up where you can really track projects. We had a guy working, Jim somebody—I can't remember his last name—who I assigned or had assigned to work on a systematic way of tracking projects much more closely than we were able to do with just these hand-drawn charts with dates on them. I mean this was not very complicated, but it had a lot of steps built into it, and kind of checkpoints and things. It was to be a process that was being instituted. When I left the department we were putting this in place, this tracking process which involved, as I say, a computer program that looked at the budget and looked at the schedules and put them all together and then had reminder dates—kind of the same stuff they do in weapons production or whatever—any assembly line.

PETERSHAGEN Similar to a PERT [Project Evaluation and Review Technique] Chart with key events?

Unable to verify
GIANTURCO

Exactly. It was a PERT Chart type thing, although it was a modification because with construction, you're not exactly. But that was the general concept. And I don't know what's happened to that process because, as I say, all I read now is this pathetic record of project delivery which sounds to me as though it's ten times worse than when I was there.

PETERSHAGEN

Interesting. So, I guess, if we can go back to my question about Carpenter that I asked so much earlier, that whether justified or not, somebody that wanted to string the right words together could come up with this case that said that you were delaying project delivery through all these changes you made. Whether that was true or not, the changes could certainly be offered as evidence, and then the emphasis on the environmental process. I guess what I'm trying to suggest is that the argument can be put forth logically, whether it's merited or not.

GIANTURCO

Well, I mean any argument should be backed up by facts, and if you looked at the facts, you would find out that the projects were being delivered faster under me than they had been.
GIANTURCO before And, as I say, I believe it is the case because I'm reading this constantly, that Caltrans It sounds to me as though it's in much worse shape project delivery-wise now and has been since I left And those are the essential facts And, as a matter of fact, one thing that would screw up these projects before was that they did such a lousy job on Environmental Impact Reports and various things that many times they had to be completely redone And, boy, you really slow something down if you have to do a whole new environmental report or a supplement or something Just sloppy work I remember it now, I don't remember who was at fault here, but when I discovered this, I just could not believe it We were building, maybe it was the Dumbarton Bridge, I don't remember, some big bridge in the Bay Area, and at the absolute last minute I remember this was in one of these project delivery meetings I had been told everything's on schedule We're getting ready to lay the piers This was a huge project, as I recall, and had several stages to it First contract's on schedule to go
GIANTURCO out. We've done everything. Next project delivery meeting I go to, they say, "We've run into a little problem here, Adriana." I said, "Jesus, what is it?" Well, it turns out that they failed to do the most basic thing, which was soil studies of the composition of this mud in the mud flats that they were going to be building this pier on, and this was a crucial piece of information. You don't know what weight you're bearing, I mean what the impact of that weight is, how far the bridge is going to settle down, whether you have to reinforce it, so that project came to a stop. They had to go back, do soil studies. It was probably delayed two years as a result of that.

[End Tape 9, Side B]

[Begin Tape 10, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN Now, Adriana, I think we're pretty much through project delivery, but there are some other things you wanted to discuss with regards to the administration and the administrative functions in Caltrans so I'll let you start where you want.

GIANTURCO OK, I wanted to make a comment about the role of engineers in Caltrans. When I got there
there were engineers, licensed civil engineers, in virtually every major function at Caltrans, with the exception of the head of the Legal Division, who was a lawyer, but who reported to an engineer, as I recall. And this meant you had engineers running the budget shop, running—well I can't remember—but all these functions, which, to me, require basically business training. You're not looking at plans. The appropriate background for these people is not going through engineering school and studying statistics and mechanics and all these things, but it's learning about administrative things. One of the things that I did over a period of time was move engineers out of these jobs and, boy, they didn't like it at all because many of them had gotten used to. Some of them had not done engineering in years. They had been doing budgets or whatever the heck it was, and the last thing they were prepared to do was to go back to this old engineering function. That was a very difficult problem to deal with on a personal level. It was
GIANTURCO

hard telling people that they were being reassigned. I did a lot of that.

I would say another aspect of Caltrans that bothered me was the organization struck me as being extremely ossified. People had been in jobs for years and years and years. It wouldn't be atypical to be in a job for ten years. My own feeling is—and I've read some management stuff on this that kind of confirms it—is that most people tend to burn out or to lose the energy and enthusiasm and the willingness to try new things and so on, innovative ideas in a job after five years in a particular position is usually about the maximum. I mean there are, of course, exceptions. People who stay in jobs I'm talking about the same job. I'm not talking about the same organization, but the exact same job so that you're coming in every day and doing exactly what you did yesterday. So it's good to have movement in an organization. Move people around, and this is laterally, promote them, do whatever, but don't have people doing the same thing year after year. So I said that rotation of staff
GIANTURCO is one of the things we're going to do here. And, boy, people, again, didn't like that at all.

I was concerned specifically or most particularly about district directors, some of whom had been in their jobs for fifteen or twenty years. At that point, they've developed so many ties to the community and obligations to various people who they've done favors for or the other person has done a favor for them, or they've developed these personal relationships so that they're no longer able to be objective about the job. And, not only that, but they tend to get so enmeshed in local issues that it is very difficult for them to take direction from headquarters or to see themselves as part of a statewide organization. So I went through a program to rotate district directors, and, as a matter of fact, I rotated every single one. They didn't like that at all, but I rotated every single one except for Leo Trombatore who was named director after me and who did nothing but badmouth me, and I did the guy a great favor by leaving him in his job because he had personal problems.
GIANTURCO

But, in any event, every other one was rotated, and the functions that were non-engineering in nature that had been assumed by engineers, unless there was some reason to keep this engineer in the job, I replaced them with people who had backgrounds in public administration or budgeting, economics, whatever.

As I looked more and more at this organization and as I got things more under control in the highway area, in the substantive areas, I was able to spend more time on these organizational questions. My order of priorities was not to deal with organization right off the bat other than cutting down the number of people who were reporting to me. These other things happened over a period of time. But as time went on, as I had a better handle on the highway program, the mass transit program, and so on, relations with the legislature, getting our budgeting process under control, and so on, I was able to deal with a lot of organizational issues in a more sustained way than I was initially. And one of the things that I discovered fairly early on, but didn't take
GIANTURCO action on until, I guess, it must have been probably the last couple of years I was there, was the question of the top heavy-ness of Caltrans, which at that time was just replete with managers, and it was practically all chiefs and no Indians. It was very common to have what they called--it was just unbelievable--one on one reporting situations, where you had a supervisor and a worker, and the worker is doing the work, and the supervisor is just reviewing this work when it's done, which is just crazy. Why not have the supervisor do the work, period? You don't need two people to do one job is what it boils down to.

There were also many instances of spans of control which were only two, and many, many, many of spans of control of three. So, when I started the project, we went through the entire organization, not just headquarters, but the districts, every place, to look at how every single division was organized in terms of spans of control. We set as a rule of thumb that the ideal would be to have five people reporting to one person. Now, there could be circumstances
where that's not appropriate, that you do want fewer or you want more, but five would be the average. And, what we did was eliminate a large number of manager positions. There were just too many of them. The way we did that was basically to circle the positions because we're talking about civil service so you can't fire people, but when one of these positions that was excess in terms of the appropriateness of the span of control became vacant, it would not be filled, or if there was a possibility of transferring one of these excess supervisors to another opening where there legitimately needed to be a supervisor he would be transferred, and we cut down a lot of fat. But, I was reading in the paper the other day, the same thing. They've got this problem. I bet it's crept right back up, the spans of control, with these one-on-ones and two-on-ones. Crazy.

As we review the bidding, the argument might be made that a significant contributor to this would have been the downsizing of Caltrans that had gone on in the few years essentially before you became director, and
I'm sure that was a contributor, but I think your suggestion is that this was something that was institutionalized, also, and not just totally the result of that downsizing. I think you're correct, George. I hadn't thought about it, or I thought about it so long ago that I don't remember what I thought at the time was the explanation. I was told that part of the reason for this problem, but not the whole reason—again, it was institutionalized, and it happened before the downsizing. But, one of the things that had happened was that when Caltrans went into its lay-off mode, an agreement was reached. This was before I was there because the layoffs started when I was in the Business and Transportation Agency. I don't know who made this decision and at what level the decision was made. A decision was made that positions at a certain level would be maintained, not cut, or not cut in the same proportion as these lower level positions. This was some kind of arrangement that was reached. I believe, with PEG, the professional engineers organization. I could be wrong. It could have been CSEA.
GIANTURCO [California State Employees Association] but I bet it was PEG because it had principally to do with engineering positions—that the higher level positions would go through fewer or no cuts with the understanding that when they became vacant, they were not to be refilled. But, that had not happened. The second part of this agreement had never gone into effect so what happened was you had this really top-heavy structure. I think it was, as you say, it had already been a problem before.

Any organization tends to evolve like that because what happens is as people stay around they expect to be promoted. And, human beings being what they are, they want to be nice to other human beings, so they promote them. So, you are tending to promote, and unless you are doing a lot of hiring at the bottom, pretty soon you're going to have all chiefs at the top and very few Indians. And that's what had happened Caltrans hadn't been hiring people for years or hadn't hired any significant number of people. So, you had very few people entering in the bottom of the ranks, and people were
GIANTURCO

just constantly being promoted. Pretty soon, you've got all these situations with just untold numbers of managers and hardly any beginning people.

But, speaking of that, at one point we did do--a year or two into my tenure--a study of the age structure of Caltrans and how it would be affected by retirements which we could anticipate coming up. It was easy to see. You could project out very easily by the age of the employees to see what the structure would be two years down the line, five years, as people retired. At the same time, because of this project delivery problem, getting back to that, with people crawling all over me constantly about project delivery, here I am flailing the organization. It's like trying to row a boat in molasses. I'm not getting very far, but I'm being blamed for it.

One of the reasons I was given repeatedly by the engineering establishment of Caltrans as to why these projects were taking so long to get out was that they didn't have enough young lower level engineers. That they needed more staff is
what it boiled down to. They needed these young engineers to draw up the plans and do all the scut work and so on, and then it would move up the structure, and they didn't have enough of these. And I heard this over and over and over. I mean it was just a running theme. We need more engineers. We've got to do some hiring. We haven't done some hiring for years. If we just got these engineers on board these projects would be just zipping out of here. So, finally, I got so disgusted with this, George. I recall the legislature also got involved in this. It may have been at a later date, but I did this regardless. I may have been compelled to do it, but I would have done it whether or not I was compelled to do it. I think I took independent action, and then the legislature said you have to do it after I'd already done it. Basically, what I told the person who was in charge of Project Development at the time is, "I don't want to hear one more word ever about not having enough of these young engineers. You've been telling me this for the last year or two years or whatever, and we are going to go on a hiring program."
want to know how many engineers you need, and we're going to go out and hire them. Well, I think this guy probably couldn't believe what he was hearing. Well, he'd come back to me with a number of new engineers that we need, which was, say, fifteen hundred. It was a large number. I got the Personnel Department all organized on this. They went, had a team of people that went, across the United States visiting engineering schools to recruit these new engineers. We put ads in all the engineering publications, and we recruited, we got something like, whatever that number was, fifteen hundred new engineers. As I said, "I don't ever want to hear about staff being a problem with this project delivery again."

Well, it had very little effect on project delivery. I couldn't understand it. I mean six months have gone by. We got this huge slew of these new engineers. All of a sudden we went from having this all managers to having this huge crowd of recent graduate engineers at the bottom of the organization. Usually what happens if you graduate from engineering school--I could be wrong on this,
but I think it is the case—usually people haven't taken their licensing exam at that point, so they're hired as an assistant, and at the assistant engineer level you're not licensed. But after a certain period of apprenticeship you typically take the exam, and then you become licensed, and then you are automatically promoted maybe to associate engineer. I've forgotten what the next title is, but, anyway, we had this huge slew of these assistant engineers, these recent graduates, and it isn't doing a thing for project delivery.

So, I should say that I instituted another thing, George, which was I had an open door policy on Wednesday morning from, I've forgotten, 9:00 to 10:30, or something like that. My door was open to any employee from Caltrans who could come in and tell me if they had a problem. I thought this is a way I'm going to kind of cut through all the bureaucracy. Somebody has something that's been bothering them for years, they can come in. They had to schedule a meeting in advance with my secretary. They didn't just sit out in the waiting room, but you could
call and get a ten-minute meeting with the director. It didn't matter if you were a maintenance worker or whoever. That one hour or hour-and-a-half a week, open door policy, you could come and see the director.

So, even if I were somebody at the Orick Maintenance Station, for example, I could fly down, if I chose to buy a plane ticket. Absolutely, Caltrans wouldn't pay for it, but you could just come into my office and tell me what your problem is. Many people did that, exactly like that—like the Orick Maintenance Station or someplace like that, they'd come in. It would be something that they thought was an unjust situation that had been going on for years. There were just all kinds of things. And what I would do is one of my executive assistants was given the responsibility for following up on these things. Say this person in this Orick Maintenance Station, he lived in Caltrans housing and, because typically the housing is provided by Caltrans, to give a hypothetical example, the plumbing has been stopped up for five years, and Caltrans is refusing to get it fixed or something like that—let's say
GIANTURCO some justifiable complaint And, he's gone through every channel he could think of and still can't get the toilet to flush or something So, my executive assistant would cut right through all the bureaucracy, call the district director, or whoever, there and say, "What's the story with this plumbing?" The district director would have to find out and within three days or whatever, some short period of time, we would have solved that problem Of course, many people would come in who, to put it charitably, were not quite all there, and they'd come in with some paranoid fantasy about somebody had mistreated them twenty-five years before, and as a result of that, their daughter was being Oh, God, you know, just all kinds of crazy stories but those were the minority Most of them were more along the line of the first example I gave.

Well, what started happening after about six months after we hired this slew of young engineers, recent graduates, is I started getting young engineers that were coming in, and they were telling me they weren't being given any work to do George, my mind was
GIANTURCO absolutely blown. They were leaving in droves because they were being given literally no work to do. I remember a troop of about three or four of them came in from District Four, San Francisco, which had a terrible project delivery problem. They were way behind on everything, and they still are. I mean this stuff about the earthquake business, which, of course, they're blaming on the community for not wanting them to build some God-awful, terrible structures in replacing what fell down, which, if Caltrans were a little more sensitive they wouldn't be trying to build these terrible things. I'm kind of fantasizing here about what's going on. I don't know the details of why it's taking so long to recover from that Loma Prieta deal. But in any event, District Four historically has had a terrible problem with project delivery before my time, and clearly it's still going on. And we had added, I don't know, maybe one hundred engineers to District Four, presumably because this was their problem, and these people were not being given assignments. As I say, I think that was the first group that came in. It
was three or four of them that came in from District Four and told me they were just sitting around at their desks and nobody was giving them any work to do. They had all found other jobs. They were coming in just because they thought I should know as director that this was happening.

PETERSHAGEN: Wow.

GIANTURCO: And they left. I mean those four left. Oh! I was just shocked. What happened was that it takes skill, it takes time, and it takes work to supervise, and people at Caltrans weren’t prepared for that. They were prepared to blame the lack of progress on lack of staff, but then all of a sudden they have three staff and they don’t have a clue of how to divide up the work or give them an assignment, supervise it, monitor it, sign off on it, whatever. We lost—I don’t remember what the percentage was—but a substantial percentage of those engineers that we hired left because they weren’t given enough work to do.

PETERSHAGEN: That really is amazing. Are there any other issues that you want to address under the
span of control, or for that matter, anything else in the organization?

GIANTURCO No, I think I've covered the major things having to do with organization. I mean I could talk for years about Caltrans' organization, but I think I hit some of the high points here
PETERSHAGEN Adriana, we were discussing Caltrans' organization, and it's this very morning that the Bee carries the article that has the caption, "Caltrans Chief Cut Manager Ranks by Twenty-five Percent" and explains that we're going to make some management adjustments in Caltrans. Perhaps you'd care to comment on that.

GIANTURCO Well, it just blew my mind when I read that, frankly. I mean, of course, that's a complimentary headline, and if that headline had been written about me, I take that back. The Bee was generally pretty fair, although I did have some bad experiences with them as I told you before, but it's presented as though Caltrans is doing something positive and, boy, this is great. The fact of the matter is that, as I mentioned when we were talking about administration, this is a long-standing problem. I recognized it, I would say,
within a couple of years of my becoming director I began to deal with it in a serious concerted fashion in the last couple of years that I was there, which is over ten years ago. And, we, at that time, went through the process of looking at spans of control, which is precisely the issue here--too many managers and not enough Indians--one-on-one reporting relationships plus one-on-two, one-on-three. We said it should be a minimum, absolute minimum, of one-on-three, and on average, it should be between four and five, and it could go up to seven as I recall. This was based on a lot of hard analysis of how large organizations, efficient ones, work. These weren't numbers picked out of a hat.

We went so far as to go through the entire organization to circle every single position under these criterion. We looked at what the people did. It wasn't some kind of arbitrary thing where you just threw a dart, and if it happened to end up on a position that had less than three people reporting it was gone. We tried to see if there was something special about the situation. We
GIANTURCO did a thorough study of this, identified the actual positions which were excess in terms of too many managers and not enough Indians, so to speak, and had identified these positions to be not filled or combined with other positions. We identified the other positions they were to be combined with when they became vacant. We went through this whole deal over a decade ago, and here I'm reading now in 1994 that they're getting their act together and deciding to do this. But, what particularly shocked me about this story is the story says that for the last decade they have been adding to these management positions. Not only did they fail to follow through on this effort which was a serious, comprehensive, profound, not a superficial, kind of thing that we did over ten years ago, but they went in the opposite direction. I think it's disgraceful as a tax-paying citizen. I mean it's great that they're doing it. You mentioned yourself, George, yes, there's a lot of tricks you can play with this stuff by simply renaming positions, no longer calling a person a supervisor, but calling him a technician.
But actually, he's still in the same reporting relationship, and you haven't changed a thing. That was one of the things we were aware of and had tried to structure things so it would not happen like that.

But, one of the problems at Caltrans, historically, has been that the people working in technical positions who are not involved in supervising other individuals, reach, I guess you could call it, a glass ceiling. Of course, that term is not usually used in that way, but they reach a salary ceiling because the way salaries are structured under the civil service system, basically, after a certain level, in order to move beyond some particular salary—and I don't know what it is, let's just say, for the sake of argument, it's forty thousand dollars—that you could never earn more than forty thousand dollars unless you were supervising people. So, what that means is the people that are really not suited for supervision, whose talents lie in doing the hands-on work or research or whatever, get stuck.
So, you move them and it's kind of a Parkinson's Law working in the worst possible way. You keep moving them up in order to give them a decent salary and they stop doing the things that they are good at doing, and they start doing something they're not very competent doing, and they move into this excess manager ranks. This is all rolled into one. So, it is a problem, and there's not a simple solution to this problem. It demands a pretty comprehensive approach in order to really get a handle on it, and I don't know from reading this story if this is serious or this is just some number being thrown around again in order to satisfy the legislature, and they'll be back to their old tricks as soon as [Caltrans Director James] van Loben Sels leaves, assuming he does at some point in time. They'll start adding those managers back in.

Just to get this on the tape, there's a couple of sentences that kind of jumped out at me that I thought were rather interesting, and I guess the principal one is in discussing the supervisor and employee ratio. It looks like you started out, I think you
said you had a problem with about two or three to one

GIANTURCO  There were many instances

PETERSHAGEN  And even some one-on-one

GIANTURCO  Yes

PETERSHAGEN  But now, according to the article, the problem that Caltrans is trying to cure now, the perceived problem, is about a four to one ratio, and they're trying to get it to a five or six to one ratio  So, without really coming out and saying it in the article, one can see that, perhaps, during your tenure things were improved from say two or three to one to four or five to one, and now it looks like they're trying to take another step

GIANTURCO  You mean beyond what I did?  I doubt it  I seriously doubt it, because

PETERSHAGEN  Somehow, I expected that would be your answer  [Laughter]

GIANTURCO  Virtually every administrative change that I made, not all, but the ones that were relatively easy to change, the moment I left Caltrans, they reverted back, they nullified whatever policy and procedure manual I had put into effect or whatever and said, "This is no longer operational  We are wiping the
Adriana era out of our history, and we're going back to the way it was before she issued these memos. So, I seriously, seriously doubt that they went through an effort to cut down management. I mean this article goes, I don't know where these numbers come from and what exactly they're based on. It's easy to play around with the numbers. The article also does say that there has been in the last decade, which is approximately the amount of time I haven't been there, a decrease in the management to workers ratio. When I gave numbers earlier on and throughout all our interviews, George, this is based on memories that are a minimum ten years old, so you know, I may have given you the wrong numbers. It could have been that, at the time, we had a four to one ratio, and I wanted to bring it up to six to one. I just don't recall. What I do recall is the egregious instances, many of which we found, of one-on-ones and two-on-ones, which I just thought were inexcusable, and that's what I was stressing.

PETERSHAGEN The other thing that I saw in this that I thought was rather interesting was some
rather pointed criticism of van Loben Sels in adding to his personal staff. Do you have any comments on that part of it?

PR [Public Relations] and legislative affairs? Well, I don't know what to say. I don't know what he started out with. I know that under the [Governor George] Deukmejian administration they were adding people like crazy, and he, maybe, inherited this situation. I just don't know. I don't know if he had to deal with a pre-existing condition, or he added to it or what went on there. But, as I say, I do know that under the Deukmejian administration, they hired all kinds of people. I just couldn't believe it.

One of the things that I think was my strength and also probably my weakness, given the sphere I was operating in, was that I, as I said a number of times, am basically an apolitical person. And my idea of public service is you are there to serve the taxpayer, and the governor is your boss, but your ultimate boss is the taxpayer.

And if I was asked to do something by my immediate boss who was the secretary of Business and Transportation, later changed to
Business, Transportation and Housing, or the governor or members of the governor's office which I didn't think was appropriate, I made strong arguments against it. I would say probably in 75 to 85 percent of the cases, I mean a vast majority of them, I stood my ground and I won the battle. Whereas my impression of the more typical behavior of a political appointee, a person put in a position such as Caltrans director is to feel that you owe your job to the governor, which you do. If the governor's office tells you to put various people on your staff because they, for one reason or another, have been helpful to the governor, you do it, and you don't complain about it. You may make a few noises, but you do it. And I wasn't the type to just do it. I'd say, you know, "This is outrageous. This is a forty thousand dollar position, and I don't want to be using it for somebody that happened to, you know, contribute some money to a campaign or whatever was the case."

PETERSHAGEN: I think you've indicated, though, in the past that you didn't really suffer that sort of
From time to time, I did. But, I early on established that I wasn't at all going to be a soft touch for this and so there were very few requests made of this kind after the first two or three incidents. And I can't even remember the first two or three incidents. Another thing was borrowing staff. I think I told you that I had so few exempts. I had something like one or two exempts in Caltrans. Well, the reason was that the exempts had been taken over by the Business and Transportation Agency and the governor's office.

But that had been done by previous directors. I think what must have happened was that a former governor, whoever, Ronald Reagan or Edmund G. Brown, Sr., who knows, [Governor] Earl Warren, could have come to the director of the Department of Public Works, or whatever the title was at that time, and said, "I want some positions, and I'm taking them." And they had just said, "Well, if that's the way it's gotta be, it's gotta be"
Adriana, we've just about said all that needs to be said about administration at Caltrans, and you had expressed an interest to discuss mass transit and alternatives in transportation, so perhaps you could begin on that subject for us.

OK. Well, this is a huge subject, George. I want to make it clear at the outset that, in fact, this was a major thrust of the Brown administration and of my directorship, and I spent enormous amounts of time on this which will not be reflected in the number of hours devoted to it in these interviews.

As an aside, excuse the interjection here, but I think not only was this a major thrust of the Brown administration, but it was probably one of the principal issues of what I considered to be serious opposition to some of what you were trying to do, the Collier kind of influence.

This is true. This is true. I'd just like to start out in talking about this. I've even written some notes on it because I
thought we were going to have to go through it fairly rapidly, and I want to hit some major points here.

You can take as much time as you want, seriously.

I thought I might talk a little bit about the history of the idea of alternatives to highways and the single passenger automobile as being the transportation system for California. The history of it, I suppose, goes back a long time, way before my presence on the governmental scene in California. But its recent incarnation, before I did appear on the scene, was in the legislation that established Caltrans itself. And a major thrust for that legislation, in fact the thrust for the legislation, was to take the state of California past and beyond the highways-only era in transportation as far as the state's interests and promotion and whatever into a new era, which was going to be multimodal transportation. And that phrase that was used frequently in A B 69, the legislation that established the Department of Transportation, and it's very significant that the name is the Department
GIANTURCO of Transportation It's not the Department of Highways or Division of Public Works. It's Department of Transportation, whatever transportation is.

A B 69 uses the phrase, repeatedly, balanced transportation, and in the overall language introducing the bill and throughout the legislation itself, it keeps coming back to this concept that California is crazy. It's not desirable from a public policy standpoint for the public to be reliant on a single mode of transportation, which is the automobile usually occupied by a sole passenger at work time which is when most people are driving, and a system of transportation which places overwhelming emphasis on highways. A B 69 goes on and on about the need to develop, specifically mass transit, but not only mass transit, a better use of the automobile itself, changing it from carrying single passengers to carrying multiple passengers, in other words, diamond lanes, HOVs [high occupancy vehicles], all the rest of that stuff, car pools vans, and also the need to promote alternative means of
Gianturco propelling transportation, in other words, alternative fuels, alternative technologies.

In addition to the modal thrust of adding the transit mode to the mix, A.B. 69 also contemplates that considerably more attention will be given to low-tech forms of transportation, such as the bicycle and pedestrians, and in the freight area, that California will not put all its eggs in the basket of trucks traveling on highways, but will encourage freight transportation by rail as well as by truck and highway. I mean this is broad legislation. It was the thrust and intent of the legislature and the governor in signing this bill and creating the whole department. So I took—and I took this very seriously—A.B. 69, I thought, was my bible that was to guide my work at Caltrans. So, from day one, my principal objective repeated in speech after speech, policy statement after policy statement, memorandum after memorandum was our goal is to create a balanced transportation system. And again, it meant all these things that I've just gone through.
GIANTURCO At the time that I became director which was 1976, A B 69 and Caltrans, or A B 69 had been in existence and the Department of Transportation had existed for only two years, which is, you know, just a flicker in the history of a bureaucracy and not to mention, overall world history. This is just a blink of an eyelid. Very little had been done along the lines of anything I was just talking about, for good reason, and the reason was that the highway program was in such deep trouble, being on the verge of bankruptcy. Moving into the immediate prospect of bankruptcy by the end of the Reagan Administration and the beginning of the Brown Administration, that the energy of the people in the Department was taken up with trying to save the highway program, and there was very little energy left over to worry about these other things. If your roof's falling in, and there's a tornado, you know, passing through town, that's not the time when you're going to sit down and write the great American novel. [Laughter] You have to deal with the crisis that is at hand,
and that is what people did. So, very very little had been done to implement A B 69, the philosophical concepts or the organizational modes and structures that would emerge from applying these philosophical concepts to the real world.

So, I mean I had pretty much a blank slate to work with.

When I came to Caltrans, I believe, there was a Division of Mass Transit. About all that had been done was that there had been a new division created called the Division of Mass Transit. It was just kind of scotch-taped onto the old Division of Highways and there it was, the Division of Mass Transit. It had, I believe in it, altogether, including people that worked on transit in the districts, we probably had no more than, I would say, thirty-five person-years assigned to transit. This was out of a total staff. Depending on which point of the layoffs you were talking about, the total staff at Caltrans had varied between thirteen and seventeen thousand. Thirty-five of those people, or their full-time
GIANTURCO equivalent, were devoting their time to transit. The rest were involved in highways in one way or the other.

Another thing that A B 69 had done and which I did not mention in running through these different modes, was there had been a separate Department of Aeronautics before the creation of the Department of Transportation. And this, too, had had its name changed to Division of Aeronautics and had just been glommed onto this massive highway structure. There were more people working in Aeronautics, maybe. And I'm guessing at these numbers, there may have been fifty or sixty of them in the Department of Aeronautics. The Division of Mass Transit was something completely new. There had never been a Division of Mass Transit in the state government before, but this Department of Aeronautics had been around for years. And it took me, I would say, almost my entire term as director to get people to stop calling it the Department of Aeronautics and start calling it the Division of Aeronautics. We used to get correspondence all the time addressed to the Department of Aeronautics or
GIANTURCO

the director of the Department of Aeronautics. Newspaper stories written about the Department of Aeronautics would never mention Caltrans at all, as though it were still a totally independent entity, and it was operating like that when I got there.

As a matter of fact, they weren't in the same building with Caltrans. They were located at Executive Airport. I remember there was a restaurant out there called the Red Baron, and some of the major patrons of the Red Baron restaurant were the employees of the Division of, well, the Department of Aeronautics. I mean they led the good life. The Department of Aeronautics, later the Division, had three or four planes of its own, and they pretty much kept to themselves out in these offices at Executive Airport, and they flew around the state in these private planes, checking up on airports. Exactly what they were doing was not terribly clear, but they were doing their own thing as they had been doing for thirty or forty years. And nothing of this of any substance had changed as a result of the title being changed to Division and it being put under
Caltrans. I was determined to do something about that, also.

One of the first things I did was to move that Division of Aeronautics away from Executive Airport and into the Caltrans Headquarters and, boy, did that set up a howling and a screaming and a whining you wouldn't believe. You would have thought that I was trying to destroy the air transport system of the United States of America, [Laughter] and all our space efforts and everything else were doomed as a result of this move from Executive Airport to 1120 N Street. But I never backed down, and it did happen. But I'll get onto that after we talk about transit because, frankly, I think that transit was more important and did take up a lot more of my time than aeronautics did.

Getting back to the Transit Division, as I say, I think they had about thirty-five positions, thirty to thirty-five positions, or full-time equivalent positions, person-years. We used to call them man-years in the beginning. It was switched to person-years at some point in my tenure. They accounted
GIANTURCO: for well under 1 percent of the budget of Caltrans, I don't recall what we were spending on mass transit. Gee, I find it hard to even think of a number. It was a tiny, little number. It was in maybe the tens of millions, whereas the budget of Caltrans, as a whole, was well over a billion. And over the course of my being director of Caltrans, we vastly expanded the transit operation. It still was a drop in the bucket compared to highways, but I think that by the time I left, we probably had and, again, I just am not good on remembering these numbers from so long ago. I don't recall if we had a one hundred and fifty positions or three hundred positions or something, but the increase was very, very substantial. Of course, it took place from a very small base so that even though it was substantial in terms of percentage increase, you know, adding two hundred or something positions to highways, you wouldn't have even noticed the difference, but transit, that was a huge difference in terms of the workload that they were able to carry out and the responsibilities they were able to assume.
GIANTURCO I was talking earlier when we were discussing the press and Caltrans, how the Bee had written this story about how I had misrepresented the transit budget by saying that it was three percent of the total when, in fact, it was four percent. I won't get into that again, just refer back to that as a "cf" type thing in this oral history. But the fact was that by the end of my tenure, we were at between 3 and 4 percent, depending on how you calculated it, and that was a whole lot more than we started out with, but in my view, by no means balanced. Balance to me means fifty-fifty, quite frankly. I mean if you look up the word in the dictionary, that's what it means. So, I mean to have 3 or 4 percent in transit I thought was a minimal accomplishment. I was delighted, and we had to push, push, push to get that done. But it was by no means a full implementation to my mind of what A B 69 was trying to accomplish.

The other thing about the Transit Division when I came there was, not only was it tiny and very few resources devoted to it, but nobody had sat down and thought about
what this division is supposed to be doing
The most basic conceptualization of its role
had never occurred. Nobody was able to tell
me, and there was a lot of discussion of
this, as a matter of fact, within the setting
of the State Transportation Board which
existed as a separate entity at that time,
and later folded into the Highway Commission
to become the Transportation Commission, of
what is the state role in transit, as opposed
to the local role in transit

Bus systems, which were the principal
mode of public transportation in California
and in most places, had been taken over by
local governments, and the state had played
no role. And so, the question was, what is
it appropriate for the state to do? What
should the state be doing as opposed to
localities? Because transit usually involves
short-range trips, mostly short-range or most
of them, or many of them are, should transit
funding and the policy-making and so on, be
in the hands of local entities as opposed to
the state? Well, A B 69, first of all, said
there is a state role. It did not spell it
out precisely, but it was clear that the
GIANTURCO legislature thought there was a role to be played, and it was important to try to figure that out so that the Transit Division didn't just kind of grow like Topsy. I don't mean to say that it would grow fast, but just assume a function here and a function there in sort of a mish-mash of things with no clear-cut concept of what are we trying to accomplish or what are we directing our efforts towards.

I did a lot of things as I look back on it which I should not have had to have done. I mean, there should have been staff working on these things, but the problem was that the staff of Caltrans. Although there were some really excellent people there, I mean I never met more competent people than some of the individuals I worked with at Caltrans, but there was a dearth of people who were really into policy as there was a dearth of people with training in economics or finance. And I couldn't find anybody who could seem to understand what I was talking about when I was talking about how we were going to define the state role in transit. As I say, the State Transportation Board had wrestled with
GIANTURCO

this issue and had never been able to get a handle on it, but were concerned about it as a concept as a bothersome thing that ought to be pinned down. So I, in the absence of having a staff person or a division capable of thinking through something like this—again, not to downplay the intelligence or the competence of the staff at Caltrans because there are many extremely talented people there, or were when I was there anyway—I, personally, went through this effort. I spent a lot of time thinking about it. I mean that was just something that was in the back of my mind. It wasn't that I was dealing with it every day, but I was trying to sort through it, and thoughts would come to me in the middle of the night, and I would write them down.

At the end of a certain period of time—it didn't take that long, several months—I figured out what I thought the state role in transit should be, and I put it down in a memo. I assume it must be in a memo floating around someplace—this is the state role in transit—and that became the state role in transit. And as I recall, what I did
specifically, was to say that the state role involved basically four areas, where we would say that the state had a special interest that either could not be fulfilled by local entities or could be more appropriately, or more efficiently, or more effectively, fulfilled by the state.

The first area was very obvious. If it was statewide mass transit, then, clearly, we had a role. And that, specifically, means intercity transportation by mass transit, translated into, principally the activity that we got involved with, but not entirely, wasn't limited to this, was the statewide rail program. None existed when I came to Caltrans. None. Zero. We had no role in that, and we made that a major effort of the Division of Mass Transit to assume that role.

The second area that I said the state had an interest in transit was where a transit system, or a transit facility, was involved in connecting different modes of transportation or making a mode of transportation where the state has a clear interest, such as a highway, operate more efficiently. And from that perspective, the
GIANTURCO

state had an interest in some instances, in many instances, in intracity transit because that would take a load off the highways that were being misused really. The state highway system is designed also to serve statewide travel, but ends up serving in large part local travel.

And it's local travel at commute hours that really clogs down these interstate highways, and this is exactly the kind of transportation, or one of the kinds, that makes most sense to carry on trolleys or buses or whatever. So, in that sense, we had an interest in intracity transit from that perspective, and also from the perspective of making it easier to get off something that was clearly a statewide interest mode of transportation or system, namely the highway system, and switch over to the intracity. So, from that perspective, we had already had a number of projects doing this, but it gave them a rationale that they hadn't had before, namely intermodal transfer facilities, making it easier to come in from the airport and rent a car or get on a train or transfer from a train to a bus, or whatever. And we
thought it was appropriate for the state to fund and/or build or operate these facilities

PETERSHAGEN

This sounds like it could be something as big as perhaps the Trans-Bay Terminal where one goes from rail to bus, or bus to car or whatever

GIANTURCO

Yes Absolutely A perfect example

PETERSHAGEN

Or even as small as the Park and Ride kind of thing, where you park in a remote parking lot and catch a van or bus into the city

GIANTURCO

Yes Another example, another kind of thing, would be the the cross-platform transfer station, which Caltrans built to connect BART and Amtrak in, I believe, Richmond It's a very simple facility, but you bring the tracks into a single place, and you can get off the train, the intracity train, if you're coming from Sacramento and get on BART and go right into San Francisco There are lots of different applications of this And it became a major effort, a separate program, the Intermodal Transfer Program, or Intermodal Terminal Program, I guess, we called it I've forgotten But in any
event, the concept, as you say, could extend from very complicated facilities to quite simple ones. The idea was transfer between modes which is An essential element of transportation is continuity. I mean that's the whole idea. If you want to get from here to there you've got to be able to get from here to there. It's not good enough to get from here to one mile from there. That final mile. If that doesn't happen, you're not going to use the first nine miles or whatever it is. So, if it means making a switch from Amtrak to BART that's what you have to do, or you're not going to get anybody riding Amtrak.

OK, so the next area I said there was a clear-cut state interest--I gave the analogy--was where we were protecting the interests of minorities that would not have enough weight or clout on their own to represent these interests if they were disbursed at the local level. And my idea here was similar to the argument that's made for the federal government to be interested in civil rights. That it is protecting the rights of people who are, you know, maybe one-tenth or one
GIANTURCO: -hundredth of the population in a locality and yet it is not. I mean under our system of government, the majority should not abrogate the rights of that minority, and you should set up mechanisms so that the rights of those minorities can be protected even though we have majority rule.

Well, the same thing in transportation. The minorities that are involved here that traditionally have not had their interests represented, or not represented very well, are the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped. Again, this was in the law. It was in A B 69 that Caltrans should pay attention to the interests of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped. Well, this principally relates to mass transit. Outside of the commute users, the other users of transit are those three groups, people who can't afford to drive an automobile or people who cannot physically drive an automobile, either because they are in a wheelchair or whatever. They're incapable of driving even a modified vehicle, or their eyesight is gone, or whatever, and they need an alternative way to get around. And I said...
the state must be the body to ensure that this happens, that localities can't ignore the needs of these people.

And the last area, which I said there was a clear-cut state interest in mass transit, was where the state could sponsor projects that even though they might be focused on a locality had broader application than a single locality, namely, research and demonstration type projects, where it wouldn't be worth it for, say, the City of Riverside, to—as I remember we had a project with hydrogen buses down there for the City of Riverside—to pay for two or three hydrogen buses to see how they worked. But it was worth it to the state as a whole to see whether these buses worked. It was totally appropriate for there to be state funding passed on to the local transit district there to purchase and operate these hydrogen buses. The idea being that if it works, it'll have broad application.

So, basically I said there were four areas in which we had an interest, and we are going to focus our efforts around those four areas, and that's pretty much the way it
worked I think I came down with that policy, kind of outlined, probably towards the end of my first year in office in Caltrans. The first two things I had to deal with were that diamond lane project and the highway crisis, the highway funding crisis, and this was percolating in the back of my mind as the next major thing that we needed to get a handle on. As I said, it was percolating in the back of my mind before it finally formulated itself and came out, but, I think, it was within the first year that that happened.

Just on the personal side, you've mentioned these three issues now that were going on at about the same time. Did thinking about the alternative transportation aspects of your job was that somewhat therapeutic to help overcome some of the negatives of the diamond lane kind of thing you were going through?

Well, it's interesting you should say that I don't know that it was therapeutic, but I thought of it always as a positive. I was constantly being criticized that I'm doing all these negative things--I'm holding up projects, which we had a long discussion of
GIANTURCO

before I was not holding up projects I was being accused of this—I'm not building needed highway projects, I'm stifling the engineering staff, I'm doing all these negative things and, from my view at the time, I wasn't doing negative things at all. As a matter of fact, a major part of my energy, and I kept saying, "There's a whole world out there." I said this to the engineering staff. "There are so many things we could be involved in above and beyond highways. We are not constricting the role of Caltrans. We're expanding it. Let's look at it that way. This is expansion."

Getting back to that the last major thing I got involved in in transit was a major push to get Caltrans involved in high-speed rail which I was going to deal with at the end of this. And I tried and tried and tried to get the engineering staff—I'm talking about the established engineering staff, kind of the "old boy" network—interested in this. I said, "Look at it as though we're talking about building a new interstate highway system. It's that exciting. It's that new. It's going to
involve engineering talents and engineering expertise, and it's something that we can be proud of. It's a clear statewide thing. We need to be moving. And I just couldn't get anybody interested.

But, anyway, to answer your question, I don't know if it was so much therapy, but it certainly entered into my consciousness, repeatedly. This is ridiculous. The impression that seems to be created on the outside, or certain people are trying to promote, is that Adriana is just trying to stop things. I wasn't trying to stop things. I was trying to stop things I thought were inappropriate, such as pork-barrel projects. But, I was trying, principally, to expand transportation beyond dependence on the single-passenger automobile on the highway.

Now, of course, my idea of the mentality of the times was that you were taking gas tax money, which was "highway money," and I say that in quotes, and applying it to other things. And whether A B 69 had been passed or not, I am sure there were still people that saw this as taking highway money away from the highway program and, especially, I
think that some of the Colliers, the more rural people, would see this as money that would otherwise benefit them being spent in San Francisco or Los Angeles.

GIANTURCO: Well, there are two parts to the answer to that. I have already talked about Collier and how, you know, we had a reconciliation, and he turned out to be somebody that I had no problem dealing with after that happened and his fear that my interest was in building BART through Mt. Shasta, or something like that. [Laughter] Well, anyway, the two parts to that, trying to answer that question, are it is true that gas tax money was being used to fund transit, but it was not the same gas tax money that was protected in the Constitution and was intended to go to highways. This was separate money. It came from the sales tax on gasoline which is a separate tax from the so-called gas tax on gasoline. And this sales tax on gasoline had been passed. It's a complicated thing and, boy, I stopped trying to explain it, and our PR people stopped trying to explain it and just had a few pat phrases that we used after a while because it was so complicated.
GIANTURCO

What happened was, and this was at about the time that A B 69 passed as part of the pro-transit trend in the legislature and across the country, the sales tax, the regular sales tax that you pay on things like clothing or, you know, sporting equipment or anything, had not applied to gasoline. Gasoline had this flat gas tax which, at the time, was, I don't know, four cents or something like that in California. It's since been increased substantially, but it was a flat tax. The sales tax is a percentage tax which applied to sales of most items, but gasoline was exempted. In a very complicated piece of legislation that, as I say, passed about the same time as Caltrans was created, the sales tax was extended to gasoline. And a formula was devised to figure out. And, again, I can't remember. It was so complicated, I think very few people understood it. If you made a comparison of what the sales tax would have been if it hadn't been on gasoline.

[End Tape 10, Side B]

[Begin Tape 11, Side A]
So, Adriana, we were discussing the sales tax on gasoline that was developed to help fund some of these other-than-highway projects. I'll call them. Would you continue your explanation of that, please?

As I was saying, there was a complicated formula, and I just don't remember what it was. It's not worth going into. Somebody can read the law. But there was a complicated formula which decided how much sales tax money went into transit, and the sales tax on gasoline was passed specifically for the purpose of funding transit. That money had never existed before, so obviously it had never gone into highways before. So, it was not a question of taking money away from highways. It was a new source of revenue, and its intent from day one was to fund transit.

The other aspect, though—I said there were two parts to this answer—was there resistance to transit because people saw it as detracting from highways or using funds that could be used for highways. And the second part of the answer is that is partially true because there was a second
source of funding for transit which came out of so-called Proposition 5\(^1\), as it was known at the time. I think that term has dropped out of current usage, but it was used for years afterwards. It was a proposition that was put on the ballot in this same pro-transit era, which amended the California Constitution by popular vote, and it passed by popular vote. So this was not something imposed by the legislature. It was the people of California speaking directly. And by Proposition 5, they voted to allow the regular gas tax, the flat tax on gasoline, to be used for fixed guideway projects. That was Article Twenty-six of the Constitution which had previously stated that the only use of those funds, the flat gas tax, could be highways, and they changed the constitution. So, what it said was you can use this flat tax.

However, it was restricted to fixed guideways and there was a long, well not long, but several year, period of trying to define what a fixed guideway was. And also,\(^1\)

\(^1\)Proposition 5 (June 1974)
GIANTURCO

I think I may have mentioned before when I was talking about my battles with the Highway Commission. The subject of actually allocating these funds to fixed guideway projects was one of the real bones of contention between me and the Highway Commission. The Highway Commission, which was dedicated to highways, I mean their mind set was highways, period, was the body charged with--this was before the passage of legislative budgeting--coming up with the budget for Caltrans and any pass-through funds that Caltrans intended to make available to local governments, state funds that were to be used for local projects. And this Highway Commission interpreted the provision of the constitution, the amendment to the constitution, Proposition 5 that had just passed, as saying that this was just crazy.

And to give you a little insight into the way that Caltrans and bureaucracies work, not that you need it, but somebody else reading this might be interested in this. I'll just divert from my main train of thought, but it's not far off my main train.
GIANTURCO of thought I had earlier told you that the Highway Commission didn't have its own staff to speak of. It had an Executive Secretary, an individual who worked full-time, whose main job necessarily—I mean it took a lot of time—was organizing the agenda of Highway Commission meetings and meeting places and so on. And he was assisted, I assume, by a secretary-secretary type, who typed up letters and got out correspondence and so on. They, in addition to that, had virtually no staff. They drew directly on Caltrans staff. If they needed something done, they would ask for the assignment of somebody from the department, and I don't recall ever a request being refused.

They also had a lot of secret sources of information within Caltrans, within this "old boy" network, who saw, particularly when I came on, the Highway Commission as the last bastion to defend the old highway establishment against this woman who is determined to change Caltrans from a Division of Highways into a Department of Transportation, balanced transportation, all these things which were not seen as good by
GIANTURCO

the highway types. In any event although they only had two people, as I recall, working for them full-time, the Executive Secretary and, I assume, a secretary-secretary, there was a third individual who spent a substantial portion of his time working for the Highway Commission, although he was not under their control.

He was in the Legal Division of Caltrans, and his assignment was supposed to be a part-time assignment—but, I suspect, that he probably spent full-time on this—was to advise the Highway Commission on legal matters. And this guy was totally steeped in the old idea that "highways uber alles." I mean that's all there is. Anything else is folly, stupidity, waste of the taxpayers' money, or as Deukmejian said in his inaugural address, "exotic forms of transportation." Thinking that this is just stupid, ridiculous, we shouldn't be wasting our time thinking about it. That was the attitude of this lawyer. I've forgotten his name. I'm sure he's long retired by now. And every piece of advice that he gave the commission reflected that point of view. And one piece
of advice he gave them was that the way he interpreted Proposition 5 and the application of it to the allocation of flat gas tax money to fixed guideway projects was that the commission would first identify a highway project that could be funded with money gas tax money, and then deliberately drop that project and substitute a mass transit project for it. Well, this was a bureaucratic strategy that made it virtually impossible to allocate funds for mass transit because what they would do was a very simple-minded, but, on the other hand, clever bureaucratic game.

It was kind of like the Washington Monument game. You identify the Washington Monument as the most important part of the National Park System. If somebody tells you you have to cut the National Park budget, you say, "OK, we've got to close down the Washington Monument." Well, what the commission would do is, they'd say, "OK, somebody has suggested that we fund the Metro Subway Project in L.A. We're going to look at what highways, assuming these funds were used to build highways, what could it go
for?" And they would identify the most crucial, important highway project that had been hanging around for years as the one that was going to be dropped in order to build the Metro Subway. Then the Highway Commission would say, "We can't drop this highway project. It's crucial." And they wouldn't fund the Metro.

When I became director, I believed that the total amount of Prop 5 money that had been allocated by the Highway Commission was probably under a million dollars, if that, and it hadn't been used to fund any kind of engineering or construction. It had been used to fund a few studies, and it may have been used to fund some of those Metro studies. Another project that was hot then in L.A. was the Downtown People Mover, and it may have been used to fund a couple of things in San Francisco, again studies, abstract type of things, and that was it. It hadn't gone into one bit of concrete, rail, or anything like that.

And, as I say, this lawyer was telling the commission what they wanted to hear, which was that they had to go through this
GIANTURCO process which made it politically impossible for them ever to use this flat gas tax money. So, not far into my tenure, I reassigned that lawyer, which was completely within my prerogative. He worked for me, or he worked for Caltrans, not the commission, but the guy had been, in effect, attached to the commission for God knows how long, probably a minimum of five years, maybe twenty years, for all I know. And, again, there was an incredible amount of howling and screaming that went on when he I said, "This is rotation, and we're going to get somebody else in here to advise you. You're going to get just much time from this new lawyer as you got from your old lawyer. And this new lawyer is extremely competent, got all the credentials, and so on."

I don't remember who it was that I assigned, but somebody who didn't have this kind of an idea at all. And he immediately advised them there's nothing in the constitution that says you have to identify a highway project and drop it. And so, they no longer had that excuse. And they started, reluctantly, funding projects out of
GIANTURCO

Proposition 5 funds There was funding By the time I left, it had become quite substantial because by that time, we not only had gotten rid of the Highway Commission, we had a Transportation Commission, although they were principally oriented towards highways also as it turned out They still knew that their job was to be interested in transit as well, and so they didn't have this real, I mean just feet-set-in-concrete, attitude against spending Proposition 5 money on fixed guideways So, both sources were spent

And in the second case, it's true, the money could have gone for highways The voters of the state of California decided that they wanted to have some flexibility in the use of money, and if a transit project made more sense than a highway project, or a transit project was of greater merit than highway projects, they wanted the state to have the flexibility to do it The people spoke, and it finally happened

The next thing that I'd like to just mention in recounting the history is that, this sales tax on gasoline, interestingly
GIANTURCO

enough

This is an interesting

sidelight on the things. At the time that I

became director, California's economy, I

guess, was booming. I'm trying to remember,

this was 1976. It seems to me that sales,

retail sales, including gasoline, were going

up every year. Since this was a percentage

tax, it started generating huge amounts of

money. The legislation that set up this

sales tax on gasoline deal, there was a sort

of a loophole in it, whereby at a certain

point the state could start funneling money

out of this pot that was being created for

transit, and putting it in the General Fund.

The Department of Finance was doing that and

the issue came up early in the Brown

administration, should this continue? I

fought to put all the money in transit, but I

lost that battle, and so substantial amounts

of this money went into the General Fund.

This was before the passage of Proposition

13. It's kind of ironic. All it did was

help build up what was then called an obscene

surplus in the General Fund and took money.

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1Proposition 13 (June 1978)
Regardless, though, we did still get substantial sums of money out of that sales tax on gasoline.

Then, a couple of years into the administration another event happened which must have been the second era of the oil embargo. I think the first one was '73, '74, and the second one was '78, as I remember. When that happened we had people standing in lines for gasoline—the same old thing. Freeways practically emptied out. It was just incredible what was going on. At some cabinet meeting which I think I attended, although I wasn't normally present at cabinet meetings because the director of Caltrans is not a member of the cabinet. It's under the Business and Transportation Agency. Anyway, I think [Governor's Chief of Staff] Gray Davis might have been running the meeting. He played a major role in this as did the governor, himself. They said we've got to come up with some concerted response to this problem of oil embargoes and the energy problem in general and develop some new state programs, new state approaches, that will get California past this current crisis plus lead
us more towards the path of energy independence which was, of course, the goal of the United States, but it has not been achieved.

It happens also that Jerry Brown, personally, was very, very, interested in the question of energy, particularly alternative energy. This was a continuing interest of this man. He had no trouble concentrating or focusing on this for extended periods of time. It was something he, personally, as I say, took a great interest in, intellectually, and being in a position where he could do something about it.

Well, at this meeting, my first thought was they're not saying a thing about transportation. My reaction was, "Well for God's sake, something like 60 percent of the petroleum we're using--it was more than 50 percent in California--is going into transportation. And it's all well and good to be talking about alternative fuels and photovoltaic cells and all these things for housing or factories, but the main problem is associated with the automobile, and there is
GIANTURCO

no alternative source of energy for that now " I mean no practical source

As I say, we had this project going in Riverside County, I don't know if that had started at that point for the hydrogen bus, and there were some research efforts going here and there, not only in California, but nationwide, for electric vehicles and one thing and another. But, as a practical matter, the transportation sector was almost entirely dependent on petroleum as a source of energy, and there were not the vehicles, nor the filling stations or anything around to convert to any other source. So, I thought "We've got a golden opportunity here to do something in transportation" which, apparently, had not really been the thrust of the thinking in the governor's office when they raised this as an issue that all the cabinet people and the department heads who had something to do with this should start thinking about. As I recall, they set up a second meeting to discuss what our reaction should be as a follow-up to this first one. I do recall that Gray Davis was running the second meeting, and a funny thing happened.
which I will recount after I get through what I'll say which is not so funny, more serious

In any event, I had put the staff of the Division of Transportation Planning to work on this problem right after that first meeting, and it wasn't a new issue Caltrans had been concerned with energy before As a matter of fact, in the first transportation plan, the one that got shot down as a wind tunnel of rhetoric, it had been a major theme They never knew how to grapple with it, but they kept talking about it--energy is a big problem So, the assignment that I gave to the Division of Transportation Planning was to think through what can we do to alleviate the energy problem, particularly the use of petroleum in transportation, that can be translated into real action, legislation, funding programs, projects, whatever And they came back with a document which, as I recall, was not that great, but had a few things in it I spent a lot of time on this myself This is another instance where I ended up doing a lot of staff work
But anyway, as a result of that effort which lasted maybe a couple of weeks, we put together a proposal, or I put together a proposal, that I proposed at this follow-up meeting of what was the state response going to be to this massive problem of the second Arab oil embargo. I had a specific set of projects, programs, and pieces of legislation that I suggested the governor's office try to find sponsors for and push through, and that became embodied in a piece of legislation, S B 325. What it did was to substantially expand the role of the state in transit and alternative means of transportation, set up some new funding for it. I don't know where that funding came from. Maybe it jiggled some of these existing formulas around or something. It listed projects. It went into a lot of detail. As a matter of fact, it was the principal outcome of this effort by the governor's office to come up with a response to that second Arab oil embargo. I mean something of lasting effect in California.

1'S B 625, 1971 Reg Sess Cal Stat, ch 1400
The funny thing that I was going to say was at that time, the Secretary of Resources was Huey [P ] Johnson, and Huey Johnson was kind of an innovative kind of person, unconventional, interested in, you know, a futurist. He came up with a lot of what sounded at the time, wild ideas, in response to this assignment of deciding how the state could respond to the energy problem. And in this meeting, I remember Huey Johnson hadn't been saying anything, and maybe I'd been talking about these proposals for the transportation sector, and making the case that this was 60 percent, or whatever it was I had the exact numbers of the problem right there, and anything else we did, it would be like saying, "I'm going to go on a diet by cutting out one ice cream cone a day" when you're eating a diet that's got four thousand calories in it. You know, we could deal with photovoltaic cells on roofs of houses instead of, you know, water heaters that are run by electricity, but that's not where the heart of the problem is. And so, if you want to get to the heart of the problem, you deal
with the heart of the problem, which was transportation.

Anyway, Huey Johnson, as I recall, hadn't been actively participating in this meeting until a certain point where he spoke up and came out with this proposal which, as I recall, had something to do with salmon. I mean the fish, s-a-l-m-o-n, which in the ordinary course of human communication you'd think is the furthest thing possible removed. You'd say what does salmon have to do with the energy problem? And this was precisely the reaction of Gray Davis who capsulized Huey's proposal as, "Put a salmon in your gas tank." As I say, I don't remember what the proposal was. I think when Gray Davis said that, those were the last words Huey Johnson uttered in that meeting, and whatever this proposal was, the salmon was saved for a later date, another occasion, another subject area.

Anyway, S.B. 625 went into effect, and that in combination with the legislation that was already on the books, really allowed Caltrans to take off in the transit area. And I recall Walter Ingalls who basically
GIANTURCO didn't like the idea of anything riding on a rail. If it was riding on a rail, it was no good. His theme was we've got to promote rubber-tired means of transportation. So, that means in transit buses. Well, the problem with buses is they get caught up in traffic jams just like cars. Maybe if you've got buses on a separated roadway, such as the diamond lanes on the Santa Monica Freeway, or the busway on the San Bernardino Freeway, fine. But if you're just going to put more buses on crowded streets, it'll help some people, but it's not going to solve the traffic problem. But Ingalls was really into this rubber-tired modes of transportation.

I remember at one point, he called me. It was a command performance as it always was, at Ingalls'. Show up at his office. He wanted to discuss something I used to meet with this guy, I'd say, at least once a week. He made my life miserable. But, anyway, he said, "Adriana, we're going to give you", or "I'm going to give you" is probably the way he put it, "a year to make this S B 625 work." He wasn't particularly
GIANTURCO

in favor of it, but, as I recall, he probably got his name on the bill. He was the chairman of the Transportation Committee, so he had to be involved in it, and "If it doesn't work, you are finished." And, of course, that was what he was hoping for, that it's not going to work.

At some place along the line I reorganized the Division of Transportation Planning, got a new director in there. Oh, I guess that was subsequent to S B 625. I said, "We are going to make this S B 625 and its implementation a major priority of the department, and we're going to put one person in charge of making sure that every element of this bill is carried out." The person I selected was Lee Deter, who—I don't remember what experience he had in transit, not a whole lot—but the guy was a real go-getter. There were a lot of administrative problems in the Transit Division, and it could have been that I had had him in there working out some of those problems. So he had some exposure to this, and it was obvious to me that this was a can-do kind of person. That is, if you assign him and give him marching
orders, he's going to do it. And so, I put him in charge of the implementation of S B 625, and we went like gangbusters to implement that thing.

First of all, we decided, just from a bureaucratic standpoint that we were going to involve anybody who was likely to be a critic. They were going to be on the inside. As [President] Lyndon Johnson said, "It's better to have them inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in." [Laughter] We were going to get them in the tent. So, we got the staff people who'd been critical of S B 625 as it was going through the legislature. We got bus people who were very suspicious of this. We got all kinds of people involved in an advisory committee for S B 625 and had them hash through virtually everything we did in implementing this legislation. They met frequently. They had a real say in what went on, and it worked pretty much the way Lyndon Johnson said those things all work. I mean, they ended up on our side, not against us. And, as I say, by the time the first year of that legislation had been in place, pretty much what the
legislation said should be done was in place Shortly after that, as I recall, I did this reorganization of the Division of Mass Transit, and Lee Deter became the head of that division. Now all I've been talking about is organization and have not gotten to any specific things that we actually did do in transit, which is what I'd kind of like to deal with now.

Certainly, go ahead.

Well, the major things that we did were to establish the intercity rail program which I've referred to before. Caltrans was not involved at all, didn't have a dime of money in this, did not sponsor any intercity trains, although there was under federal law, the possibility for the state, any state, to become the sponsor of a rail line, a partner with Amtrak. I believe you paid 50 percent of the cost, and Amtrak would pay 50 percent. I don't know how it works now. This didn't mean that they would necessarily run the train. They made an independent decision. Even if you were willing to pay 50 percent, they would decide whether it was a route that they wanted, they thought the ridership
GIANTURCO justified it, or whatever the elements were I am sure there were a number of criteria that they applied We had not done that at all We had not taken advantage of that program, period

And, as I recall, at the time that I became director, discussions had been going on already for something like two years about Orange County, San Diego County, and L A County, either the three of them or some combination of those counties, becoming the partner with Amtrak and sponsoring additional trains or an additional train, between L A and San Diego And these three counties, or some subset of them, had just never been able to get their act together, and these discussions had gone on and on, hadn't led anyplace Nothing was happening

I remember there was a guy in the Transit Division, who still works for Caltrans, Rich Tolmach, who is extremely knowledgeable in the area of rail transit This guy knows rail transit the way few people know it And I think it was Rich who brought to my attention something that I wasn't aware of, which was there was no
GIANTURCO reason that the state couldn't step in that, in fact, in most states where this program had been carried out, this partnership program, it was the state. It wasn't Amtrak dealing with local governments, it was the state. We had the full legislative authority to do it under A B 69, just sort of a general authority. We had the source of funds, we had funds from, at that time, it probably would have been the sales tax because S B 625 hadn't passed. So I said, "Let's do it."

I called up [State] Senator [James R] Mills, he was the one, the person in the legislature. He was then the speaker pro tem of the senate, and he was also the person with the greatest interest in rail transit over there. He had been highly involved in Proposition 5 plus the passage of the sales tax on gasoline measure. He was also the one who at my confirmation hearing, was the one person who objected to my being named to the job because he thought I wasn't interested enough in transit. Because I had made such an effort to allay the fears of the highway
GIANTURCO types, he had gotten the impression I had no interest in transit.

Well, anyway, I remember, after I found out that we could do this, I think I made a call to Amtrak—I guess I had somebody smooth the way—called some high official, maybe it was the president of Amtrak—I don't remember—and said, "If we agree to do this, do you have a problem with this route?" And they said, "No, Fine. We can start it in a month," or something like that. I mean it would really work fast. All of this took place within the span of like a morning, it was truly amazing. I found out this could be done. You could make this call.

My next call was to Senator Mills, and I said, "How would you feel about the state sponsoring a new train on the L.A.-San Diego run?" Well, I remember, the man was speechless. He said nothing for something like two minutes on the phone. He just could not believe. I mean this was the first good news he'd probably ever heard out of Caltrans. He was one of the people who was very frightened of Caltrans being given the transit responsibility because he was afraid.
it would be buried under this highway business. There was some validity to that point of view. He was absolutely delighted. And within a span of just no time at all, we had got this thing organized and got a new train running on that route, and that was the beginning of the intercity rail program in California. There were three trains a day when I started, and, by the time I left, I think that was up to six. I don't know how many there are now. Nine or ten, something like that.

Another major route that we became involved in was the "San Joaquin" train.

[End Tape 11, Side A]

[Begin Tape 11 Side B]

PETERSHAGEN So, Adriana, you were talking about your success with the San Diego to L A line with Amtrak, and I guess the last things we addressed were the San Joaquin trains, so if you'd care to pick it up from there and go forward.

GIANTURCO OK. Maybe I could go back just for a moment to a question you asked me earlier on, which was did being involved with transit psychologically give me a positive boost.
since I went through so many negative things
on the highway side And I was just thinking
of that in terms of this train program, that
it was so obvious that it was just a success
waiting to happen I used to tell the staff
at Caltrans, "Trains are a winner Everybody
loves trains And, you know, we just can't
go wrong with this Now, we're not going to,
obviously, run trains where there are no
people to take the trains, but if we get a
train service, a decent train service, in an
area where there are potential passengers,
people are going to take those trains
There's something about trains " I said,
"People love trains " And they do love
trains I've been proved right So this was
a really positive thing, this Amtrak program
that we co-sponsored with Amtrak

The second project that we got involved
with had to do with the San Joaquin trains
which run down the Central Valley, but don't
go to Sacramento, which is one of the
problems They go to Stockton I guess they
end up in Is it Fresno? Or
Bakersfield? I don't know Anyway,
someplace down in the valley They by-pass
They go to Stockton, and then they go on to the Bay Area--Martinez, Richmond, whatever I don't think they end up in Oakland Maybe they do now I'm not sure

Anyway, as I remember, there was one train a day on that route, and it had very low ridership It was on Amtrak's list to cut At this time, Amtrak was having real funding problems Every president that came along, and I think there were three presidents in office over the span of the time I was in Caltrans I was there in the beginning of 1976 I guess it was still Nixon, and then we went to Ford, and then we went to Carter And, each time the administration changed, we thought, the transit types and I, "Boy! Great! This new administration is going to like trains " And each one of those administrations tried to cut Amtrak, one right after the other I couldn't believe it

So, anyway, Amtrak was fighting for its life over these years, and they were trying to save money and cut back their services where the revenues were low They had set
some formula—I don't remember what it was—the fares should cover 35 percent or 50 percent or 75 percent, or something, of operating costs. And the "San Joaquins" weren't meeting that percentage by anything close. And, so, it was on their list to cut. And it had been threatened repeatedly. I mean they kept threatening to cut it, and then they finally decided they were cutting it. The final decision of Amtrak that they were going to cut that one train a day and just eliminate that service, period, happened when I was out of Sacramento visiting a district, which I used to do for like a two-day stretch at a time, or I had a conference, a TRB [Transportation Research Board] in Washington, or something. Anyway, I wasn't around when this happened, when Amtrak made that final decision, although I was in constant contact with the office.

I wasn't away very long, but when I came back, I remember, one of my staff people, a principal staff person. He was either an executive assistant or I had put him in the position of the deputy director for Planning and Programming, and I think it was
GIANTURCO probably at the time he was in the second position. This was Jeff Rupp, one of the most talented people that I worked with inside or outside government. This guy is smart and gets things done. Really, really competent. Anyway, I remember Jeff coming into my office, and he said, "Adriana, I've got an idea. We've worked something out with these 'San Joaquins' that we think is just going to blow them out of the water. Not only are we going to suggest that the state of California pick up the funding for the 'San Joaquin' under the partnership program,"—that had previously been funded 100 percent by Amtrak, and that's why they could just cut it out—"But we're going to say the terms on which we'll do this is if you allow us to put a second train on. Not only will we have one train, but we're going to have two trains, and the state of California will pay for half of each one of those trains. And, we're going to put together such a powerful package, they'll never be able to turn us down." And he had already done some groundwork on this in the few days that I had been out of the office.
And we did that. We made this presentation, and we persuaded Amtrak to let us do this. As I recall, they were reluctant.

It seems to me that we got the railroad union people on our side on this issue because part of the problem with that train was that there were various technical problems associated with the operation of that train. Because of the union work rules, they had to change the crews half-way through, even though they had been on the train for something like two hours by this time. And there was a real feather-bedding kind of situation and various things going on that didn't have to go on that were just kind of imbedded in the way that the passenger rail service has grown up over the years, which Amtrak just took over. Amtrak didn't start from scratch. It took over existing services. We got the union people on our side, and they made various concessions that they would agree to changes. As I recall, changes in some of these work rules so that the service would be less expensive and more efficient because it was a
GIANTURCO

question, it was for sure, they were going to lose those jobs, period. They were going to be gone. It wasn't a question of making, you know, a crew change in wherever the heck they were doing it, Stockton or Martinez, or something. There wasn't going to be any crew change. There wasn't going to be any crew to change. So, with that kind of incentive the union made various concessions to improve, to cut down the cost of operating these trains. And we made this offer to pick up 50 percent of the cost as long as it was two trains, and Amtrak went for it.

And also, another thing which I remember, Rich Tolmach was very influential in this. He made the point that it is essential that we have feeder bus service associated with this train because of the fact that it's stopping in some locations which are not the locations people want to go to. Like, for example, it doesn't go to Sacramento. Well, with feeder bus service, the whole idea is you have a dedicated bus that's there waiting for the train. It's not that you get off the train and have to wait around and then sooner or later a bus shows
up The idea is they are both part of the same service You just get off one, get on the other No hassle So, we instituted that in connection with the trains which had not existed before, and the ridership started going up, as I recall, immediately And we also started an intensive marketing program for that train which had never existed before And the ridership went up and up and up, and now it's one of the most successful services in the whole Amtrak system

PETERSHAGEN Just as an aside--and you can take issue with this if you wish--but as somewhat of a dedicated railroad passenger, the dedicated buses are fine as far as knowing that you're going to have transportation to continue, but that's still one of the weak links in the system as far as I'm concerned

GIANTURCO I couldn't agree with you more

PETERSHAGEN Those of us that are rail buffs resent getting off the train and getting on the bus

GIANTURCO I couldn't agree with you more Now, in many cases where that's the case, it's because of some problem with the railroad As I recall on that San Joaquin train, it was a question of Santa Fe [Santa Fe Railroad] tracks versus
Southern Pacific [Southern Pacific Transportation Co /Southern Pacific Railroad] tracks. The agreement was with Santa Fe, and if it had been with Southern Pacific, it could go to Sacramento. But it couldn't because it was Santa Fe.

And SP [Southern Pacific RR] was one of the most difficult, well without question the most difficult railroad to work with. A feeder bus is better than nothing, George, although I couldn't agree with you more. That's why I think that the idea of making people transfer on the way to the airport [San Francisco International Airport] from BART a mile away, or something, is crazy. And when people give the example of National Airport in Washington, D.C., as a place where that's worked, that's crazy. I mean I grew up in Washington, D.C., and I've been there many, many times. And the fact that that train, the Metro train there, doesn't go into the airport is a major deterrent to people using it to get to the airport.

I think it stops about a mile or a mile-and-a-half short of it, as I remember, just enough that you
GIANTURCO: Yes, you have to lug your luggage and all that stuff.

PETERSHAGEN: My own idea is that when it's snowing in Washington, the last thing I want to do is walk from the train to the airport.

GIANTURCO: Exactly. Well, anyway, my point is, feeder buses are better than nothing. And what had been the case before, there was nothing. You got off the train in Stockton. If you wanted to get to Sacramento, it was up to you to get down to Greyhound [Greyhound Bus Lines] or whatever. I don't know what you did. It was just up to you. We changed that situation so, it certainly was an improvement even if it wasn't the ideal. Well, anyway, I don't know what more to say on that.

The intercity rail program we also had planned. This is a case that I haven't given a whole lot of thought to, but it has kind of nagged at me over the years. There was a third intercity train that I wanted to set up, which never came to pass and which I kept asking about and kept getting these so-called progress reports that never told me anything, and it just never happened. This is an experience that many directors in very
different organizations have had, I believe. This I wanted to run. And Senator Mills was very anxious to do this. He and I talked about this endlessly. We wanted to run a train basically from the Bay Area to Sacramento, a simple-minded idea. It had been kicking around for years. There had been a corridor study of the Sacramento to Bay Area corridor shortly before I became director, or maybe it even concluded while I was director within the first few months, I don't know. Anyway, it was one of the recommendations. It wouldn't seem to be a big deal to do it.

And I was under the impression, for like the first six and a half years of my time at Caltrans, that we were working to get this thing set up. I mean I thought that this was underway. And I kept reporting back to Senator Mills on various problems that we were. I mean this still blows my mind. It was like in maybe February of the final year I was the director, still we don't have any train going, and I asked what's going on with this train, and I was told, "Oh, we've never been working on a train from the Bay
Area to Sacramento  The train we've been working on is the second overnight train—which I'll describe now, which went all the way from Los Angeles to Seattle and passed through the Bay Area and Sacramento on the way. It was never my intention that that substitute for this Bay Area to

I never will figure that out, but when I think about that, in retrospect, it kind of boils down to the fact that any individual, such as myself, I was an outsider. I entered this organization. I'm trying to change an entire organization which is like an oceanliner that's been going in one direction for years, and to switch it around and get it interested as an organization, as a bureaucracy, in different things is not an easy task. One person, even if you have competent staff working for you, a few individuals, there are going to be things that slip between the cracks. It takes time to set these things up, and the work had not been done. I remember, it just absolutely blew my mind! I could not believe it!

The third project that we did work on was this one I just referred to, which is the
second train to go along the coastal route
That train from L A to Seattle, the "Coast Starlight," is the, as I remember, I think, the single most popular train in the United States. If it's not the single most, it is right up there in the top two or three

Of the overnights
Of the long distance trains
Not the commuter trains

Well, since you mention commuter trains, when I was at Caltrans the federal law specifically precluded Amtrak from being involved in commuter rail service. Of course, Amtrak didn't like being precluded from this, and we sure didn't like it with those "San Diegans" because we saw that as a possibility of business trips in between. I don't remember how we got around that law but we said that even though they were leaving San Diego--one of these trains we added on left San Diego--I'm making up these times, but, say it left San Diego at quarter of seven and got to L A at eight-fifteen, precisely when you'd want to commute. We said, "This isn't a commuter train. It's
GIANTURCO just an "early morning business express" or something like that

Anyway, among the long distance trains, that "Coast Starlight" is one of the most popular trains in the United States. It's almost impossible to get a reservation on it, certainly for sleeping accommodations in the summer. They're booked up months in advance. So, our idea was to add a second overnight train, but have it run the opposite hours. I mean what you saw during the daylight on one route, you'd see, or you wouldn't see, at night. I mean you would see the opposite. They would be crossing paths midway. And putting that in place was a major, major, major effort because it involved SP. And SP as I say, is the most difficult railroad to deal with, was at that time, anyway. But we finally got that in place and started running it, and it didn't run for very long.

I can't remember what we ended up calling that train, but, anyway, we decided as part of the promotion effort for the train, we would have a contest to name it. I don't remember if there were coupons that you could clip out of newspapers and send it in.
with your recommended name or how it worked
But anyway, we did this in all the
communities that it passed through, the
principal ones being L A , San Francisco,
Sacramento, I don't remember Well, anyway,
San Jose was probably in on it We got
thousands and thousands of suggestions of
names We put together a committee that was
going to select the name out of these
thousands of suggestions And one of the
members of this committee was [Sports
Commentator] John Madden, that guy who
comments on football

    Well, at the time, I hadn't known this,
but I found this out shortly after I came to
Caltrans John Madden has a fear of flying
Right

And at that time, he used Amtrak all the time
for his traveling around the country He
wasn't coaching He was doing commentary, I
guess, already at that point And so, he was
kind of a favorite of Amtrak He was well-
known to the Amtrak crews, and, you know,
people, passengers, would come up and say
hello to John Madden and so on He was kind
of like a mascot of Amtrak almost Since
GIANTURCO

then, he's bought a bus, and he's outfitted the bus to be a luxury deal. He doesn't use Amtrak anymore. But at that time, he was using Amtrak all the time. So, one of the people we put on this committee to select the name of the train was John Madden.

Anyway, we'd gotten all these thousands of suggestions of names. One of the names that came in was "The Grizzly," and that was the name that John Madden liked. [Laughter] Finally, the committee came to me with recommendations, a final list of maybe three or four names, and "The Grizzly" was on there. I said, "We just cannot call this train "The Grizzly." It just sounds so unfriendly. People love trains, and grizzlies just don't have a good image." So, we didn't call it "The Grizzly," but I don't remember what we did call it.

It did not do well. It did not get a lot of passengers. As I remember, SP did as little as it could to help us in this effort. They hadn't wanted it in the first place. It was one of the first things that Deukmejian cut when he was elected to office, along with
this commuter train that we had running in the San Fernando Valley.

Just for the record, let me go back a few minutes and say that I've used the Capitols a few times, the trains from Sacramento down to the Bay Area. I really enjoy that. From the perspective of one who, on the train twenty or thirty years ago, especially in the East, saw nothing but ripped up seats and floors that needed repair, broken windows and all that. Now things like the San Joaquins and the Capitols. The cars always seem new no matter how old they are.

There's always nostalgia for steam trains, too. But, the fact is steam trains are just dirty as hell. I remember those, too. I grew up when trains were still operated by the private railroads. They were steam, and the air conditioning never worked. They'd open the windows in the summer, and the soot would blow in. It was just horrible. As a matter of fact, there's all this nostalgia for trains, and there's all these rail buffs around. People are crazy about steam trains.

Let me get off intercity rail and talk about the second major transit effort we were
involved in That was the promotion of intracity rail. The reason this rail stuff assumed the importance it did was number one, on the intercity rail program, it was obviously of state interest. The fact that we became the sponsor of the L A -San Diego was because you had more than one local jurisdiction involved. It's difficult for them to work together. You've got three bureaucracies instead of one. We just cut through all that, and we got that train. As soon as I had that conversation with Amtrak, it was like a month later the train was running. No big deal. So, anyway, intercity rail was an obvious thing.

It was Caltrans, basically, that funded the San Diego project, the trolley system there. It was principally Caltrans engineers that worked on the engineering under the supervision of a Caltrans engineer who was on loan to the metropolitan transit authority there. That was a Caltrans project. We got zero credit for it. I remember Pete Wilson [Mayor of San Diego] was against this project. I mean he was dead set against it. And there were two people on the transit
authority, MTTD [Metropolitan Transit Development Board], I guess Is that what it's called? [San Diego Council member] Judith Bauer was the name of one of them and [San Diego Council member] Maureen O'Connor, who later became mayor of San Diego. They were very, very interested, the two of them, in getting this project going. They were the most active ones in promoting it, but they were working against the opposition of Wilson throughout this thing. I mean he gave no help and actively was impeding this project.

And he was the mayor?

And he was the mayor of San Diego. This project got built despite Wilson, not because of Wilson. When he was running for governor of California the first time he had this commercial on about how he had built the light rail system. I couldn't believe it. I was going to write a letter to the Bee. That election may have been the first election where newspapers started writing these critiques of political ads, analyzing them Is the politician telling the truth in the ad? I wanted to write them. Finally, I thought "The hell with it! This guy is just
GIANTURCO lying through his teeth  He had nothing to
do with this project  He tried to stop it
And here he's taking full credit  His theme
was that he had built this project, I mean,
as though he'd been actively involved in
promoting it, and making it happen

And the other thing was that no federal
funds were used  The fact he failed to
mention was that it was 100 percent state
funded  It was the state that funded it  It
was state engineers that designed it  It was
state people that, you know, figured out the
operational patterns  It was the state of
California  It had nothing to do with the
city of San Diego or Pete Wilson, absolutely
nothing  It had to do with this local
authority, for sure, but these were
volunteers  This was not a full-time job
Judith Bauer and Maureen O'Connor were
extremely helpful in pushing this thing
through, but it was a state project

That was not the only one we did  The
Sacramento light rail system which Caltrans
has also gotten zero credit for, that project
never would have happened but for Caltrans
That was a Caltrans project even more clear
GIANTURCO - cut than the San Diego project. In that case the genesis of that was a study. Now, it may have been talked about for years by the Modern Transit Society, I don't know, but nothing had ever happened to make it a reality until the Brown administration. The way it happened from my side, or how we became involved, was that I'd been at Caltrans maybe two or three years when a study was done by some group. I've forgotten who it was. Maybe the city of Sacramento, or the RTD [(Sacramento) Regional Transit District], the transit district, about running a historic trolley on J Street. This same individual, Rich Tolmach, brought this study to my attention, and I read the study. I read the whole thing. My first reaction, my own reaction, to it is, "Why are we talking about some kind of toy train, historic trolley? Why don't we talk about a real trolley?" So, I sent this study, as I remember, back to the Division of Mass Transit and said, "I'd like you to start thinking about what we can do to make this a real project, not just a historic trolley." But, you know, we've got Proposition 5. We
GIANTURCO built the San Diego System. What can we do here?"

Also, this coincided with another effort that I was heavily involved in. Going back again to this famous confirmation hearing—I mean famous from my perspective, nothing in anybody else's estimation, I'm sure—where Senator Mills had questioned whether or not I'd be a proponent of transit. He mentioned in the hearing itself, the confirmation hearing, that this provision existed in federal law, the Interstate Transfer Program, where you could use federal highway money to build transit systems, and that California had never taken advantage of this. And I was aware of that program.

And so, I was determined from that day forth that we were going to take advantage of that Interstate Transfer Program. Very early on in my tenure, I identified the project that I wanted to use. There were two projects that I was interested in using. One was dropping the Century Freeway and transferring those funds, which in my estimation was a big mistake. That wasn't done. It was a natural. It could have cut
ten years off the development of mass transit in Los Angeles had that been done. The other project that I thought was a natural candidate for the Interstate Transfer Program was the planned bypass of Interstate 80 in Sacramento.

[End Tape 11 Side B]
Adriana as we finished our last session we were talking about the Sacramento light rail vis-a-vis the 80 Bypass of Sacramento, and how those two related to each other. So, can you continue that story for us, please?

Somebody had presented me—I believe it was Rich Tolmach—who saw to it that I read a report that had been done by some group on instituting an historic trolley along J Street. I don't recall who did this report, but it was sponsored by some official or semi-official body like the city council or SACOG [Sacramento Area Council of Governments]. My reaction to that was, why fool around with historic trolleys? Why not do a real trolley? I sent it back to the Transit Division and said, "I want you to start thinking about a real trolley here."

At the same time, there was another thread that joined perfectly this thread of transforming the historic trolley into a real
trolley which was that from my really first days on the job, I had been interested in taking advantage of this federal program which has gone through many modifications since then but, at the time, was known as Interstate Transfer. Early on in my tenure at Caltrans, I identified two projects that I thought were appropriate for Interstate Transfer. One was the Century Freeway in Los Angeles, and the second one was this planned bypass of Interstate 80. I guess they're named now 80 and Business 80.

Initially, 80 had been built. That wasn't adequate to handle the traffic, so a bypass of 80, called at that time 880, was built. That still, in the opinion of the engineers of the time, was not adequate to handle traffic, and they wanted to build yet another bypass which would have been 8880, I guess. [Laughter] But even the engineers, even the most pro-highway engineers in the department or types in the construction industry, the highway lobby, recognized that this third bypass was really going a little too far because at that time, actually, it seems to me, that 880, now called [Business]
GIANTURCO 80, had very little traffic on it. It just had not come up to the expectations, the projections, that had been done for that. So it seemed kind of silly to be talking about yet another bypass, and there was no push on to build that other bypass. It was one of the few, as a matter of fact, highway projects on the board in California where there was no lobby behind it, pushing it. People didn't show up at Highway Commission meetings, and say, "This is a death-trap or a 'blood alley'" or "Terrible, it's affecting the economy. We've got to have this road." Nobody ever mentioned this road. You'd never know it existed if you hadn't really explored the maps of what the laid-out system included, and it was on there. The state had applied for Interstate designation for this hypothetical road to be built in the future, meaning it was eligible for Interstate funds.

Well, as I say, I identified it right off the bat immediately as a candidate for Interstate Transfer. When this issue came up about there being interest in an historic trolley in Sacramento, this converged very nicely with my interest in doing an
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Interstate Transfer project because here was the source of funding for it. It's the state that does Interstate Transfer. It's not local government. The rules and regulations have changed many times, but, at the time, the state had to decide that it did not want to do a project. That was the state's decision. The law was kind of vague on this point. As a matter of fact, it became a major issue when I attempted to do the same thing, or proposed that the same thing be done, with the Century Freeway, and I couldn't get local agreement to do it.

The law at that time said that the state would make the proposal because the Interstate Highway projects are state projects. The Interstate funds, all federal highway funds with rare exceptions, flow through the state. The state would apply to FHWA or the U.S. DOT [U.S. Department of Transportation], I forgot which, to eliminate the segment from the system and to set aside the funds for application to a transit project. But, there was another step that had to be taken, which was that the state had to get the concurrence of the local regional
GIANTURCO planning agency, or MPO, metropolitan planning agency, which would have been, at that time, I guess it was called SACOG. It may have said something vaguer than that. It may have said something like any local planning agency or local jurisdiction because, as I say, this became an issue for us. We researched it thoroughly when it came to a question of the Century Freeway because it was not very clear from the wording in the law what this concurrence process was—who actually had to be involved, what concurrence meant, whether it was a formal vote, or whether it was just kind of silent assent or lack of opposition or what was it. In any event, the initiative for this process had to come from the state because it was state money.

One of my beliefs, as the director of Caltrans, was that the staff had become calcified, its top staff people had been in various positions too long, in particular, the district directors. I think Jake Dekema, who was in San Diego, had been there the longest, had been in that job for something like thirty years. There were people, it was
not atypical, who had been there for ten or fifteen years. And, I won't go into this again, but I don't think this is a healthy situation for an organization. I think you just run out of ideas. You burn out in a position. You need somebody coming in fresh from time to time. It's not good for the person in the job. It's not good for the area. So, I decided to do rotation of district directors. It set up a terrible whining and moaning and groaning, but it did take place. I rotated every single district director with the exception of one. The one was Leo Trombatore, who at that time was the director in District Three.

I'll just tell you a little sidebar here on the personal level. Leo Trombatore, of course, succeeded me at Caltrans. He was not my immediate successor. My immediate successor was an acting director, John Kozak. Then they appointed Trombatore, who was the first registered civil engineer ever to be appointed to the job as far as I know. As I think I may have said before, Jim Moe, who preceded me, had a degree in engineering, but he was not a licensed civil engineer when he
went to Caltrans, and had not practiced engineering because he wasn't licensed. While he was director, toward the end of his term as director, he took the licensing exam, but shortly thereafter he left. So, as I say, Trombatore was really the first person who moved into the job saying, "I'm an engineer, I'm a civil engineer, and that's one of my principal qualifications for the job."

It had never happened in however many years Caltrans has been around, which I just learned the other day, is apparently one hundred years, if you trace it back to its earliest origins as a Division of Bicycles or something at the turn of the century. I just heard that because, apparently, they're doing a history, George. They've engaged some historian to write the hundred year history of Caltrans.

**PETERSHAGEN**  
Exactly. And it goes back to the 1895 Bureau of Highways.

**GIANTURCO**  
Of course, the automobile was not in common use at this time. They were just experimental basically. And it was the bicyclists that were pushing for hard
-surfaced roads or roadways to ride on because you couldn't ride a bicycle over a field, or you know, through tracks that a cart drawn by a horse would make. So that was pretty interesting. This is kind of a sidelong on how these things happen. But in any event, in this whole history, as far as I know, there had not been a licensed civil engineer as the head of the department until Trombatore came along. He was, as I say, the one district director that I didn't rotate.

Now, what I did when I rotated these district directors, I decided that I was going to make this a real process. It wasn't just going to be a casual thing where District Director A went to District B, and somebody went to C, and then it was all done. Of course, there weren't transfers just between districts. I took some people, as a matter of fact, it may have been the majority, I don't remember, and put them back in headquarters and sent people from headquarters out to the field. I wanted to get a real shake-up and fresh ideas and blood going in this organization as much as possible using the people that were there.
GIANTURCO had very little flexibility as I mentioned before. In any event, when I transferred a person into a new district director position, whether or not he had been a district director in another district, or whether he was coming from the headquarters position, I went through a formal session with that person. First, before we did that, I had my deputies in each of the four major areas, draw up a set of problems and goals that they wanted to see accomplished in that district which they each were familiar with. I mean I would get from the deputy for Administration and Finance a list that would say we've had a continuing problem with personnel, time records, or you name it, I don't know, anything. From maintenance, it would say, "This district just doesn't seem to be able to get with the program in terms of litter pickup and we've been on them, and they just, you know." There's some problem there. Ditto for all the areas.

Also, each deputy gave me a list of specific things that they would like to see a new district director accomplish. I think I gave a time limit of five years because I
think I told people that I thought about the right time for a person to be in a job was five years. After five years you start really repeating yourself and burning out. So, these were goals, hopefully, to be accomplished in a shorter period than five years, but to be accomplished, certainly, within the next five years.

The next step was when I appointed them. As part of the appointment process, I set up a meeting with each one of these new district directors, which lasted usually about an hour. I had this written out for them, too, as I recall. This was a set of problems, issues, and goals and objectives that the department, the director—namely me and my deputies—wanted to see them accomplish. These were their marching orders. They were getting the job, and this is what they were going to be judged on and held accountable for.

I think this was actually a very valuable process because it really allowed us to keep track of what was going on in these districts and were these district directors carrying out headquarters' policy. It was
GIANTURCO

something concrete and specific It wasn't that you were just sitting out there kind of coming to the office everyday and presiding over the troops You were supposed to be there getting something done You knew what that was, and it was made very clear to you when you got the job

Anyway, as I say, with every single district director, except for Trombatore, it was a new person that I put in the job In the one instance of Trombatore He was already in District Three, and I decided to leave him in District Three and not to rotate him, making one exception to this whole rule for two reasons One was that he, of all the district directors, had gone out of his way from the day that I was named Director of Caltrans, to indicate to me how much he agreed with virtually everything I was doing how wonderful it was that the policies of the department had finally moved away from a 100 percent emphasis on highways, and how it was so wonderful we were doing transit and balanced transportation I don't remember the man saying one negative word He must have called me at least once a week to tell
GIANTURCO

me this. He would have read some article in the newspaper, and that would trigger some thought of his. He would call me up to say, "You know, I'm just so happy"—as I say, these conversations occurred practically on a weekly basis—"we've finally done this." Many times he would say—I don't know whatever this thing was we were promoting, bicycles, or we were trying to get some transit going someplace, or something or other—"This is something I tried to do in District Four, but at that time, there was no interest from headquarters. It's just so wonderful to have you there, Adriana. Now we're finally moving ahead." So, I thought of all the district directors, if there is one who is clearly with the program, it is Leo Trombatore.

I could not have been more flabbergasted when the man assumed the job, and then had nothing good to say about the entire Brown administration. Flabbergasted is an understatement. For seven solid years I had been hearing from Leo Trombatore how much he agreed with all the goals and objectives that I was promoting.
The second thing was for humanitarian reasons, which is that Leo Trombatore's son, when he was in San Francisco, had committed suicide. It was for humanitarian reasons that he had been put in District Three because it was the thought--this was my predecessor, acting director, I believe, Sid McCausland, who did this--that it was painful for Leo to be in San Francisco because of the fact of this suicide. It was the memories, and so on. So, they had transferred him to District Three so he would be in a new environment, and it would be helpful to him mentally. And, I thought I'm not going to be stirring up old memories. He's so happy in District Three, which he loved, I'm not going to be the one who now makes him move again after this terrible personal history.

So, I--again continuing this humanitarian tradition--made this big exception, which he also used against me after I left, bragged all over the place, apparently that he was the one district director that was so good that I hadn't transferred him. I'm telling you this on this tape for the first time what the true
reasons were. But, I tell you, if there was anything that rankled me after I left Caltrans, it was the behavior and the statements of this man for exactly the reasons I've laid out here on this tape, which I'm saying for the historical record.

Anyway, Trombatore, when I had the meeting with him, even though I didn't reassign him--what I did was confirm his assignment as District Three director, because with every other district director, when I went through the rotation process, I had this meeting that I just described--I decided to have exactly the same kind of meeting with Leo. In this meeting with Leo, I had the list of objectives and all this stuff from the different deputy directors. On the program side, the thing that I told him was his two principal program-type assignments. One had to do with finding an environmentally acceptable solution to the transportation problems in Lake Tahoe. And we had already done a lot of work on that. We didn't want to build the loop road that the area wanted to have built. We had devised a plan which would have shut down one road, diverted
traffic It would have put a light rail line down the middle of--I've forgotten what the name of that road is--but the one that goes by all the casinos I'm sure they'll do that, ultimately Ultimately, this is going to happen There were technical problems with it because of the snow removal issue But, gee, they have rail lines all over the east coast where they have just as much snow as they have in Lake Tahoe Where you move the snow shouldn't stop being able to run rail lines

**PETERSHAGEN**

Just to make sure we're all on the same page here, we're talking about a light rail system along Highway 50?

**GIANTURCO**

I was trying to remember which road is which I guess it is Highway 50 What happens is you have a Y When you're coming in on 50 in South Lake Tahoe, you come to a point that they call the Y Part of it continues as 50, and part of it becomes something else, and I guess it's the 50 portion that goes down to the casinos

**PETERSHAGEN**

That's really the main street through the casino area
GIANTURCO

That's the main street. That's the street I'm talking about. We were talking about having a trolley line running along that portion of 50, or that section of the Y, which is very, very congested. Because that's people staying in hotels on the California side driving down to the Nevada side to gamble, and so on. The idea was to just be running these shuttle kind of You talk about your historic trolleys. Maybe this is the place to have, you know, kind of a Disneyland type thing. This is a vacation resort, and it's the kind of area where that could be part of the vacation experience.

Anyway, as I said, we'd done quite a lot of work trying to put together something for Tahoe. This never came to be, and it still hasn't come to be. I think that with more work, it could have come to be. There was a lot of positive interest in this among the casinos and the business community up there. Getting these things done in public life is not simple. It just takes time, getting everybody on board, working out the details, and so on. We just didn't have enough time to get all the way through that, and after I
left Caltrans, there was no interest in any kind of project like this. So, I don't know what happened to it. I guess it just fell by the wayside.

Well, anyway, that was one of Trombatore's program assignments, a principal one, was to work on that, to try to get something done there, and the other assignment was that I wanted to accomplish the transfer of the Interstate 80 Bypass funds in Sacramento from that highway project and put it into a light rail project in Sacramento. And this, at the time, was not an issue in Sacramento. Again, as I say, all there was around was this historic trolley project. I found out sometime along here that the Modern Transit Society had been interested, I guess, in light rail for quite some time. But they're just a group of individuals, and it certainly was not on the public agenda. It was just people meeting from time to time discussing, "Gee, it would be nice to have light rail." I didn't even know about the activities of the Modern Transit Society.
It seemed to me that we had a perfect source of funding here, and we had a city which was compact enough and with congestion problems developing in various corridors. I was always thinking light rail because heavy rail is too expensive. Also, we don't have the density for that there, but the two came together. I mean it was an ideal situation, need and source of funding. And the thing was to put them together. As I say, it was not on the political agenda. Nobody was talking about this. There was no groundswell of anything coming up, so we had to really start from scratch and generate that groundswell. And that was Trombatore's assignment, to get people, get the thing organized so that people start getting interested in it, do the technical work, work with the people at headquarters.

The main person at headquarters who was working on this was Ron Herbold, who was my Deputy for Planning and Programming, one of the most brilliant administrators I have ever run across in my life. There is a long story associated with Ron, but, boy, is that guy sharp. And if he decides he's going to do
some things it will be done, and it will be
done right. Anyway, Herbold worked on this,
and Herbold was the main contact for
Trombatore in putting this together.

I don't remember the details because I
was leaving it up to Ron and Leo to make it
happen. But we got a citizens' committee put
together, or an advisory committee, something
like that, to look at the issue of light
rail. [Sacramento Council Member] Ann Rudin
who was then on the council—she was not the
mayor—was the chairman of that committee.
She worked very hard on this. Of all the
local politicians who have taken credit for
this project, Ann Rudin was the only one who
legitimately does deserve credit. [Laughter]
Nobody else had any interest in it.

There was one member of the council, I
recall, who was actively opposed, was dead
set against it. And we managed to neutralize
him at the last minute, and I forgot how we
did it. Somehow, we promised him some minor
thing, like a stop sign at a corner in his
district or something, and he just agreed to
shut up. Not that he was going to come out
and say this is a great idea, but he wasn't.
Gianturco was going to make a big song and dance against it.

Rudin was in favor of it and did work hard as chairman of that committee, and I've forgotten who else was on the committee. Again, it was one of these things, as I was saying before with the S B 625, we tried to get everybody who would possibly have an interest inside the tent pissing out, not outside the tent pissing in. And we had a representative, I'm sure, from the Chamber of Commerce. We may have also done this under the auspices of SACOG, the regional planning agency. I think we gave SACOG some money to do a study. The idea was working with this committee which would have broad representation, they would come out with a study of the possibility of light rail in Sacramento, not a historic trolley, but real light rail.

And Leo worked very hard. It seems to me that we also hired a consultant, a big-name type consultant. I don't remember who it was, but like Bechtel [Corporation]. Early on the issue developed of would it make more sense to put this light rail line in the...
GIANTURCO 80 corridor or in the 50 corridor, and it developed into a controversy. It was one against the other, and this consulting firm that we had—whoever they were I've forgotten—did a study and concluded that it made more sense, I think they said that the real need was in the 80 corridor.

Well, whatever they said, I disagreed with it. And I remember, I read the whole report. I didn't agree with the traffic analyses that they had done. I asked the staff to redo some of these traffic analyses. I wasn't satisfied with the way that the staff did the traffic analyses, and as I recall, I, personally, ended up doing some of these analyses. I learned how to do this stuff when I was studying for my Ph D, and I know about statistics and how you worked them and all the rest of this stuff, and I came to the conclusion that the assumptions that they had used about population growth and numbers of people living within a quarter of a mile and so on were very skewed. They were not getting a realistic picture of what was likely to happen and where the need for this line was.
GIANTURCO

When I finished, as I recall this, I ended up thinking if we've got to make a choice between these two, it makes more sense to do it in the 50 corridor than in the 80 corridor. But, on the other hand, the bypass, itself, the project we were dropping, was in the 80 corridor. Even though there was no support for the I-80 Bypass, the highway project, it sure would have been simpler. From a political standpoint, if you were taking something away from the people in that corridor, even though it was very sparsely populated then, and giving them something in that same corridor, rather than taking something away from them, and giving something to the people in another corridor, So, it was kind of a dilemma.

At which point, though, someplace along in here, Leo came in. I think he maybe had a meeting with the Modern Transit Society. Anyway, he came in and he said, "You know, we've been thinking about this, and we think the thing to do is a U-shaped project." This was the first mention of it. I mean there had been no mention by anybody. It may have been talked about by the Modern Transit
GIANTURCO Society, but nobody else, I said, "Fantastic! Why not? What's wrong with the U-shape? We'll do both 50 and 80." And that became our position.

And, I remember, I wrote a letter to SACOG. I said this consulting firm that you hired with our money has done a piss-poor job, basically. I phrased it more diplomatically, but these numbers aren't right, and it is my suggestion that we move forward with a U-shaped corridor. This was based on a recommendation from Leo and his staff and Ron Herbold. I gave some preliminary numbers to justify that and said we will give you more money, because we were funding this study, to hire either this same consulting firm to do some more work on this or somebody else to see if this idea makes sense. Because, although on the surface it appears to make sense, the U-shaped corridor, we don't want to move forward with this just from these preliminaries. So, the subsequent study was done, and, when the numbers came out, it was seen that was obviously the thing to do. That was confirmed.

[End Tape 12, Side A]
So, Adriana, we were talking about how we ended up with the U-shaped, or the horseshoe-shaped, light rail system. Would you please continue with that.

I was going to say, interestingly enough, when we finally applied to UMTA [Urban Mass Transit Administration]. The way the Interstate Transfer Program worked was, although you gave up highway funds, you did not get highway funds back, at that time anyway. You got transit funds back from UMTA, but you got dollar-for-dollar what you gave up. You had to go through a separate application process to fund the transit project, and UMTA made you do this thing. I don't know that they have the same procedure anymore, called an alternative analysis. And, boy, do you have to go through a lot of hoops to get that transit money! And UMTA was very skeptical about the ridership numbers that were generated for this Sacramento project. I haven't kept track of this recently, but the ridership by now has exceeded the projections that we came out with. Well, UMTA, at the time, though,
GIANTURCO looking at the proposal for the project, said, "Never in a million years are the people in Sacramento going to ride this line. This is ridiculous." It was a real hassle getting the funding out of them, you know, arm-twisting and going to congresspeople and getting them to put pressure on UMTA and back-and-forth letters and so on to get the funding for the project.

As I say, it turned out that there was a big demand for this project as things worked out in actuality. So, after we had come up with the U-shaped line, and pinned that down in terms of the kind of project, a general notion of station locations, and a pretty conceptualized, not a detailed, project, but enough to make an application to UMTA. Simultaneously, we were going through the preliminary steps with FHWA or U.S. DOT to drop the bypass project.

We were doing all this at the same time we're trying to consolidate our local support for this project. Phil Isenberg was the mayor, and he was actually not interested in it. I like Isenberg, and I think he was a fantastic mayor. On this project--he changed
his mind later on—but at the time Isenberg was one of our problems because Isenberg had said the best use of these funds if we, Caltrans, were going to drop this Interstate Highway project, that we should use the money, not for a light rail line, but for a busway

First of all, I had no interest in a busway. The whole idea was we were going to do light rail. We had decided that was the thing to do. We had gone through all these analyses, and now he’s throwing in this busway deal. But, there was a practical reason why it really made no sense. If we were going to do a busway first of all, it would have to be right in the corridor where that bypass was, which we had already decided there wasn’t any need for a rubber-tired type thing in that corridor.

PETERSHAGEN Roughly, where is the location of that?
GIANTURCO I've forgotten. It's north of existing 80 out in the booneys. Business 80, as it's now called, I guess, is the southernmost of these things. Then if you were looking at a map, south to north you've got Business 80 and then you've got Interstate 80, which used to
be called 880, and then there would have been this third 80 named something or other, on top of that, going north, just swinging off 5. I guess it would have swung off 5 the way Interstate 80 does. You know, you go a little bit north of the city of Sacramento, and then you go across and rejoin 80, Interstate 80, going towards Tahoe, North Tahoe. This would have been yet another loop, swinging off even further north, looping around and rejoining 80.

And his idea was to put a busway out there somewhere. As I say, not only did it not make sense to me from a traffic standpoint, but in addition to that it made zero sense financially because if we were to build a busway, we did not have to go through Interstate Transfer to do that. Interstate Highway funds could be used in their pure form to do that without going through all this process, this paperwork, unbelievable applications, and all this fancy stuff we had to do. You could just use it because it was a highway project. In other words, he was saying, "Build another highway project." Not only that but, financially, it was a loser.
GIANTURCO because if you use the Interstate funds as Interstate funds, the match ratio is federal funds, 92 percent In California—it varies state by state—the federal government will pay 92 percent of the cost of an Interstate project, and the state pays 8 percent For a transit project in those days, projects funded through UMTA—which is what he was proposing we do, do Interstate Transfer, go through UMTA—the match ratio would have been UMTA funds 80 percent, the state funds 20 percent Now, why would we want to pay 20 percent for the same project that we could fund for 8 percent? It didn't make any sense

So, anyway, I remember that Ron Herbold and I and Ann Rudin and Phil Isenberg had a meeting in Isenberg's office As I say, I always got along with Isenberg, and I respect him He's a fabulous guy He ethical He's smart He's a good person I mean everybody in politics is not a sleaze-bag, and he, certainly, is not a sleaze-bag He's the kind of person you want in public service, but he really had this bug in his ear that he wanted this busway Finally, I remember I
GIANTURCO said in this meeting, "Phil, if you want that busway, we're not going to do Interstate Transfer. It's as simple as that. We're not going to do it, period. We're not doing it. We'll just drop the thing, and we'll keep that project, that Interstate Highway project, in the books and you're not going to see anything out there because we're not building a busway with UMTA funds where we're paying 20 percent. It's crazy." I think I may have even said that in a letter to him, followed it up with a letter.

At that point, he backed down. He said, "OK, Adriana, if you really think this thing's going to work, and Ann likes it." He was an ally of Rudin. Ann was making the same arguments, backing me up every step of the way, and Ron Herbold had a lot of technical things to say. He said, "OK, I'll go with this light rail thing." Reluctantly he did. He never made any public statements that in any way shot us down, he never actively opposed. He wasn't like Pete Wilson, as far as that goes. Pete Wilson did things that slowed that project down, the light rail project in San Diego.
GIANTURCO

Isenberg never did anything like that, but he was not on board until quite late in the process. Once he got on board he was fine.

Getting back to this process, as I say, there was this vague language in the federal law that said you have to have local concurrence, and we didn't know exactly what that meant. But we figured that if the mayor of a major city was against it, that would certainly indicate some kind of lack of concurrence. [Laughter] So, anyway, we get him on board. We get a vote of the city council. As I remember, we got a vote of the board of supervisors. We got a vote of SACOG. We just pushed this right through, and, when I say we, I mean Caltrans. I mean Leo Trombatore working with Ann Rudin as the chairman of this citizens' committee or whatever it was we had set up. They brought it before body after body and got it approved by everybody we could think of, got votes from the Chamber of Commerce, got endorsements from everybody, and then the question was—well, we were working on this simultaneously, this all was happening—how are we going to organize this project?
GIANTURCO

This was also my idea because I was kind of frosted by the way this San Diego one had developed, with Caltrans providing all the money and essentially doing all the work, and getting zero, but I mean zero, credit. Nobody even knew the state was involved. I thought, "With this one in Sacramento, we're going to build this project. We're the ones with the expertise, we have the engineers that worked on the San Diego project, so why should we start from scratch." My idea, also, was that I was trying to persuade these Caltrans engineers, the old line engineers, and this will come back when I talk about high-speed rail, if we can ever get to that. My idea was we've got this fantastic engineering expertise at Caltrans, built up over a hundred years or however long it's been, and there's no reason in the world why these people can't transfer these skills to rail. They're civil engineers, and admittedly they're different problems, but they've had courses in mechanics and structural whatever, you know, the basics of mathematics, and basics of engineering. So, why can't they learn how to design rail
projects as well as they've been designing bridges and highways? And maybe it takes some retraining, but we've got a real resource here, thousands, more than five thousand engineers, and all the procedures, the contracting procedures in place and everything. It's a whole new world that we can open up here.

I just couldn't get people interested in this, though. It was one of my great disappointments. They just would look at me with this blank look in their eyes when I would go into a spiel similar to what I've been saying now. They just couldn't seem to see it.

PETERSHAGEN It's interesting. You're talking about just the reversal of a process, really, because some of our early highway engineers got their bridge building experience and that sort of thing associated with the railroads.

GIANTURCO Absolutely.

PETERSHAGEN You're just talking about two generations going back the other way.

GIANTURCO Yes.

PETERSHAGEN Interesting.
But, the thing was, there were still highway projects around to be built. Maybe the difference was those rail projects were really drying up so they were happy to have something to do, so they moved from the bridges with railroads into bridges for highways. But this was something new that was on the horizon. It wasn't as tangible, this transit stuff. They didn't want to give up the known for the unknown was maybe part of the problem, the psychological problem. I mean there was a real psychological problem here. That's what it is. There's a psychology of bureaucracy, and I could talk for hours about that. I've done a lot of thinking about this, too, and the engineering mentality and the way bureaucracy works and groups of people.

But going back to this specific thing, we had put all this work into this San Diego project and were the only people that had built a light rail project in the United States in modern times. I remember that San Diego project was the first light rail project that had been done in the US for something like twenty years, as I recall.
GIANTURCO There may have been extensions there were, certainly, extensions of things like the Boston, I don't know, subway system and its surface portions and so on. But, in terms of starting a project from scratch, I believe that was the first one in quite some time, and it had been organized, put together, and basically managed by Caltrans engineers.

Getting back to my idea of the state role in transit, I had gone through on an earlier tape, the four or five different things that were appropriate for the state to do. "It was appropriate for the state to do things," I said, "such as demonstration projects or research, where something was transferable from one area to another." And this light rail construction was of that type, although it was not research or demonstration. Conceptually, it had the same justification for the department to be involved in that. If the department built up a corps of people who were experienced in building light rail, it made no sense to me to have a local government start from scratch and build up another corps of people to do a single project. It just doesn't make any
GIANTURCO

sense You have the people You have the procedures Why not use them on one? Then they learn from that and use them on another
That's how I thought

So I was determined that we would use the Caltrans engineering staff to basically run this project, supplemented by consultants as necessary, because, obviously, we didn't have the expertise in all aspects of this I mean the rolling stock and so on People hadn't been trained in this Although I did send quite a few engineers to training programs I've forgotten who ran them, but there were a couple of training programs around for government employees, or engineering types, to sort of help with the transition

What this is reminding me of as I'm talking about it is the whole issue of defense conversion I had the same idea Now we're talking about using military talent and retraining it so that it can do civilian kinds of jobs, the engineers in the military Well, I had the same idea We're going to transfer this expertise that's been devoted
GIANTURCO to highways and retrain it, do whatever, supplement it, and put it in transit

The question was how precisely do we organize this project. Ron Herbold played a major role in this. We decided that first of all we would do it by means of an authority because this is how the transit project, the one in San Diego is, under an authority, the MTDB BART, of course, has its own board. Muni [Municipal Railway], I guess, is under the city of San Francisco, but it is quite common to do things with an authority, a joint powers-type thing. Seeing as this involved something that was going to have really local application, it made sense to set up a governing structure which included local government, as well as the state which was going to fund it, and, in my view, was going to provide the staff for the project, the engineering for the project. And so, we structured this authority. Herbold put it together, specifically. It was a joint powers agreement, basically, that set this up, that we wrote, and we got the city, and I guess, the county was the other signatory to it. It set up this authority.
GIANTURCO

The question was who was going to the chairman of the authority. My first thought, but I dismissed it immediately, was that this was a Caltrans project from start to finish. The money for it came from Caltrans. The impetus, the thought for the project came from Caltrans. It makes sense to have Caltrans, a representative of Caltrans, be the chairman. But, as I say, I dismissed that immediately because, thinking politically, I thought, "Boy! These locals aren't going to like it with just the idea that the state's in charge. Even if it's only one vote, and even though the chairman is just administering meetings, let's make the chairman a local official. And, let's have the vice chairman."

I believe we put this actually into the joint powers agreement, the vice chairman. We may or may not have. I'm just not sure, but the idea was that the vice chairman would be a representative of the state. That's how it was set up. I'm trying to remember. I guess Isenberg became the first chairman, and I was the vice chairman of this authority. We
GIANTURCO hired this guy, who then left two or three years later, to become executive director.

I was not involved at all with the project after I left Caltrans, but there were cost overruns which, to me, is no big deal. Now, maybe it should be a big deal, but unfortunately in public construction that is the rule, not the exception. And in the highway area, it is nothing unusual for a project to cost twice what the estimate was. Three or four times wouldn't be that unusual. I mean it's de rigueur. It happens all the time, and to have a project go 10 or 15 percent over the estimate, big, huge deal!

You build in a contingency. You expect that I'm not saying, again, that this should happen. It shouldn't happen, but it does. That's reality. I'll play the devil's advocate and switch 180 degrees and take the other side, because when I was at Caltrans, with highway projects, I was extremely concerned about the way that this kept happening, and I put a whole lot of procedures into effect to make it very, very onerous for people to estimate projects low and come in high. So, we managed to cut down
GIANTURCO  these overruns quite substantially, but when
I first started in there, a 200 or 300
percent overrun was nothing unusual

Well, getting back to what I was saying
about light rail, something like two or three
years after I'd left the department, there
was a whole lot of publicity locally about
the fact that this light rail project was
running over the estimate. I don't remember
what they were, but, say, the whole project
was supposed to cost $140,000,000, and it was
ending up costing $155,000,000 or
$160,000,000. Well, number one, almost all,
just about every cent of the first
$140,000,000 was state and federal funds.
There were no local funds in this project.
And the overrun which was minor—I mean like
15 or 20 percent—was going to have to come
out of local funds, but so what? They were
going for a big, huge, fat gift from the state
and federal taxpayer. They were talking
about mismanagement of this project, and this
poor guy that was running the project, whose
name I've forgotten, he then went on to
Seattle and became a consultant. Now, he's
working for some other transit agency.
GIANTURCO The way we structured it, there was an executive director or somebody with that type of a title and then a sort of a chief engineer underneath. The chief engineer person was a Caltrans person. The executive director whose job was general oversight, to get citizen participation, deal with the board, supervise the engineering aspect, but also supervise all the politics and the other things that go together into the administration and go into building a project. His job was that. And the Caltrans job, Jim Roberts was the person in that job, who's still with the department. I believe he's head of the Bridge Department\(^1\)--very, very competent person, also. He had the job of the chief engineer. I don't remember what the title was, but he was in charge of the technical end of getting the project built, the engineering side.

Anyway, they just--I mean the public--came unglued and the local political structure and the Sacramento Bee and everybody else, and they dismantled that.

\(^1\)Structures Division
They fired this poor guy who was the executive director and put it under I think they got the guy who's now the city manager of Sacramento, it seems to me Isn't his name [Light Rail Project Manager William] Edgar? He used to be at the Housing and Redevelopment They got him in there, presumably, to straighten out this project that they said was a real mess because of this overrun They restructured it and put it directly under RTD which, by the way, we had deliberately not put it under because RTD had actively opposed light rail for years I'd forgotten that aspect, come to think That was one reason why there hadn't been any movement for light rail in Sacramento because every time the issue came up, and apparently it had come up, RTD would shoot it down and say it was ridiculous This was not an appropriate location Buses were the way to go Again as a result of this, to me, minor overrun, and the fact that Sacramento had to cough up a few bucks when they had this huge gift from the taxpayers of other locations and made such a big deal out of this,
GIANTURCO dismantled the project, and remanitore it and reconfigured it, really frosted me

But, to just kind of wrap this up, that project did get built, and it got built basically because of the work of Jim Roberts and that first executive director. By the time this overrun had occurred, it was well along, and it opened up on time as I recall, or pretty close to on time, pretty close to on budget and has been hugely successful. And, that is a Caltrans project, although nobody will tell you that except for me. Jim Roberts would tell you that. Ann Rudin would tell you that if you asked her.

I'll just say one other thing, just for the historical record. I told you that I had identified two projects as candidates for Interstate Transfer, this I-80 one in Sacramento, which allowed us to do the light rail project, and the Century Freeway. I actually identified a third one, also. That was in San Francisco and was to be an extension of--I believe it's Route 280--which is, as I remember, kind of an off-ramp or a small segment leading into the Embarcadero. When the Embarcadero Freeway was stopped,
GIANTURCO which was before my time as Caltrans director, and just left hanging in the air there had been some other connection planned to make that stub operate better. It was on the books. It was a viable project. There was work being done, some work. It was being kept alive. It was going to cost something like, I'm guessing here, say seventy million dollars and that was an obvious candidate. What I had thought there—we did a lot of work on this, too, and unfortunately it came to a vote of the people, and the people voted it down—was to drop that segment. We did do this. We went through the same kind of process that we did in Sacramento, but we didn't have a positive outcome to it. Same kind of thing that we did in San Francisco to drop that segment of—I think it's 280—and to use the money to tear down the Embarcadero. Now this is before the Loma Prieta Earthquake.

What happened was, we did actually apply to the federal government for the Interstate Transfer, and we did the studies in connection with the city of San Francisco and I don't remember who else was involved, MTC.
[Metropolitan Transportation Commission], whoever we said we're going to tear down the Embarcadero and basically do what they've now decided to do, build a surface roadway there and use some of the money for some additional transit. What happened, though, was that this became controversial. We thought it would be totally uncontroversial because people hated that Embarcadero so much. Well, in fact, people in the East Bay loved that Embarcadero. And it came to a vote. It was put on the ballot. I guess it was voted on in San Francisco, but there had been so much publicity about it, mainly coming from the East Bay, that had spilled over—I mean negative things said about it—that the people of San Francisco voted it down and said they wanted to keep the Embarcadero. So, we didn't do the Interstate Transfer, and that thing stood until the earthquake knocked it out. Now it's gone.

PETERSHAGEN Let me shift subjects on you a bit here. We've talked about rail and mass transit, in general, in the sense of moving people. Was there any consideration during your tenure at
Caltrans for the same sort of application for moving freight?

GIANTURCO

Yes

PETERSHAGEN

To displace trucks

GIANTURCO

Yes, I was going to talk about that. Let me just mention that there were—I don't know that we'll have time to talk about this—two very major projects that we worked on in the area of commuter rail. Whether or not we get to talk about them, I just want to get their names on the record. One is the commute service on the peninsula in San Francisco, which was saved by Caltrans, became a Caltrans project. The other was the institution of new commuter rail service in Los Angeles, and I can't remember the name of that line. We actually started up a line which went from Union Station to, I guess, through the San Fernando Valley, and it went through Simi Valley. It went through various places. We built the stations. We ran the trains. We got the whole thing in place. We worked on this project for seven solid years from the time I became director. It was a major, major effort on the part of Caltrans and, as I say, it resulted in an actual rail
GIANTURCO line which was terminated by Deukmejian within the first two months of his being in office. He just stopped it.

It ran on SP tracks. SP was adamantly opposed to it, fought it for seven years. We went through two complete sets of hearings before the [California] Public Utilities Commission [PUC]. This has all kinds of historic implications. As a matter of fact, the decisions of the PUC in that case, and later confirmed by the California Supreme Court, are the justification that provided the legal foundation for all this work that is now being done instituting passenger rail service on old freight rail lines, particularly in Los Angeles, where they're essentially trying to reconstitute the Red Car system. It was this effort to do it on this one line that made it possible, and that's exactly how we treated it. We're going to establish this legal precedent, and it's going to happen.

It did happen, and we got the trains running. As I say, we got them running just before the end of the Brown Administration. It took thousands of man-hours. It was a
GIANTURCO

major project getting that done. Also the thing to take over the commuter rail service on the San Francisco Peninsula was a major, major effort. I don't know if I'm going to have time to get into those two things which I would, even if not on this tape, discuss because a lot of interesting things happened in connection with both of those.

But, on the issue of rail freight, yes, this was another interest, major interest, of mine. The entire time I was at Caltrans, and I'm sure this is still an issue, the trucking industry kept trying to get bigger, heavier, longer, more car trucks. After they had gone to the doubles, and then they wanted to be able to put triples on, I guess I mean how far can this go? When you get triples, you are practically talking about a small train. You get quadruples, quintuples. You're talking about trains on. This is why we have rail lines. Anyway, it's crazy.

Plus, trucks cause tremendous damage to highways. Caltrans had done a study, or did a study, right in my early years there. This study has been used nationwide to really try
GIANTURCO to calculate the damage caused by trucks to highways. As I remember the number, one truck, fully loaded truck, eighty thousand pounds or whatever the limit was at that time, will cause the same amount of damage to a highway as five thousand cars. As various engineers pointed out to me in Caltrans, if we had only cars on highways, the highways, to the standards to which we build them, would last virtually forever. The timeline would be out there in infinity, but it's not. The reason the life span of a highway is calculated at twenty or thirty years is because of the damage caused by trucks. They're tremendously damaging, and they congest the roads, and we have this alternative system, which is rail freight. I was extremely interested in this.

The problem with it was that we could not get these damn railroads interested in rail freight. It was one of the big frustrations of my tenure at Caltrans. I have to say, I made overture after overture to the rail industry, specifically Santa Fe and Southern Pacific. I guess also, to some extent, Union Pacific, saying we have a
GIANTURCO

common interest here. We are interested in helping you, doing whatever we can to make life easier for you and your operations more profitable, so that you can get a larger share of the freight traffic, and we simply could not get them interested. They were extremely suspicious, number one, because of the fact that they all at that time—their attitude has changed since—but at that time, they were very, very worried about Amtrak. They thought that this was a smoke screen for our true interest, which was getting passenger rail running on their freight lines, and they were dead set against passenger rail. They've done a 180 degree turn on that. At the time I remember talking to executives from these rail companies and saying, "Gee, I just don't understand why you are against this passenger rail. You've got a guaranteed profit on it. It doesn't make any sense. Why are you against it?" I never got a decent answer.

The history of it is that the railroads lost so much money on passenger service when it was entirely private that they have just never gotten over this. It has taken them
the last fifteen years to finally realize that Amtrak is actually a boon to them, that under the Amtrak system they stand to gain. But, they were so suspicious of government at that time because of Amtrak, that when I would bring up freight rail their eyes would glaze over. They thought it was some code word for Amtrak. We just got no place.

I will tell you one episode that really sticks in my mind. I thought this is something right here that shows what's wrong. Early on in my tenure at Caltrans, Southern Pacific suggested that I take a trip along their Central Valley Line, starting in Roseville and ending up some place in San Bernardino County where they have that big switching yard, to see what their operation was like. I thought, "Great," because, as I say, I want to work with these people. I want to help them. I want to form some kind of a partnership and get some traffic on the railroads and off the highways.

[End Tape 12, Side B]

[Begin Tape 13, Side A]

PETERSHAGEN So, Adriana, you were talking about your inspection trip, your proposed inspection
trip, to learn the SP operations. Would you care to continue that?

GIANTURCO

There was some top level executive. It was not [SP Chairman Benjamin F.] Biaggini. It was somebody right below him, an Executive Vice President, or something or other, who conducted this tour. It was a regularly scheduled train, and they hooked up their executive car. Well, I had never seen that before. Boy, that is something else! You're talking about the luxury of the nineteenth century preserved in the twentieth century. Just fabulous! Mahogany everywhere you look and solid silver tableware and ashtrays and polished brass. They have their own dining car on there. Yes, I guess they had a separate dining car. They had bedrooms for these executives to sleep in with showers—all very, very elegant. Kind of like the Orient Express. We are not talking Amtrak. We are talking real luxury here.

So they had this executive car hooked up for this trip, and we sat in the executive car which was at the back of the train. It had a platform and didn't have a caboose. In other words, you could just go out and it
GIANTURCO

had a kind of an observation thing so you could stand in the back and look at what was going on. We get on this thing early in the morning. It had to be a regularly scheduled run because it left something like, some God-awful time like, five o'clock in the morning. You had to get out to Roseville to get on this thing. We went all the way down to San Bernardino on this train, talking about rail freight. Another problem with these rail companies and getting them interested in rail freight as opposed to truck freight is that at that time anyway—there's been so much restructuring that's going on in the rail industry—but at the time I'm talking about, Southern Pacific and Santa Fe, as I recall, both had subsidiaries that involved trucking. So, there was a little ambivalence there about this issue of truck versus rail. They were playing both sides of the fence.

But what struck me, and the incident I was going to mention is, we're going down the valley—and I have to say, boy, that was a boring trip. It was down the whole Central Valley from Roseville to San Bernardino. By the end of it, I didn't think I could take
GIANTURCO

one more second on this train, and I'm a train buff [Laughter] Anyway, part way down the valley, we get to a section where--this may be true in several sections, in any event, it was very obvious at this point--where we could see across to the Santa Fe line

We're sitting, this big honcho from SP and I, in the back looking out the car so we could see everything that was going on, and here comes this train down the Santa Fe line. This executive got extremely agitated, super-agitated. He was just furious. He was all jumping around. He starts calling various people in, and he kept saying, "There's the competition!" His idea was that their competition--I mean it was so compelling--their competition was other railroads. It wasn't trucking. And, I thought, "This is kind of hopeless here. If their attitude is going to be that they're going to fight to the death, which is a nineteenth century attitude, the railroads battling each other, where their real competition is not each other."
GIANTURCO  This is the thing that stuck in my mind the most. I just could not believe it. The man was truly upset. He was counting the cars on this Santa Fe thing and where they were from, and "How come they got that business," and, "I was telling you you should go after United Fruit Company," or whatever the heck it was. It would be something. "And I thought we had locked them up, and there goes that train." Boy, that train had a lot of cars on it! Every car that went by, he was getting madder and madder. He was mad as a hatter. [Laughter]

So we were never able really to get anything done in the rail freight area. The most we were able to do was to help the railroads in terms of the only program that they were interested in, that they would actively participate in and lobby for, the railroad grade separation program which they wanted, too, so that they didn't have to cross highways. And we made a lot of money available for that pretty minor aspect of things, but that was about it in the rail area, and it wasn't for lack of trying. We
made attempt after attempt and just never could get them interested

Going back through Caltrans history, the grade separation issue seems to be the one common thread of joint endeavor between the Division of Highways, eventually Caltrans, and the railroads. Otherwise, there doesn't seem to be a whole lot of cooperation. You had mentioned you wanted to discuss the five modes of transit. Do you think it would be a good time to go to that now?

Well, I talked about Amtrak, the intercity rail. We talked about the light rail projects in San Diego and Sacramento. We also funded the one in San Jose. We made funding available for various extensions and improvements to Muni in San Francisco. Commuter rail—I mentioned those two projects—the SP Peninsula Service that we took over, and the institution of new commuter service in Los Angeles, which was stopped by Deukmejian almost immediately upon assuming office.

The other thing I had wanted to talk about, though, for the last area, is high speed rail. I was interested in high speed
rail the whole time I was at Caltrans. One reason I was interested in it is Jerry Brown is very interested in high speed rail. In terms of his interest in transportation, it boils down, basically, to two things, specifically. He was very interested in high speed rail because he'd been in Japan. This is before everybody was talking about the Shinkanzen Line, the bullet train. He had been there a number of years before he was governor and had been extremely impressed by this. So, he had a knowledge of and was interested in high speed railway before it became a popular thing in this country, and he was interested in that from day one, in doing something in high speed rail in California. The other thing he was interested in was this commuter rail line which I can't remember the name of, and you ought to supply it on the tape, George, the one in Los Angeles.

PETERSHAGEN: We'll footnote the transcript.¹

GIANTURCO: He had made the institution of that commuter rail line in Los Angeles a campaign issue.

¹Oxnard-L.A. Caltrain
GIANTURCO when he ran for governor and had mentioned in a number of speeches how crazy it was to be spending all this money on highways when we had existing rail lines around that could be converted to passenger use, and he specifically focused on this particular one in Southern California in the Los Angeles area, as a good example It basically would take traffic and did take traffic off Route 101 which is heavily, heavily congested—the Ventura Freeway—going north The whole idea fit perfectly in with our philosophy, our overall philosophy, of how government ought to work, which is make better use out of what you have, as opposed to spending money on new gaudy, Christmas tree ornaments for everybody around In the same fashion that we wanted to make better use of the highways by encouraging carpooling, high occupancy vehicle use, van pools, transit use, mini-buses on highways, it was part of our philosophy that it made sense to use existing rail infrastructure which was there on the ground to provide passenger service or more freight service As I say, the infrastructure is there on the ground, and
GIANTURCO: It's a marginal cost to add the operating service on top of that, as opposed to starting from scratch and building a Metro System in L A or a new BART or whatever.

As I said, Jerry Brown, upon assuming office and in running for governor, had had two very specific transportation projects that he was interested in. One was high speed rail, and the other was the institution of rail service on an existing rail line. It was this rail line in L A that we did institute service on—as objectives for him in his governorship. So, he had made this known to me, you know, as soon as I became director, that he wanted to do something in both of these areas. We started working within the first year on the commuter rail project. It took us a good six years to get it in place because we had to go through all these legal proceedings which I'm not going to deal with.

But, the high speed rail is just a matter of not being able to do everything at once. I guess that must have been probably like the two years before the end of the administration that we started seriously...
GIANTURCO working on high speed rail, although we had been investigating that. We had done some work, done some research. The Transit Division had kind of explored what the different options were, and so on, but we had put this together, must have been two years or a year and a half before the end of the second Brown term. We pulled it all together, and we made it into a real project. By that I mean we organized it. It got far enough along so we decided we needed legislative authorization to proceed with this. I personally got involved in the conceptualization of this. It was my idea that California should take the lead in talking about high speed rail, but nobody was really doing anything then. The stuff that has gone on in Florida and other places hadn't happened at this point. So, we would have been the leader, truly would have been the leader. Well, they were working on the East Coast with improving speeds on the system between Washington and New York or Boston or wherever the heck it goes. But, in terms of a Shinkansen type thing, there was nothing happening any place in the country.
My idea was that we would frame this project basically in three stages. In the first stage, we would explore alternative technology and alternative corridors. The basic idea was that you could either build stuff from scratch completely as the Shinkanzen thing is, or you could use existing rail lines and upgrade them in such a way that you could run at much higher speeds, although not as high speed as you could if you had a completely new line. The third sort of technological aspect of this was the equipment itself. The British at that time--and I don't know who's doing this--the Canadians may be doing it, also, these tilt trains which allow you to go around curves. In other words, you don't have to straighten out all the curves. You can go much faster around curves. So, there were various technological things. Plus, mag lev [magnetic levitation] was coming in then. So, we were going to look at Mag Lev. We were going to look at the Shinkanzen-type thing. We were going to look at the tilt train. We were going to look at these different technologies in a broad way for
application and try to get some general cost figures

We were also going to look at different corridors. The corridors we identified were basically three, but they overlapped. One was the corridor from Los Angeles to San Diego, running along the coast, which has got real environmental problems. Another thing about California which is kind of bad, is that the distances aren't quite right. I've forgotten what the ideal distance, the ideal length, of one of these lines is, but it's a little longer than, say, LA to San Diego, but it's not as long as, say, LA to San Francisco. The length of the line is important because of the station spacing. In order to have high speeds, you don't want to have too many stops, but you've got to pick up enough people obviously in order to make it financially feasible. So, there are a lot of things that have to be taken into consideration. Anyway, the one corridor was the coastal corridor. The second corridor was the Central Valley corridor, also LA to San Diego. The problem there is the Tehachapi Mountains. And at that time, as I
remember, the rule of thumb was that with the technologies that we were looking at, you could not have more than a 5 percent grade. That's kind of sticking in my mind. And, there was no way to get over those mountains with a 5 percent grade. You would have to tunnel, and then it becomes extremely expensive. So that was the disadvantage of that route. Then another corridor that we were looking at which kind of overlapped these two or could have been an extension of either one was Bay Area to Sacramento. I mean across the northern end of the whole area we were looking at.

PETERSHAGEN: It sounds like corridors and technology are really not separate subjects.

GIANTURCO: No, they aren't.

PETERSHAGEN: They're integrated.

GIANTURCO: They're integrated. And so in the first stage we were going to look at corridors and technology, sort of on a conceptual level—these kind of general questions that I'm just raising here. And then, hopefully at the end of that phase, we would narrow down, although we wouldn't have made a final decision, but we would have narrowed down to a preferred
GIANTURCO technology and a preferred corridor. In my concept, at that stage we would start doing detailed studies of that preferred technology and preferred corridor and combine that with the environmental process. We would continue to look at the alternatives because it could have been that at a conceptual level we concluded one thing, but when we really got into the details in stage two where we were doing detailed engineering, not final design, but much more detailed work, and looking at impacts and alternatives, that we would find out that what we had thought initially was the right thing to do wasn't the right thing to do. In which case, we'd be able to switch at that stage because we would pursue the alternative through the second stage. At the end of the second stage, we would have a draft Environmental Impact Report, and we would have a preferred, definitely preferred, corridor and technology. Then in stage three would be actual design, final design, and stage four is construction. It would be laid out like that. This was written up that way.

We got to the point where we started working basically on stage one. By this
time, the word had gotten around that Caltrans was doing this, and we started getting phone calls. I personally got all kinds of phone calls from foreign countries. These foreign countries were hot to trot. I'm talking about French National Railways called, some high mucky-muck there, and the British Rail. The Japanese were very interested. The Canadians because they were doing something—I've forgotten whether it was a tilt train or what it was. The Germans were starting to get interested in this stuff. Mag lev people. We were hearing from all kinds of people. Plus private consultants wanted to get in on this. I remember at one point getting a call from the Business and Transportation Agency, or maybe it was Dick Silberman at the Department of Finance. Anyway, it was outside the department, somebody saying, "Gee, I didn't realize you'd gone as far as you have with this high speed rail stuff, but since you're starting to correspond with various people, I want you to talk to somebody or other," and gave me some other foreign country or some name of somebody or other. People were
GIANTURCO really interested in this because obviously it could, would have been should have been, should still be, a major project.

I was simultaneously trying to get the department interested in it, which gets back to the psychology of, you know, trying to get people out of thinking in terms that the 1960s are going to last forever, and we're moving into the future. My pitch was, over and over, that this is a project which will take Caltrans into the future. We're not talking about the city of Los Angeles building something like that, it would be totally inappropriate. This is obviously a statewide transportation project or one which crosses, which would involve, so much of the state that the appropriate entity to be involved in it is a state agency, and what state agency other than the Department of Transportation is the obvious one? I said, "This is the future for us. Don't worry about losing your jobs designing interchanges. You've got big stuff coming up. We can get this underway. This is what's really going to provide the answer to Caltrans' withering on the vine as the
GIANTURCO highway program winds down " Never could get interest in it, though As I say, the eyes would glaze over, and I could just tell people were thinking, "Gee, why is she talking about this crazy stuff? It's never going to happen"

Well, as I say, it started in this first stage, which was this conceptual stage of exploring corridors and technology At a certain point not very far along in this, I decided that--and I don't know that anybody told me it had to be this way, I think I just decided it on my own--that we're not talking about some minor project here Although we had money in our budget, unallocated planning funds, which could have been used legitimately for at least stage one of this project, which, I've forgotten how much we estimated it was going to cost, but, let's say, half a million dollars, something like that Stage one was relatively cheap It was when you got into the detail work that you started talking about big bucks We had enough money to do this without getting specific legislative authorization because we had general authorization to carry out
planning studies and corridor studies and so on. I thought, "This is such an important project that it really isn't proper to just start this kind of through the back door using general funds. We ought to make this explicit, what we're doing." I guess we were just starting a budget cycle when I had this thought. "Let's separate this out and talk about it in our budget hearings and have a specific item for this." So, we did do that, and strategically. Frankly, looking back, I don't know what else I could have done. Maybe I could have sneaked it through, possibly, but it wouldn't have made any difference because Deukmejian would have stopped it the day I left office anyway.

Come to think of it, this had to be at least two years before the end of the Brown administration, maybe three or four, because the chairman of the Assembly Transportation Committee was still Walter Ingalls. He left part way through the second Brown administration, and the chairman of the Committee was [Assemblyman] Bruce [E] Young, who was pro-transit. Although Bruce Young later ran into troubles, which had nothing to
do with transportation, he was a joy to work
with compared to Ingalls. First of all, he
was really interested in transit and secondly
he was a nice guy. He was pleasant to deal
with.

But Ingalls was a highway person from
the get-go. And he had all these problems
dealing with women, dealing with me, dealing
with the world. The guy had a lot of
problems, as his later history showed.
Anyway, he just went berserk over this high
speed rail—against it. And he made speeches
all over the place, talked to editorial
boards and said, "This is the craziest, most
ridiculous, thing."

I remember the Sacramento Bee—I was
shocked! Getting back to our discussion of
the press, the Sacramento Bee editorialized
against this, picking up on what Ingalls was
going around saying that this was just some
kind of "Buck Rogers dream." I remember
that. That was the phrase that he used, and
they picked it up. "What is this crazy
ridiculous high speed rail? We've got
problems right here and now in California,
and Adriana wants to waste money studying
high speed rail  How stupid  How far out
Governor Moon-beam " All this stuff  That
was the reception we got, and they refused to
allocate money  They killed it in the
Assembly Transportation Committee, and that
basically killed the high-speed rail project

So, the up-front approach to funding this may
not have been the wisest way

Well, as I say, though, George, had I taken
the back door approach which is where we were
starting  It wasn't back door, it was
just that we were using our general
authority  I thought the honest way to do
this, because I'm seeing this as a major
thing, is to deal with it explicitly  What's
to be secretive about? This is a positive
thing  This is going to bring all kinds of
economic benefits for California  We're not
talking about wasting taxpayers' money
We're talking about doing something that's
truly going to benefit the state of
California

As I described it to the engineers in
Caltrans, I said, "We're talking about
something comparable to the building of the
interstate highway system  Look at it that
GIANTURCO way We're talking about the interstate highway system of the 1990s instead of, you know, the interstate highway system of the fifties and sixties. We're moving into the nineties. This is the new interstate highway. This is where you got your jollies before, and now you can get it out of this."

And so, I saw no reason to be secretive about this. I thought it was something that, you know, people should be enthusiastic about. But, as I say, Ingalls went on this one-man crusade about it, and I got no support from anybody.

Which brings up a general question in my tenure at Caltrans on transit in general, and on some of these extremely damaging highway projects that I was against, such as the one that is still hanging around to tear down South Pasadena and six historic districts. It's shocking to me that such a thing would even be under consideration, and that Devil's Slide project, which is some of the most gorgeous unspoiled environment, nothing like it in the entire United States. Talking about building a freeway through there is absolutely outrageous.
But, in any event, I was going to say, on those kinds of issues as with the high speed rail, I knocked myself out trying to get support from the groups that I thought would be interested, specifically environmentalists. I just couldn't get them interested. I had many conversations with people along the line about why is this 'I need your help, you know. These are the kinds of things you ought to be supporting me on. I just can't be just a one person crusade here." What I finally figured out, and what many people confirmed for me, was that the people that were interested in transit, and that were interested in the environment and air quality and energy conservation and all these things that I was interested in, spending taxpayer dollars in a more reasonable way, figured that they had other battles to fight, and I'd fight this battle. Since I was in a pretty powerful position and was outspoken and got quoted in the newspaper and got press and so on, I didn't need any help. And they would concentrate on things like the Peripheral Canal or whatever the heck else was going on.
And I used to say, "Look, it's not just one person. That's not the way our society works. I mean I can't be out there by myself, Joan of Arc, you know, being the only person saying there's any benefit to high speed rail or the only person saying we shouldn't tear down six hundred historic houses in South Pasadena. I've got to have somebody that agrees with me."

I just couldn't get it, and that's what happened on high speed rail. I don't recall any organized group coming out to support me on that, not one. Now, there may have been a few individuals that made statements here and there, but in terms of any kind of people getting themselves together and trying to battle this negative stuff that Ingalls was coming out with, it didn't happen. The final end of that chapter was that we had to drop that. Boy, was I disappointed! As were all these countries. Places like the Japan National Railroad and SNCF [French National Railway] or whatever—-that French National Railroad—were prepared to participate in this study, at no cost to us. They were that interested. They thought if we can get in on
the ground floor, it'll make it more likely that we'll get a contract later on. And all these people were terribly, terribly disappointed. [Laughter] I'm not saying that they had a big crisis at the UN over this, but, you know, this had generated widespread interest beyond California, but Walter Ingalls killed it with his Buck Rogers. I'll never forget that. I remember the Sacramento Bee. As I recall, that was the title of the editorial, "Forget this Buck Rogers Stuff," or something like that, some cynical thing, just picking right up on what he said, that this was ridiculous.

PETERSHAGEN: The plan was, in your mind, California would have been the leader.

GIANTURCO: Absolutely.

PETERSHAGEN: Of an international coalition looking into the feasibility of

GIANTURCO: At stage one we would have looked at all these technologies being used by different countries. As I say, at the end of stage one we would have selected what we thought was a preferred alternative, a preferred alternative in terms of technology and corridor. Then in stage two, we would
explore in greater detail that preferred alternative in corridor, but continue looking at alternatives in case this one on greater or more detailed examination fell by the wayside or turned out to have problems that we didn’t realize initially. And then, by the end of the project, by the end of stage three, actually by the end of stage two, we would have selected the corridor and the technology, and the design work would have begun in stage three. So, by stage three, you know, SNCF or Japan National Railways or whatever, would have been out of the picture because of their technology, but in the early stages, all these countries and railroads would have some role to play in presenting their technologies and helping us work through how it would apply to California and so on.

PETERSHAGEN: Interesting, and it was essentially all lost.

GIANTURCO: Lost, just lost. There was one final kind of a postscript to this thing, but in no way, substituted for it in my mind. It must have been in the last year that I was at Caltrans, in the last six months I was there, this organization was established called the
American High Speed Rail Corporation, headed by Alan Boyd who had been the head of Amtrak, and, I guess, earlier on was head of U S DOT at an early stage. Anyway, they decided they were interested in building a high speed rail line between L A and San Diego, and--I just couldn't believe this--they never even consulted Caltrans. They just did their thing, started putting this thing together without talking to anybody in Caltrans, without talking to me, without talking to any of the staff, when they made a trip to Sacramento. And I had had pretty good relations with Amtrak as a matter of fact when Boyd was at Amtrak. That was when we had started all our Amtrak stuff. Now he had left Amtrak, was involved in this thing.

As I say, it was toward the end of the administration, Boyd made a trip to Sacramento, didn't even tell me he was coming to Sacramento, and had set up various meetings with people in the legislature to talk about this L A to San Diego line. I was just stunned! I thought, "What the heck is going on here?" Well, first of all I thought it's crazy. You're never going to be
able to do this unless you have the cooperation of the
But, their concept was that this would be an entirely private
venture, profit-making, private. That's how they presented it initially. It turned out to be something quite different, which I could have predicted had I been brought in on the early stages, but I wasn't. I was ignored. He went straight to various committees of the legislature and got them to endorse this concept by resolution, I guess I don't think it involved any legislation, although there was some legislation passed. And he went to the Business and Transportation Agency, but ignored Caltrans.

There had been one individual in California who expressed any interest in this, and this was me, backed up by my extremely talented staff. I mean talented. These were people who were truly interested in this, and we were just left out in the cold. We couldn't believe it. We thought, "What the heck is going on here?" So, they just started doing their thing, but it turned out, of course, that this wasn't going to be entirely private. What they intended to do,
and what they got from the legislature
I couldn't believe this This went through
I don't know that we were even made aware
that this was passing through I think maybe
we heard about it after it passed It was
just crazy--some legislation that would have
allowed this American High Speed Rail
Corporation to use highway rights of way--I
believe at no cost--which, as I remember,
after we heard about this, I said, "This is
probably illegal, a gift of public funds"
And I had the Legal Division of Caltrans look
into it, and they said, "Absolutely not
Forget it This is a gift of public funds
Public funds were used to acquire these
lands, and they cannot be made available to
use to a profit-making corporation without
the state receiving"

[End Tape 13, Side A]

[Begin Tape 13, Side B]

PETERSHAGEN Adriana, when we finished the other side of
the tape you had been discussing the so-
called "private venture" in high-speed rail
So why don't you take it from there and
finish that?
This corporation, the American High Speed Rail Corporation, had done its thing, totally ignoring Caltrans, dealing directly with the legislature, which passed some, as I recall, bill allowing them to use highway rights-of-way, which our Legal Division told me was unconstitutional because it was a gift of public funds. They had not talked to me or any member of the staff at Caltrans, as far as I know, certainly nobody that was in a position of authority, just talked to people in the Business and Transportation Agency who had never taken a particular interest in this, and they got this legislation through. Then they started working on this project which continued through the remainder of the time I was at Caltrans. As I say, this started toward the end of the Brown administration, within the last year.

It continued, it seems to me, for a couple of years after that, and as I could have predicted from day one, it got no place. They were going to build this high speed rail line. I mean right off the bat, they had decided on a corridor, L A to San Diego. There are some questions whether that
corridor is long enough, again, because of the spacing of the stations. You might have to have so many of them that you no longer have high speed in order to get the kind of traffic that would use that line. Plus, you're running along the coast. Gee, talk about environmental problems! You know, it's crazy. The communities along that corridor went berserk against this thing, and they weren't able to get funding for it. I've forgotten what happened. There was huge opposition to it. Whatever funding they had expected to get, I think they had several sources of funding which they thought they had pretty much locked up, but when the opposition surfaced, whatever these sources were, made themselves scarce—no longer around—whatever they were going to use to build it. It just died. So, that was the end. To go on from there, George, that's about the story of high speed rail in California.

PETERSHAGEN

Then you wanted to go into the commute lines, I think, both in L A and in the Bay Area, probably in that order.
Let me start with L A. The L A line had been an interest of Jerry Brown's from the time he ran for governor, and for all I know, could have been an interest of his for years before that. And, he had made it a campaign issue. He had given speeches on it. The theme was, as I had mentioned before, it doesn't make sense to have these rail lines lying around the state, all over the place, that have very light traffic, or no traffic on them. Yet we've got freeways that are congested so you can barely move. Wouldn't it be reasonable to try to transfer some of the people from those highways onto those rail lines, namely by putting some passenger rail service on the rail lines and taking the cars off the freeways as a result? I mean it makes a whole lot of sense. It's cheap, and it's easy to do as long as you get cooperation. And that's the rub because those rail lines, all of them, are owned by private railroads. That's the way it happens in the United States. The government gave rights of way to the railroads and, boy, have they benefitted from it, which was a point, a major point that we made in the chain of
GIANTURCO

... events that occurred after we decided to follow up on this campaign promise of Jerry Brown.

As I say, Jerry Brown had talked about this on a number of occasions when he was running for office, and shortly after I was named Caltrans Director, he started bringing this up. Almost every time I would meet him, he would say, "What are you doing about getting that rail, that commuter rail line, going in L A?" Well, there were a lot of other things going on at the time, namely, the diamond lanes, which, you know, handling that problem in itself was a full-time job. Plus the highway program was broke, and we were trying to reconstitute that. We had layoffs still going on. So, anyway, I just didn't have any time to deal with this rail thing, and I kept telling him that as soon as things settle down a little bit, believe me that will be a big priority, and we will get started on putting this rail line in L A. And he never dropped this. I mean every time, practically every time I met him—and I would meet him quite frequently. Not every day, not even every week, but, say, at least...
GIANTURCO

once a month I would have a meeting with him for some reason or other, it would come up at some point. Usually as I was leaving the governor's office, he'd say, "What's going on with that rail line?" And I'd say, "Well, Jerry, or Governor, I told you, you know, we have the diamond lanes. We have this and that, and as soon as Please, you know, just give me a chance I promise you we'll work on this rail line."

So, after probably, maybe within a year, you're talking about a span of seven years that I was at Caltrans, toward the end of that first year, we had got the diamond lanes under control in the sense that the court had stopped them. We'd got the highway program straightened out. It's out of bankruptcy. The financing problems are over. We had done the reorganization at Caltrans. Things are pretty much under control, and we're ready to start some new initiatives, which is about the time we started all of the transit stuff, toward the end of that first year.

Well, the problem with trying to get rail service on these under-utilized freight rail lines is that the rail lines, the lines
themselves, the rights of way and the tracks, are owned by private railroads, and they have property rights to them. If they don't want you to use their lines you can't use their lines. They own it.

So we started a proceeding before the Public Utilities Commission, and I believe this is the first case of its kind that the PUC had heard since something like 1905. The issue was does the state have the right to compel a railroad to allow the use of one of its lines since it was the people of the United States that gave this land to this railroad in the first place? It's supposed to be a public utility. It's supposed to serve a public purpose. Well, as I say, this had not been tested for years and years. As I recall, the last time that it was an issue, having to do with the institution of new rail service where there had been a controversy about it was around the turn of the century. So, we were really breaking new ground. We took this before the PUC which is a very, as I learned, complicated, drawn-out, procedure. We had at least one lawyer working full-time on this and probably several more than that.
GIANTURCO who were assigned at least part-time. Plus, we had a lawyer, a consulting lawyer, who worked out of an office in Washington, D.C., who was very familiar with this type of stuff, who helped us on various aspects of this case. Of course, the resources of the Transit Division to put together data and so on. A tremendous effort went into this, to make a long story short. I mean in terms of the resources, the human resources, that went into making this case before the PUC.

It seems to me that the case was not even heard for something like two or three years after we first introduced the motion for the hearing. And SP, which was the railroad involved here, was fighting us tooth and nail. They put major resources into fighting this because they saw this as setting a precedent, which is exactly what we were trying to do. We thought, "If we can win this case, we're going to establish a legal principle that will allow the state or a public body to institute rail service on freight lines." And this is exactly what's happening now, all over the state of California. We're not just talking about
The immediate goal was to make this service possible on this one line that Brown had happened to mention that he was particularly interested in. It was a logical one. There was a lot of traffic on the parallel freeway, and here was this line that had like one train a week or something running on it. Well, SP put every ounce of attention that they could spare into fighting this thing. We probably didn't get the first decision on this for something like, I don't know, three or four years. It took a long time, and it came down on our side. We won. We were overjoyed. We were having celebrations. I just couldn't believe it! We just couldn't believe it, although we knew we were right. We had put so much effort into this, and we thought, "My God! We've actually won it!" We have won this thing. It is a landmark decision.

Well, that joy lasted for like a day. And then something like twenty-four hours later, we find out that SP has filed for a rehearing before the PUC, which was something that I didn't even realize was a possibility. But apparently, the PUC can just decide, even
though they just made the decision, to start all over again and do the same thing a second time—crazy

**PETERSHAGEN**

It's almost like double jeopardy or conducting their own appeal process

**GIANTURCO**

Double jeopardy Exactly! They had just reviewed like two million pages of documents. It's taken them three years to get through or four years, or whatever. What is this deciding twenty-four hours later that you're going to go through the whole thing all over again? Yes, double jeopardy But, also from a standpoint of waste of taxpayers' money, the documents are going to be the same. Well, anyway, they grant a rehearing So, you know, our spirits sink We think, "Oh my God What's going on here?"

Well anyway, it takes another year or two They rehear this thing And they reach the same conclusion So, we're all excited again We won this thing At which point, SP still I mean they still won't give up on this thing They take it to the California Supreme Court, the only appeal from the PUC We are now in the last year of the Brown administration We are now in
GIANTURCO

about May, say, and the election is going to be in November. There's going to be a "lame duck" administration after November, and we've come to May, and they're taking it to the Supreme Court in May. Of course, we have no train running because, even though we have an order from the PUC, you know, compelling them to run it, they're appealing it to the Supreme Court, which as I was about to say, is the only resort that doesn't go through the whole court system. The only place you appeal a PUC decision is to the Supreme Court.

So, we're on pins and needles. What's going to happen with this Supreme Court? Well, the Supreme Court refuses to hear the case which means that they confirm the PUC decision. So, we have won. We have conclusively won. There is no question about it. Well, SP still won't let us--I mean we want to do things. We want to get down there. We don't have much time to get this thing going. We are determined to get trains actually running on that line before the Brown administration leaves office because we're already getting the message from
Deukmejian that he doesn't care about transit. That's the last thing on his mind. If that train isn't running, the chances are you can forget that train. As it turned out, even though we got it running, he stopped it as soon as he came in so it didn't make that much difference, but, at least, we did get a principle established. Anyway, we'd won.

There's no further appeal for these people, and they still are not allowing us to enter their property, or do whatever we needed to do. I don't know where we got this court order, whether we got it from the California Supreme Court, from the PUC, from a Superior Court, or whatever, but we got an order that was compelling them. I recall—this is a kind of a personal angle on things—a subpoena was issued for the head of—the guy's name was [CEO, Southern Pacific Transportation Co] Robert Krebs—to appear before some court body to explain why they were not complying with this order. And time's running out, we want to get in there. I mean what we wanted to do was specifically build stations, or platforms, to improve the track in certain locations, and that involved...
being on their property, and we needed some cooperation from them. Plus the order was that they were compelled to operate the service for us, and they were refusing to do that. That meant that they had to get equipment together. I mean all this had been identified. It wasn't that the preliminary work hadn't been done, but they were just stonewalling it even though these decisions had come down.

As I say, there was a subpoena issued for one of these SP executives to explain—to come to court, to come to one of these bodies that we'd been before, and explain—why they were stonewalling it. And the guy was eluding this subpoena for like three or four days. Every day, as we figured it counted. I recall this. It was so funny. I was in my office. As I remember it was a Friday afternoon. I'm sitting in my office. We've been trying to track down this executive for like three or four days with this subpoena, and he is avoiding the subpoena server. All of a sudden, somebody comes into my office. One of my deputies walks in, and says, "You are not going to believe this, Adriana, but
GIANTURCO

this guy whoever he was, this SP executive, is in the Caltrans building in the men's room, right now, and we can serve him with the subpoena in the men's room" [Laughter]

What had happened was this guy, this SP executive, who we were trying to track down for three or four days, or the process server was, had been across the street in the Capitol Caltrans, 1120 N Street, is directly across the street from the Capitol. He had been testifying in some hearing or talking to some legislator doing some lobbying for SP, and, apparently, had parked on the street outside in front of Caltrans. Then he decided he needed to go to the bathroom so he just came into the closest public building which happened to be Caltrans, and he's in there. He was recognized by one of the members of our Mass Transit Division. So anyway, we got a lawyer to hustle himself right into that men's room, and they served him with the subpoena right then and there [Laughter]

And so the hearing occurred, and the judge said no more of this garbage. If they put any more obstacles in its face, the
executives of SP would be held personally responsible for this thing. By this time the legal system was on our side, and they were getting pretty distressed with the attitude of SP. These people were going to be personally serving jail time if they didn't cooperate with us.

So we started to get cooperation. The cooperation was grudging, but they allowed us onto their property. We built the platforms. We got the equipment together. The SP conductors were assigned to the service. We started the service. I'm trying to remember when. Oh, it was round the clock. Caltrans just knocked itself out. It proves that that organization when it wants to do something. We got people all excited, --not only the Transit Division people, but the highway engineer types--because they had to do this design work that involved the tracks, the stations, whatever, it was physical type stuff. Most of the people in the Transit Division were policy types. They didn't know about that. We got people from Structures, Operations, various divisions of Caltrans, assigned to this crash.
GIANTURCO project to get this train running. We had like two months to get it running before the end of the Brown administration. They worked around the clock and on weekends, and this thing started up.

Well, at that point, it's like four months before the end of the administration, and within two months they had performed the work that normally would take an organization a year to do. I'm talking about the Caltrans staff, both the District Seven and headquarters people who were assigned to this project, with the lawyers breathing down Southern Pacific's neck at every point. And, the trains ran. And, as I say, something like a month after Deukmejian came into office, maybe not that long, he stopped it. It was one of the first things he did. What I was told was that SP had supported Deukmejian in the election. One of the things they had told him very clearly was they did not want to be running passenger service, and they wanted this stopped. But, as the Caltrans attorneys told me at the time, and they were quite upset. Everybody at Caltrans who had been involved
In this was upset when it was stopped, but the way they consoled themselves was that we had established that legal principle. Stopping that actual service did not change the ruling of the PUC, and not only that, but the department, as far as I know, maintained those physical improvements. The platforms and all stayed; they weren't ripped up. It seems to me that there may have been some further legal proceeding to establish that SP did not have the right to go in and take this stuff down once the service stopped, so it stayed there. As far as I know, it's in use now by one of those commuter lines that's running in L.A.

PETERSHAGEN

As you said, it's an illustration of what Caltrans staff can do once it makes up its mind that it's going to do something.

GIANTURCO

People really got caught up in this, got interested in it, and it had so many kind of interesting sidelines like that thing with that guy in the men's room. I'll just never forget that. He had been on the lam. You know, we never could find him. We'd call his office. I'm not talking about me, but
whatever--these process server guys

[Laughter]

PETERSHAGEN How about the peninsula service? Have you
got a few minutes so we could discuss that?

GIANTURCO The L A service was done at the absolute
tail end of the administration The
peninsula service had kind of a different
history to it It was an existing service
I believe that service started, as I
remember, in 1898, something like that I
believe it was before 1900 It was one of
the early commute services There were many
of them in the United States, particularly, I
guess, on the east coast, but also in
California That service has been around for
a long time, but run by SP from the
beginning And it had been doing very poorly
for years SP had gone before the Interstate
Commerce Commission [ICC] I'm kind
of hazy on this We were intimately involved
in this for years It seems to me that they
went before the Interstate Commerce
Commission to try to drop the service There
was some kind of an ambiguous ruling there
that didn't allow them to drop it right away,
but it looked as though if some other events
ocurred, maybe there would be a second ruling that would allow them to drop it. I just don't remember. It seems to me also that we used that same lawyer, the one in Washington, D.C. He helped our legal division on this because our legal division—and they performed beautifully on this, the Caltrans Legal Division. They didn't know about this stuff either. The Caltrans Legal Division is used to dealing with torts and eminent domain and, you know, highway law of one kind or another, but they're smart people. If they want to learn something new they can and they did. But, anyway, we participated in these ICC hearings, as I recall, against their dropping the service.

Their point was that they were losing tremendous amounts of money, and there was no question about this. This was true. They were losing money. Of course, our argument on the other side, and it seems to me that we were the principal opponent of the SP request before the ICC. There may have been other people testifying, but we took the lead in opposing the dropping of the service, and this may be in the law, too. I've forgotten
how the ICC with these abandonment of rail service proceedings works. I think it may be that the state is assumed to be the party that would have the principal interest in appearing before the ICC. I'm not sure about that. But, in any event, this was an abandonment proceeding, and we were the principal party opposing it. The ICC proceedings went through several stages as I remember, and as I say, I think the way it was looking was it didn't look good. They hadn't actually allowed them to drop it, but by implication, they were losing so much money that it really didn't seem fair to make them keep running this thing.

By your statement, "It didn't look good," you mean it didn't look good from your point of view.

For passengers
From your point of view, for the commute service
Right, which was to maintain the service
That's right. So, at some point along here, we decided that the thing to do was to offer to take over the service, and we did. And it must have taken at least a year, maybe two
years, to work out the contract with SP I referred to this earlier on, which is my one meeting with Biaggini, the president then of SP. Gianturco is an Italian name, and so is Biaggini so when I met Biaggini for the first time, Biaggini thought I was the devil incarnate because of Amtrak and all that stuff, and SP was so against it. Just trying to make small talk to Biaggini, who is a very dour type, I mean very serious and unsmiling and so on, I said, "Mr. Biaggini, I notice you have an Italian name and so do I. What part of Italy is your family from?" At which point he drew himself up—as I remember, he's from Sardinia or some place like that—well, anyway, it's a big thing with him that he's not Italian [Laughter] I had said exactly the wrong thing.

It took us at least a year, maybe two years, to work out a contract with SP that provided for. I can talk about this for days, George, but since I don't have time, I'll just wrap it up by saying that the outcome of it was that SP continued to run the service, but they ran it under contract to us, and we took it over. We were then the
official sponsor, owner-operator, whatever, and they were just running it as an agent of Caltrans. We renamed it Caltrain. We changed the schedule. There had been a lot of problems with that service, and one of the principal ones is running it into downtown San Francisco, or having a better terminal point. I could talk also for hours about that, but I won't. I will just summarize by saying that had it not been for the actions of Caltrans in taking over that service, it would not exist anymore.

PETERSHAGEN: I don't think there's any argument with that at all. Well, I guess that concludes our time, so I'll just say thank you very much, and we'll end at this point.

[End Tape 13, Side B]
NAMES LIST

State Government Oral History Program

Interviewee_____________ Adriana Gianturco

List Compiler/Editor_____________ George Petershagen

Cooperating Institution_________ Oral History Program, Center for California Studies, California State University, Sacramento

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>SOURCE OF VERIFICATION</th>
<th>PAGE INTRODUCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valentine McGillycuddy Gianturco</td>
<td>Mother of Adriana Gianturco</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elio Gianturco</td>
<td>Father of Adriana Gianturco</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julia Morgan</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benito Mussolini</td>
<td>Italian Dictator</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuele Gianturco</td>
<td>Grandfather of Adriana Gianturco</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesare Gianturco</td>
<td>Uncle of Adriana Gianturco</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea Clinton</td>
<td>Daughter of President Bill Clinton</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Horowitz</td>
<td>Pianist</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty Friedan</td>
<td>Author/Advocate</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloria Steinem</td>
<td>Author/Advocate</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Role</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David L Wolper</td>
<td>Motion Picture Producer</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Bader Ginsburg</td>
<td>U S Supreme Court Justice</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund G Brown, Jr</td>
<td>Governor of California</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Mills</td>
<td>Friend of Gianturco Family</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Durrell</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Books In Print</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Marx</td>
<td>Philosopher/Economist</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Smith</td>
<td>Founder of Mormon Church</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty [Unknown] Reporter</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles de Gaulle</td>
<td>President of France</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herb Caen</td>
<td>Columnist</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon</td>
<td>President of United States</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F Kennedy</td>
<td>President of United States</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Saltonstall</td>
<td>Attorney/Husband of Adriana Gianturco</td>
<td>A Gianturco</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis W Sargent</td>
<td>Governor of Massachusetts</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Dukakis</td>
<td>Governor of Massachusetts</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale Champion</td>
<td>California Political figure</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund G Brown, Sr</td>
<td>Governor of California</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Position</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom O'Brien</td>
<td>Massachusetts Political figure</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Burns</td>
<td>Secretary of Business and Transportation, California</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
<td>President of United States</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sid McCausland</td>
<td>Acting Director, Caltrans</td>
<td>Caltrans Library Files</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard Ullrich</td>
<td>Director, Caltrans</td>
<td>Caltrans Library Files</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Best</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Caltrans</td>
<td>Caltrans Library Files</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverett Saltonstall</td>
<td>Member, United States Senate</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Deukmejian</td>
<td>Governor of California</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlotta Mellon</td>
<td>Appointments Secretary to Governor Jerry Brown</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Herringer</td>
<td>Director, BART</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose Bird</td>
<td>Secretary of Agriculture and Services</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Moe</td>
<td>Director, Caltrans</td>
<td>Caltrans Library Files</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Thomas Collins</td>
<td>Legislative Liaison to Governor Jerry Brown</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Poche</td>
<td>Legislative Liaison to Governor Jerry Brown</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Walter E Garrison</td>
<td>Director, Dept of Public Works, California</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Lee Kelly</td>
<td>Director, Dept of Public Works, California</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William (Bill) Jefferson</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carol Browner</td>
<td>Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, United States</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randolph Collier</td>
<td>Member, California State Senate</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerson Rhyner</td>
<td>Caltrans Legal Counsel</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James R Mills</td>
<td>Member, California State Senate</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zev Yaroslavsky</td>
<td>Member, Los Angeles City Council</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross Eckard</td>
<td>Member, California Transportation Board</td>
<td>Caltrans Library</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John D Ehrlichman</td>
<td>Member of President Richard Nixon's staff</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Buchanan</td>
<td>U S Presidential candidate</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D Eisenhower</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William E Leonard</td>
<td>California Highway Commission</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William R Leonard</td>
<td>Member, California State Assembly</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dianne Feinstein</td>
<td>Mayor of San Francisco</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Title</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pete Wilson</td>
<td>Governor of California/Mayor of San Diego</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen Reddy</td>
<td>Entertainer</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Hinderaker</td>
<td>California Transportation Commission</td>
<td>San Francisco Chronicle</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton Simon</td>
<td>California Transportation Commission</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Meyer</td>
<td>California Transportation Commission</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Press</td>
<td>Director, Office of Planning and Research</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Silberman</td>
<td>Secretary, Business and Transportation</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gene Cornelius</td>
<td>Caltrans</td>
<td>Caltrans Library Files</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Carpenter</td>
<td>Member, California State Senate</td>
<td>S F Chronicle</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Jerome Oziel</td>
<td>Psychiatrist</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menendez Brothers</td>
<td>Alleged Murderers Of Own Parents</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred E Alquist</td>
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